Extortion-Driven Harm Lacks “One Central Reason” Nexus to Gender-Based Social Groups; CAT Review Is Forfeited Without Specific Error

1. Introduction

In Mejia-Padilla v. Bondi (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2026) (summary order), petitioners Milgian Liseth Mejia-Padilla and her minor child, natives and citizens of Honduras, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection.

The case arose from gang targeting and extortion in Honduras, including a serious assault (the record describes gang members throwing boiling water on Mejia-Padilla). Mejia-Padilla argued the targeting was connected to gender-related proposed social groups, and that the Honduran state’s inability or unwillingness to protect women supported both persecution and CAT relief.

The dispositive appellate issues were narrow: because the BIA denied asylum and withholding solely for lack of nexus to a protected ground, the Second Circuit addressed only nexus (and then separately CAT, which it held was abandoned on appeal).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit denied the petition for review. It held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that the gang’s motive was extortion, not persecution “on account of” a protected ground. Even accepting evidence of “widespread misogyny and patriarchy” in Honduras, the record did not compel a finding that Mejia-Padilla’s gender or related family-status formulations were “one central reason” for the harm.

The court also rejected a due process claim (no showing the IJ ignored evidence or caused cognizable prejudice) and held the CAT claim was abandoned because the petitioners failed to develop any specific challenge to the agency’s finding that future torture was not sufficiently likely.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Scope of review and “as modified by the BIA”

  • Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005): The court reiterated that it reviews the IJ decision “as modified by the BIA,” excluding grounds the BIA did not rely on. This framing mattered because it limited review to the BIA’s chosen basis—nexus—and foreclosed reaching other asylum components such as the “particularity” of proposed social groups.

2) Standards of review: substantial evidence vs. de novo

  • Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018): Reaffirmed the bifurcated standard—fact-finding reviewed for substantial evidence; legal questions and applications of law to fact reviewed de novo.
  • Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2006): Applied substantial evidence review specifically to the nexus determination.
  • Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 593-94 (2d Cir. 2021): Emphasized that substantial evidence review does not permit reweighing evidence; reversal requires the record to compel a different finding.
  • Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006): The court presumed the IJ considered all evidence unless the record “compellingly suggests” otherwise—important to rejecting the claim that the agency ignored country-conditions evidence.

3) Nexus and motive: the protected-ground requirement

  • Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2022): Confirmed that withholding of removal uses asylum’s “one central reason” nexus standard in the Second Circuit.
  • Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313-14 (2d Cir. 1999): Stated the baseline principle that general crime and violence are not grounds for asylum or withholding.
  • Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005): Required direct or circumstantial evidence that the persecutor’s motive arises from a protected ground.
  • Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985): Provided the persecution-as-punishment concept—harm inflicted to punish a person for a belief or characteristic the persecutor seeks to overcome—which informs how motive is analyzed.
  • Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 758 (2d Cir. 2022): Central to the outcome: harm motivated by perceived ability to pay extortion is not persecution “on account of” a protected ground; any protected-ground connection may be “tangential or incidental.”
  • Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (cited “cf.”): Reinforced that when harm is attributable to ordinary criminals’ incentives (e.g., money) rather than persecution, the analysis tilts away from protected-group persecution.

4) Due process in removal proceedings

  • Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007): Recognized due process claims where the applicant lacked a full and fair opportunity to present claims or where fundamental fairness was compromised.
  • Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008): Required a showing of “cognizable prejudice” attributable to the challenged process.

5) CAT: two-step inquiry and abandonment on appeal

  • Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 592 (2d Cir. 2021): Described CAT burden: “more likely than not” torture by, or with acquiescence of, government officials acting in an official capacity.
  • Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 759 (2d Cir. 2022): Clarified CAT’s two-step requirement: (1) likely torture, and (2) by or with consent/acquiescence of a public official.
  • Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023): The court treated undeveloped appellate arguments as abandoned; failure to make legal/factual arguments constitutes abandonment.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The court’s narrowing to nexus (and why it matters)

The court explicitly limited its asylum/withholding analysis to nexus because the BIA’s affirmance rested “solely on the lack of nexus to a protected ground.” Under Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Just., that choice constrained the court’s review: it did not reach disputes about the “particularity” of proposed social groups, even though petitioners briefed them.

