Finality over Flexibility: Sixth Circuit Bars Rule 60(b) Re-Litigation after an FTCA Judgment

Introduction

James King v. United States is the latest chapter in a decade-long fight over the limits of civil liability when federal officers injure private citizens. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a published opinion authored by Judge Rogers, refused to reopen a final Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) judgment so that the plaintiff could avoid the “judgment bar” and revive his companion Bivens constitutional claims. By labelling King’s request a mere “attorney error or strategic miscalculation,” the Court elevated the interest in finality over the equitable flexibility of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The decision cements three interconnected propositions:

  1. Where an FTCA judgment (even one that simultaneously defeats jurisdiction) is entered against a plaintiff, § 2676’s judgment bar stops any further suit against the individual officers on the same facts.
  2. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Brownback v. King (2021) clarified that such judgments are “on the merits,” a plaintiff cannot use Rule 60(b) to withdraw the original FTCA count and thereby escape the bar.
  3. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, attorney-driven litigation choices—even if rendered disastrous by unforeseen changes in law—are not “extraordinary circumstances” justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6).

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to reopen its 2017 judgment. King’s Rule 60(b) motion sought to delete the FTCA claim (which had triggered the judgment bar against his Bivens action after Brownback) and to proceed solely on the constitutional tort. The panel held:

  • King’s motion sounded in Rule 60(b)(1) (“mistake … or excusable neglect”) and was therefore time-barred by the one-year limit; even if treated as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, it was untimely and meritless.
  • McCurry ex rel. Turner v. Adventist Health Sys. (6th Cir. 2002) forecloses Rule 60 relief predicated on counsel’s litigation strategy.
  • The Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Brownback—even if unexpected—did not constitute the “extraordinary circumstances” required for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
  • Because these issues were dispositive, the Court declined to address whether modern limitations on Bivens theories would independently defeat King’s claims.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

a) 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (FTCA Judgment Bar). The statutory command that “any judgment in an action under section 1346(b)” bars suits against the same employee “by reason of the same subject matter” is the fulcrum of the case.

b) Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209 (2021). Unanimously reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that where a district court resolves an FTCA claim on any element (including ones that are also jurisdictional) the resulting judgment is “on the merits” and triggers the bar. Brownback distinguished dismissals under FTCA exceptions (§ 2680) but treated failures under § 1346(b) elements as merits rulings.

c) McCurry ex rel. Turner v. Adventist Health Sys., 298 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 2002). The cornerstone for denying Rule 60(b) relief arising from attorney misjudgment. It holds clauses (b)(1) and (b)(6) are mutually exclusive and that strategic errors are governed only by (b)(1).

d) Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trustees of UMWA Combined Benefit Fund, 249 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2001). Restates the “exceptional or extraordinary circumstances” prerequisite for Rule 60(b)(6) relief and that changes in decisional law are normally insufficient.

e) Simmons v. Himmelreich, 578 U.S. 621 (2016) / Himmelreich v. BOP, 766 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2014). Applied the judgment bar not to operate where the government was dismissed under a § 2680 exception. King argued these cases foretold victory; the Sixth Circuit disagreed, calling the language dicta for § 1346(b) dismissals.

2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Rule-Classification. The court classified King’s motion under Rule 60(b)(1) because it was grounded in his conscious choice to abandon the FTCA count—a “mistake” concerning litigation strategy.
  2. Timeliness. A (b)(1) motion must come within a year of judgment; King waited six. Even if re-labelled as (b)(6), the Court found six years “unreasonable.”
  3. Merits of Relief. Under McCurry, strategic decisions—even catastrophically bad ones—do not justify reopening. The Court adopted that logic wholesale, noting that King “simply gambled and lost.”
  4. Intervening Change in Law. Blue Diamond says shifts in law rarely suffice. The Court emphasised that Brownback overturned only the Sixth Circuit’s unique view; no “settled, universal rule” had existed such that King was blindsided.
  5. Policy of the Judgment Bar. Allowing plaintiffs a “second bite at the money-damages apple” would undermine Congress’s decision to make the FTCA an exclusive remedy once judgment is entered.

3. Impact

  • Locking the Courthouse Door after FTCA Losses. Plaintiffs who plead FTCA and Bivens claims together must contemplate that an adverse FTCA judgment—no matter the doctrinal label (jurisdictional or merits)—will almost certainly bar the constitutional claims.
  • Rule 60(b) Narrowed. Within the Sixth Circuit, counsel cannot rely on Rule 60(b) to correct high-stakes tactical choices. Other circuits (e.g., the Ninth in Henson v. Fidelity Nat’l Fin.) treat intervening-law situations more leniently; the split may attract Supreme Court attention.
  • Bivens Contraction Continues. Though the panel did not reach the point, dicta signalled that modern Supreme Court cases—Ziglar, Elhady, Egbert—would probably foreclose King’s claims anyway. The judgment thus accelerates the practical extinction of Bivens remedies in the Sixth Circuit.
  • Litigation Strategy Shift. Civil-rights plaintiffs against federal officers might now file FTCA and constitutional claims in separate suits or safeguard the FTCA count (e.g., voluntarily dismiss without prejudice) until Bivens issues are resolved.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • FTCA (§ 1346(b)) – Allows individuals to sue the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees, applying state tort principles.
  • FTCA Exceptions (§ 2680) – Carve-outs (e.g., discretionary-function) where the government keeps its sovereign immunity; dismissals under these do not trigger the judgment bar.
  • Judgment Bar (§ 2676) – Once a court enters any final judgment on an FTCA claim, the same claimant cannot sue the employees individually on the same facts.
  • Bivens Action – A judicially created cause of action allowing damages against federal officials for constitutional violations; courts now treat new contexts with extreme caution.
  • Rule 60(b) Relief – A mechanism to reopen final judgments in narrow circumstances; clause (b)(6) is a safety valve for “extraordinary” situations not covered by clauses (1)-(5).

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in King (III) is a forceful reaffirmation of judicial finality and of the FTCA’s judgment bar. By refusing to rescue James King from the unforeseen fallout of Brownback, the Court tells litigants that once they choose to litigate under the FTCA, the consequences—good or ill—are nearly irreversible. Although the decision preserves the efficiency of one-trial-only policy, it heightens the risk that victims of federal misconduct will receive no judicial remedy at all. Until Congress amends the FTCA or the Supreme Court clarifies Rule 60(b)’s equitable reach, plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit must tread carefully: a single strategic misstep can close the courthouse doors for good.