Federal § 2255 Successive Motions After Bowe: § 2244(b)(1) Old-Claim Bar Inapplicable; Authorization Turns on § 2255(h) Alone

1. Introduction

Case: In re: Michael Bowe, No. 24-11704 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).
Posture: Application for authorization to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
Parties: Michael Bowe (federal prisoner; petitioner/applicant) and the United States (respondent in the underlying criminal case).

This Eleventh Circuit decision sits at the intersection of (i) AEDPA’s gatekeeping regime for successive collateral attacks, (ii) the Supreme Court’s void-for-vagueness line of cases affecting firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and (iii) a newly clarified statutory boundary: whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)’s “old-claim bar” applies to federal prisoners proceeding under § 2255.

Bowe pleaded guilty to: (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)); (2) attempted Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2); and (3) discharging a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence” (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)), with Count Three expressly tied to the Hobbs Act counts. He received a 288-month sentence, including a mandatory consecutive 120 months on Count Three.

The key issues on remand were:

  • Gatekeeping standard: After the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowe v. United States, No. 24-5438 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2026), may the Eleventh Circuit consider a successive application that reasserts a previously raised claim, or must it be dismissed under § 2244(b)(1)?
  • Merits threshold: Does Bowe make a prima facie showing under § 2255(h)(2) that his § 924(c) conviction is invalid in light of United States v. Davis and subsequent “crime of violence” decisions (Brown v. United States and United States v. Taylor)?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit granted Bowe authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, holding that he made the required prima facie showing under § 2255(h)(2). The panel explained that:

  • The Supreme Court has now abrogated In re Baptiste by holding that § 2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar “does not apply to federal prisoners,” so the Eleventh Circuit may not dismiss on that jurisdictional ground.
  • In re Hammoud establishes that United States v. Davis announced “a new rule of constitutional law” retroactively applicable on collateral review for § 2255(h)(2) purposes.
  • After Davis, § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause cannot support a “crime of violence” predicate; after Brown v. United States and United States v. Taylor, neither conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery nor attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause.
  • The authorization decision is only a threshold determination; the district court must decide de novo whether the § 2255(h) criteria are actually satisfied and must also address timeliness under § 2255(f), which the Eleventh Circuit does not resolve at the authorization stage.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

(a) Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015)

Bowe’s first § 2255 effort invoked Johnson, which invalidated the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Although Johnson did not directly govern § 924(c), it provided the doctrinal foundation for later vagueness challenges to similarly worded “risk-based” definitions of violent crimes. The procedural history in this opinion underscores how Johnson launched a cascade of litigation, but also how such challenges can be blocked (at least temporarily) by then-binding circuit precedent classifying certain predicates as “crimes of violence.”

(b) United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019)

Davis is the constitutional engine of Bowe’s successive application. It held § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause void for vagueness. In this opinion, Davis matters in two distinct ways:

  • Substantive invalidation: Any § 924(c) conviction dependent on the residual clause cannot stand.
  • Gatekeeping hook: Through Eleventh Circuit precedent (In re Hammoud), Davis supplies the “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive” required by § 2255(h)(2).

(c) In re Hammoud, 931 F.3d 1036 (11th Cir. 2019)

Hammoud is the Eleventh Circuit’s retroactivity bridge: it held that Davis announced a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court, satisfying § 2255(h)(2). This opinion relies on Hammoud to clear the statutory gate—without it, Bowe could struggle to show that his successive § 2255 motion rests on a qualifying “new rule” under AEDPA’s stringent standard.

(d) Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2019)

Brown supplies an important predicate conclusion: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. The panel quotes Brown for the key insight that an agreement (and knowledge of the conspiratorial goal) does not necessarily entail the “use, attempted use, or threatened use” of force as an element. In Bowe’s case, that removes Count One as a possible elements-clause foundation for Count Three.

(e) United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022)

Taylor held attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A). This opinion uses Taylor not as the § 2255(h)(2) “new rule of constitutional law” (the Eleventh Circuit previously reasoned Taylor was statutory interpretation), but as the controlling merits authority establishing that Count Two cannot qualify under the elements clause. Combined with Davis (which eliminates residual-clause reliance), Taylor helps produce the necessary showing that Bowe’s § 924(c) predicate offenses are non-qualifying under current law.

