Fake-Identity Bank Account Holders Are Not “Customers” Under Shaw: Bank Fraud Proof and Deferred-Restitution Jurisdiction

Case: United States v. Omoruyi (1st Cir. July 15, 2026)  |  Charges: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349, 1956(h)

I. Introduction

United States v. Omoruyi concerns two brothers, Osakpamwan Henry Omoruyi (“Henry”) and Osaretin Godspower Omoruyi (“Osaretin”), convicted after an eight-day jury trial in the District of Massachusetts of (1) bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344, (2) conspiracy to commit bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and (3) conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).

The core conduct was identity-driven: each brother used a fake passport (bearing his own photograph but a false name) to open accounts, into which scam proceeds (romance scams and pandemic unemployment scams) were deposited. They withdrew money using debit cards printed with the false names and exchanged account information with each other and overseas partners.

On appeal, they raised five clusters of issues: (1) sufficiency of the evidence for bank fraud and bank-fraud conspiracy; (2) alleged error in the bank-fraud materiality instruction; (3) alleged error in the court’s response to jury questions on conspiracy; (4) an “authentication feature” enhancement under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii); and (5) restitution, including jurisdiction to enter the restitution order while an appeal of the initial judgment was pending, the proof supporting loss amounts, and joint-and-several liability.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit affirmed across the board: convictions, sentences (including the authentication-feature enhancement), and restitution orders.

  • Sufficiency: The evidence supported bank fraud under § 1344(1) and conspiracy under § 1349. The court rejected defendants’ reliance on Shaw v. United States, holding they were not the “customers” contemplated in Shaw because the accounts were opened under fake identities.
  • Materiality instruction: No plain error; the instruction matched United States v. Moran and the circuit had not adopted Maslenjak v. United States’s standard for bank fraud.
  • Jury questions on conspiracy: The response did not misstate the law or mislead; it properly anchored guilt to “the conspiracy as charged in the indictment.”
  • Guidelines enhancement: Fake passports with unique numbers qualified as “authentication features” under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii).
  • Restitution: The district court retained jurisdiction to enter deferred restitution despite pending appeal of the initial judgment; victim impact statements and FBI 302s supplied a “modicum of reliable evidence”; and joint-and-several liability was permissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Sufficiency of evidence framework

  • United States v. Díaz- Rosado (quoting United States v. Cruz-Díaz): supplied the de novo sufficiency standard—view evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and ask whether a rational factfinder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This lens drove the court’s acceptance of circumstantial evidence (fake IDs, account openings, withdrawals, information-sharing).
  • United States v. Pérez-Greaux and United States v. Maldonado-Peña: cited for the proposition that if defendants prevailed on sufficiency, Double Jeopardy would bar retrial—explaining why sufficiency was addressed first.
  • United States v. Blasini-Lluberas: supplied conspiracy principles (agreement may be tacit; proof may be circumstantial) and the elements used by the panel to validate the bank-fraud conspiracy conviction.

2. The bank-fraud “property” interest and defendants’ reliance on Shaw

  • Shaw v. United States: defendants argued that because they were “customer[s] in fact,” withdrawals did not deprive the bank of “something of value.” The First Circuit treated Shaw as answering a different question: whether a bank has a property interest in funds deposited in a customer’s account (it does), such that a plan to access those funds can satisfy § 1344(1). The key move in Omoruyi is to cabin Shaw’s “customer” concept to real, legitimate customers—rejecting its use to legitimize a fake-identity account opening.

3. Materiality and plain error

  • United States v. Moran: controlled the “natural tendency to influence or capable of influencing” materiality definition; the district court’s instruction tracked it and was therefore not plainly erroneous.
  • Maslenjak v. United States: defendants tried to import a stricter “truth would have resulted in a different outcome” standard; the panel rejected this because Maslenjak concerned 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (immigration naturalization fraud), and the First Circuit had not extended it to bank fraud.
  • United States v. Vega, United States v. González- Vélez, and United States v. Paniagua-Ramos: reinforced the demanding plain-error framework for unpreserved instructional challenges, particularly the “nowhere looms larger” admonition in the jury-instruction context.
  • United States v. Langston: used to dispose of the claim because, absent “binding on-point precedent,” defendants could not satisfy the “clear or obvious” error requirement.

4. Responding to jury questions; assessing instructional adequacy

  • United States v. Jadlowe: provided the two-part preserved-instruction framework—de novo for legal error; abuse of discretion for whether the instruction adequately explains law or confuses/misleads.
  • United States v. Gonzalez: supplied the “instructions as a whole” approach and the district court’s discretion in wording/structure.
  • United States v. Correia: supported the presumption that juries follow instructions, undermining the claim of confusion.
  • United States v. Zannino: used to deem waived a perfunctory constructive-amendment/variance argument.

