Felon-in-Possession Challenges in the Eleventh Circuit: § 922(g)(1) Remains Constitutional After Bruen and Rahimi Under Binding Prior-Panel Precedent

1. Introduction

United States v. Eibe Scott (11th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026) is a non-published, per curiam decision on the Eleventh Circuit’s Non-Argument Calendar affirming a felon-in-possession conviction by summary disposition. The appellant, Eibe Scott (pro se), challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—the federal prohibition on firearm and ammunition possession by individuals convicted of crimes punishable by more than one year—arguing the statute violates the Second Amendment as applied to him.

The central issues were:

  • Whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to Scott in light of modern Second Amendment doctrine.
  • Whether the Eleventh Circuit could revisit its prior decisions upholding § 922(g)(1), particularly in light of Scott’s contention that United States v. Dubois (Dubois II) was wrongly decided.
  • Whether summary affirmance was appropriate.

The Government moved for summary affirmance, contending the appeal was foreclosed by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit granted summary affirmance and affirmed Scott’s convictions. The panel held that Scott’s Second Amendment challenge—explicitly including his as-applied theory—was foreclosed by the Eleventh Circuit’s prior decision in United States v. Rozier, and that United States v. Dubois (Dubois II) reaffirmed Rozier after the Supreme Court’s decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi.

Because a prior panel’s holding binds later panels absent en banc or Supreme Court abrogation, and because no such abrogation occurred, the Government’s position was “clearly right as a matter of law,” justifying summary affirmance under Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Procedural tools and standards of review

  • Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969): The court relied on Groendyke for the standard governing summary disposition—appropriate where one party’s legal position is clearly correct or where the appeal is frivolous. Here, controlling precedent made the outcome effectively predetermined.
  • United States v. Ostrander, 114 F.4th 1348 (11th Cir. 2024): Cited for the proposition that constitutional challenges to statutes are reviewed de novo. Even under fresh review, however, the panel emphasized it remained bound by controlling circuit precedent on the Second Amendment question.

As-applied challenges and the need for a factual record

  • Schultz v. Alabama, 42 F.4th 1298 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2009)): These cases were used to articulate the nature of an as-applied challenge—one that depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the party and therefore “necessarily requires the development of a factual record.” In Scott’s case, this discussion underscores an important tension: Scott framed his challenge as as-applied, but the panel resolved the appeal without fact-intensive inquiry because Rozier treats felon status as categorically disqualifying for Second Amendment purposes (at least in this circuit’s binding precedent).

Second Amendment framework and felon disarmament

  • D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): The opinion relied on Heller for two foundational propositions: (1) the Second Amendment protects an individual right, but (2) the right is “not unlimited,” and nothing in Heller should be taken to cast doubt on “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” described as “presumptively lawful.”
  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): The panel recited Bruen’s text-and-history test and its rejection of means-end scrutiny. But consistent with Dubois, the panel did not re-litigate § 922(g)(1) under Bruen from scratch; it treated the question as controlled by circuit precedent that Bruen did not abrogate.
  • United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010): Rozier is the dispositive precedent. It upheld § 922(g)(1) as constitutional and stated the statute is valid “even if a felon possesses a firearm purely for self-defense.” It also held the felon’s purpose and the fact possession was in the home were immaterial because felons “as a class” may be excluded from firearm possession.
  • United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010): Cited via Rozier for the characterization of felon-in-possession laws as “‘presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition[s].’” The citation helps show the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Heller line of cases treating felon disarmament as within the Amendment’s accepted limits.

Post-Bruen and post-Rahimi circuit posture on § 922(g)(1)

  • United States v. Dubois (Dubois I), 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024): The initial panel decision holding that Bruen did not abrogate Rozier, meaning § 922(g)(1) remained constitutional in this circuit under binding precedent.
  • Dubois v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1041 (2025): The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded Dubois I for reconsideration in light of subsequent developments (notably Rahimi).
  • United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): The opinion described Rahimi as upholding § 922(g)(8) and clarifying that the history-and-tradition analysis does not require a “historical twin.” It also emphasized historical support for disarming categories of individuals and reiterated that felon prohibitions remain “presumptively lawful.” Although Rahimi focused on restraining orders, the Eleventh Circuit cited it to reinforce that the Supreme Court continues to accept disarmament of certain individuals as consistent with the Second Amendment’s historically understood limits.
  • United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025): On remand, the Eleventh Circuit reinstated Dubois I and held that Rahimi did not abrogate Rozier. Dubois II is crucial here because Scott expressly attacked it; the panel responded that even if Scott believes it was wrongly decided, it remains binding on later panels.

