Extension of Vermont Anti-Stalking Orders Turns on Protective Necessity—Not New Stalking—and Pro Se Filings Risk Rule 11 Sanctions for Fake Authority

1. Introduction

In Cheryl O'Donnell v. Hope Clough (Vt. July 10, 2026) (entry order), the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Orange Unit Civil Division’s second one-year extension of an anti-stalking order against a self-represented defendant. The parties are neighboring landowners in Bradford, Vermont, with a parallel history of right-of-way litigation. The extension proceeding arose after the plaintiff alleged the defendant again encroached near the boundary/right-of-way area and engaged in confrontational conduct despite prior anti-stalking orders and property rulings limiting the defendant’s rights.

The appeal raised three recurring issues in protective-order practice: (1) what “due process” requires when a defendant does not attend a noticed hearing, particularly when health issues are asserted; (2) how appellate courts review credibility-based findings in protective-order matters; and (3) what must be shown to extend an anti-stalking order under 12 V.S.A. § 5133(e). The Court also addressed a separate appellate-integrity issue: citation to a purported, non-existent Vermont Supreme Court decision, and the applicability of Rule 11 certification duties to pro se litigants.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the extension. It held that due process was satisfied because the defendant received notice and had an opportunity to be heard, but did not request a continuance and had previously demonstrated the ability to seek one. The Court rejected challenges to the trial court’s factual findings, emphasizing deference to credibility determinations and noting that criminal charges referenced by the trial court were still pending as of the hearing date.

Critically, the Court reiterated that, under 12 V.S.A. § 5133(e), extension of an anti-stalking order does not require a new finding that the defendant stalked the plaintiff during the pendency of the existing order; the question is whether additional time is necessary to protect the plaintiff.

Finally, the Court warned the defendant that citing “fake authority” materially undermines an argument and may trigger sanctions, reminding that pro se parties are bound by V.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) and V.R.A.P. 25(d).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • O'Donnell v. Clough, No. 25-AP-088, 2025 WL 2589467 (Vt. Sept. 5, 2025) (unpub. mem.)
    Referenced to situate the parties’ broader dispute (right-of-way ownership). The Supreme Court treated the property litigation as context but did not allow it to transform the protective-order appeal into a collateral re-litigation of title and maintenance rights.
  • O'Donnell v. Clough, No. 23- AP-359, 2024 WL 2854705 (Vt. May 10, 2024) (unpub. mem.)
    Cited as the prior affirmance of the initial anti-stalking order, reinforcing that the underlying order remained binding and was not open to attack by noncompliance or collateral argument during extension proceedings.
  • O'Donnell v. Clough, No. 24-AP-350, 2025 WL 1355970, at *3 (Vt. May 9, 2025) (unpub. mem.)
    Provided the procedural history and prior clarification of what the order required (including limits on right-of-way maintenance). The current opinion used that history to evaluate the reasonableness of the trial court’s conclusion that tensions persisted and protection remained necessary.
  • State v. Mott, 166 Vt. 188 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Hinkson v. Stevens, 2020 VT 69, 213 Vt. 32
    Anchored the due process framework in anti-stalking proceedings: notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Court also relied on Mott to support proceeding in a defendant’s absence where notice was given and the defendant failed to take steps to participate. The “overruled in part” signal (via Hinkson v. Stevens) preserved Mott for the due-process proposition relied upon here.
  • Swett v. Gates, 2023 VT 26, ¶ 20, 218 Vt. 76
    Supplied the appellate review standard for factual findings in anti-stalking orders: findings are upheld unless clearly erroneous, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, with strong deference to trial-court credibility determinations.
  • Landmark Trust (USA), Inc. v. Goodhue, 172 Vt. 515, 520 (2001)
    Reinforced that choosing between competing evidence and crediting one side’s narrative is the trial court’s role and generally not reversible error. The Court used it to reject the defendant’s complaint that the plaintiff’s testimony was “uncorroborated.”
  • Raynes v. Rogers, 2008 VT 52, ¶ 9, 183 Vt. 513
    Confirmed the extension decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion, framing the inquiry as whether the trial court’s protective-necessity determination was reasonable on the record.
  • Zorn v. Smith, 2011 VT 10, ¶ 22, 189 Vt. 219
    Supported the Court’s admonition that self-represented litigants, while given some leeway, remain bound by procedural rules, including Rule 11 obligations and sanctions for noncompliance—directly relevant to the “fake authority” issue.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Due process and proceeding in the defendant’s absence

The Court applied State v. Mott’s baseline: due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Notice was undisputed. The defendant’s key failure was procedural: she moved to dismiss but did not request a continuance of the noticed final hearing, and nothing in the record suggested the court excused her appearance. The Court emphasized practical indicators that the defendant had an opportunity to be heard—she had previously obtained continuances and conceded she was not mentally incapacitated—making the trial court’s decision to proceed consistent with due process.