5. Sentencing review and the “authentication feature” enhancement

  • United States v. Leach and United States v. Ruiz-Huertas: supplied the preserved-sentencing-error standard (abuse of discretion) and its component sub-standards (de novo for Guidelines interpretation/application; clear error for factfinding).

6. Restitution jurisdiction and procedure in deferred-restitution cases

  • United States v. Naphaeng: central authority in-circuit that a district court retains jurisdiction to enter amended restitution while an appeal of the initial judgment is pending, where restitution was deferred under the MVRA mechanism.
  • United States v. George (and United States v. Carpenter distinguishing it): George (a forfeiture case) did not control; unlike the situation in Omoruyi, the first judgment in George did not actively defer forfeiture, but merely suggested possible future forfeiture. Carpenter was used to explain that difference.
  • Dolan v. United States: reinforced that a court can retain authority beyond the MVRA’s 90-day period if it made clear it would order restitution (the panel noted defendants did not contest “clarity” here).
  • Manrique v. United States: supplied the conceptual framing that deferred restitution produces “two appealable judgments,” supporting the district court’s continuing authority and the procedural posture.
  • L. Offs. of David Efron v. Matthews & Fullmer L. Firm: cited for de novo review of jurisdictional issues.

7. Restitution proof standards; evidence admissibility; joint and several

  • United States v. Chiaradio: supplied the standard of review for restitution (abuse of discretion; clear error for factual findings; de novo for legal questions).
  • United States v. Simon: emphasized the deferential “modicum of reliable evidence” benchmark and the need to resolve genuine disputes by a preponderance of evidence.
  • United States v. Carrasquillo-Vilches and United States v. Alphas: described MVRA restitution as limited to “actual losses” and requiring an “adequate causal link” (direct and proximate harm).
  • United States v. Padilla-Galarza: placed the rebuttal burden on defendants once the government makes a prima facie loss showing—speculation is not enough to reduce the award.
  • United States v. Salas-Fernández and United States v. Gallardo-Ortiz: supported the proposition that normal rules of evidence do not apply at restitution and that victim-impact statements/FBI 302s can be considered; also supported that apportionment is not required and joint-and-several liability may be imposed.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1): “customer” status cannot be bootstrapped via fake identity

The opinion’s most consequential reasoning is its treatment of Shaw v. United States. Defendants attempted to recast themselves as the relevant “customer[s]” because the fake-passport accounts were opened for their own use. The court rejected the premise: in a fake-identity account opening, the “customer” referenced in Shaw is not the fraudster behind the disguise. Thus, Shaw does not support a defense theory that the bank cannot be deprived of “something of value” when the defendant later withdraws from the fraudulently opened account.

Applying the sufficiency standard from United States v. Díaz- Rosado, the court held the evidence showed a knowing scheme to defraud a federally insured bank: fake passports were used to open TD Bank accounts in fictitious names; debit cards bearing those fictitious names were used to withdraw funds; and the accounts served as receptacles for scam proceeds. The panel treated the fake-ID account opening and subsequent withdrawals as quintessential § 1344(1) conduct.

2. Conspiracy to commit bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349: information-sharing and fund movement as circumstantial proof

Relying on United States v. Blasini-Lluberas, the court found adequate evidence of agreement and voluntary participation from: (i) the brothers exchanging account information with each other before sending it to others; (ii) transfers from “Nelson Bright” accounts to Henry’s personal account; and (iii) withdrawals as overt acts in furtherance of the scheme. The court’s approach underscores that coordinated “account infrastructure” behavior can establish conspiracy even if operational roles differ.

3. Materiality instruction: reaffirmation of Moran in bank fraud; Maslenjak not imported via plain error

The panel held that the district court’s definition of “material” (“natural tendency to influence or be capable of influencing”) was consistent with United States v. Moran. Because defendants did not object at trial, plain-error review applied (United States v. Vega; United States v. Paniagua-Ramos), and the absence of “binding on-point precedent” extending Maslenjak v. United States to bank fraud foreclosed relief under United States v. Langston.

4. Answering the jury’s conspiracy question: no constructive broadening where the court anchors the “as charged” conspiracy

The jury asked whether the government had to prove the defendants conspired “with each other,” or whether each could have separate agreements with “other co-conspirators.” The district judge responded that the jury must find “the conspiracy as charged in the indictment” and that each defendant could be convicted if he conspired with at least one other person “as charged,” even if the other defendant were acquitted.

Evaluated “as a whole” (United States v. Gonzalez), the First Circuit found no legal error (United States v. Jadlowe) and no misleading confusion, emphasizing the repeated “as charged” limitation and the presumption that jurors follow instructions (United States v. Correia). A perfunctory variance/constructive-amendment claim was deemed waived under United States v. Zannino.

