FCA § 3730(d)(1): Attorney’s Fees Require a Relator’s Proceeds Share (Fifth Circuit)

1. Introduction

This False Claims Act (FCA) qui tam case addresses a narrow but recurring remedial question: whether a relator can recover attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) when the Government intervenes but later declines to pursue the relator’s specific claims, the settlement resolves only Government-added claims, and the relator receives no “relator’s share” of settlement proceeds.

Relator Bud Conyers sued Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) in 2006 under the FCA, alleging misconduct tied to KBR operations in Iraq. The Government later intervened, filed its own complaint with some overlapping and some additional allegations, then ultimately settled claims that were not Conyers’s original claims for more than $13 million. After earlier appellate proceedings (including a remand following United States ex rel. Conyers, 108 F.4th 351 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Conyers I”)), Conyers renewed a motion for attorney’s fees. The Fifth Circuit’s 2026 opinion resolves whether § 3730(d)(1) independently authorizes fees absent any relator proceeds award.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit held that under the text of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1), a relator may recover “reasonable expenses,” “reasonable attorneys’ fees,” and “costs” only if the relator received a relator’s share of the proceeds of the action or settlement. Because Conyers’s claims were dropped and he received no relator’s share of the settlement proceeds, he was not entitled to fees. The court therefore affirmed the denial of Conyers’s renewed fee motion.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

• United States ex rel. Conyers, 108 F.4th 351 (5th Cir. 2024) [hereinafter Conyers I]
  The prior Fifth Circuit decision provided the essential procedural and substantive predicate: a relator is “entitled to a share only of a settled ‘claim’ he brought, not additional claims added by the Government.” Because Conyers was not entitled to a proceeds share from the 2022 settlement, Conyers I also indicated the district court’s fee award was erroneous. On remand, the district court treated that logic as dispositive; the 2026 opinion confirms the statutory basis for that result.
• Vanderlan v. United States, 135 F.4th 257 (5th Cir. 2025)
  Cited for the standard of review: statutory interpretation of the FCA is reviewed de novo. This framed the appeal as a pure legal question about § 3730(d)(1)’s meaning, not an exercise of district-court discretion.
• United States v. Joseph, 102 F.4th 686 (5th Cir. 2024)
  Used for the bedrock interpretive principle that statutory interpretation “always begins with the text of the statute.” The court relied on this to prioritize § 3730(d)(1)’s structure and grammar over legislative history.
• Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004)
  Cited for the contextual reading canon: a phrase “gathers meaning from the words around it.” This supported reading “such person” as a referential term tethered to earlier sentences in § 3730(d)(1), not as a free-standing synonym for any relator.
• Adkins v. Silverman, 899 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2018)
  Invoked for the rule that legislative history is unnecessary when statutory text is unambiguous. After concluding § 3730(d)(1) was clear, the court declined to consider legislative history arguments.
• United States ex rel. Bryant v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 24 F.4th 1024 (6th Cir. 2022)
  This Sixth Circuit decision closely aligned with the Fifth Circuit’s reading. It concluded “only persons who receive a relator’s share may recover attorney fees,” reasoning that “also” presupposes receipt of something in addition to fees—namely, a proceeds share. The Fifth Circuit cited Bryant as persuasive confirmation that its textual reading matches other circuits.
• In re Sanders, 551 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2008)
  Cited within the discussion of Bryant for the interpretive approach of looking to the “closest appropriate word” when resolving referents like “such person.”
• United States ex rel. Lovell v. AthenaHealth, Inc., 56 F.4th 152 (1st Cir. 2022)
  The First Circuit held that relators who did not receive a relator’s share from the Government (but were paid under a private agreement) were not entitled to fees. The Fifth Circuit used Lovell to show cross-circuit consistency on the “no proceeds share, no fees” principle.
• United States v. Claris Vision, LLC, No. CV 18-00176-MSM, 2024 WL 165172 (D.R.I. Jan. 16, 2024)
  Distinguished as inapposite: it involved the proposition that fee payment is mandatory where relators recover a relator’s share. The Fifth Circuit treated such cases as consistent with, not contrary to, the proceeds-share prerequisite.
• U.S. ex. rel. Averback v. Pastor Med. Assocs. P.C., 224 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D. Mass. 2002)
  Also distinguished; it addressed calculating fees after settlement, not entitlement to fees without a proceeds share.
• United States ex rel. LeFan v. GE, No. 4:00-CV-222, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3020 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 14, 2008)
  Similarly distinguished as dealing with the amount of fees following settlement rather than entitlement absent a relator’s share.
• Call One Inc. v. Berkley Ins. Co., 587 F. Supp. 3d 706 (N.D. Ill. 2022)
  Noted as addressing the Illinois False Claims Act’s remedial structure and thus not controlling on the federal FCA’s text.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s holding turns on close reading of § 3730(d)(1)’s internal cross-references and demonstratives:

1. Three-sentence structure matters. The first sentence sets the core entitlement: if the Government proceeds with a relator’s action, the relator “shall … receive” 15–25% of proceeds “of the action or settlement of the claim.” The second sentence clarifies that any such payment “shall be made from the proceeds.”
2. “Such person” is a referential limitation. The third sentence—fees and expenses—applies to “[a]ny such person.” The Fifth Circuit applied the “rule of the last antecedent” to interpret “such person” as referring to the nearest reasonable antecedent: the person who receives a payment under the prior sentence, i.e., a relator who actually receives a proceeds share.
3. Context forecloses a broader reading. Conyers argued “such person” should mean any relator in a case where the Government intervened, even if the relator receives 0% of proceeds. The court rejected that as context-stripping, emphasizing (via Hibbs v. Winn) that meaning is supplied by surrounding words. If Congress intended fees for every relator regardless of proceeds, it could have said “the person” (without “such”) or repeated the “person [who] brought an action” phrasing from the first sentence.
4. Unambiguous text ends the inquiry. Having found the text clear, the court declined to consult legislative history (citing Adkins v. Silverman).
5. Inter-circuit alignment. The court bolstered its reading by citing United States ex rel. Bryant v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc. and United States ex rel. Lovell v. AthenaHealth, Inc., both of which treat receipt of a relator’s share as a prerequisite to fee shifting under the FCA.

3.3. Impact

• Bright-line entitlement rule in the Fifth Circuit. The opinion crystallizes a clear prerequisite: FCA fee shifting under § 3730(d)(1) requires an actual relator’s share award from proceeds. If the Government drops the relator’s claims and settles only different claims, the relator cannot recover fees.
• Incentives and litigation strategy for relators’ counsel. The ruling increases the practical importance of (i) ensuring the relator’s claims remain part of the Government’s pursued/settled “claim(s),” and (ii) negotiating or litigating entitlement to a proceeds share as a gateway to any fee recovery.
• Settlement dynamics when the Government intervenes. Defendants and the Government may resolve Government-added claims without creating fee exposure to a relator whose claims are not settled, because the fee obligation is tethered to relator-share entitlement.
• Doctrinal convergence across circuits. By aligning with the First and Sixth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit contributes to an emerging consensus that § 3730(d)(1) fee shifting is not freestanding; it is supplementary to a proceeds-share payment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• False Claims Act (FCA): A federal statute imposing civil liability for submitting false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States. It authorizes both Government enforcement and private enforcement.
• Qui tam / relator: A private person (the “relator”) who sues on behalf of the United States and may receive a percentage of any recovery.
• Government “intervention”: The Government may take over primary responsibility for a relator-filed case. Intervention does not guarantee that the Government will pursue every relator allegation.
• Relator’s share / proceeds: The percentage of settlement or judgment proceeds awarded to the relator under § 3730(d)(1), typically 15–25% when the Government proceeds with the action.
• Rule of the last antecedent: A grammar-based canon: words like “such,” “that,” or “which” usually refer to the nearest reasonable prior noun. Here, “such person” is read to mean the person described immediately before—i.e., the person paid from proceeds.
• Fee shifting: A statutory rule requiring the opposing party (here, potentially the defendant) to pay the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees. The Fifth Circuit treated § 3730(d)(1) fee shifting as conditional on receiving the relator’s share.

5. Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit’s decision establishes a straightforward textual rule for FCA qui tam litigation within the circuit: under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1), a relator may recover attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses only if the relator receives a relator’s share of proceeds from the action or settlement. Because Conyers’s claims were abandoned by the Government and the settlement did not include them—yielding no relator’s share—he could not recover fees. The opinion reinforces a proceeds-linked conception of FCA relator compensation: fees are not an independent entitlement, but an additional payment for “such person” who actually receives proceeds.