Fifth Circuit: MVRA Misapplication on Plain-Error Review Won’t Be Corrected Absent Fourth-Prong Harm; Restitution May Include Future Psychological Care

I. Introduction

In United States v. Padilla (5th Cir. Sept. 1, 2026), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a restitution order entered after Luis Enrique Padilla, the former chief of the Sunset Police Department in Sunset, Louisiana, pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor deprivation of rights under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242.

The underlying conduct arose during a December 2023 hit-and-run investigation, when Padilla handcuffed R.A. (who did not match the suspect’s description), verbally berated him, and—while R.A. remained handcuffed—forcefully twisted R.A.’s thumb and wrist, causing injury and later psychological distress. The district court imposed probation and later ordered restitution for therapy, concluding the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, applied because Padilla’s conviction was a “crime of violence.”

On appeal, Padilla raised two core issues: (1) whether the district court plainly erred in applying the MVRA to his misdemeanor § 242 conviction; and (2) whether restitution for future psychological care was lawful and adequately supported by the evidence.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the restitution order. Although Padilla relied on United States v. Williams, which stated that a misdemeanor § 242 violation “is not a crime of violence,” the court held that Padilla failed to satisfy the fourth prong of plain-error review because the record showed the restitution award was fair and could have been imposed even if the MVRA did not apply (via discretionary restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A)).

The court also rejected Padilla’s challenges to therapy restitution: it reiterated that the MVRA permits restitution for future psychological care (citing United States v. Serrata), and it deferred to the district court’s credibility findings regarding the psychologist’s testimony that R.A. suffered PTSD caused by Padilla’s use of force and both needed and wanted treatment.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• United States v. Borino and Johnson v. United States: The court applied the familiar four-part framework for unpreserved error (plain-error review), quoting Johnson’s articulation of prongs one through three.
• United States v. Mahmood, United States v. Klein, and United States v. Barnes: These cases supplied the standards of review for restitution—de novo as to legality, abuse of discretion as to amount, and clear error for factual findings.
• United States v. Williams: Padilla’s principal authority on the MVRA trigger. Williams stated that a misdemeanor § 242 offense “is not a crime of violence.” The panel did not definitively resolve whether Williams controlled the MVRA question here; instead, it assumed arguendo that Padilla could satisfy the first three plain-error prongs and focused on the fourth.
• United States v. Olano and United States v. Atkinson: The court emphasized the discretionary nature of prong four: correction is reserved for errors that “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation” of judicial proceedings.
• United States v. Vonn: Cited for the proposition that the defendant bears the burden to persuade the appellate court to exercise discretion under prong four.
• United States v. Hankton: Padilla argued Hankton supported prong-four relief for MVRA misapplication. The court distinguished Hankton as a case involving a conceded error, significant joint-and-several liability ($1.6 million), and a risk of “compounding” the error by leaving one co-defendant potentially liable for the full amount. The court also stressed that prong four is case-specific.
• Puckett v. United States: Reinforced that prong four is “case-specific and fact-intensive,” limiting the value of categorical arguments based solely on statutory noncompliance.
• United States v. Brown and United States v. Escalante-Reyes: Used to underscore that plain-error relief is not automatic and should be rare, particularly in sentencing/punishment contexts where the record can show fairness.
• United States v. Serrata: Directly addressed the merits of therapy restitution, holding the MVRA permits restitution for “future psychological care.” The panel declined to depart from Serrata.
• United States v. Bass and United States v. Garza: Supported deference to credibility determinations and factual findings; absent clear error, the appellate court will not second-guess the district court’s assessment of expert testimony.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Plain-error focus on prong four, not merely statutory mismatch. The opinion’s central move is methodological: even if applying the MVRA was error (given Williams) and even if the error were plain and affected substantial rights, the panel would still decline relief because Padilla did not show the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of proceedings. The court rejected Padilla’s contention that “fundamentally” requiring statutory compliance is enough to satisfy prong four, reasoning that such a rule would effectively make reversal automatic for any statutory error—contrary to Fifth Circuit precedent and the Supreme Court’s discretionary prong-four framework.
2. Discretionary restitution under § 3663 as a key “fairness” anchor. A decisive factual and legal feature was Padilla’s concession that restitution could have been imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) even if the MVRA did not apply. The panel treated that alternative authority, combined with the evidentiary record, as undermining any claim that the order was unfair or illegitimate in the prong-four sense.
3. Evidentiary support and the district court’s credibility findings. The district court credited a psychologist’s testimony that R.A. suffered PTSD caused by Padilla’s force and needed and wanted treatment. The Fifth Circuit emphasized its deference to credibility choices and factual findings absent clear error, and it found none.
4. Future psychological care is compensable restitution. On the merits, the panel treated United States v. Serrata as settled Fifth Circuit guidance that the MVRA permits restitution for future therapy. The court therefore rejected Padilla’s argument that restitution must be limited to past or already-incurred expenses.

C. Impact

• Raises the bar for unpreserved MVRA-trigger challenges. The opinion signals that, in the Fifth Circuit, defendants who fail to object to MVRA applicability in the district court may have difficulty obtaining reversal even where a plausible statutory/categorical argument exists (e.g., whether an offense is a “crime of violence”). The practical question becomes not only “Was it error?” but “Why is the restitution order unfair in a prong-four sense given the record and other restitution authority?”
• Distinguishes Hankton and narrows categorical reliance on MVRA misapplication. By emphasizing Hankton’s unique posture (government concession; joint-and-several risk; compounding error), the court limits defendants’ ability to cite Hankton as a general rule that MVRA errors automatically satisfy prong four.
• Confirms therapy-forward restitution as a remedial tool. The reaffirmation of Serrata supports restitution awards that fund future psychological treatment when supported by credible expert testimony, which can be especially salient in civil-rights prosecutions where psychological harm may be a primary consequence.
• Encourages timely objections. The decision reinforces a strategic lesson: MVRA applicability disputes should be raised in the district court. Failure to do so may shift the appellate battleground from statutory interpretation to the harder, discretionary terrain of prong four.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

MVRA vs. discretionary restitution

The MVRA (18 U.S.C. § 3663A) requires restitution for certain offenses (including qualifying “crimes of violence”). By contrast, 18 U.S.C. § 3663 generally allows (but does not require) restitution in many cases. Here, the court stressed that even if MVRA did not apply, the judge still had power to order restitution under § 3663.

“Crime of violence” (MVRA trigger)

The MVRA applies when the conviction is a “crime of violence, as defined in section 16.” Whether a misdemeanor § 242 conviction qualifies can be disputed. Padilla relied on United States v. Williams for the proposition it does not.

Plain-error review (the four prongs)

If an issue was not preserved in the trial court, an appellate court typically requires: (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Prong four is discretionary and highly fact-dependent.

Future psychological care as “loss”

Restitution can include the cost of treatment that has not yet occurred if evidence shows it is needed and is tied to the defendant’s conduct. The Fifth Circuit treated this as already settled by United States v. Serrata.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Padilla is most significant for its approach to plain-error challenges to MVRA restitution: even assuming the MVRA was mistakenly applied, the Fifth Circuit refused to grant relief where the defendant failed to show prong-four unfairness—particularly because the record supported the therapy award and the district court could have ordered restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663 anyway. The decision also reinforces that restitution may lawfully cover future psychological care when supported by credible evidence.