Fifteen Months in Foster Care and Proven Parental Unfitness Permit Termination Under Wyoming Law

Introduction

In this parental-rights termination appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Skylar Colten Remer’s parental rights to BEP. The case arose after BEP entered state custody at approximately five weeks old because of concerns about inadequate feeding, inappropriate medication, low weight, and his mother’s ability to care for him.

Father’s paternity was established in May 2023. The Wyoming Department of Family Services then attempted to help him develop a relationship with BEP and acquire the stability and parenting skills necessary for placement. Those efforts included counseling referrals, supervised and community visitation, parenting coaching, transportation assistance, home assessments, case planning, and invitations to participate in BEP’s medical care.

The Department petitioned to terminate Father’s rights in May 2025. Father did not timely answer, and default was entered against him. At the termination hearing, he could cross-examine witnesses but could not present evidence. The district court terminated his rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (v). The dispositive appellate question was whether sufficient clear and convincing evidence supported termination.

Rule Established

Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v), parental rights may be terminated when clear and convincing evidence establishes that:

1. The child has been in foster care under Wyoming’s responsibility for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months; and
2. The parent is currently unfit to have custody and control of the child.

Reasonable reunification efforts are not an additional element under this subsection. Current fitness is assessed at the time of trial, but the court may rely on a parent’s unresolved conduct and conditions over time. When default has been entered, the petition’s factual allegations are deemed admitted; those admissions, together with corroborating testimony, may support a finding of unfitness.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed on § 14-2-309(a)(v) alone. Because Wyoming’s statutory grounds for termination are independent, the Court did not decide whether termination was also proper under § 14-2-309(a)(iii).

Father did not dispute that BEP had spent more than fifteen of the preceding twenty-two months in foster care. The appeal therefore centered on parental fitness. The Court concluded that the record showed:

• Father had never demonstrated an ability to provide BEP’s basic daily care;
• He had not consistently attended visitation or medical appointments;
• He sometimes slept during supervised visits and allowed others to care for BEP;
• He had not meaningfully improved his parenting skills despite coaching;
• He engaged only minimally in recommended mental-health and family counseling;
• His housing, finances, and transportation remained unstable;
• He had not formed or maintained a sufficiently nurturing relationship with BEP; and
• He had not shown that he could meet BEP’s behavioral, emotional, and therapeutic needs.

These facts appeared in the unanswered petition and were substantially confirmed by the Department’s caseworker. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Department, they amounted to clear and convincing evidence of current unfitness.

Analysis

1. Governing standard and strict scrutiny

Termination implicates the fundamental liberty interest in family association. Wyoming therefore subjects termination statutes to strict scrutiny and requires proof by clear and convincing evidence—evidence making the asserted facts highly probable.

On a sufficiency challenge, however, the appellate court does not retry the case. It accepts the prevailing party’s favorable evidence as true, draws favorable inferences from it, and discounts conflicting evidence from the unsuccessful party. This combination preserves the heightened burden of proof while respecting the district court’s fact-finding role.

2. Section 14-2-309(a)(v) provides an independent ground

The Court emphasized that each statutory ground for termination is separate and independent. Once the Department proved the foster-care period and unfitness under subsection (v), there was no need to review subsection (iii).

The foster-care component was described as a “mathematical question.” BEP had remained in the Department’s custody since December 2022, easily satisfying the fifteen-of-twenty-two-month requirement when the petition was filed in May 2025.

3. Meaning of parental unfitness

Although “unfit” is not statutorily defined, Wyoming precedent treats fitness as the ability to meet the child’s continuing physical, mental, and emotional needs and to maintain a positive, nurturing parent-child relationship. The inquiry is individualized: the court considers the specific parent, the specific child, and the child’s particular needs.

Unfitness ordinarily is not established by one isolated mistake. It is generally demonstrated by a pattern of incidents and conditions, including unstable housing, deficient parenting skills, lack of contact or bonding, failure to engage in treatment, and inability to assist a child with significant emotional or behavioral needs.

4. Present fitness may be evaluated through past conduct

Fitness must exist at the time of trial, but the court need not disregard the past. Longstanding conduct is particularly probative when the conditions remain unresolved. Here, the concerns identified by the juvenile court, the Department, the case plan, and service providers had not been adequately addressed by the termination hearing.

