Facility-Specific Child-Abuse Report Counts Are Disclosable Under CORA When They Do Not Reveal a Confidential Report or Protected Identifying Information

I. Introduction

Brubaker v. Colorado Sun, 586 P.3d 706 (Colo. 2026 CO 18), arose from public-records requests by Colorado Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News (collectively, the “Media Organizations”) directed to the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS), through its records custodian, Amanda Brubaker.

The Media Organizations sought (via the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA)) basic, facility-level statistics about alleged abuse or neglect reporting from three state-funded residential child care facilities (“RCCFs”): (1) the total number of reports over a three-year period for each facility, and (2) how many of those reports were screened in for investigation.

CDHS refused, invoking CORA’s exception for disclosures “contrary to any state statute,” § 24-72-204(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025), and pointing to the Children’s Records Act confidentiality provision, § 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025), which states that “reports of child abuse or neglect and the name and address of any child, family, or informant or any other identifying information contained in such reports shall be confidential and shall not be public information.”

The central issues were: (1) whether § 19-1-307(1)(a) is ambiguous (and thus open to narrowing constructions), and (2) whether facility-specific counts “disclose” confidential “address” (or other protected identifying information) merely because they relate to reports made from a known facility location.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Colorado Supreme Court (Samour, J.) held:

  • § 19-1-307(1)(a) is unambiguous. It protects (i) reports of child abuse or neglect, and (ii) the name, address, and any other identifying information contained in those reports.
  • The Media Organizations requested six “cardinal numbers” (two per facility). CDHS failed to carry its burden to show that disclosing those numbers would disclose a protected “report,” a protected “name,” a protected “address,” or “any other identifying information” within the meaning of § 19-1-307(1)(a).
  • CDHS therefore must disclose the six requested counts.

Procedurally, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ remand for factfinding and directed that the matter proceed consistent with the Supreme Court’s view that the numbers must be produced; the district court on remand should address attorney fees and costs under § 24-72-204(5)(b).

Justice Berkenkotter (joined by Chief Justice Márquez and Justice Hood) concurred in the judgment only, arguing the majority’s reasoning effectively compels prohibited “confirmation” of confidential report existence and improperly introduces an “already public” carveout inconsistent with statutory text.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Transparency vs. privacy framing

  • Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting): invoked for the “right to be let alone” to frame the privacy interests at stake in child-abuse reporting.

2. CORA’s pro-disclosure baseline and the custodian’s burden

  • Shook v. Pitkin Cnty. Comm'rs, 2015 COA 84: cited for two foundational CORA propositions: exceptions are construed narrowly given CORA’s presumption of openness, and the records custodian bears the burden of proving an exception applies.
  • Sargent Sch. Dist. No. RE-33J v. W. Servs., Inc., 751 P.2d 56 (Colo. 1988): cited for the principle that courts narrowly construe “exceptions to the broad, general policy of [CORA]” favoring disclosure.

3. Plain-meaning statutory interpretation; when courts may look beyond text

  • Reno v. Marks, 2015 CO 33; Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083 (Colo. 2011); Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88; Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3: collectively cited for de novo review of statutory interpretation, the primacy of plain meaning, and reading words in context and grammar.
  • In re People in Int. of A.T.C., 2023 CO 19; Archuleta v. Roane, 2024 CO 74: cited for the rule against constructions producing “illogical or absurd results” and against surplusage.
  • Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83; Crandall v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 238 P.3d 659 (Colo. 2010): cited for the directive that where text is clear, courts “look no further”—plain meaning ends the inquiry.

4. Canons of construction and the rejected “reverse ejusdem generis” approach

  • United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996): discussed as the origin of “reverse ejusdem generis,” which the court of appeals used to treat “name” and “address” as only protected when they are “identifying.” The Supreme Court rejected this as an unreasonable reading given the agreed definition of “identifying information.”
  • Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480 (2024); Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022); People v. Sims, 2020 COA 78: cited in the notes to explain ordinary ejusdem generis (not the reverse variant).

5. Constitutional avoidance concerns raised below—but deemed inapposite

  • Peck v. McCann, 43 F.4th 1116 (10th Cir. 2022): the court of appeals relied on Peck to worry that reading § 19-1-307(1)(a) broadly could create First Amendment problems unless limited to “identifying disclosures.” The Supreme Court found those constitutional concerns “inapposite” because, on its view, names and addresses are always identifying information—so the statute does not, properly read, sweep in “nonidentifying information.”

6. Party presentation principle: deciding only issues framed by the parties

  • United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020); Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring): cited for the proposition that courts act as neutral arbiters and do not reframe cases; here, the majority refused to decide whether the counts might be “other identifying information” because CDHS did not make that argument as a basis to meet its burden.

7. Concurrence’s additional authorities (warning about confidentiality rationales)

  • Educ. reEnvisioned BOCES v. Colo. Springs Sch. Dist. 11, 2024 CO 29; People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75: invoked by the concurrence to criticize the majority for, in its view, rewriting the statute to solve “practical challenges.”
  • Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); Watso v. Colo. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 841 P.2d 299 (Colo. 1992): used by the concurrence to emphasize why confidentiality is thought to encourage reporting and protect informants.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Court’s core interpretive holding: § 19-1-307(1)(a) is unambiguous

The majority reads the confidentiality clause as creating four protected categories: (1) reports of child abuse or neglect (the reports themselves), (2) the name of any child/family/informant contained in such reports, (3) the address of any child/family/informant contained in such reports, and (4) any other identifying information contained in such reports.