(f) In re Baptiste, 828 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016)

Baptiste formerly functioned as a jurisdictional gatekeeper in this circuit by extending § 2244(b)(1)’s same-claim bar (textually applicable to § 2254 applications) to federal prisoners bringing successive § 2255 applications. It was the reason multiple earlier Bowe applications were dismissed without reaching the § 2255(h) inquiry.

This opinion’s significance is inseparable from Baptiste because it chronicles the doctrinal “demise” of that interpretation: the Supreme Court held the extension was wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation.

(g) Bowe v. United States, No. 24-5438, manuscript op. (U.S. Jan. 9, 2026)

The Supreme Court’s decision is the decisive intervening authority. It resolved a circuit split by holding § 2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar “does not apply to federal prisoners.” Crucially, it also delineated what § 2255(h)’s cross-reference to § 2244 actually imports: the procedures for panel certification, not § 2244’s content requirements such as the old-claim bar.

The Eleventh Circuit applies that instruction on remand and proceeds to the proper question: whether Bowe meets § 2255(h)(1) or § 2255(h)(2).

(h) Jordan v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs., 485 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007)

Jordan supplies the standard of review structure for authorization proceedings:

  • The court of appeals decides only whether the applicant has made a prima facie showing that statutory criteria are met.
  • The district court then determines de novo whether the criteria are actually satisfied.

The panel uses Jordan to emphasize that authorization is not a merits ruling and does not entitle the movant to relief.

(i) In re Jackson, 826 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2016)

In re Jackson is cited to explain that potential untimeliness under the habeas statute of limitations is not part of the court of appeals’ authorization-stage inquiry because the limitations bar is not jurisdictional. The panel couples that with the Supreme Court’s reminder in Bowe that even a claim satisfying § 2255(h) must comply with § 2255(f)’s “demanding” limitations period—leaving the timeliness fight for the district court.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The corrected gatekeeping framework after the Supreme Court’s Bowe decision

The central legal correction is structural: the Eleventh Circuit may no longer dismiss federal successive § 2255 applications as jurisdictionally barred simply because they repeat a previously presented claim. The panel explains that, under the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation, § 2255(h) incorporates § 2244 only as to the certification procedure, not as to § 2244(b)(1)’s substantive old-claim limitation.

Practical consequence: a federal prisoner may “bring previously asserted claims” in an authorization request, but still must satisfy one of § 2255(h)’s two narrow grounds.

The panel also notes an important limiting principle recognized by the Supreme Court: even without § 2244(b)(1), courts may address repetitive filings through doctrines like law of the case. The opinion does not apply law-of-the-case to deny authorization here; instead, it proceeds to the § 2255(h)(2) analysis.

(b) Why § 2255(h)(2) is the operative provision in this application

Bowe does not claim “newly discovered evidence” under § 2255(h)(1). He proceeds under § 2255(h)(2): a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive by the Supreme Court, previously unavailable.

The panel identifies Davis (as filtered through Hammoud) as the qualifying “new rule.” That move is pivotal because it supplies AEDPA’s required constitutional novelty and retroactivity, opening the door for Bowe to argue—using Taylor and Brown as intervening merits authorities—that his § 924(c) count lacks a valid “crime of violence” predicate.

(c) The “crime of violence” predicate analysis at the authorization (prima facie) stage

The panel’s prima facie reasoning is cumulative:

  • Residual clause eliminated: Under Davis, § 924(c)(3)(B) cannot support any predicate designation.
  • Elements clause foreclosed for Count Two: Under Taylor, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy § 924(c)(3)(A).
  • Elements clause foreclosed for Count One: Under Brown v. United States, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy § 924(c)(3)(A).

On that legal landscape, Bowe has made the required showing that his § 924(c) conviction “is predicated on offenses that do not qualify as crimes of violence.” The panel is careful to cabin the holding: this is sufficient for authorization, not a final determination that the conviction must be vacated.

(d) The division of labor: court of appeals vs. district court

A defining feature of AEDPA’s design (as applied here) is institutional:

  • Court of appeals: screens for statutory eligibility via a prima facie showing.
  • District court: evaluates eligibility and entitlement to relief on a fuller record, adversarial briefing, and de novo review, including procedural defenses such as timeliness.

