Failure to Acknowledge Abuse Makes a Post‑Adjudicatory Improvement Period Futile: Denial and Termination Affirmed Amid Ongoing Domestic Violence and Methamphetamine Use

1. Introduction

In In re K.S. (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. June 24, 2026), petitioner father B.S. appealed the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s dispositional order terminating his parental rights to newborn K.S. The case arose from an abuse and neglect petition filed by the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) after K.S. exhibited withdrawal symptoms at birth, the mother admitted prenatal methamphetamine use, and DHS documented an ongoing pattern of domestic violence connected to the father’s alcohol abuse.

The central appellate issue was narrow: whether the circuit court erred by denying the father’s motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the circuit court acted within its discretion given continued domestic violence, repeated methamphetamine positives (including immediately after release from jail), and the father’s lack of credible acknowledgment of wrongdoing—especially in light of prior involuntary terminations.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the termination order and the denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period. It reiterated: (1) appellate review standards in abuse and neglect matters; (2) a post-adjudicatory improvement period is discretionary; and (3) a parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is likely to fully participate.

The Court found “ample evidence” supporting the circuit court’s conclusion that improvement was unlikely where the father continued violent conduct, tested positive for methamphetamine multiple times, and remained evasive and non-accepting of responsibility—rendering an improvement period “an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.”

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, -- S.E.2d --, 2026 WL 1362143 (W. Va. May 15, 2026)

The Court relied on this syllabus point for the familiar abuse-and-neglect appellate framework: substantive rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal issues de novo. That standard is outcome-shaping here because the father’s claim attacked a discretionary call (improvement period) and depended heavily on credibility and factual inferences drawn from his conduct and testimony. Under these deferential layers, the Court focused on whether the circuit court had a reasonable evidentiary basis—not whether the Supreme Court would have made a different decision.

Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.A., 251 W. Va. 626, 915 S.E.2d 520 (2025)

In re K.A. supplied the specific standard for reviewing improvement period rulings: abuse of discretion. The Court used this to frame the appeal as an uphill climb for the father—he needed to show the circuit court’s denial was outside the range of permissible choices given the record.

In re M.M., 236 W. Va. 108, 115, 778 S.E.2d 338, 345 (2015)

The Court quoted In re M.M. for the principle that West Virginia law gives circuit courts discretion to grant or deny improvement periods. This precedent undercuts any notion that a parent is “entitled” to an improvement period merely by requesting one or showing partial compliance.

In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002)

In re Tonjia M. was cited for the proposition that a circuit court may deny an improvement period when “no improvement is likely.” The decision in In re K.S. applies that practical prediction model: the father’s repeated violence and drug positives—even after services and jail— were treated as forward-looking indicators that additional time would not correct conditions “in the near future.”

In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 217, 599 S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004))

These cases provided the decisive doctrinal lens: acknowledgement is a prerequisite to remediation. The Court reiterated that “the problem must first be acknowledged,” and that failure to do so makes the problem “untreatable,” turning an improvement period into “futility at the child’s expense.” This precedent was directly mapped onto the father’s “extremely evasive” testimony (e.g., minimizing or denying domestic violence convictions, attributing positive methamphetamine screens to proximity to others, and professing ignorance of positives immediately after incarceration).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in four linked steps:

1. Statutory gatekeeping: Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), a post-adjudicatory improvement period may be granted only if the parent shows by clear and convincing evidence that he is likely to fully participate.
2. Discretion remains paramount: Even if some participation is shown, precedent confirms the decision is discretionary and may be denied when “no improvement is likely.”
3. Evidence supporting “no improvement likely”: The circuit court had record support for pessimism: (a) multiple methamphetamine positives (including immediately after release from jail); (b) ongoing domestic violence (including arrest for domestic battery against a pregnant girlfriend during the case); (c) prior involuntary terminations involving domestic violence and severe neglect; and (d) a parental fitness evaluation giving a “very poor” prognosis due to refusal to accept responsibility and lack of insight.
4. Credibility and insight as treatment prerequisites: Using In re Timber M./In re Charity H., the Court treated the father’s evasiveness and non-acceptance of wrongdoing as legally significant because they bear directly on whether services can work. On that record, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying an improvement period and proceeding to termination as in the child’s best interest.

Notably, the Court did not treat completion of one service (a domestic violence class) as dispositive, especially where the circuit court found the father continued violent conduct afterward. The Court also accepted the circuit court’s reliance on judicial notice of prior terminations and its credibility findings— both critical in predicting future safety and parental capacity.

3.3 Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, In re K.S. reinforces several practical points likely to influence future abuse and neglect litigation:

• Improvement periods are not automatic post-adjudication: A parent must do more than request time; he must prove likely full participation under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), and the circuit court may still deny based on “no improvement likely.”
• Insight and accountability are “gatekeeper facts”: The decision underscores that denial, minimization, and evasiveness are not merely moral failings—they are legal predictors of futility that can justify skipping additional time and proceeding to permanency.
• Post-service misconduct is highly probative: Continued domestic violence after completing domestic violence programming was treated as powerful evidence that services were ineffective or not internalized.
• Drug positives near critical hearings matter: A positive test immediately after release from incarceration—coupled with prior positives—supported the inference that conditions could not be corrected “in the near future.”
• Prior involuntary terminations carry substantial weight: Judicial notice of prior terminations based on domestic violence and extreme neglect can strongly support findings about patterns and prognosis in a later case, particularly where new allegations echo old ones.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Post-adjudicatory improvement period: A court-ordered window after a parent has been found abusive/neglectful (adjudicated) during which the parent receives services and must demonstrate change. It is discretionary, not guaranteed.
• Clear and convincing evidence: A heightened standard of proof—more than “more likely than not,” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Here, it applies to whether the parent is likely to fully participate in the improvement period.
• No reasonable likelihood conditions can be substantially corrected in the near future: A dispositional finding that, based on evidence and prognosis, additional time/services will not fix the problems soon enough to meet a child’s need for safety and permanency.
• Judicial notice: A procedure allowing a court to recognize certain facts or prior proceedings without re-proving them (e.g., prior termination orders).
• Abuse of discretion / clear error / de novo: Different appellate review levels. “Abuse of discretion” is deferential; “clear error” defers to the trial court’s factfinding unless plainly wrong; “de novo” means the appellate court gives no deference on pure legal questions.

5. Conclusion

In re K.S. affirms that a post-adjudicatory improvement period may be denied—and termination affirmed—when the record shows ongoing violence, continued substance abuse, and, critically, a parent’s failure to credibly acknowledge and take responsibility for the conditions of abuse and neglect. By applying W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B) through longstanding precedent emphasizing discretion and the futility of services without insight, the Court reinforced that child welfare dispositions prioritize realistic prospects of timely change over aspirational promises made at disposition.