Date: Apr 24, 2026

Fees-on-Fees Are Not Automatic: Trial Courts May Deny Post-Settlement Fee-Litigation Time as Unreasonable Under Fee-Shifting Statutes

1. Introduction

Butcher v. General R.V. Center, Inc. (Va. Apr. 23, 2026) addresses a recurring issue in fee-shifting litigation: whether a prevailing consumer who is entitled to statutory attorney’s fees may also recover the additional fees incurred in litigating the fee request itself (“fees on fees”).

William and Traci Butcher purchased a recreational vehicle that allegedly suffered from defects. After negotiations failed, they sued the dealer and manufacturer (collectively referenced in the opinion as “Keystone”), asserting claims under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The merits settled: Keystone agreed to repurchase the RV for $106,500 and stipulated (for attorney-fee purposes only) that the Butchers were prevailing parties under Magnuson-Moss. The dispute narrowed to the amount of fees.

The trial court awarded fees for the work leading to settlement but denied fees for time spent litigating the post-settlement fee motion. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding the denial was within the trial court’s discretion because fee recovery—including fees on fees—turns on reasonableness and necessity under the case’s facts and circumstances.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court reaffirmed that a prevailing party may seek “fees on fees,” but such fees are recoverable only if reasonable and necessary.
The Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 19.43 hours of fee-litigation time, given the record supported a finding that the expenditure was not reasonable in this case.
The Court emphasized the fee applicant’s burden to prove reasonableness and necessity, and recognized trial courts may evaluate billing practices (including block billing and noncontemporaneous reconstruction) when assessing “actual time expended.”
The Court noted that trial courts are not generally required to provide detailed reasoning for discretionary decisions, citing Shannon v. Commonwealth.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Abuse-of-discretion framework

Portsmouth 2175 Elmhurst, LLC v. City of Portsmouth, 298 Va. 310 (2020) and West Square, LLC v. Communication Technologies, 274 Va. 425 (2007): These cases supply the core appellate standard: fee awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and appellate courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for the trial court’s assessment of reasonableness.
Lambert v. Sea Oats Condo. Ass'n, 293 Va. 245 (2017) (quoting Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass'n v. Batt, 284 Va. 409 (2012)): The Court restated the “three principal ways” discretion can be abused: ignoring a key relevant factor, relying on an improper factor, or making a clear error of judgment in weighing proper factors.
Commonwealth ex rel. Fair Hous. Bd. v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n, 289 Va. 34 (2014): The Court reiterated that discretion can also be abused if the decision rests on an erroneous legal conclusion—important here because the Butchers argued the trial court committed “legal error” by denying fees-on-fees.
Harris v. Joplin, 304 Va. 338 (2025) (quoting Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555 (2016)): The Court applied the principle that reversal is warranted only when “reasonable jurists could not differ.” That maxim was decisive: even if another judge might have awarded fees-on-fees, the question was whether denial was outside the range of reasonable outcomes.

2) Reasonableness, necessity, and the fee applicant’s burden

Sidya v. World Telecom Exch. Communs., LLC, 301 Va. 31 (2022): The Court used Sidya to underscore the moving party’s burden: requested fees must be shown “reasonable” and “necessary.” The Butchers’ failure, in the trial court’s view, was not that fees-on-fees are categorically unrecoverable, but that these particular fees-on-fees were not proven reasonable and necessary.
Portsmouth 2175 Elmhurst, LLC v. City of Portsmouth and Denton v. Browntown Valley Assocs., Inc., 294 Va. 76 (2017): These supplied the multi-factor reasonableness rubric (time/effort, nature, complexity, value, results, market consistency, necessity/appropriateness). The Court stressed that not all factors must be discussed in every case; their relevance depends on “specific circumstances.”
Denton v. Browntown Valley Assocs., Inc.: This was the Butchers’ key authority for fees-on-fees, quoted for the proposition that fees incurred litigating attorney’s fees are “no different” from those incurred litigating other issues on which the party prevails. The Court in Butcher did not reject Denton; it harmonized Denton by insisting that “no different” means they are subject to the same reasonableness/necessity constraints—thus they can be reduced or denied when unreasonable.

3) Evaluating tasks, opposing-party conduct, and billing practices

Lambert v. Sea Oats Condo. Ass'n (quoting Mullins v. Richlands Nat'l Bank, 241 Va. 447 (1991)): The Court relied on Lambert/Mullins for the practical point that litigation demands vary with how vigorously the opponent responds, and trial courts must assess necessity and time under the “facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Here, Keystone’s minimal litigation activity supported the trial court’s skepticism about substantial post-settlement fee-litigation time.
McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81 (4th Cir. 2013): Cited for a definition of “block billing.” While not a Virginia decision, it was used descriptively to explain why block billing hampers a reasonableness assessment.
Tazewell Oil Co. v. United Va. Bank/Crestar Bank, 243 Va. 94 (1992): Cited to illustrate that contemporaneous time records can support a fee award, implicitly contrasting with reconstructed records that may be viewed as less reliable.
Shannon v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 203 (2015): Used to reject the argument that the trial court had to articulate detailed, precise reasons for its discretionary determination; stating it relied on “facts and circumstances” was sufficient.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The rule clarified: “fees on fees” are permissible but not presumptively reasonable

The Court’s central clarification is structural: a party’s entitlement to seek fees-on-fees under a fee-shifting regime does not convert every hour spent pursuing fees into a mandatory award. Instead, fees-on-fees are assessed under the same constraints as merits fees: the applicant must prove they were reasonably incurred and necessary.

