Failure to Provide a Hearing Transcript Compels Affirmance and Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity Bars § 1983 Damages for Advocacy-Phase Evidence Use

1. Introduction

In Lakeria Montgomery v. Coy Morgan (11th Cir. May 27, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of a pro se plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against an Assistant District Attorney. The plaintiff, Lakeria Monae Montgomery, was a corrections officer at the Mobile County Metro Jail. She alleged that Coy Morgan, in connection with the prosecution of her incarcerated brother, caused or contributed to her termination and engaged in misconduct related to allegedly “illegal messages” from contraband cellphones.

The appeal presented two practical and doctrinal issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals could review the District Court’s stated reasons for dismissal when the appellant failed to provide the hearing transcript the District Court relied upon; and (2) whether Montgomery’s allegations—by her own framing—fell within the core of absolute prosecutorial immunity because they challenged actions taken as an advocate in a criminal case.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on two independent bases:

  1. Record deficiency under Rule 10(b)(2): The District Court granted the motion to dismiss “for the reasons stated on the record at the hearing,” but Montgomery did not include the transcript in the appellate record. That failure left the Eleventh Circuit unable to review the District Court’s reasoning and required affirmance.
  2. Absolute prosecutorial immunity: Even apart from the missing transcript, Montgomery’s own allegations asserted that Morgan’s motive and conduct were tied to using cellphone messages as evidence in her brother’s criminal prosecution. Because that conduct was “in the course of his role as an advocate for the State,” Morgan was absolutely immune from damages under § 1983—even if the acts were “wrongful or malicious.”

The panel also addressed Montgomery’s attempt to substitute the Mobile County Sheriff’s Department for the jail and concluded that, even if treated as a request for leave to amend, denial was proper because amendment would be futile.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015) — Cited for the standard of review on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal (de novo; allegations accepted as true; construed in plaintiff’s favor). This frames the appellate lens, but the court ultimately could not apply it meaningfully without the hearing transcript.
  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) — Provide the “plausibility” pleading standard. Their functional role here is to reinforce that a complaint must plead facts permitting a reasonable inference of liability; however, the immunity doctrine meant that even plausible accusations of prosecutorial wrongdoing could still be legally barred.
  • Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) — The cornerstone authority establishing absolute immunity for prosecutors from § 1983 damages for conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase” of the criminal process. The panel uses Imbler as the governing rule.
  • Kassa v. Fulton Cnty., 40 F.4th 1289 (11th Cir. 2022) — Emphasizes the functional test: immunity turns on the “nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor.” This supports the conclusion that what matters is whether Morgan’s challenged conduct was advocacy-related.
  • Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) — Defines the scope of prosecutorial immunity to include acts undertaken in preparing for initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, “in the course of his role as an advocate for the State.” The panel quotes Jones to connect Montgomery’s own “motive” allegation to protected advocacy functions.
  • Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2009) — Reinforces that absolute immunity covers “even wrongful or malicious acts.” This case neutralizes Montgomery’s attempt to avoid immunity by characterizing Morgan’s conduct as malicious or fraudulent.
  • In re Coady, 588 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2009), Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1991) — Applied to the missing transcript problem: the court will not “speculate” about potential errors when the appellant fails to include relevant portions of the record, and Rule 10(b)(2) applies even to pro se litigants.
  • Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2004) — Used to reject amendment/substitution: leave to amend may be denied when amendment would be futile, i.e., the amended pleading would still be dismissed.
  • Estelle v. Gamble, 29 U.S. 97 (1976) (as quoted in the opinion) — Cited for the general principle that courts construe pro se pleadings liberally. Here it supported the District Court’s decision to interpret Montgomery’s filing as a response to a motion to dismiss rather than a proper amended pleading.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Appellate-record doctrine: Rule 10(b)(2) as a gatekeeper

A distinctive feature of this decision is that the Eleventh Circuit treated the missing transcript as independently dispositive. The District Court’s order incorporated by reference its oral reasons “stated on the record at the hearing.” Under Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2), an appellant who challenges findings or conclusions must provide the relevant transcript. Without it, the appellate court cannot evaluate what the District Court actually decided or why, and it will not guess. The panel relied on In re Coady and Fernandez v. United States to underscore that this is not relaxed for pro se parties.

