Failure to Acknowledge Neglect and Benefit from Services Supports Denial of an Improvement Period and Termination of Parental Rights

Introduction

In In re B.S., G.S., R.S., and S.S., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed an order terminating Father C.S.’s parental rights to four children. The case began after the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleged that S.B., the biological mother of three children and stepmother of S.S., physically abused S.S. Father was adjudicated as an abusing and neglecting parent because he failed to protect the child.

The appeal presented two related questions: whether Father should have received a post-dispositional improvement period and whether the circuit court should have selected a less restrictive alternative to termination. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court acted within its discretion because Father did not acknowledge his own wrongdoing, did not complete therapy or consistently attend visitation, remained in a volatile relationship with the mother, and obtained only minimal benefit from extensive services.

The decision does not announce a wholly new doctrinal test. Instead, it reinforces an important rule in West Virginia abuse-and-neglect law: participation in services is not enough when the parent fails to recognize the underlying safety problem and does not demonstrate meaningful improvement.

Background and Procedural History

The DHS filed its petition in September 2023 after allegations that the mother grabbed S.S. by the back of the neck and covered his mouth to stop him from screaming. S.S. reported that the mother yelled at him, handled him roughly, and physically prevented him from crying. He said that he did not feel safe at home. Other children confirmed that the mother physically disciplined S.S. but did not treat them in the same manner.

At the February 2024 adjudicatory hearing, the mother admitted grabbing S.S. by the neck but denied intending to hurt him. Father acknowledged seeing bruises and injuries but testified that S.S. had attributed them to older children at school. The circuit court found that S.S. had bruises in various stages of healing and was the target of physical abuse. It adjudicated Father as an abusing and neglecting parent for failing to protect S.S. The other children were also found abused and neglected because they were living in the home where the abuse occurred.

During the ensuing proceedings, Father received parenting services, supervised visitation, and a direction to participate in weekly therapy. Although he engaged in some services, the evidence showed that he:

• continued to deny that he had personally done anything wrong;
• remained in a volatile relationship with the mother;
• misrepresented whether he and the mother were living together;
• stopped individualized therapy after only a few sessions;
• missed multiple supervised visits; and
• failed to respond appropriately to the children’s emotional needs during visitation.

Service providers described the parents’ relationship as toxic and marked by yelling, throwing objects, and chasing one another. They also reported that the children’s behavior worsened after visitation began. Particularly significant was the evidence that S.S. would not return to Father’s custody while the mother remained in the home.

Following a multi-day dispositional hearing, the circuit court found no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future. It further found that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare and terminated Father’s parental rights.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed both challenged rulings. First, it held that Father did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was likely to fully participate in a post-dispositional improvement period. His incomplete therapy, missed visits, continued volatile relationship, dishonesty concerning his living arrangement, and refusal to acknowledge his failure to protect demonstrated that further improvement was unlikely.

Second, the Court rejected Father’s request for a less restrictive disposition. Under West Virginia law, termination may be ordered without first employing lesser alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. The record supported both findings. Father also did not challenge the circuit court’s determination that termination served the children’s best interests.

Analysis

Standard of Appellate Review

Relying on syllabus point 1 of In re K.S., the Court applied a mixed standard of review. Substantive rulings in abuse-and-neglect proceedings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal questions de novo.

This framework gave substantial deference to the circuit court’s assessment of witness credibility, Father’s progress, and the likelihood of future correction. The Supreme Court did not reweigh the evidence; it examined whether the findings had adequate support and whether the circuit court correctly applied the governing law.

Denial of the Post-Dispositional Improvement Period

West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(3)(B) permits a post-dispositional improvement period when the parent demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is likely to participate fully. The burden therefore rests on the parent seeking the additional opportunity.

The Court emphasized that Father’s partial participation did not establish likely full participation or meaningful improvement. He discontinued therapy, missed visits, remained in the unsafe family dynamic, and failed to recognize his own role in permitting the abuse. These facts supported the circuit court’s conclusion that another improvement period would not likely remedy the conditions affecting the children.

Acknowledgment as a Condition of Effective Rehabilitation

The central reasoning of the opinion concerns Father’s refusal to acknowledge his wrongdoing. Although he eventually recognized that the mother had abused S.S., he continued to insist that he had done nothing wrong. That position prevented him from meaningfully addressing the adjudicated failure to protect.

The Court treated acknowledgment as more than a verbal formality. A parent who does not accept that a safety problem exists is unlikely to benefit from services intended to correct that problem. Thus, service attendance and nominal cooperation cannot substitute for demonstrated insight, changed behavior, and the ability to protect the children.

Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) authorizes termination when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. Section 49-4-604(d)(3) identifies a parent’s failure to follow through with a reasonable family case plan or rehabilitative efforts as one circumstance establishing that correction is unlikely.

The evidence fit that statutory framework. Father received services for an extended period but did not consistently follow through or demonstrate sufficient benefit. His continued relationship with the mother was especially relevant because the relationship remained volatile and because S.S. would not return while the mother remained in the home.

The opinion should not be read as creating a categorical rule that a parent must always end a relationship upon the DHS’s request. Rather, the Court relied on the specific evidence that this relationship perpetuated instability, domestic conflict, and a concrete barrier to reunification. In that factual setting, Father’s decision to maintain the relationship supported the finding that the underlying conditions remained uncorrected.

Precedents Cited

In re K.S.

This decision supplied the appellate standard of review: abuse of discretion for substantive rulings, clear error for factual findings, and de novo review for legal issues. It framed the Supreme Court’s deferential treatment of the circuit court’s findings regarding Father’s progress and credibility.

In re M.M.

In re M.M. establishes that a circuit court has discretion when deciding whether to grant an improvement period. Even where some participation has occurred, an improvement period is not automatic. The precedent supported affirmance because Father did not prove that continued services were likely to produce correction.

In re Tonjia M.

The Court cited In re Tonjia M. for the proposition that a circuit court may deny an improvement period when improvement is unlikely. Father’s incomplete therapy, missed visitation, volatile relationship, and limited insight furnished the factual basis for applying that principle.

In re Timber M. and In re Charity H.

Quoting In re Charity H., the Court in In re Timber M. explained that an abuse or neglect problem must first be acknowledged before it can be remedied. Failure to acknowledge the problem makes it untreatable and renders an improvement period futile at the child’s expense.

These authorities were particularly important because Father acknowledged the mother’s conduct but not his own failure to protect. The Court viewed that incomplete acknowledgment as preventing effective treatment of the adjudicated neglect.

In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M.

In re Kristin Y., quoting In re R.J.M., establishes that termination may be imposed without first using less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected. These cases directly answered Father’s argument that the circuit court should have chosen a lesser disposition.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Improvement period

A court-supervised opportunity for a parent to complete services and correct the conditions that caused abuse or neglect. It is not an entitlement; the parent must demonstrate a genuine likelihood of full participation.

Clear and convincing evidence

A demanding level of proof requiring evidence that makes the asserted fact highly probable, though it is less stringent than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Failure to protect

Neglect arising when a parent knows or should know that a child is at risk and does not take reasonable action to protect the child, even if that parent did not personally inflict the injury.

No reasonable likelihood of correction

A finding that the parent is unlikely to remedy the harmful conditions within a time that is consistent with the child’s need for safety and permanence.

Less restrictive alternative

A disposition short of permanent termination, such as continued services, temporary custody arrangements, or other protective supervision. Such alternatives are unnecessary when correction is unlikely and termination is required for the child’s welfare.

Best interests of the child

The controlling consideration of the child’s safety, stability, emotional well-being, and need for a permanent home rather than the parent’s preference for additional time.

Potential Impact

The opinion reinforces several practical principles for future abuse-and-neglect proceedings:

• Participation must produce benefit. Courts may distinguish between attending services and making measurable behavioral changes.
• Acknowledgment must include the parent’s own conduct. Recognizing another person’s abuse does not cure a parent’s refusal to accept responsibility for failing to protect.
• Domestic instability is relevant to reunification. A continuing volatile relationship may demonstrate that the home remains unsafe or that the causes of neglect have not been corrected.
• Children need not wait indefinitely. Courts may deny additional time when the evidence shows that further services would likely be futile.
• Termination need not follow a sequence of lesser dispositions. Once the statutory findings are established, the court may proceed directly to termination.

The decision also illustrates the importance of developing a detailed record. Testimony concerning missed services, lack of insight, domestic conflict, the children’s emotional deterioration, and the parent’s dishonesty collectively supported termination. Any single factor might not have been decisive, but together they demonstrated a sustained failure to correct the conditions of neglect.

Conclusion

In re B.S., G.S., R.S., and S.S. confirms that an improvement period is not warranted merely because a parent has participated in some services. The decisive question is whether the parent has acknowledged the problem, followed through with rehabilitation, and demonstrated a realistic capacity to provide a safe home.

Father’s minimal benefit from services, refusal to accept responsibility, incomplete therapy, inconsistent visitation, and continued volatile relationship supported the findings that further improvement was unlikely and that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare. The decision therefore underscores West Virginia’s priority of child safety and timely permanency over additional rehabilitative opportunities that the record shows would likely be futile.