The Court anchored this in both Virginia doctrine (reasonableness factors and burden of proof) and the text of Magnuson-Moss, which allows recovery of attorneys’ fees “based on actual time expended” that are “reasonably incurred,” and permits the court, “in its discretion,” to determine an award would be “inappropriate.”

2) Why denial was reasonable on this record

The Court identified three record-based grounds that made the trial court’s denial of the 19.43 hours of fee-litigation time defensible:

Avoidability and negotiation dynamics. The opinion emphasized evidence that Keystone repeatedly tried to address fees during negotiations, while the Butchers’ counsel declined to engage on fee amounts until after merits settlement, then made a $20,000 demand without documentation and with a three-day deadline, followed by a motion months later seeking over $40,000. The trial court could reasonably infer that some or much of the fee-litigation work was avoidable “under the facts of this particular case.”
Mismatch between limited merits activity and expanded post-settlement fee request. Keystone engaged in minimal litigation (no discovery, no motions to dismiss, no venue transfer pursuit). The Court accepted that a trial judge could view extensive fee-litigation work as disproportionate when the underlying case involved “few filings and court appearances.”
Documentation problems affecting the “actual time expended” showing. The time records contained an admitted misattribution of an associate’s time to lead counsel, plus block billing and indications time may have been reconstructed. The Court treated these as legitimate considerations in evaluating reasonableness, particularly because Magnuson-Moss references “actual time expended.”

3) Reconciling Denton: recoverable in principle, reducible in practice

The Butchers framed the issue as a categorical legal error: that Virginia law requires compensation for fee-litigation time whenever the party prevails on fees. The Court rejected that framing by reading Denton v. Browntown Valley Assocs., Inc. as an equality principle, not an entitlement presumption: fees-on-fees are “no different,” meaning they are tested by the same reasonableness inquiry and may be denied when the applicant fails to carry the burden.

C. Impact

Practical constraint on fee-shifting leverage. Even where entitlement to fees exists, this decision empowers trial courts to police post-settlement fee escalation, particularly when negotiation was possible and the record suggests the fee dispute was prolonged by the fee applicant’s tactics.
Incentives for early, documented fee negotiations. The case signals that refusing to provide support for a fee demand until after settlement—and then substantially increasing the request—may undermine recoverability of fees-on-fees. Trial judges may view such conduct as creating unnecessary fee litigation.
Heightened importance of billing hygiene in fee-shifting cases. Misattribution, block billing, and noncontemporaneous reconstruction are not per se disqualifying, but they can materially affect the court’s confidence in “actual time expended,” justifying reductions or denials.
Appellate posture favors trial-court discretion. By reiterating that reversal requires a decision outside the bounds where “reasonable jurists could not differ,” the opinion makes fee-on-fee challenges difficult absent clear legal error or a record showing improper factors drove the decision.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Fee shifting: A statute (or contract) requiring the losing side to pay the winning side’s reasonable attorney’s fees, often to make it economically feasible to bring certain claims.
Prevailing party: A party who achieves sufficient success on the merits (or through settlement recognized for fee purposes) to qualify for fee shifting. Here, Keystone stipulated the Butchers were prevailing parties for Magnuson-Moss attorney-fee purposes.
“Fees on fees”: Attorney time spent preparing, filing, negotiating, and litigating the request for attorney’s fees itself (as opposed to time spent on the underlying claims).
Reasonable and necessary: Even when fees are authorized, the court awards only those fees it finds proportionate and justified for the work required; the party seeking fees must prove this.
Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard. The appellate court does not ask whether it would have made the same decision, but whether the trial court’s decision was outside the range of reasonable options or based on improper considerations.
Block billing: Grouping multiple tasks into one time entry without specifying time per task, which makes it harder to evaluate whether the time spent on any particular task was reasonable.
Contemporaneous time records: Time entries recorded when the work is done (or close in time). Courts often view them as more reliable than after-the-fact reconstruction.

5. Conclusion

Butcher v. General R.V. Center, Inc. does not reject the concept of “fees on fees.” Instead, it clarifies a controlling limitation: even in fee-shifting regimes like the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, trial courts may deny fee-litigation time when the applicant fails to prove it was reasonably incurred and necessary in light of the “facts and circumstances” of the case.

The decision’s significance lies in its pragmatic message: statutory fee shifting aims to enable consumer representation, but it is not a blank check. Litigation over fees must itself be proportionate, well-documented, and justified—especially when the record supports the conclusion that negotiation and clearer substantiation could have avoided substantial post-settlement fee disputes.