2) Applying the “one central reason” requirement to extortion targeting

Mejia-Padilla offered three gender/family-status formulations (e.g., “Honduran women,” women without a protective figure in the home, and mothers whose children’s fathers do not live with them), and argued that country-conditions evidence of misogyny and impunity supplied circumstantial proof of motive.

The Second Circuit did not deny that gender-based violence can be relevant to motive; instead, it held the record did not compel the conclusion that gender or the proposed social-group characteristics were “one central reason” for the gang’s actions. The court emphasized that extortion motive—i.e., selection based on perceived ability to pay—fits the paradigm described in Garcia-Aranda v. Garland and Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey: ordinary criminal incentives, even amid broader societal misogyny, do not automatically convert criminal predation into protected-ground persecution.

Procedurally, the court also relied on the presumption from Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Just. that the IJ considered the evidence; absent a compelling indication otherwise, the court declined to recast the country-conditions record as mandating a different motive finding.

3) Due process: no ignored evidence and no prejudice

The due process argument failed because the court found no showing that the IJ denied a full and fair opportunity to present claims (Burger v. Gonzales) and no “cognizable prejudice” (Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey). In practice, the same evidentiary posture that sustained the substantial-evidence nexus finding also undercut the claim that the agency ignored critical proof.

4) CAT: likelihood of torture must be argued; acquiescence alone is not enough

The court noted petitioners’ reliance on impunity statistics (e.g., non-investigation of sexual violence and femicide) could bear on government acquiescence, but held that—even assuming acquiescence—the petitioners did not identify evidence compelling a finding that torture was more likely than not. Under Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, CAT requires both elements.

Because the brief did not develop specific error on the likelihood-of-torture element, the court treated the CAT challenge as abandoned under Debique v. Garland.

C. Impact

  • Reinforcement of the extortion/nexus barrier: The decision fits a recurring Second Circuit pattern: where a record supports an inference of financial motive, generalized evidence of gendered violence or patriarchal conditions may be insufficient—without case-specific linkage—to make a protected ground “one central reason.”
  • Strategic consequences for PSG-based claims: Even where gender-based groups are pleaded, applicants must marshal direct or tightly connected circumstantial evidence that the persecutor acted because of that protected characteristic, not merely in a context where that characteristic correlates with vulnerability.
  • Appellate briefing discipline for CAT: The abandonment holding underscores that CAT appeals must squarely address both prongs—likelihood of torture and official involvement/acquiescence—with record citations and articulated error.
  • Practical importance of issue selection by the BIA: By affirming solely on nexus, the BIA effectively narrowed judicial review. Litigants should anticipate that, if nexus fails, disputes about PSG formulation may never be reached on petition for review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Nexus”: The required causal link between the harm (or feared harm) and a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group). The court asked: were the gang’s threats and violence aimed at her because of her protected characteristic, or mainly for money?
  • “One central reason”: A protected ground need not be the only reason, but it must be more than minor; it cannot be merely “tangential or incidental” (as framed via Garcia-Aranda v. Garland).
  • “Substantial evidence” review: The court does not decide what it thinks is most persuasive; it asks whether the record compels a contrary conclusion. If two views are plausible, the agency wins.
  • CAT “acquiescence”: For CAT, it is not enough that a government is ineffective; the applicant must show torture is more likely than not and that officials would consent to it or acquiesce in it (i.e., turn a blind eye with awareness).
  • “Abandonment” on appeal: If a petitioner does not develop an argument with specific claims of error, the court will treat it as waived/abandoned (Debique v. Garland).

5. Conclusion

Mejia-Padilla v. Bondi illustrates the Second Circuit’s strict application of the nexus requirement in gang-extortion contexts: even robust country-conditions evidence about gendered violence will not suffice unless it connects the persecutor’s motive to a protected ground as “one central reason.” The decision also underscores two procedural realities—courts review only the grounds the BIA relied upon, and CAT relief will not be entertained on petition for review where the appellant fails to articulate specific, record-based error on the likelihood-of-torture element.