Fifth Circuit Reaffirms § 922(g)(1) Against As-Applied Bruen Challenges Where Predicate Felonies Are Violent, and Enforces the Rule of Orderliness

1. Introduction

United States v. Williamson is another installment in the Fifth Circuit’s post-New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen litigation over the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The defendant, Jaterron Williamson, was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and appealed on two constitutional grounds: (1) that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied to him under Bruen and the Fifth Circuit’s own framework in United States v. Diaz; and (2) that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

Procedurally, the Government sought summary affirmance. The panel indicated the appeal could be resolved without further briefing, yet declined to employ summary affirmance under Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, ultimately issuing a merits disposition that both (i) affirms the conviction under binding circuit precedent and (ii) highlights continuing doctrinal tensions—especially in Judge Willett’s concurrence—about the proper analytical route for as-applied Second Amendment challenges and the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The per curiam opinion rejects both of Williamson’s constitutional challenges. On the Second Amendment claim, the court holds that Williamson’s prior felonies— three convictions for “Deadly Conduct - Discharge Firearm at Individual”—are “closely analogous” to the predicate offense relied on in United States v. Reyes, which rejected an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) where the defendant’s criminal history included a deadly-conduct firearm discharge felony. Under the Fifth Circuit’s “rule of orderliness,” articulated in Jacobs v. Nat'l Drug Intelligence Ctr., one panel cannot overturn another panel’s decision absent an intervening change in law. Accordingly, Williamson’s as-applied challenge fails.

On the Commerce Clause argument, Williamson concedes the challenge is foreclosed by circuit precedent, and the court affirms on the authority of United States v. Alcantar.

Notably, the panel denies the Government’s motion for summary affirmance, while also denying the alternative request for an extension of time as unnecessary—signaling that although the outcome is straightforward under precedent, the court opted to resolve the case through an ordinary merits affirmance rather than the exceptional summary procedure described in Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Drive the Result)

• Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969)
  Used for the proposition that summary affirmance is a special procedural device, not automatically warranted even when an appeal can be resolved without further briefing. The panel’s denial underscores that a precedential merits disposition may be preferable where recurring constitutional questions benefit from a reasoned application of existing law.
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
  Provides the governing methodological backdrop: once a challenger shows the Second Amendment’s “plain text” covers the conduct, the government must justify regulation by reference to the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Williamson’s argument tracks a common post-Bruen move: insisting that only Founding-era analogues involving capital punishment or estate forfeiture can support disarmament.
• United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2822 (2025)
  Central Fifth Circuit authority post-Bruen. The per curiam opinion treats Diaz as part of the governing line of cases and rejects remand for “first-instance” application because intervening Fifth Circuit decisions already control Williamson’s fact pattern. The concurrence, however, stresses that Diaz articulated a more specific test—asking whether a predicate felony would have led to Founding-era capital punishment or estate forfeiture— and criticizes later cases for not consistently hewing to that formulation.
• United States v. Reyes, 141 F.4th 682 (5th Cir. 2025)
  The workhorse precedent for disposing of Williamson’s as-applied claim. The panel analogizes Williamson’s three “Deadly Conduct - Discharge Firearm at Individual” felonies to the deadly conduct firearm discharge felony in Reyes, treating Reyes as binding confirmation that § 922(g)(1) constitutionally applies to a defendant with such violent firearm-related predicate convictions.
• Jacobs v. Nat'l Drug Intelligence Ctr., 548 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2008)
  Supplies the “rule of orderliness”: later panels must follow earlier panel decisions unless there is an intervening change in law by statute, the Supreme Court, or the en banc court. This rule is outcome-determinative because Williamson’s arguments implicitly ask a panel to disapprove Reyes and related cases.
• United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2013)
  Forecloses Williamson’s Commerce Clause challenge under existing Fifth Circuit precedent sustaining § 922(g)(1) as a permissible exercise of Congress’s commerce power.
• United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 1 996) (per curiam) and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
  Mentioned in the concurrence to emphasize that the Fifth Circuit previously reaffirmed § 922(g)(1) against Commerce Clause attacks even after Lopez, which famously constrained Congress’s commerce power in the context of gun possession near schools.
• United States v. Bonner, 159 F.4th 3 3 8 (5th Cir. 2025) (Willett, J., concurring), United States v. Hembree, 165 F.4th 909 (5th Cir. 2026) (Willett, J., concurring), United States v. Wilson, 164 F.4th 380 (5th Cir. 2026) (Willett, J., concurring)
  These concurrences frame Judge Willett’s ongoing critique: that “mere possession” offenses sit uneasily within the original meaning of the Commerce Clause and that broad modern doctrine risks converting the commerce power into a general police power. They also illustrate that the panel’s affirmance in Williamson occurs against a background of active intra-circuit debate (albeit not one that a panel can resolve).
• United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
  Cited for interpretive method: original meaning is the “first and most important rule in constitutional interpretation.” The concurrence uses this to argue that enumerated powers questions should be assessed through original meaning, not only modern doctrinal accretions.
• Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
  These cases represent the Supreme Court’s expansive Commerce Clause framework. The concurrence acknowledges them but argues that even under Raich’s “three general categories of regulation,” “mere possession of a firearm” is a poor fit—casting doubt on § 922(g)(1)’s enumerated-powers basis.
• United States v. Contreras, 125 F.4th 725 (5th Cir. 2025), United States v. Bullock, 123 F.4th 183 (5th Cir. 2024) (per curiam), United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025)
  These decisions (as presented in the concurrence) illustrate divergence in how panels operationalize post-Bruen analysis for § 922(g)(1): some hew to an “analogous felony punished by death/forfeiture” approach (as Contreras reads Diaz), while others employ a broader “dangerousness” rationale (as in Bullock and, per the concurrence, Reyes and Kimble).
• Range v. Att'y Gen., 69 F.4th 9 6 (3d Cir. 2023) (Porter, J., concurring), Range v. Att'y Gen., 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc) (Hardiman, J.), Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting), Folajtar v. Att'y Gen., 980 F.3d 897 (3d Cir. 2020) (Bibas, J., dissenting), United States v. Jackson, 85 F.4th 468 (5th Cir. 2023) (Stras, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc), United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024) (Thapar, J.)
  These authorities are not controlling in Williamson, but they map a broader, national debate about whether Second Amendment rights turn on felony labels, dangerousness, or historical analogues of disarmament. Their inclusion in the concurrence signals that the Fifth Circuit’s doctrinal choices are part of an active cross-circuit conversation.
• Duncan v. Bonta, 83 F.4th 803 (9th Cir. 2023) (Bumatay, J., dissenting) and William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 125 (2d ed. 1829)
  Used to reinforce the textual premise that “possess[ion]” is within the Second Amendment’s “keep” concept, and to underscore an originalist caution that no clause should be read to give Congress a general power to disarm the people.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The as-applied Second Amendment challenge fails because precedent already resolves the relevant “historical analogue” question for violent firearm-related felonies.

Williamson framed his as-applied challenge in Diaz/Bruen terms: he argued that his prior felonies are not analogous to colonial-era offenses punishable by execution or estate forfeiture, and that the district court incorrectly thought pre-Bruen caselaw foreclosed the claim—thus warranting a remand to apply the correct framework.

The panel’s response is essentially twofold:

1. Factual analogy to United States v. Reyes: Williamson’s three convictions for “Deadly Conduct - Discharge Firearm at Individual” are “closely analogous” to the deadly conduct conviction that featured in Reyes. That analogy makes the merits outcome straightforward: under Reyes, § 922(g)(1) may be constitutionally applied to defendants with violent firearm-discharge histories.
2. Doctrinal closure via the rule of orderliness: even if Williamson believes Reyes and similar cases misapplied Bruen/Diaz, a panel cannot revisit them absent an intervening change in law. Jacobs v. Nat'l Drug Intelligence Ctr. supplies the controlling constraint.

In effect, the court declines to treat “district court used the wrong framework” as a reason for remand because, regardless of how the district court analyzed the question, binding appellate precedent supplies the correct answer given Williamson’s predicate felonies.

(b) The Commerce Clause challenge fails because it is conceded and foreclosed.

