FCRA “Credit-Report Pull” Claims After Charge-Off Fall Within Broad Cardholder Arbitration Clauses

1. Introduction

In Deborah Glover v. Merrick Bank (3d Cir. June 22, 2026) (not precedential), the Third Circuit affirmed an order compelling arbitration of a consumer’s Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) claims. Deborah Glover, a Merrick Bank credit-card customer whose account had been charged off in 2016, alleged that Merrick violated the FCRA in 2022 by accessing her credit report “without consent or any lawful reason,” asserting no ongoing “in personam credit relationship” existed at that time.

The central issues on appeal were: (1) what procedural standard governs a motion to compel arbitration (Rule 12(b)(6) vs. Rule 56) and whether limited discovery into “arbitrability” was required; and (2) whether Glover’s FCRA claims fell within the scope of the cardholder agreement’s broadly worded arbitration clause (governed by Utah law via a choice-of-law provision).

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Standard of review / procedure: The Third Circuit held that the Rule 56 framework applied because arbitrability was not apparent from the face of the complaint (the complaint did not reference or attach the cardholder agreement). Nonetheless, the court agreed that no discovery was necessary because Glover did not dispute the existence of the arbitration provision and there was no factual dispute about its scope requiring discovery.
  • Scope: Applying Utah law, the court concluded the arbitration clause unambiguously covered Glover’s FCRA claims, particularly because the clause expressly included disputes about “information obtained” from credit bureaus and more generally covered any claim “arising from or relating in any way” to the agreement or account.
  • Disposition: The court affirmed the order compelling arbitration (and dismissal of class-based claims consistent with the agreement’s class-action waiver).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc.

The court cited Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc., 939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019), for the baseline proposition that appellate review of an order granting a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. This ensured the panel independently evaluated both the procedural standard and the scope question.

Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC and Young v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc.

The opinion’s procedural core is the Third Circuit’s “two-path” approach for arbitration motions articulated in Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC, 716 F.3d 764 (3d Cir. 2013), and further clarified in Young v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 119 F.4th 314 (3d Cir. 2024).

  • Path 1 (Rule 12(b)(6)): If arbitrability is apparent on the complaint’s face and documents relied upon in the complaint, the court may decide the motion without discovery.
  • Path 2 (Rule 56): If arbitrability is not clear from the pleadings—or the plaintiff rebuts with “reliable evidence”— the court proceeds under a summary-judgment-like standard.

Here, the panel relied on Young to hold that Rule 56 applied because the complaint did not reference or attach the agreement. But Young also supplied the limiting principle that even under this framework, discovery into arbitrability is not automatic: discovery is unnecessary when “no factual dispute exists as to the existence or scope of the arbitration agreement.”

In re Remicade (Direct Purchaser) Antitrust Litig.

In re Remicade (Direct Purchaser) Antitrust Litig., 938 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2019), supported two points: (1) state law generally governs the scope of an arbitration clause; and (2) the “related to” inquiry can be framed as whether there is a “logical or causal connection” between the dispute and the agreement—language later echoed through Utah authority.

Utah contract/arbitration authorities: HITORQ, LLC v. TCC Veterinary Servs., Inc. and Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs.

The court treated the choice-of-law clause as dispositive of the interpretive framework and drew on Utah Supreme Court precedent: HITORQ, LLC v. TCC Veterinary Servs., Inc., 502 P.3d 281 (Utah 2021), and Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002).

  • These cases establish a standard contract methodology: if the clause is unambiguous, courts enforce the plain meaning.
  • If ambiguous, Utah applies a presumption in favor of arbitration as a matter of policy.

The Third Circuit did not need Utah’s pro-arbitration presumption because it found the clause unambiguous; still, citing these cases reinforced that any close call would likely tilt toward arbitration under Utah law.

Willow Creek Assocs. of Grantsville LLC v. Hy Barr Inc.

Willow Creek Assocs. of Grantsville LLC v. Hy Barr Inc., 501 P.3d 1179 (Utah Ct. App. 2021), supplied the operational test for “related to” under Utah law: a dispute relates to a contract if it has “some logical or causal connection” to the agreement. This test allowed the court to connect a post-charge-off credit-report access claim to the earlier cardholder relationship.

Issue preservation: Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist. and Brown v. Phillip Morris, Inc.

