Fifth Amendment “Reasonableness” Limits Rule 4(k)(2) Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants in Helms‑Burton Trafficking Suits

I. Introduction

This appeal arises under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (the “Helms‑Burton Act”), which creates a private damages action against any person who “traffics” in property confiscated by the Cuban government after January 1, 1959, to which a U.S. national holds a claim. The plaintiffs—U.S. nationals and heirs/descendants of Ramón Rodriguez Gutiérrez—alleged that their family’s Havana cigarette-factory property, confiscated in 1961, was trafficked in by a network of companies associated with Cuban cigar production and marketing.

As relevant on appeal, the plaintiffs sought to hale two foreign defendants into federal court in Florida: (1) Imperial Brands, PLC (U.K.), which indirectly held an interest in Habanos via acquisition of Altadis, and (2) WPP, PLC (a British holding company incorporated in Jersey), alleged to have provided marketing services through U.S. advertising subsidiaries. The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. After briefing, the Supreme Court decided Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 606 U.S. 1 (2025), which reshaped the Fifth Amendment personal-jurisdiction framework. The Eleventh Circuit applied Fuld to evaluate jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

Core issues: (a) whether Helms‑Burton “authorizes” personal jurisdiction such that Rule 4(k)(1)(C) applies; (b) if not, whether Rule 4(k)(2) permits jurisdiction over foreign defendants consistent with the Fifth Amendment after Fuld; and (c) whether jurisdiction is “reasonable” given the defendants’ ties (or lack thereof) to the United States.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. It held:

• No Rule 4(k)(1)(C) jurisdiction: The Helms‑Burton Act does not expressly authorize personal jurisdiction or nationwide service of process; the court declined to infer such authorization.
• Rule 4(k)(2) governed, but Fifth Amendment controls: Because Rule 4(k)(2) applies to federal claims against defendants not subject to any one state’s general jurisdiction, the relevant constitutional limitation is the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted by Fuld.
• Fuld implies a Fifth Amendment “reasonableness” test rather than “minimum contacts”: The court adopted the three-factor “reasonableness” inquiry discussed in Fuld (drawn from Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102 (1987)).
• Unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over WPP and Imperial: Plaintiffs’ interest favored jurisdiction, but the United States’ forum interest was more attenuated than in Fuld, and the burden on both foreign defendants was severe due to weak U.S. connections, lack of “clear notice,” and significant practical and legal burdens (including U.K. blocking measures).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1. The Fifth vs. Fourteenth Amendment Pivot: Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 606 U.S. 1 (2025)

Fuld is the opinion’s keystone. The Eleventh Circuit read it to do two things:

• Abrogate circuit law equating Fifth- and Fourteenth-Amendment personal-jurisdiction tests: The court noted prior Eleventh Circuit cases (e.g., Herederos De Roberto Gomez Cabrera, LLC v. Teck Res. Ltd., 43 F.4th 1303 (11th Cir. 2022)) had treated the standards as the same—an approach Fuld rejected.
• Replace “minimum contacts” with a more flexible Fifth Amendment inquiry: The panel emphasized Fuld’s core holding that the Fifth Amendment “does not incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts standard,” and its suggestion that an “inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular case” may be required.

The court treated Fuld not as limited to Rule 4(k)(1)(C) but as applying equally to Rule 4(k)(2), because both invoke Fifth Amendment constraints on federal assertions of jurisdiction.

2. The Fourteenth Amendment Baseline (for Contrast): International Shoe, Ford, Bristol-Myers, Daimler

Although Fuld decouples Fifth from Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, the opinion still canvassed canonical Fourteenth Amendment cases to explain what no longer governs:

• Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (minimum contacts; “fair play and substantial justice”).
• Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351 (2021) (general vs. specific jurisdiction framing).
• Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255 (2017) and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (limits on specific/general jurisdiction).

These cases functioned as doctrinal scaffolding: they explain the “minimum contacts” approach that governed Eleventh Circuit Fifth Amendment cases before Fuld, and thereby highlight what changed.

3. Service-of-Process and Statutory Authorization: Omni Cap. Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987)

To reject plaintiffs’ late-breaking Rule 4(k)(1)(C) theory, the court leaned on Omni Capital’s insistence that Congress knows how to authorize nationwide service of process and that courts should not lightly infer it. Plaintiffs relied on Helms‑Burton “findings” language (e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 6081(10)) as implied authorization; the court found this insufficient under Omni Capital.

4. Rule 4(k)(2) History and Prior Circuit Approach: Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2000), Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009)

The court acknowledged Rule 4(k)(2)’s characterization as a “national long-arm statute” in Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc. (later abrogated on other grounds by Fuld). Defendants invoked Advisory Committee Notes referenced in Oldfield to argue Rule 4(k)(2) embeds a “contacts” requirement. The panel rejected that argument on textual grounds: Rule 4(k)(2)(B) requires consistency with the Constitution, not a particular pre-Fuld doctrinal formula.

