FDLE Certification and Emergency-Response Duties as Essential Functions: Limits on ADA Accommodation, FMLA Reinstatement, and USERRA Proof

Case: Will Twigg v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Per Curiam, Non-Argument Calendar; Not for Publication)
Date: 2026-07-01

1. Introduction

This appeal arises from the termination of Will Twigg, a Corrections Deputy Sheriff employed by the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office (“PBSO”). Twigg—who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) related to combat trauma—requested an accommodation to avoid triggers and, as described by his provider, to work in an “administrative or clerical setting” with flexible break/leave options. PBSO denied the accommodation and terminated him shortly after receiving medical documentation.

Twigg sued under three federal statutes: (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate; (2) the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), alleging a failure to reinstate him after leave; and (3) the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), alleging discrimination based on military service. The district court granted summary judgment for PBSO on all claims and also denied Twigg’s late request to extend discovery and entered a protective order preventing the deposition of Sheriff Ric Bradshaw.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board, focusing on two practical features of the corrections deputy role: (i) emergency/violent-incident response as an essential function, and (ii) the legal requirement under Florida law to maintain active FDLE certification.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for PBSO, holding:

• ADA: Twigg was not a “qualified individual” because he could not perform essential functions—responding to violent/emergency situations—and also lacked required FDLE certification. The accommodations he sought would effectively remove essential functions or require PBSO to create/nonexistent positions or speculate about vacancies.
• FMLA: Twigg had no right to reinstatement because he could not perform essential functions on return from leave; additionally, PBSO showed it would have terminated him regardless due to certification lapse.
• USERRA: Twigg produced no evidence that military service was a motivating factor in termination; instead, the record showed termination followed inability to do the job and certification problems.
• Post-judgment and procedure: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 59(e) relief, enforcing the scheduling order given Twigg’s lack of diligence, or granting a protective order barring the sheriff’s deposition given minimal personal involvement and availability of the HR decisionmaker for deposition.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and how they shaped the decision)

A. Standards of review and procedural discretion

• Beasley v. O'Reilly Auto Parts (de novo review of summary judgment): Anchored the appellate posture—no deference on the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
• Lockard v. Equifax, Inc. (abuse of discretion review of Rule 59 denials): Set the deferential frame for post-judgment relief.
• Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc. (Rule 16 “good cause” requires diligence): Provided the controlling test for whether discovery deadlines may be extended; the court treated lack of diligence as dispositive.
• Pres. Endangered Areas of Cobb's Hist., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs and In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig. (protective orders and balancing): Supported the district court’s authority to protect parties from undue burden and to balance discovery needs.
• F.T.C. v. Nat'l Urological Grp., Inc. (definition of abuse of discretion): Supplied the general yardstick for evaluating whether discretion was misused.
• Arthur v. King (Rule 59 limits): Constrained Rule 59(e) to newly discovered evidence or manifest error, barring relitigation.
• Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States (cannot amend complaint at summary judgment): Foreclosed Twigg’s attempt to pivot to a new USERRA theory after the pleadings stage.
• Zakrzewski v. McDonough (high standard for Rule 60(b) relief): Reinforced that post-judgment “do-over” relief is exceptional, not routine.
• Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc. (cited in Sosa): Used to underscore that diligence is the heart of Rule 16 good cause.