3.3. Impact

(a) Successive § 2255 practice in the Eleventh Circuit after Bowe

This decision operationalizes the Supreme Court’s rejection of In re Baptiste. The immediate impact is procedural: federal prisoners in the Eleventh Circuit can no longer be turned away at the courthouse door solely because they previously presented the same claim in an earlier successive authorization request. Instead, the analysis must focus on whether § 2255(h)(1) or (h)(2) is satisfied.

At the same time, the opinion signals that repetitive filings are not consequence-free: the law-of-the-case doctrine (and other judicial tools) may still limit relitigation. The net effect is a shift from an absolute statutory bar to a more flexible, doctrine-driven management of repeat requests—bounded by AEDPA’s still-narrow § 2255(h) criteria.

(b) Substantive ripple effects for § 924(c) convictions predicated on Hobbs Act conspiracy/attempt

On the merits trajectory, the opinion underscores a powerful combination for prisoners whose § 924(c) convictions rest on (i) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and/or (ii) attempted Hobbs Act robbery:

  • Davis removes the residual clause route.
  • Brown v. United States removes the elements clause route for Hobbs Act conspiracy.
  • Taylor removes the elements clause route for attempted Hobbs Act robbery.

For such defendants, authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion may be more attainable—though ultimate relief will still depend on case-specific questions (e.g., what predicate(s) actually supported the § 924(c) conviction as a matter of record, waiver/plea issues, procedural default arguments, timeliness under § 2255(f), and any applicable harmless-error analysis depending on the litigation posture).

(c) Timeliness becomes a central battleground

The panel expressly leaves limitations issues open, while highlighting the Supreme Court’s caution that satisfying § 2255(h) does not excuse compliance with § 2255(f). Practically, as more applications clear the authorization stage post-Bowe, district courts are likely to see heightened litigation over when the one-year clock begins and whether any tolling applies.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Second or successive” § 2255 motion: After a prisoner has already filed one § 2255 motion, any later § 2255 motion is typically “second or successive” and cannot be filed in the district court unless the court of appeals authorizes it.
  • Authorization and “prima facie showing”: At the authorization stage, the court of appeals does not decide the case. It decides only whether the applicant has made a threshold showing that the motion fits within § 2255(h)’s narrow categories.
  • § 2255(h)(2)’s “new rule of constitutional law … made retroactive”: This is a strict gateway. Not every new Supreme Court decision qualifies. Here, Davis qualifies (per In re Hammoud) because it announced a constitutional vagueness rule that applies retroactively on collateral review.
  • “Crime of violence” in § 924(c): elements clause vs. residual clause:
    • Elements clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A)): looks to whether the offense’s legal elements require the use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force.
    • Residual clause (§ 924(c)(3)(B)): used a risk-based definition; Davis invalidated it as unconstitutionally vague.
  • Why attempt and conspiracy can fail the elements clause: Under Taylor, attempted Hobbs Act robbery can be proved without proving the defendant used/attempted/threatened force. Under Brown v. United States, Hobbs Act conspiracy can be proved by agreement/knowledge without any force element.
  • Law of the case (as a limit on repeat filings): Even if a statute does not categorically bar a repeat request, courts may still refuse to revisit issues already decided in the same case absent certain exceptional circumstances.

5. Conclusion

In re: Michael Bowe is a landmark procedural reset for the Eleventh Circuit’s successive § 2255 docket. Implementing the Supreme Court’s abrogation of In re Baptiste, the panel confirms that § 2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar does not apply to federal prisoners and that repeated claims must be assessed under § 2255(h)’s text rather than dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the basis of § 2244(b)(1).

On the substantive side, the decision illustrates how United States v. Davis (retroactive via In re Hammoud), combined with United States v. Taylor and Brown v. United States, can render certain § 924(c) predicates non-qualifying—supporting authorization to file a successive motion where the § 924(c) count rests on attempted or conspiratorial Hobbs Act robbery.

The core takeaway is dual: (1) the gatekeeping door is now governed by § 2255(h) alone (not § 2244(b)(1)) for federal prisoners, and (2) authorization is merely the beginning—district courts remain the forum for de novo eligibility determinations, full merits adjudication, and rigorous timeliness scrutiny under § 2255(f).