Date: Jun 24, 2026

Facially Sufficient Venue Allegations Bar Pretrial Dismissal of a Money-Laundering Conspiracy Charge; Venue, Single-Conspiracy, and Intent May Be Proven Through Co-Conspirator Acts, Rule 404(b) Convictions, and Deliberate-Ignorance Evidence

Introduction

In United States v. Toochukwu Okorie (11th Cir. June 22, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Okorie’s conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and 1957, as well as an upward-variant 108-month sentence and an order of immediate restitution. The case arose from an alleged “international criminal conspiracy” combining business e-mail compromise and romance-scam conduct that induced victims and intermediaries to send fraud proceeds through bank accounts, including accounts controlled by Okorie’s entities (notably TMO Consulting, LLC and Collective Intelligence Forensics).

Okorie’s appellate issues spanned: (1) venue in the Northern District of Alabama; (2) material variance (single vs. multiple conspiracies); (3) admission of Rule 404(b) evidence (prior convictions); (4) a deliberate ignorance jury instruction; (5) reasonableness of an upward variance; and (6) immediate restitution without an ability-to-pay analysis. The court rejected each challenge.

Summary of the Opinion

Venue: The indictment’s venue allegations were facially sufficient; under circuit law, venue is a fact question for the jury when the indictment is facially valid. Venue for a money-laundering conspiracy may lie where any act in furtherance occurred, and co-conspirator acts before a defendant joins are attributable to later-joining members.
Material variance: No plain error; evidence supported a single conspiracy with a shared goal (laundering fraud proceeds), overlapping participants, and linked transfers (including payments to Ebhos Auto and onward movement to Nigeria).
Rule 404(b): No abuse of discretion admitting Okorie’s prior wire-fraud and money-laundering convictions to prove intent/knowledge; limiting instructions mitigated prejudice.
Deliberate ignorance instruction: Proper because evidence could support either actual knowledge or deliberate avoidance.
Sentence: Procedurally and substantively reasonable; the court began with the Guidelines and varied upward based on § 3553(a) factors including recidivism and deterrence.
Restitution: No plain error ordering immediate payment; the PSI contained unchallenged financial information supporting ability to pay at least some restitution.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Venue in conspiracy prosecutions: facial sufficiency and the jury’s role

United States v. Muench, 153 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 1998): supplied the standard of review for denial of a motion to dismiss for improper venue.
United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2010): the key doctrinal anchor. The court reiterated Snipes’s rule that when an indictment is facially sufficient, venue is an essential element for trial and the venue determination is for the jury, not a basis for pretrial dismissal.
United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1990): used for the proposition that in conspiracy cases, venue lies in any district where an act in furtherance occurred, and the government need prove venue only by a preponderance of the evidence.
United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) and Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982): foreclosed Okorie’s individualized venue theory; earlier co-conspirator acts in a district are attributable to later joiners.
United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008): reinforced the prior-panel-precedent rule binding the panel to Davis.
United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998): distinguished. The court emphasized that Cabrales concerned substantive money laundering and does not limit venue in conspiracy cases; Cabrales itself recognized conspiracy venue can rest on co-conspirator acts.

How these authorities shaped the result: Snipes controlled the procedural posture: because the indictment alleged acts in the Northern District of Alabama, the venue dispute could not be resolved through a pretrial dismissal. Smith and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(2) supplied the substantive conspiracy-venue rule. Davis eliminated any “I joined later” carve-out.

2) Single vs. multiple conspiracies and “rimless wheel” arguments

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946): the classic multiple-conspiracy “rimless wheel” framework.
United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796 (11th Cir. 2004): explained hub-and-spoke conspiracies and when lack of a “rim” yields multiple conspiracies.
United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2009): refined the “rimless wheel” concept and emphasized that spokes without interconnection imply multiple conspiracies.
United States v. Goldstein, 989 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2015): governed standards of review and plain error posture.
United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2015): variance doctrine and prejudice requirement.
United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2008): the three-factor single-conspiracy test (common goal, nature of scheme, overlap of participants) and deference to the jury if supported by substantial evidence.

How these authorities shaped the result: Richardson/Edouard provided the analytical structure. Chandler/Seher/Kotteakos supplied the vocabulary for Okorie’s “rimless wheel” claim, which failed because the panel found evidence of interconnection (financial flows and participant overlap) sufficient to form a “rim.”

3) Rule 404(b) intent evidence and limiting instructions

United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2013) and United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009): emphasized deference to district courts and the “rule of inclusion” approach to Rule 404(b).
United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007): not-guilty plea makes intent material; Rule 404(b) permissible absent steps to remove intent; limiting instructions mitigate prejudice.
United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2005): similarity between extrinsic acts and charged conduct increases probative value for intent.
United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Fiallo-Jacome, 874 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1989): barred review of an argument first raised in a reply brief (here, the separate challenge to admitting the grand jury testimony).