Williamson “correctly concedes” his Commerce Clause argument is foreclosed, and the court cites United States v. Alcantar to affirm. This is a conventional “foreclosed-by-precedent” disposition. The concurrence, however, uses the case to press an institutional point: even if the panel must follow precedent, the correctness of that precedent remains contestable.

(c) The concurrence identifies two doctrinal fault lines: enumerated powers and the proper post-Bruen test for as-applied challenges.

3.3. Impact

(1) Near-term litigation effect in the Fifth Circuit.

Williamson reinforces that, for defendants with violent firearm-discharge predicates, as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are unlikely to succeed under current Fifth Circuit precedent. The opinion also signals that remand requests premised on “the district court didn’t apply Bruen properly” may be denied where circuit law already supplies a dispositive answer on materially similar facts.

(2) Procedural signaling: reluctance to use summary affirmance for recurring constitutional questions.

By denying summary affirmance under Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis while still affirming swiftly, the panel indicates that even “easy” precedent-bound cases can warrant a conventional opinion—especially where the underlying issues (post-Bruen § 922(g)(1) challenges) continue to generate doctrinal disputes and require clear, citable applications.

(3) Medium- to long-term: a record of intra-circuit tension inviting en banc or Supreme Court resolution.

The concurrence’s candid critique deepens an already visible intra-circuit conversation. Two specific questions are positioned for future escalation:

• Whether § 922(g)(1)’s jurisdictional hook and “possession” focus fits within Commerce Clause limits (originally or even under modern doctrine).
• Whether the Fifth Circuit’s as-applied Bruen methodology should be anchored to Diaz’s “capital punishment/estate forfeiture for an analogous felony” formulation, a “dangerousness” tradition, or some synthesis.

Although Williamson does not change the governing rule, it strengthens the evidentiary and analytic “paper trail” that may support en banc reconsideration or Supreme Court review in an appropriate vehicle.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “As-applied” vs. “facial” Second Amendment challenges: A facial challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in all its applications; an as-applied challenge argues the law is unconstitutional when applied to a particular person given their specific circumstances (here, Williamson’s particular criminal history).
• Bruen’s “historical tradition” test: Courts ask whether modern gun regulations align with historical analogues—historical laws or practices that are relevantly similar in purpose and burden. The fight is often over what counts as a proper analogue and the level of generality at which history is read.
• “Analogous felony punishable by death or estate forfeiture”: This is a specific way of translating history into a test: if the Founding era treated certain serious felonies as punishable by death or forfeiture, that may be used to justify disarmament today. The concurrence notes this test is not consistently applied across later cases.
• “Dangerousness” rationale: Another way of reading history is that legislatures traditionally could disarm persons deemed dangerous. Under this approach, courts focus less on matching specific Founding-era felony categories and more on whether the defendant’s conduct shows dangerousness.
• “Rule of orderliness”: In the Fifth Circuit, one three-judge panel must follow prior panel decisions unless the Supreme Court, the en banc Fifth Circuit, or a statutory amendment changes the legal landscape. This institutional rule often decides cases where litigants argue precedent was wrongly decided.
• Commerce Clause / enumerated powers: Congress can legislate only using powers listed (“enumerated”) in the Constitution. The Commerce Clause is often invoked for federal criminal statutes. The concurrence argues that interpreting “commerce” to reach “mere possession” risks granting Congress a general police power the Constitution withholds.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Williamson is a precedent-application decision with outsized doctrinal significance. The per curiam opinion reaffirms that, under binding Fifth Circuit authority—especially United States v. Reyes and the rule of orderliness in Jacobs v. Nat'l Drug Intelligence Ctr.—a defendant with violent firearm-discharge felony predicates cannot succeed on an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). It also confirms that Commerce Clause challenges remain foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar.

At the same time, Judge Willett’s concurrence sharpens two unresolved questions: whether § 922(g)(1) is soundly grounded in Congress’s enumerated powers and whether the Fifth Circuit’s post-Bruen as-applied methodology should adhere to United States v. Diaz’s “analogous felony punished by death/forfeiture” test or a broader “dangerousness” tradition. The case thus both stabilizes outcomes for violent-predicate defendants under current precedent and highlights the analytical clarity that future en banc or Supreme Court review may need to supply.