Factual findings, credibility, and the “uncorroborated testimony” argument

The Court rejected the notion that a plaintiff must present corroborating witnesses or documents to support findings in an anti-stalking extension hearing. Under Swett v. Gates, appellate review is deferential, and credibility is for the trial judge. Under Landmark Trust (USA), Inc. v. Goodhue, the trial court’s choice to credit one side’s testimony is not error merely because the other side disputes it.

The Court also addressed the defendant’s claim that criminal cases were dismissed. The dispositive point was timing: the dismissals occurred after the civil hearing, so the trial court did not err in referencing the then-pending proceedings when assessing ongoing risk and need for protection.

Extension standard under 12 V.S.A. § 5133(e): necessity to protect, not new stalking

The defendant argued the extension was improper because the hearing evidence did not establish a new “course of conduct.” The Court treated that argument as legally misplaced because 12 V.S.A. § 5133(e) expressly states that it is unnecessary to find the defendant stalked the plaintiff during the pendency of the order in order to extend it. The operative inquiry is whether additional time is “necessary to protect the plaintiff.”

Applying Raynes v. Rogers’ abuse-of-discretion review, the Court held the trial court acted within its discretion by relying on: (1) the defendant’s continued assertions of ownership/control despite contrary property rulings; (2) the defendant’s violations concerning cutting/pruning within the right-of-way area; (3) the original findings and continuing “tensions and emotions”; and (4) the existence of criminal proceedings at the relevant time.

Property-dispute context does not excuse noncompliance

The Court acknowledged the broader property dispute but framed it as context, not a defense. It highlighted that the defendant’s disagreement with the outcome of the civil property litigation did not justify violating protective-order restrictions. It invoked Mott for the principle that courts generally do not permit a person to challenge an order by violating it.

“Fake authority” and Rule 11 / Appellate sanctions

The Court noted the defendant repeatedly cited a supposed Vermont Supreme Court decision—“Hering v. Gurdak, 2014 VT 56”—that did not match the citation and could not be located as an existing opinion. The Court treated this as a serious professional obligation issue, not a mere technicality, because legal citations are representations to the court.

It tied that concern to the certification duties in V.R.C.P. 11(b)(2), incorporated into appellate practice by V.R.A.P. 25(d)(2), and reminded (via Zorn v. Smith) that pro se litigants are bound by these rules and may face sanctions. The opinion functions as a caution that mis-citation is not cost-free when it crosses into fabrication or reckless assertion.

3.3. Impact

  • Clarified extension focus: The decision underscores that extension hearings are not mini-trials on whether new stalking occurred; they are forward-looking protective determinations under 12 V.S.A. § 5133(e). Litigants should tailor evidence and argument to ongoing risk/necessity rather than re-proving every element of stalking.
  • Procedural discipline in remote/medical contexts: Even where health problems exist, parties must affirmatively seek continuances or other accommodations. A motion to dismiss does not substitute for a request to postpone a scheduled evidentiary hearing.
  • Reinforced deference to trial judges: The Court reaffirmed that trial courts may rely on credible testimony without corroboration and that appellate review is highly deferential on factfinding in protective-order matters.
  • Stronger warning against fabricated citations: The explicit “fake authority” admonition—paired with Rule 11 and V.R.A.P. 25(d) references— signals a readiness to sanction parties (including pro se litigants) who submit invented or recklessly inaccurate legal authority.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Due process” (in this setting)
The minimum fairness required before a court can act: the defendant must get notice of the hearing and a real chance to participate. If the defendant chooses not to attend and does not request a continuance, the court may proceed.
“Clearly erroneous” review
An appellate court does not reweigh evidence. It asks whether the trial judge’s factual findings have support in the record. If they do—especially where based on credibility—the findings usually stand.
“Abuse of discretion” review
A deferential standard used for decisions like whether to extend a protective order. The question is not whether the appellate court would decide the issue the same way, but whether the trial court’s decision was reasonable and based on appropriate considerations.
“Course of conduct” vs. extension of an order
While stalking claims often involve a pattern of behavior, Vermont’s extension statute (12 V.S.A. § 5133(e)) expressly allows extension without proving new stalking during the existing order. The extension turns on whether continued protection is necessary.
Rule 11 certification / “fake authority”
When a party files a brief, they represent that their legal contentions are supported by existing law (or a good-faith argument to change it) and that their citations are the product of reasonable inquiry. Inventing or recklessly misrepresenting authority can lead to sanctions.

5. Conclusion

Cheryl O'Donnell v. Hope Clough reinforces three practical rules for Vermont anti-stalking litigation: (1) a noticed hearing may proceed when a party fails to appear without requesting a continuance, consistent with due process under State v. Mott; (2) trial-court factfinding grounded in credited testimony is rarely reversible under Swett v. Gates and Landmark Trust (USA), Inc. v. Goodhue; and (3) under 12 V.S.A. § 5133(e), an extension depends on protective necessity, not proof of new stalking during the prior order.

The opinion’s pointed warning about “fake authority,” coupled with the Rule 11 and V.R.A.P. 25(d) citations and Zorn v. Smith, also signals that Vermont appellate courts will hold self-represented litigants to core duties of accuracy and candor—backed by potential sanctions—when presenting legal authority.