B. ADA “qualified individual,” essential functions, and reassignment limits

• Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc. (ADA prima facie elements): Framed the dispute as turning on the second element—whether Twigg was a “qualified individual.”
• Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C. (essential functions; accommodation must enable performance; no elimination of essential functions): The court used Holly repeatedly to justify treating emergency response as non-negotiable and to reject accommodations that would remove core duties.
• Terrell v. USAir (employer need not create a position): Supported rejecting proposed “administrative” roles that did not exist (e.g., “Military Liaison” as described in the record) or would require creation of a new job.
• Leigh v. Warner Bros. (conclusory, self-serving affidavits): Undercut Twigg’s reliance on his own affidavit claiming suitable administrative positions existed.
• Willis v. Conopco, Inc. (reassignment required only if a vacant position exists): Supplied the rule that reassignment is not an abstract obligation; it is vacancy-dependent.
• Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc. (speculation about vacancies insufficient): Reinforced that plaintiffs must identify a “specific reasonable accommodation,” not hypothesize openings.
• Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc. (conclusory allegations lack probative value at summary judgment): Used to dismiss unsupported assertions about reinstating certification or PBSO’s obligations regarding certification.
• Ismael v. Roundtree (when prima facie fails, no “helpful evidentiary burdens or presumptions”): Positioned the case as requiring Twigg to survive on the strength of evidence alone.
• Akridge v. Alfa Ins. Cos. (convincing mosaic): Provided an alternative route to defeat summary judgment via circumstantial evidence of intent; the court held Twigg’s timing argument did not create such a mosaic.

C. FMLA reinstatement constraints

• Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Del., LLC (no reinstatement if employee cannot perform essential functions): The direct doctrinal basis for rejecting reinstatement when essential functions remain unperformable.
• Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Birmingham (employer may deny reinstatement if it would have discharged employee anyway): Supported PBSO’s additional justification—FDLE certification lapse as an independent termination ground.

D. USERRA discrimination proof framework

• Thomas v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff's Off. (motivating factor test; relevant evidence types): Supplied the framework and examples (disparate treatment, hostility, pretext). The panel found Twigg offered none, emphasizing his prior military leave history without issue.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. ADA: Essential functions, reasonable accommodation, and certification as a job requirement

The panel treated two constraints as independently fatal to ADA qualification:

• Emergency/violent-incident response is essential. The court relied on the written job description (explicitly listing emergency response as an “essential job duty”) and corroborating deposition testimony (from both Twigg and HR). Twigg’s own medical documentation stated he could not regularly respond to violent/emergency situations, and Twigg conceded his PTSD prevented emergency response. Under the ADA, an accommodation is “reasonable” only if it enables performance of essential functions, and an employer need not eliminate essential functions.
• FDLE certification was treated as an essential requirement. Florida law requires law enforcement officers to maintain active certification to be employed. The panel reasoned that because an officer “cannot remain employed” without certification, maintaining it effectively functions as an essential job requirement, and Twigg undisputedly lacked certification at termination.

The court then explained why Twigg’s proposed alternatives failed:

• “Administrative Deputy Sheriff” roles still carry deputy essential functions. Even in clerical assignments, PBSO asserted deputies must be ready to respond to emergencies and maintain order. Thus, reassignment to a deputy role did not solve the essential-function problem.
• Nonexistent positions need not be created. The ADA does not require creating new roles to accommodate an employee.
• Vacancy is required for reassignment. Twigg did not identify a specific vacant position he could perform with restrictions; general willingness to take “any” clerical job was not enough.
• Conclusory affidavit and speculation cannot defeat summary judgment. The panel repeatedly refused to credit unsupported assertions about available positions or easy recertification.

Finally, the panel addressed intent via the “convincing mosaic” concept, holding that termination on the day medical documentation was provided was not suspicious where PBSO had warned of termination for noncompliance and where the documentation confirmed inability to perform essential functions.

B. FMLA: No reinstatement right without ability to perform essential functions

The court applied the Eleventh Circuit’s established limitation: FMLA reinstatement is not required when an employee cannot perform essential job functions upon return. It further credited PBSO’s independent reason for termination—lack of certification—under the principle that an employer can deny reinstatement if it would have discharged the employee even absent FMLA leave. Temporal proximity alone did not create a triable issue of FMLA-related wrongdoing on this record.

C. USERRA: “Motivating factor” requires evidence tied to military status

Under the motivating-factor standard, Twigg needed evidence that his service influenced the adverse action (e.g., hostility, disparate treatment, pretext). The panel emphasized that Twigg served throughout his employment and took leave “several times without issue,” and that termination aligned with certification lapse and inability to perform essential functions—not with military leave events. Without evidence linking the termination to military status, the USERRA claim failed as a matter of law.