5. Website/Internet Contacts (Pre-Fuld backdrop): Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842 (11th Cir. 2010)

The magistrate judge had relied on Fraser for the proposition that a generally accessible website is not, by itself, enough for jurisdiction. While the Eleventh Circuit did not ultimately decide the appeal on Fourteenth Amendment “minimum contacts,” Fraser remains important context: it shows why plaintiffs’ earlier jurisdiction theory (U.S.-visible web marketing) was weak even before Fuld, and why the case’s post-Fuld “reasonableness” analysis still confronted thin U.S.-directed conduct.

6. Corporate Separateness / Attribution of Subsidiary Conduct: Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2002) and Herederos De Roberto Gomez Cabrera, LLC v. Teck Res. Ltd., 43 F.4th 1303 (11th Cir. 2022)

Because plaintiffs attempted to leverage alleged U.S. conduct by WPP’s subsidiaries (Y&R and BCW) to support jurisdiction over WPP (and then to reach Imperial), the court applied “hornbook” corporate separateness:

• Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd. illustrates the “extreme” alter-ego scenario allowing imputation—wholly owned subsidiaries acting exclusively for parent, intermingled finances, parent providing day-to-day services.
• Herederos De Roberto Gomez Cabrera, LLC exemplifies the opposite—observing corporate formalities (separate boards, books, taxes) defeats alter-ego attribution; overlapping officers and consolidated financial statements are not enough.

The panel found the allegations closer to Herederos than Meier, rejecting imputation and thereby weakening any claim that WPP itself had meaningful U.S. ties.

7. The “Reasonableness” Factors Source: Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102 (1987)

Although an older Fourteenth Amendment case, Asahi supplies the specific multi-factor “reasonableness” framework that Fuld quoted and that the Eleventh Circuit adopted: (1) burden on the defendant, (2) forum’s interest, and (3) plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief.

8. Additional framing precedents

• Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 580 U.S. 82 (2017) (personal jurisdiction as “power over the parties”).
• Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (due process source; jurisdiction required before judicial power).
• J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (sovereignty language quoted in Fuld).
• Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (quoted in Fuld for “meaningful contacts, ties, [and] relations”).
• Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., 57 F.4th 916 (11th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (Helms‑Burton background).
• Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Marin, 982 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2020) (one of the prior Fifth=Fourteenth decisions implicitly displaced by Fuld).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Two-step jurisdiction architecture: service authorization + due process

The opinion insists on a clean sequencing: (1) some statute or Rule must authorize service that can establish jurisdiction (citing Omni Capital), and (2) the resulting exercise must satisfy due process (citing Ins. Corp. of Ireland). This method matters because Helms‑Burton creates a cause of action but does not necessarily create personal jurisdiction over every foreign defendant worldwide.

2. No implied jurisdictional authorization in Helms‑Burton (Rule 4(k)(1)(C) fails)

The plaintiffs attempted to pivot to Rule 4(k)(1)(C) by pointing to Helms‑Burton’s findings about protecting U.S. nationals and providing remedies. The court treated this as precisely the type of “implied authorization” Omni Capital discourages. The upshot is a practical rule: a federal cause of action (even one with strong policy findings) does not itself supply nationwide personal jurisdiction absent a clear congressional service/jurisdiction provision.

3. Rule 4(k)(2) remains available, but the Constitution is now Fuld’s Fifth Amendment

Because defendants did not contest Rule 4(k)(2)(A) (not subject to general jurisdiction in any one state), the case turned entirely on Rule 4(k)(2)(B): whether jurisdiction is “consistent with the United States Constitution.” After Fuld, the Eleventh Circuit rejected importing a “minimum contacts with the United States” requirement as a constitutional proxy. Instead, it treated Fuld as authorizing (and strongly nudging toward) a “reasonableness” inquiry aimed at fairness to the defendant, free of interstate-federalism concerns that animate the Fourteenth Amendment.

4. Adoption and application of the three-factor “reasonableness” test

The panel operationalized Fuld by applying the three factors the Supreme Court listed (from Asahi):

• (3) Plaintiffs’ interest in relief: Weighed for jurisdiction because Helms‑Burton claims are available to U.S. nationals, and U.S. courts are effectively the only forum.
• (2) Forum’s (United States’) interest: Present but “more attenuated” than in Fuld. The court contrasted PSJVTA’s tight tailoring (targeted predicates; only PLO/PA) with Helms‑Burton’s breadth (applies to “any person” trafficking, regardless of U.S. nexus). This reduced the weight of U.S. interests on these facts.
• (1) Burden on defendant: Decisive against jurisdiction for both WPP and Imperial. The court emphasized severe litigation burdens (foreign defendants dragged to Florida), lack of clear statutory notice (no PSJVTA-style predicates), lack of meaningful U.S.-related conduct by the defendants themselves, and lack of significant U.S. presence.

5. Refusal to attribute subsidiaries’ U.S. conduct to foreign parent (absent alter ego)

A key doctrinal move is the court’s insistence that even in a post-Fuld world, corporate separateness remains the default: subsidiary contacts are not imputed to the parent without plausible alter-ego allegations. By concluding this case resembled Herederos rather than Meier, the court prevented plaintiffs from bootstrapping U.S. marketing activity of Y&R/BCW into jurisdiction over WPP—and then into jurisdiction over Imperial via agency/joint-venture theories.

