FAA § 1 “Transportation Worker” Exemption Requires a Properly Defined Class Based on Typical Work of the Class as a Whole (Not the Named Plaintiffs)

I. Introduction

In Joyner v. Frontier Airlines (10th Cir. Sept. 1, 2026), current and former customer service agents (“CSAs”)—Chiquita Joyner, Helen Dixon, and Tajahne Hobley (collectively, the “Employees”)—brought a putative class action asserting Colorado wage-law claims against Frontier Airlines, Inc. (“Frontier”) and ground-services providers operating as Menzies Aviation (collectively, “Menzies”).

The employers moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) based on mandatory arbitration clauses in the Employees’ employment contracts. The Employees opposed, invoking the FAA § 1 exemption for “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. They also argued, as an alternative, that Colorado’s Wage Act voids agreements waiving Wage Act rights, but that state-law issue did not ultimately drive the Tenth Circuit’s decision on appeal.

The core issue on appeal was methodological: under Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, how must a court define the relevant “class of workers” at step one of the FAA § 1 analysis? The Tenth Circuit held the district court erred by defining the class around what the named plaintiffs said they personally did, while treating evidence about what CSAs typically do as irrelevant.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motions to compel arbitration under the FAA and remanded. The dispositive error was the district court’s step-one Saxon analysis: it focused “exclusively on the work the Employees perform,” rather than on “the actual work that the members of the class, as a whole, typically carry out.” Because the class of workers was not properly defined, the court declined to resolve other disputes (including whether “gatekeeping” over luggage could satisfy Saxon’s step two).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450 (2022)
    The opinion’s controlling framework. Saxon established a two-step test: (1) define the relevant “class of workers,” and (2) determine whether that class is “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Critically, Saxon directs courts to look to “the actual work that the members of the class, as a whole, typically carry out.” The Tenth Circuit treated this phrase as decisive: it forbids defining a “class” based on idiosyncratic practices of a few employees and requires attention to the typical work of the class.
  • Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)
    Provided two important constraints. First, it confirmed § 1 exempts “only contracts of employment of transportation workers.” Second, it is often cited for “narrow construction” of § 1’s residual clause. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged this narrowing impulse but juxtaposed it with the Supreme Court’s more recent warning against unduly “cabin[ing]” the exemption.
  • Brock v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 121 F.4th 753 (10th Cir. 2024)
    The Tenth Circuit’s own synthesis of Saxon into the two-step framework and the notion that step one is a “necessary first step.” It also supplied standards of review referenced in the opinion (e.g., factual findings reviewed for clear error, legal questions de novo).
  • Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, 146 S. Ct. 1358 (2026)
    A key signal about interpretive posture. The Supreme Court emphasized that, in multiple recent cases, it “rejected efforts to cabin [§ 1’s] reach,” cautioning courts against an “unduly cramped reading.” The Tenth Circuit relied on this to explain why it would not decide, “in the abstract,” that only cargo-handlers can fall within § 1.
  • Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2020) and Bacashihua v. U.S. Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1988)
    Cited for the proposition that the statutory unit is the “class of workers,” not the individual worker—supporting the appellate court’s view that the district court’s plaintiff-specific approach was legally incorrect.
  • Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc., 939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019) and Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc., 67 F.4th 550 (3d Cir. 2023)
    Used to illustrate how courts define the class by function and scope (including discussion of nationwide framing), and to reinforce that courts look to “classes of workers rather than particular workers.”
  • Grice v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (In re Grice), 974 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2020)
    Invoked both to show cross-circuit agreement on class-based analysis and to suggest some authority for § 1 coverage of workers who play a “central part” in interstate movement even without frequent cargo handling—an issue left open on remand.
  • CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Hutchens, 974 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2020)
    Quoted for the “court of review, not first view” principle, supporting the decision not to decide the “gatekeeping” issue without full factual and legal development below.
  • Fraga v. Premium Retail Servs., Inc., 61 F.4th 228 (1st Cir. 2023)
    Cited to justify refusing to refine any “frequency” requirement for handling cargo “in the abstract.”
  • Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989), Zen Magnets, LLC v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 968 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2020)
    These informed jurisdictional and procedural boundaries. Volt was mentioned in a footnote in connection with state arbitration rules; Zen Magnets supported the reminder that the appellant bears the burden of establishing appellate jurisdiction.
  • Russell v. Driscoll, 157 F.4th 1348 (10th Cir. 2025) and Zink v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 13 F.3d 330 (10th Cir. 1993)
    Cited for standards of review and FAA interpretive posture: de novo review of legal interpretations of Supreme Court precedent and the FAA.
  • Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2020)
    Cited to emphasize that the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy cannot “override the original meaning” of § 1’s text.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. The dispositive rule: step one is class-typical work, not plaintiff-specific work.
    The Tenth Circuit treated Saxon’s instruction—“the actual work that the members of the class, as a whole, typically carry out”—as a binding constraint on how trial courts define the relevant class. The district court repeatedly stated the “issue is how did these plaintiffs do their work,” and discounted supervisor and process evidence as irrelevant because it did not describe the named plaintiffs’ “actual work.” The Tenth Circuit held this inverted the statutory and precedential focus: § 1 turns on a “class of workers,” and Saxon demands the typical work of that class.
  2. Why the error mattered: the rest of the analysis became “tainted.”
    Step one is “the necessary first step under the test set out in Saxon.” Without a properly defined class, the court could not reliably proceed to step two (whether the class is “engaged in” commerce). Thus, the panel reversed and remanded without reaching alternative issues.
  3. Evidence relevance on remand: both “expectations” and “actual practice” may matter, but for the class.
    The opinion clarifies that plaintiff testimony is not irrelevant; it can be a “datapoint” about typical class duties. The error was treating other evidence (supervisor testimony, videos, workplace design intended to minimize bag handling) as categorically irrelevant. On remand, the district court must weigh all evidence that bears on what CSAs, as a class, typically do.
  4. Gatekeeping left open.
    The district court partly relied on a “gatekeeping function” (ensuring luggage makes it onto planes) to find § 1 coverage. The Tenth Circuit found the point underdeveloped and, given the step-one error, premature. It also noted genuine doctrinal uncertainty: there is tension between Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (narrow construction) and Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock (rejecting efforts to “cabin” the exemption), as well as some circuit authority suggesting non-cargo-handlers may qualify if they play a “central part” in interstate movement.
  5. Jurisdictional boundary: the Colorado-law arbitration pathway was not decided.
    Although the Employees argued Colorado’s Wage Act voids arbitration agreements waiving Wage Act rights, the district court did not address compelling arbitration under Colorado law. On appeal, the employers withdrew that argument after conceding the court “likely does not have appellate jurisdiction to consider” an interlocutory refusal to compel arbitration under state law, citing Brock v. Flowers Foods, Inc. and the jurisdictional principles in Zen Magnets, LLC v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n.