How these authorities shaped the result: The panel treated prior money-laundering convictions as highly probative of intent in a money-laundering conspiracy, particularly where the defense theory was lack of knowledge/intent. The limiting instruction was pivotal to the Rule 403 balance.

4) Deliberate ignorance

United States v. Morley, 99 F.4th 1328 (11th Cir. 2024): set the test for when deliberate-ignorance instructions are appropriate and cautioned against use where evidence supports only actual knowledge or no knowledge.
United States v. Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Medina, 485 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2007): clarified the knowledge requirement in money-laundering contexts.
United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139 (11th Cir. 1993): deliberate ignorance equals knowledge.
United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2003): upheld deliberate-ignorance instruction in analogous circumstances involving suspicious financial transactions.

5) Sentencing reasonableness and reliance on criminal history

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) and United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008): procedural/substantive reasonableness framework.
United States v. Hamilton, 168 F.4th 1354 (11th Cir. 2026): preservation and plain-error review for procedural unreasonableness (not ultimately applied due to the government’s position).
United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014): permit considering factors already reflected in the Guidelines (e.g., criminal history) as part of § 3553(a) variance analysis.
United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007): sentencing courts need not discuss each § 3553(a) factor explicitly.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): discretion to weigh factors, requirements for variance justification, and abuse-of-discretion boundaries.
United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2021): courts may place substantial weight on criminal history consistent with § 3553(a).
United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Johnson, 980 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2015): disparity arguments require similarly situated comparators; co-defendant disparity generally not a basis for relief.
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008): below-statutory-maximum sentences are an indicator of reasonableness.
United States v. Charles, 757 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Dean, 487 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 2007): foreclosed Apprendi/Alleyne-based challenges to judicial fact-finding for advisory Guideline calculations.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013): acknowledged but deemed inapplicable under binding circuit precedent because findings did not alter statutory maxima/minima.

6) Restitution scheduling and ability to pay

United States v. Edwards, 728 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2013): courts consider financial resources for payment scheduling; reliance on the PSI is permissible; defendant bears the burden of demonstrating inability to pay.
United States v. Romines, 204 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir. 2000): plain-error review applies to unpreserved restitution objections.

Legal Reasoning

1) Venue: why pretrial dismissal failed

The court’s venue analysis is primarily procedural. The indictment alleged that acts in furtherance occurred in the Northern District of Alabama (including conduct affecting Birmingham victims), making the indictment facially sufficient as to venue. Under United States v. Snipes, that sufficiency pushes the venue question to the trial phase as an element for the jury. Substantively, the court emphasized conspiracy venue’s breadth under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(2) and United States v. Smith: venue lies where any act in furtherance occurred, not solely where a defendant’s own transactions occurred.

Okorie’s attempt to segment venue by joining date was foreclosed by United States v. Davis (attribution of prior co-conspirator acts to later joiners), with the panel bound by United States v. Archer. His reliance on United States v. Cabrales was rejected because Cabrales addressed substantive laundering, while conspiracy venue is broader and co-conspirator-act-based.

2) Material variance: “single conspiracy” sustained

On plain-error review, the panel asked whether there was an evidentiary foundation for the jury’s finding of a single conspiracy under the United States v. Richardson / United States v. Edouard test. It found:

Common goal: laundering proceeds generated by interrelated online fraud schemes (business e-mail compromise and romance scams).
Nature of the scheme: funds flowed from victims and intermediaries into accounts controlled by conspirators and were quickly moved or withdrawn—consistent with a coordinated laundering objective.
Overlap of participants (“rim” evidence): transfers connected Okorie to Ebhos Auto (Ebhodaghe) and Ebhos Auto to Asikhia in Nigeria, undermining a “spokes-only” narrative.

The court therefore rejected the “rimless wheel” framing under Kotteakos v. United States, United States v. Chandler, and United States v. Seher, reasoning that the evidence showed sufficient interdependence and linkage among participants.

3) Rule 404(b): prior convictions as intent evidence

Applying the “inclusion” orientation emphasized in United States v. Kapordelis, and the district court deference noted in United States v. Troya, the panel found no abuse of discretion in admitting Okorie’s prior wire-fraud and money-laundering convictions. Under United States v. Edouard, Okorie’s not-guilty plea put intent squarely at issue, and United States v. Ramirez supports heightened probative value where the extrinsic and charged conduct are similar.

The court also relied on the district court’s limiting instruction to reduce unfair prejudice, consistent with Edouard’s guidance on mitigating measures. A separate 404(b) challenge to the admission of grand jury testimony was not reached because it was first raised in the reply brief, barred by United States v. Levy and United States v. Fiallo-Jacome.

4) Deliberate ignorance: permissible “either/or” evidentiary posture

The deliberate-ignorance instruction was upheld because, under United States v. Morley, it is not error where evidence could support both actual knowledge and deliberate avoidance. The panel pointed to circumstantial evidence: Okorie’s experience as a (formerly) certified fraud examiner, repeated receipt of large transfers, and rapid movement of funds, permitting a finding that he recognized a high probability of illegality and consciously avoided confirming details. This aligns with United States v. Puche and the general equivalence principle in United States v. Arias.