Father argued that the caseworker did not know his exact housing situation at trial. The Court rejected that argument because:

1. There was no admissible evidence that Father had obtained stable and appropriate housing;
2. Even recent housing improvement would not necessarily overcome a prolonged history of instability; and
3. The finding of unfitness rested on numerous conditions, not housing alone.

Father’s counsel stated in opening that he was living in a motel while looking for housing suitable for BEP. The Court recognized that opening statements are not evidence and referred to the statement only in connection with counsel’s duty of candor.

5. Effect of Father’s default

Father never moved to set aside the default entered after he failed to answer the petition. Under Peak v. Peak, the petition’s factual allegations were therefore deemed true. Those allegations included his failure to provide daily care, attend appointments, maintain stability, engage consistently in services, develop parenting skills, and meet BEP’s heightened needs.

The decision is not best read as holding that default alone automatically terminates parental rights. The district court conducted a two-day hearing, and the Department’s caseworker gave testimony confirming and contextualizing the admitted allegations. Thus, the clear-and-convincing determination rested on both the procedural admissions and evidentiary support.

6. Reunification efforts were not a statutory element

The Court reiterated that § 14-2-309(a)(v) does not require proof that the Department made reasonable reunification efforts. Nevertheless, the record showed extensive services and assistance. This evidence was relevant because it demonstrated both the opportunities available to Father and his limited progress, even though reasonable efforts were not an independent element.

7. Parent’s rights and the child’s need for permanency

BEP had lived in foster care since five weeks of age and was thriving in a stable environment. He had never lived with Father. The Court repeated the principle that when parental rights and a child’s rights are on a collision course, the child’s right to stability and permanency must prevail.

Precedents Cited

Complex Concepts Simplified

Clear and convincing evidence

Proof showing that a factual conclusion is highly probable. It is more demanding than the ordinary civil standard but less demanding than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Strict scrutiny

A demanding level of judicial review used because parental rights are fundamental. Termination statutes must be applied carefully and supported by heightened proof.

Default

A procedural consequence of failing to answer a petition. Here, default caused the petition’s factual allegations to be treated as admitted and prevented Father from presenting evidence.

Sufficiency of the evidence

The question is whether the record legally supports the judgment, not whether the appellate judges would have reached the same factual conclusions independently.

Current unfitness

The parent must be unfit at trial, but the court may use prior conduct to determine whether longstanding problems remain unresolved.

Independent statutory grounds

Each ground in § 14-2-309 may separately justify termination. Proof of one ground makes appellate review of the others unnecessary.

Reasonable reunification efforts

Services intended to reunite a family. Under subsection (v), such efforts are not an element the Department must prove, although the Department made extensive efforts here.

Potential Impact

• Subsection (v) remains a focused statutory route: The Department need prove only the required foster-care period and current parental unfitness.
• Long-term patterns carry substantial weight: Parents cannot defeat termination merely by pointing to uncertainty about one condition at trial when a broader pattern remains unresolved.
• A child’s specialized needs matter: Fitness is measured against the actual child’s physical, emotional, and therapeutic requirements, not an abstract minimum level of parenting.
• Default has severe consequences: A parent who fails to answer and does not seek relief from default may lose the ability to contest allegations through affirmative evidence.
• Agency documentation remains important: Even when allegations are admitted, testimony and records confirming service referrals, missed visits, instability, and unmet goals strengthen the clear-and-convincing showing.

The opinion does not decide whether an uncorroborated default, standing alone, would always satisfy the constitutional and evidentiary requirements for termination. Its holding is tied to a record containing both admitted allegations and confirming testimony.

Conclusion

In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: BEP confirms that § 14-2-309(a)(v) authorizes termination when a child has spent the required period in foster care and clear and convincing evidence shows that the parent remains unable to meet the child’s needs. Fitness is judged at trial, but courts may rely on an unresolved history of instability, inadequate engagement, deficient parenting, and inability to care for a child with heightened needs.

Because BEP had been in foster care for well beyond fifteen of twenty-two months and Father remained unable to provide stable, safe, and nurturing care, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed termination. The decision underscores that the child’s right to permanency ultimately prevails when a parent has not achieved the capacity necessary for reunification.