The panel invoked Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2017), quoting Brown v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789 (3d Cir. 2001), to refuse consideration of two additional appellate arguments not raised below absent “exceptional circumstances.” While ancillary, this reinforces that arbitration disputes are heavily shaped by what is preserved in district court.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural posture and discovery into arbitrability

The court separated the standard from the outcome on discovery. It held Rule 56 applied because the complaint did not make arbitrability apparent. But it still denied discovery because the key facts relevant to arbitrability were not in genuine dispute: Glover did not contest that an arbitration clause existed or that she had agreed to the cardholder agreement by using the card. Under Young, discovery is not warranted when there is no factual dispute about the agreement’s existence or scope.

Practically, the panel treated “Rule 56 applies” as a gateway to considering materials beyond the pleadings, not as a mandate for arbitrability discovery in every case.

2) Scope under Utah law: text-first enforcement of a broad clause

The arbitration clause covered any claim “arising from or relating in any way” to the agreement or account and expressly listed as an example: “Any disputes regarding information obtained by [Merrick] from, or reported by [Merrick] to, credit bureaus or others.”

The court’s scope analysis proceeded on two independent textual tracks:

  1. Express example controls: Because Glover alleged an unlawful credit-report access, her claim was a dispute about “information obtained” from a credit bureau—squarely within the enumerated examples.
  2. “Relating in any way” captures relationship-status disputes: Glover’s theory depended on whether a credit relationship existed in 2022. The court reasoned that the cardholder agreement governed the parties’ relationship; therefore, a dispute about the presence/absence of that relationship has a “logical or causal connection” to the agreement under Willow Creek.

Notably, the court did not require the alleged misconduct to occur during the active life of the account. The “related to” logic—combined with the credit-bureau example—allowed the arbitration clause to reach conduct occurring years after charge-off.

C. Impact

  • FCRA claims may be arbitrable even long after account charge-off: Where the arbitration clause is broad and expressly references credit-bureau information disputes, post-termination credit-report access claims are likely to be treated as “related to” the account relationship.
  • Discovery into arbitrability remains constrained: Even when Rule 56 is the correct procedural framework under Guidotti, Young (as applied here) limits discovery to situations with a genuine factual dispute over the arbitration agreement’s existence or scope. Plaintiffs seeking discovery must identify a concrete dispute, not merely assert that arbitrability is unclear.
  • Choice-of-law clauses can materially shape arbitration scope: Utah’s approach—plain-language enforcement and a pro-arbitration presumption if ambiguity exists—may make it easier for issuers to compel arbitration in close cases.
  • Class-action waivers remain outcome-determinative: Because the court enforced the arbitration clause, the bolded class-action waiver effectively eliminated the class mechanism for these claims, channeling them into individual arbitration.

Although designated “not precedential,” the opinion is a useful roadmap for litigants in the Third Circuit confronting (i) arbitrability discovery requests and (ii) arbitration clauses that explicitly mention credit-reporting disputes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Charge-off”
An accounting step where a creditor treats an unpaid debt as a loss. It does not necessarily extinguish the debt and is often followed by assignment or sale to a collector.
FCRA “permissible purpose”
The FCRA generally restricts when an entity may obtain (“pull”) a consumer credit report. A claim that a report was accessed “without consent or lawful reason” is a claim that no permissible purpose existed.
Arbitrability
The threshold question whether a dispute must be resolved in arbitration instead of court—typically turning on (1) existence/formation of an arbitration agreement and (2) whether the claim falls within its scope.
Rule 12(b)(6) vs. Rule 56 in arbitration motions
Rule 12(b)(6) confines the court largely to the complaint and referenced documents. Rule 56 allows consideration of evidence outside the complaint. Under Guidotti, the choice depends on whether arbitrability is apparent from the pleadings and reliably submitted materials.
“Arising from or relating to”
Contract language expanding arbitration beyond direct contract-breach claims. Under Utah law (as applied here), “related to” can include disputes having a “logical or causal connection” to the agreement.
Issue forfeiture
Arguments not raised in the district court are usually unavailable on appeal unless exceptional circumstances exist.

5. Conclusion

Glover v. Merrick Bank reinforces two practical rules in arbitration litigation: (1) even when a motion to compel arbitration should be analyzed under Rule 56 because the complaint does not reveal arbitrability, courts may still deny discovery absent a genuine factual dispute over the agreement’s existence or scope; and (2) under a broad, Utah-governed arbitration clause—especially one expressly covering disputes about credit-bureau information—FCRA claims alleging an unauthorized credit-report pull can be deemed “related to” the underlying credit-card account relationship even years after charge-off.