5. Authentication-feature enhancement: passports’ unique identifying numbers qualify

The court affirmed the two-level enhancement under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii), interpreting “authentication feature” via the guideline commentary’s incorporation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(1). It reasoned that passports contain unique identifying numbers used to determine authenticity, and the PSRs supported that the fake passports were used to open the accounts central to the offense.

6. Restitution jurisdiction: a pending appeal does not strip the district court of power to enter a deferred MVRA restitution order

The defendants argued that their appeal of the initial judgment divested jurisdiction. The panel rejected this, relying on the MVRA’s deferral mechanism (18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5)), and the principle recognized in Manrique v. United States that deferred restitution yields “two appealable judgments.” The court treated United States v. Naphaeng as controlling and distinguished United States v. George as a forfeiture case (with United States v. Carpenter supplying the key distinction).

7. Restitution proof and joint-and-several liability

On proof, the panel applied the “modicum of reliable evidence” standard from United States v. Simon and accepted sworn trial testimony for some victims and victim-impact statements plus FBI 302s for others, noting restitution hearings are not governed by normal evidence rules (United States v. Salas-Fernández; United States v. Gallardo-Ortiz). Defendants’ generalized assertions that victims might lie did not rebut the government’s prima facie showing; under United States v. Padilla-Galarza, they needed specific evidentiary rebuttal.

On joint and several liability, the court invoked 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) and reiterated that apportionment is discretionary and that a court is “not required” to parse role to allocate losses (United States v. Salas-Fernández).

C. Impact

  • Bank fraud prosecutions involving synthetic/fake identities: Omoruyi strengthens the government’s ability to characterize fake-identity account opening plus withdrawal as § 1344(1) bank fraud, and it limits defense reliance on Shaw v. United States where the “customer” is fictitious.
  • Materiality in the First Circuit: The decision reinforces that United States v. Moran remains the operative materiality formulation in bank fraud; attempts to import Maslenjak v. United States face significant headwinds absent explicit circuit adoption—especially under plain-error review.
  • Conspiracy instructions in multi-actor fraud schemes: The court validates an approach where the jury may convict one defendant even if it acquits the other, so long as the proven agreement matches “the conspiracy as charged.” This is particularly relevant in schemes with overseas collaborators.
  • Guidelines—identity documents: The decision supports routine application of USSG § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii) to counterfeit passports, emphasizing that the passport’s identifying number is an “authentication feature.”
  • Deferred restitution practice: Omoruyi bolsters district courts’ authority to complete MVRA restitution after an appeal of the initial sentence, aligning with United States v. Naphaeng and the “two judgments” framework of Manrique v. United States.
  • Restitution evidentiary showings: The approval of victim impact statements and FBI 302s (absent specific reliability attacks) signals that defendants must come prepared with concrete rebuttal evidence to reduce awards.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Bank fraud (§ 1344(1)): A “scheme to defraud a financial institution.” The focus is on deceit aimed at the bank (not merely a private victim) and obtaining bank-controlled property through that deceit.
  • “Something of value” under Shaw: Shaw v. United States recognizes a bank’s property interest in funds in deposit accounts. Omoruyi clarifies that a fraudster cannot invoke “customer” status when the account is created under a false identity.
  • Conspiracy (§ 1349): An agreement (even tacit) to commit the crime plus knowing, voluntary participation. Direct proof is rare; coordination and information-sharing can be enough circumstantial evidence.
  • Materiality: Under United States v. Moran, a statement is material if it is capable of influencing a decisionmaker—not only if it would definitely change the outcome.
  • Plain error: A stringent appellate standard for unpreserved issues: the error must be clear/obvious and must seriously affect fairness and outcomes.
  • Authentication feature (USSG § 2B1.1(b)(11)): A document element used to verify authenticity (here, passport identifying numbers). Using or possessing counterfeit documents with such features can increase the Guidelines offense level.
  • Deferred restitution and “two judgments”: Under the MVRA, courts can enter a later restitution amount after sentencing when losses aren’t fully ascertainable; that later restitution order is separately appealable (Manrique v. United States).
  • Joint and several liability: Each defendant can be ordered to pay the full amount (with credit for payments by the other), when both contributed to the victim’s loss (18 U.S.C. § 3664(h)).

V. Conclusion

United States v. Omoruyi is a wide-ranging fraud decision, but its most durable contribution is its clarification that defendants who open accounts using false identities cannot claim “customer” status to escape § 1344(1) under Shaw v. United States. The opinion also solidifies First Circuit practice on (i) bank-fraud materiality (reaffirming United States v. Moran), (ii) careful “as charged” anchoring when answering jury conspiracy questions, (iii) treating fake passports as involving “authentication features” for Guidelines purposes, and (iv) sustaining MVRA deferred-restitution orders—including jurisdiction to enter them during a pending appeal and reliance on victim impact statements and FBI 302s when the record is otherwise reliable.