C. Impact

The opinion’s most immediate impact is procedural and evidentiary: in FAA § 1 disputes within the Tenth Circuit, trial courts must define the relevant “class of workers” based on typical class duties and cannot limit the inquiry to the named plaintiffs’ individual practices. Practically, this:

  • increases the importance of representative evidence (supervisor testimony, standardized job functions, training materials, operational design, and observational/video evidence) to establish what the class “typically” does;
  • discourages litigants from trying to win § 1 exemption status by proving only that certain individuals (or a small subset) handle cargo more frequently than their peers; and
  • pushes district courts to make an explicit, reviewable finding about the “typical” work of the class before reaching step two.

Substantively, the opinion preserves uncertainty about whether “gatekeeping” roles—screening, controlling, or ensuring goods move in interstate channels—can satisfy § 1 absent frequent physical handling of cargo. By remanding, the Tenth Circuit leaves room for the district court to develop a factual record about what CSAs typically do and, only then, to determine whether that class plays a “direct and necessary” and “active” role in interstate commerce under Saxon and Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

FAA § 1 “residual clause”
The part of the statute that exempts “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” in addition to “seamen” and “railroad employees.” It is a gateway issue: if § 1 applies, the FAA’s pro-arbitration enforcement mechanisms do not.
Two-step Saxon framework
  1. Define the class of workers by what the class typically does (not by the employer’s industry and not by one person’s unusual tasks).
  2. Decide whether that class is engaged in interstate commerce—meaning the class plays a “direct and necessary” and “active” role in moving goods across borders.
“Class of workers” vs. “individual worker”
Even if a particular employee sometimes does tasks tied to transportation, the legal question is whether the broader group to which they belong typically does such tasks. This case holds that courts commit legal error if they define the “class” around the named plaintiffs.
Interlocutory appeal under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)
The FAA allows certain immediate appeals (before final judgment), including an order denying a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA. That does not automatically extend to state-law arbitration issues, which can create jurisdictional limits.

V. Conclusion

Joyner v. Frontier Airlines establishes (and enforces) a strict methodological requirement for FAA § 1 litigation in the Tenth Circuit: at Saxon step one, courts must define the “class of workers” by the typical work of the class as a whole, not by the particular tasks performed by the named plaintiffs. Because the district court built the class definitions around what Joyner, Dixon, and Hobley personally did and deemed broader class-typical evidence irrelevant, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for a proper class definition and any ensuing step-two analysis.