Practically, the opinion signals that when a dismissal order incorporates oral reasoning, the transcript becomes central to the appeal. The absence of that transcript effectively converts many appellate arguments into unreviewable assertions.

B. Functional prosecutorial immunity: plaintiff’s own theory placed the conduct within advocacy

Even “regardless” of the record defect, the panel held that Montgomery pleaded herself into an immunity bar. Her complaint asserted that Morgan’s “motive was to use illegal messages” from a phone “in Quinterious Williams [sic] case,” and her appellate brief reiterated that Morgan had the contraband entered and “used as states [sic] evidence against” Williams.

Under Imbler v. Pachtman, Jones v. Cannon, and Kassa v. Fulton Cnty., the relevant question is whether the challenged actions were part of the prosecutorial function of advocating for the state (initiating proceedings, preparing for trial, introducing evidence). On Montgomery’s framing, the alleged wrongdoing was intertwined with evidentiary use in an ongoing prosecution—precisely the “judicial phase” activity protected by absolute immunity.

Hart v. Hodges then foreclosed any attempt to avoid immunity by alleging bad intent: absolute prosecutorial immunity attaches even to “wrongful or malicious” advocacy-phase acts, because the doctrine is designed to protect the prosecutorial role and the functioning of the judicial process from post hoc damages litigation.

C. Futility and substitution/leave to amend

Montgomery also sought to replace the non-suable jail entity with the Mobile County Sheriff’s Department. The Eleventh Circuit construed her brief as challenging the District Court’s handling of her amended filing and its refusal to allow amendment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Even if the District Court should have treated the filing as a motion for leave to amend, the denial was affirmed under Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am. because amendment would have been futile: her claims were “meritless” even if restyled against a different local entity.

3.3. Impact

  • Procedural impact (appellate practice): The decision is a cautionary precedent (even if unpublished) that appeals may fail at the threshold when the appellant omits a transcript that contains the dispositive reasoning. In cases where the district court rules “for the reasons stated on the record,” the transcript is functionally part of the order.
  • Substantive impact (civil suits against prosecutors): The opinion reinforces a broad, functional view of absolute prosecutorial immunity in § 1983 damages actions. Allegations that a prosecutor obtained, used, or introduced evidence (even if allegedly “illegal” or maliciously handled) will typically be characterized as advocacy-related conduct protected by Imbler and its Eleventh Circuit progeny.
  • Pleading strategy impact: The panel’s “regardless” analysis illustrates that plaintiffs can inadvertently concede immunity by framing alleged misconduct as part of a prosecutor’s evidentiary/trial strategy. To the extent a claim is viable at all, it often turns on distinguishing investigative/administrative acts from advocacy acts—a distinction not supported by Montgomery’s allegations as quoted in the opinion.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • § 1983 claim: A lawsuit for money damages (or other relief) against a person acting “under color of state law” who violates federal constitutional or statutory rights.
  • Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal: A dismissal because, even assuming the alleged facts are true, the complaint does not state a legal claim that entitles the plaintiff to relief.
  • Plausibility (Twombly/Iqbal): The complaint must allege enough factual matter to make liability a reasonable inference, not a mere possibility.
  • Absolute prosecutorial immunity: A complete shield against § 1983 damages for conduct tied to the prosecutor’s role as an advocate in the judicial process (e.g., preparing a case, presenting evidence). It can apply even if the prosecutor allegedly acted in bad faith.
  • Functional test (Kassa): Courts look at the type of act (advocacy vs. investigative/administrative), not the job title.
  • Rule 10(b)(2) transcript requirement: If the district court’s decision depends on what happened at a hearing, the appellant must include that hearing transcript in the appellate record; otherwise, the appellate court generally will affirm because it cannot review the claim of error.
  • Futility (Hall): Courts can deny leave to amend when the new complaint would still be dismissed, making amendment pointless.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s disposition in Lakeria Montgomery v. Coy Morgan underscores two durable lessons. First, appellate review depends on an adequate record: when a district court adopts oral hearing reasons, failure to provide the transcript can compel affirmance under Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2). Second, § 1983 damages claims targeting a prosecutor’s evidentiary and trial-related decisions are typically barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity under Imbler v. Pachtman, even when framed as malicious or fraudulent. The opinion thus reinforces both a procedural gatekeeping rule (record completeness) and a substantive immunity boundary (advocacy-phase prosecutorial acts are not actionable for damages under § 1983).