D. Post-judgment and case-management rulings

• Rule 59(e): The court treated Twigg’s motion as an impermissible attempt to relitigate issues already decided and to inject a new USERRA theory. Rule 59(e) is confined to newly discovered evidence or manifest error, neither of which was shown.
• Scheduling order modification: Applying Rule 16’s diligence-centered “good cause” test, the court upheld denial where Twigg waited until the discovery deadline and had conducted no discovery over eight months.
• Protective order (apex deposition logic): The court affirmed the protective order preventing deposition of the sheriff, reasoning the sheriff’s involvement was limited to signing the HR memorandum and that the primary decisionmaker (HR officer Thomas) was available and deposed—reducing the need and proportionality of deposing a high-ranking official.

3.3 Impact

• Public-safety and corrections employers: The decision reinforces that emergency response and order-maintenance are likely “essential functions” for sworn corrections/law enforcement roles, even when an employee is assigned to primarily administrative tasks. Employers who document these duties and apply them consistently will be better positioned at summary judgment.
• Licensing/certification as “essential”: By treating legally required certification as effectively essential, the opinion signals that failure to maintain statutory credentials can independently defeat ADA “qualified individual” status and also provide an FMLA-independent basis to deny reinstatement.
• Accommodation litigation discipline: The opinion underscores the plaintiff’s burden to identify a specific reasonable accommodation, including a specific vacant position for reassignment. General requests for “any administrative job” and speculation about openings are unlikely to survive summary judgment in the Eleventh Circuit.
• USERRA claims require linkage evidence: The panel’s analysis illustrates that USERRA is not satisfied by showing military service plus adverse action; the employee must marshal evidence that service was a motivating factor (hostility, disparate treatment, pretext).
• Procedure matters: The case is also a cautionary procedural tale: failure to conduct discovery within the schedule can foreclose later extensions, and attempting to shift statutory theories at summary judgment risks forfeiture under pleading rules.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Qualified individual” (ADA): You are protected from disability discrimination in hiring/firing if you can do the job’s core tasks (“essential functions”) with a reasonable accommodation. If you cannot do those core tasks even with accommodation, the ADA does not require the employer to keep you in that job.
• “Essential functions”: The fundamental duties of the job—not minor or occasional tasks. Courts look heavily to the employer’s written job description and practical realities. For sworn corrections roles, emergency response is frequently treated as essential.
• “Reasonable accommodation”: A change that helps the employee perform essential functions (e.g., modified scheduling, equipment, reassignment to an existing vacant job). It is not “reasonable” if it removes essential functions or requires the employer to create a new position.
• “Reassignment to a vacant position”: The ADA may require moving an employee to another job only if (1) a job is actually open at the time, and (2) the employee is qualified for it. Courts require evidence of a real vacancy, not guesses.
• FMLA reinstatement: The FMLA generally gives you your job (or an equivalent) back after qualifying leave, but not if you cannot perform essential functions at the time you return.
• USERRA “motivating factor”: Military service must be one of the reasons that influenced the employer’s action. Proof often comes from hostile remarks, different treatment of service members, or showing the employer’s stated reason is a cover story.
• Rule 16 “good cause”: To extend deadlines, the key is diligence. If you did not actively pursue discovery, courts typically deny last-minute extensions.
• Protective order / apex deposition: Courts may prevent depositions that are burdensome and low-value—especially of high-ranking officials—when the needed facts can be obtained from more directly involved witnesses.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Will Twigg v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office illustrates a firm application of established employment-law limits: an employer need not eliminate essential functions (like emergency response in a corrections role), need not create positions as accommodations, and need not reinstate an employee from FMLA leave if the employee cannot perform essential functions. The opinion also highlights that legally required certification can function as an essential job requirement, independently supporting termination and defeating ADA/FMLA theories. Finally, it reinforces litigation fundamentals—plead the right statutory theory early, pursue discovery diligently, and support accommodation and discrimination claims with specific, non-speculative evidence.