Prior-panel-precedent rule

  • United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008): Cited for the Eleventh Circuit’s rule that a prior panel decision binds subsequent panels unless overruled en banc or abrogated by the Supreme Court.
  • Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2001): Cited to reject any “exception” to the prior-panel-precedent rule based on alleged defects in reasoning. This is the doctrinal “lock” that prevents Scott from obtaining relief at the panel level by arguing Rozier or Dubois II were wrongly reasoned.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in a tight, hierarchical sequence:

  1. Identify the controlling constitutional question: Scott challenges § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment, styled as an as-applied claim.
  2. Recognize the governing circuit precedent: Rozier upheld § 922(g)(1) and treated felons as a class that may be disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.
  3. Confirm continued vitality after Supreme Court developments: Dubois II held neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier, and the panel repeats that it would require “clearer instruction from the Supreme Court” before revisiting § 922(g)(1).
  4. Apply the prior-panel-precedent rule: Under Archer and Smith v. GTE Corp., the panel is bound by Rozier and Dubois II regardless of Scott’s arguments that they were wrongly decided.
  5. Dispose of the appeal summarily: Because the legal outcome is dictated by binding authority, summary affirmance is warranted under Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis.

Notably, the panel did not conduct an independent, full Bruen historical-tradition analysis of § 922(g)(1) as applied to Scott. Instead, the decision is an explicit reaffirmation of institutional constraints: where circuit precedent has already resolved the constitutional issue, and subsequent Supreme Court precedent has not clearly abrogated it, the panel’s role is to follow the existing rule.

3.3. Impact

Even as a “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” disposition, the opinion is important for what it signals about the Eleventh Circuit’s operational doctrine in Second Amendment litigation:

  • Practical foreclosure of as-applied felon challenges at the panel level: Unless and until the Supreme Court clearly abrogates Rozier (or the Eleventh Circuit sits en banc), panels will continue to treat § 922(g)(1) challenges—facial or as-applied—as resolved.
  • Summary affirmance as a management tool in post-Bruen litigation: Where defendants bring repeated constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1), this opinion reinforces that the court may dispose of such appeals quickly when precedent is controlling.
  • Stability of the “presumptively lawful” category: By leaning on Heller and Rahimi’s repeated references to felon prohibitions as “presumptively lawful,” the Eleventh Circuit continues to treat that language as a durable anchor against broad invalidation arguments.
  • Pressure shifts to en banc and Supreme Court review: The opinion effectively channels litigants to higher fora. If § 922(g)(1) is to be reconsidered under the Bruen framework, the court indicates it expects the Supreme Court to provide “clearer instruction,” or the circuit must take the case en banc.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • As-applied challenge: A claim that a law is unconstitutional in the specific way it was applied to this particular person under their specific facts (as opposed to invalid in all circumstances).
  • Facial challenge: A claim that a law is unconstitutional in all (or most) applications, not just as to one defendant.
  • De novo review: The appellate court considers the legal issue fresh, without deferring to the district court’s legal conclusions. But “fresh review” still operates within the constraints of binding precedent.
  • Bruen test: If the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct, the government must show the regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Eleventh Circuit here did not newly apply that test to § 922(g)(1) because it treated the question as already settled by binding circuit precedent.
  • “Presumptively lawful”: A label used in D.C. v. Heller (and reiterated in United States v. Rahimi) suggesting certain regulations (including felon disarmament) are generally assumed to be constitutional unless and until a compelling legal basis is shown otherwise.
  • Prior-panel-precedent rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, once a panel decides an issue, later panels must follow it unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc clearly overrules/abrogates it. Disagreement with the earlier panel’s reasoning is not enough.
  • Summary affirmance: A fast appellate disposition granted when the outcome is clear under existing law—often used when precedent squarely controls the issues raised.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Eibe Scott reinforces a firm Eleventh Circuit rule: § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional in this circuit after Bruen and Rahimi because United States v. Rozier is still binding, as reaffirmed by United States v. Dubois (Dubois II). The opinion’s doctrinal core is institutional rather than historical: under United States v. Archer and Smith v. GTE Corp., a panel cannot revisit that rule absent clear Supreme Court abrogation or en banc reversal. As a result, Second Amendment challenges by felons to § 922(g)(1) are likely to be disposed of quickly—including through Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis summary affirmance—until a higher court changes the governing law.