5) Sentencing: upward variance justified by § 3553(a)

Procedurally, the panel rejected the claim that the court used the prior sentence as a “floor.” It read the record as beginning with the advisory Guidelines, then varying upward based on § 3553(a) considerations, consistent with Gall v. United States and United States v. Pugh. Substantively, the panel held that emphasizing recidivism and deterrence was permissible under United States v. Riley and United States v. Rosales-Bruno, and that courts may rely on factors already captured in the Guidelines under United States v. Williams and United States v. Dougherty.

The disparity argument failed under United States v. Azmat and United States v. Johnson because Okorie did not show similarly situated co-defendants; additionally, United States v. Cavallo cautions that co-defendant disparities are generally not a basis for appellate relief. The sentence’s proximity to, but below, the statutory maximum was treated as an additional reasonableness indicator under United States v. Gonzalez.

6) Restitution: reliance on PSI and defendant’s burden

Reviewing for plain error under United States v. Romines, the panel found none because the PSI contained detailed asset/liability information and a positive net worth that Okorie did not challenge. Under United States v. Edwards, the district court may rely on the PSI and the defendant bears the burden to demonstrate financial inability.

Impact

Procedural reinforcement in venue litigation: The decision underscores that in the Eleventh Circuit, a defendant faces a steep barrier to pretrial dismissal on venue grounds where the indictment pleads venue facts; venue is ordinarily resolved by the jury under United States v. Snipes.
Conspiracy cohesion in cyber-enabled fraud ecosystems: By treating romance-scam intermediaries and business e-mail compromise victims as part of a single laundering enterprise when funds and participants overlap, the opinion signals that “multi-scheme” evidence can still support one conspiracy if money flows and operational roles connect the parts.
Rule 404(b) exposure for repeat financial offenders: The holding illustrates the practical weight of prior, similar convictions in proving intent—especially where the defense is lack of knowledge— and confirms the centrality of limiting instructions in sustaining admission on appeal.
Deliberate ignorance remains a viable tool in laundering cases: Suspicious transaction patterns, rapid disbursements, and specialized background can justify the instruction even if the government also argues actual knowledge.
Upward variances for recidivist laundering: The opinion approves significant upward variance rationales centered on deterrence and recidivism, reinforcing the discretion recognized in United States v. Irey and related cases.
Restitution practice point: Failure to object to PSI financial findings can all but foreclose later ability-to-pay arguments, particularly under plain-error review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Venue: The geographic place where a criminal case may be tried. In conspiracy cases, venue is often proper wherever any conspirator performed any act to further the conspiracy—even if the defendant personally acted elsewhere.
Facially sufficient indictment: An indictment that, on its face, alleges the necessary elements (including venue allegations). If it does, courts typically do not decide factual disputes (like where acts occurred) on a motion to dismiss; the jury decides at trial.
Material variance: A mismatch between what the indictment charges and what the evidence proves at trial. In conspiracy cases, a common claim is that the indictment charged one conspiracy, but the evidence proved multiple unrelated conspiracies.
“Hub-and-spoke” vs. “rimless wheel” conspiracy: A hub-and-spoke conspiracy has a central “hub” coordinating with multiple “spokes.” If the spokes are connected to each other by a “rim” (shared awareness, interdependence, overlapping participants, connected transactions), it can be one conspiracy. If not, it can be multiple conspiracies (a “rimless wheel”), as in Kotteakos v. United States.
Rule 404(b): A rule limiting “other acts” evidence. Prior crimes generally cannot be used to show a person is the “type” to commit the charged crime, but may be used for specific purposes like proving intent or knowledge—often crucial when the defendant denies intent.
Deliberate ignorance (willful blindness): A doctrine allowing juries to treat purposeful avoidance of knowledge as equivalent to knowledge—e.g., suspecting illegality but intentionally not asking questions so one can later claim ignorance.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness concerns whether the sentencing process was correct (Guidelines calculation, consideration of § 3553(a), explanation). Substantive reasonableness concerns whether the sentence length is reasonable in light of the facts and § 3553(a).

Conclusion

United States v. Toochukwu Okorie consolidates several recurring Eleventh Circuit themes in fraud-and-laundering prosecutions: (1) if venue is plausibly alleged, pretrial dismissal is generally unavailable and the jury decides; (2) multiple fraud modalities can still comprise a single conspiracy when money flows and participants overlap; (3) prior similar convictions are powerful, admissible intent evidence under Rule 404(b) with proper limiting instructions; (4) deliberate-ignorance instructions remain appropriate where evidence supports both actual knowledge and willful blindness; and (5) upward variances grounded in recidivism and deterrence are well within district-court discretion when adequately tied to § 3553(a). The decision also highlights a practical appellate lesson: unchallenged PSI financial findings can sustain immediate restitution orders under plain-error review.