6. Role of “clear notice” in the Fifth Amendment fairness inquiry

Although “notice” is not expressed as a standalone factor in the Asahi/Fuld list, the court treated it as central to assessing burden and fundamental fairness. The PSJVTA’s defining features in Fuld—named entities and explicit jurisdiction-triggering conduct—provided predictable exposure to U.S. courts. Helms‑Burton’s broad trafficking definition (including “profits from” trafficking) did not similarly alert a foreign marketing holding company or a foreign tobacco conglomerate that indirect, offshore conduct could result in U.S. personal jurisdiction.

7. International comity and foreign blocking measures (as part of “burden”)

The opinion considered U.K. legal restrictions (blocking regulations) as an aggravating factor making U.S. litigation more burdensome for U.K.-incorporated companies. This reflects a practical, transnational dimension of “reasonableness”: even if substantive U.S. law applies, forcing litigation where foreign law constrains defense strategy or compliance can heighten unfairness.

C. Impact

1. Immediate doctrinal effect in the Eleventh Circuit: Rule 4(k)(2) is no longer “minimum contacts by another name”

The most significant development is methodological: the court treats Fifth Amendment personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) as governed by case-specific “reasonableness”, not a formal “minimum contacts with the nation” test. While the court acknowledges Fuld did not “delineate outer bounds,” it nonetheless implements Fuld in a way that will guide district courts: litigants should expect a fairness-focused balancing, not a contacts checklist.

2. Helms‑Burton defendants with weak U.S. ties gain a potent jurisdictional defense

For Helms‑Burton Title III suits—often aimed at foreign entities with offshore commercial activity—this decision supplies a roadmap to defeat jurisdiction where:

• the statute lacks explicit jurisdictional predicates (unlike PSJVTA),
• the alleged trafficking is not meaningfully connected to the United States,
• the defendant lacks U.S. presence, and
• plaintiffs rely on subsidiary conduct without strong alter-ego facts.

3. Plaintiffs’ strategic implications: pleading and discovery priorities shift

Post-Rodriguez, plaintiffs seeking Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdiction in the Eleventh Circuit will likely need to plead and develop:

• U.S.-linked conduct by the foreign defendant itself (not merely by affiliates),
• facts supporting veil-piercing/alter-ego if relying on a subsidiary’s U.S. conduct,
• evidence undermining burden (e.g., meaningful U.S. operations, prior U.S. litigation history, or express contractual forum expectations), and
• a stronger forum-interest showing (for example, U.S.-directed exploitation, U.S. financial channels, or U.S.-based decision-making tied to the alleged trafficking).

4. Congressional signal: if nationwide jurisdiction is desired, it must be stated

By invoking Omni Capital to reject implied authorization, the opinion underscores a separation-of-powers message: if Congress wants Title III to reach foreign defendants broadly in U.S. courts, it should enact explicit service-of-process and jurisdictional provisions akin to the PSJVTA’s structure.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Personal jurisdiction”

Personal jurisdiction is a court’s lawful authority over a defendant. Without it, the court cannot bind the defendant with its judgment, regardless of the merits of the claim.

2. Rule 4(k)(1)(C) vs. Rule 4(k)(2)

• Rule 4(k)(1)(C): Jurisdiction exists when a federal statute authorizes it (often through nationwide service of process).
• Rule 4(k)(2): A “gap-filler” for federal claims against a defendant not subject to general jurisdiction in any one state—so long as exercising jurisdiction is constitutional.

3. Fourteenth vs. Fifth Amendment due process in jurisdiction

• Fourteenth Amendment (state courts): traditionally requires “minimum contacts” with the state (International Shoe framework), influenced partly by interstate federalism.
• Fifth Amendment (federal courts): after Fuld, not bound to the “minimum contacts” formula; the focus is more directly on fairness/reasonableness to the defendant in light of national sovereign authority.

4. “Reasonableness” factors (from Fuld/Asahi)

Courts balance: (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum’s interest in hearing the case, and (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief. No single factor is always dispositive, but in Rodriguez the burden factor dominated.

5. “Alter ego” and why it matters

A parent company is generally not treated as legally identical to its subsidiary. To treat them as one for jurisdiction, a plaintiff must plausibly show the subsidiary is essentially a shell or instrumentality of the parent (e.g., pervasive control, failure to observe corporate formalities, commingled finances). The court found the pleadings insufficient to do that here.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision operationalizes Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization in the Rule 4(k)(2) context by applying a Fifth Amendment “reasonableness” test rather than a Fourteenth Amendment “minimum contacts” framework. It further holds that Helms‑Burton does not impliedly authorize personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(1)(C), reinforcing Omni Cap. Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.’s demand for clear congressional authorization.

The key takeaway is practical and doctrinal: in Helms‑Burton Title III cases against foreign companies with minimal U.S. presence and no meaningful U.S.-linked conduct by the defendants themselves, Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdiction may fail as “unreasonable” under the Fifth Amendment—especially where plaintiffs rely on subsidiary activity without strong alter-ego allegations.