The majority rejects two key moves made by the court of appeals:

  • “And” does not mean “only when paired.” The legislature’s use of “the name and address” does not signal an intent to protect an address only when disclosed together with a name.
  • No “identifying address” subset exists in practice under the parties’ agreed definition. The Court emphasizes that “identifying information” means information likely to reveal identity alone or with other information—and concludes that every name and every address meets that definition, making the division’s “some addresses aren’t identifying” premise untenable.

2. The case-dispositive CORA application: CDHS did not prove the requested counts fall within the exception

Although it agrees with CDHS’s textual reading that “address” is categorically protected when contained in a report, the majority holds CDHS still failed to show the requested counts are barred.

CDHS’s theory was not that the counts themselves were “reports,” but that the counts would (i) disclose the “address” or (ii) at least “confirm” that a report originated from a particular facility’s address. The Court rejects that as insufficient under the statute and CORA’s burden allocation, reasoning:

  • The facilities’ addresses were already public. The majority treats it as illogical to claim disclosure of counts “makes public what is already public.” On that premise, the statute’s prohibition on disclosing an “address contained in a report” does not extend to “confirmation of an already public address.”
  • Absurd-results avoidance supports disclosure. The Court warns that CDHS’s “confirmation” theory would block oversight of state-funded facilities: “All information, including a cardinal number,” related to reports from an RCCF could become undisclosable merely because it points to a facility location.
  • CDHS’s own offer undermined its position. CDHS offered to disclose aggregated counts across all three facilities. The Court found CDHS could not adequately explain why facility-specific counts would newly “confirm” protected information while aggregated counts would not.
  • Party presentation limited the Court’s analysis. CDHS did not argue the six numbers were “any other identifying information” under § 19-1-307(1)(a), so the Court declined to resolve whether numbers could ever qualify as such.

3. The concurrence’s critique: “confirmation” is itself disclosure, regardless of public addresses

Justice Berkenkotter’s concurrence disputes the majority’s “already public” logic and insists the statute protects information “contained in” reports, even if the same address can be found elsewhere. It further argues the majority compels CDHS to confirm the existence of reports for certain facilities, which the concurrence views as “unquestionably” prohibited by § 19-1-307(1)(a). The concurrence forecasts practical confusion for custodians and potential chilling effects on reporting.

The majority, however, treats CDHS’s litigating position as narrower—limited to “address/confirmation” and not “other identifying information”—and resolves the case within those boundaries.

C. Impact

  • Enhanced oversight of residential facilities. The holding facilitates public and media scrutiny of RCCFs by making facility-specific reporting and screening statistics available, even when underlying reports remain confidential.
  • Clarified interpretive rule for § 19-1-307(1)(a): no ambiguity; names and addresses are always identifying information. This forecloses the court of appeals’ “reverse ejusdem generis” path and reduces room for case-by-case factual hearings about whether a name/address is “identifying.”
  • Burden-focused CORA litigation posture. Records custodians must develop and present a precise theory for why a requested record falls within the statute’s protected categories; broad “confirmation” arguments may fail without a tighter demonstration of how the specific request discloses protected content.
  • New fault line: when does statistical data become “other identifying information”? Because the Court expressly left open whether a “cardinal number” can constitute “any other identifying information,” future disputes may turn on small-number scenarios, uniqueness, linkage attacks, and reidentification risk—especially if agencies litigate that theory directly (rather than “address confirmation”).
  • Potential tension with confidentiality policy. The concurrence’s warnings signal likely future litigation over “confirmation” vs. “disclosure,” the relevance of “already public” facts, and whether the statute protects against incremental “puzzle piece” releases.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • CORA (Colorado Open Records Act): Colorado’s default rule is government records are open to the public unless a specific exception applies. If an agency claims an exception, it must prove it.
  • “Contrary to any state statute” exception: CORA does not override other Colorado laws that require confidentiality. If another statute says certain information “shall be confidential,” CORA will not compel disclosure.
  • § 19-1-307(1)(a) confidentiality: Protects child-abuse/neglect reports and protected identifying details “contained in such reports” (including names, addresses, and other identifying information).
  • Ambiguity vs. unambiguity: If a statute reasonably supports more than one interpretation, courts may consult legislative history or consequences. If it is unambiguous, courts apply the text as written.
  • Reverse ejusdem generis: A rarely used interpretive idea suggesting that in a phrase like “A, B, or any other C,” the general term (C) can limit the specific items (A and B). The Supreme Court rejected its use here.
  • “Cardinal numbers”: Simple counts (e.g., “17 reports”) rather than narrative content from any individual report.
  • Party presentation principle: Courts generally decide cases based on the arguments the parties actually make; they do not invent new theories for either side.

V. Conclusion

Brubaker v. Colorado Sun establishes two key points with immediate operational consequences. First, the Court firmly holds that § 19-1-307(1)(a) is unambiguous: names and addresses in child-abuse/neglect reports are categorically protected as identifying information, and “any other identifying information” operates as a catchall rather than a limiter.

Second—and more practically—the Court holds that CDHS must disclose facility-specific counts of reports and screened-in reports when the agency fails to carry its burden to show those counts themselves disclose protected report content or protected identifying information. The opinion thus strengthens CORA’s oversight function in the sensitive context of state-regulated residential care for children, while leaving for future cases the harder question of when statistical disclosures might become “other identifying information” through reidentification or linkage.