Extending Burlington Northern: The Third Circuit Adopts Title VII’s “Materially Adverse” Standard for ADA and FMLA Retaliation

Case: Jeffrey Steidle v. United States Liability Insurance Co., Inc.
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date: June 24, 2026
Posture: Appeal from summary judgment for employer (E.D. Pa.)

1. Introduction

This precedential Third Circuit decision resolves a question the court had not previously decided in a precedential opinion: what counts as an “adverse employment action” in retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The appellant, Jeffrey Steidle, a claims employee at United States Liability Insurance Co., Inc. (USLI), alleged retaliation after exercising protected rights tied to mental health conditions (major depressive disorder, PTSD, anxiety), including taking FMLA leave and requesting workplace accommodations.

The alleged retaliation centered on compensation decisions—lower-than-expected bonuses and salary increases—awarded after: (i) Steidle took FMLA leave in late 2020, and (ii) Steidle requested accommodations in 2021. The district court granted summary judgment to USLI, reasoning (among other things) that Steidle had not shown an “adverse employment action” under a restrictive standard and had not shown causation. The Third Circuit partially reversed, clarifying the governing legal standard and the proper prima facie analysis.

Key issues

  • Does the Title VII retaliation standard for “materially adverse” action apply to ADA and FMLA retaliation claims?
  • Can reduced bonuses and smaller salary increases qualify as materially adverse retaliation?
  • What evidence suffices to establish causation at the prima facie stage (especially temporal proximity)?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s Title VII retaliation formulation from Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White applies equally to retaliation claims under the ADA and the FMLA. Under that “more relaxed” retaliation standard, an action is adverse if it “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker” from engaging in protected activity.

Applying that framework, the court ruled:

  • Adverse action: A reasonable factfinder could view lower bonuses and smaller salary increases as materially adverse.
  • Causation (2020 bonus/increase): Temporal proximity was “unusually suggestive” because the smaller bonus/increase was approved while Steidle was on FMLA leave; this sufficed for the prima facie case.
  • Causation (2021 bonus/increase): The roughly six-month gap after the accommodation request, without additional sufficient evidence (pattern of antagonism or other circumstantial indicia), did not support causation.

Disposition:

  • Vacated and remanded as to retaliation claims tied to the 2020 bonus/salary increase (for the district court to consider pretext in the first instance).
  • Affirmed summary judgment as to retaliation claims tied to the 2021 bonus/salary increase.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. The retaliation framework and burden shifting

  • McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green: The court reaffirmed that ADA and FMLA retaliation claims based on circumstantial evidence proceed under the familiar burden-shifting framework: prima facie case, employer’s legitimate reason, then pretext. The panel emphasized the sequencing significance—what belongs in prima facie versus later steps.
  • Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co. and Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc.: These decisions supplied the Third Circuit’s standard prima facie elements for ADA/FMLA retaliation: protected activity, adverse action, and causal connection—confirming doctrinal continuity across the statutes.
  • Burton v. Teleflex Inc.: Cited for the pretext step’s requirement that the plaintiff produce evidence permitting a reasonable inference that the employer’s justification is a pretext for retaliation.

B. Defining “adverse employment action” in retaliation claims

  • Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White: The cornerstone. The Supreme Court rejected limiting retaliation to actions affecting “terms and conditions” of employment; instead, the inquiry is whether the employer’s action is “materially adverse” in the sense it might deter protected conduct.
  • Moore v. City of Phila.: The Third Circuit used Moore to explain the district court’s error. Moore itself recognized that Burlington replaced earlier, more restrictive formulations for retaliation claims. The district court quoted language associated with the older, narrower approach and failed to apply Burlington’s materially adverse test.
  • Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr.: Cited both for protected activity principles in the FMLA context and for recognizing the “more relaxed standard” for retaliation, as well as for temporal proximity being unusually suggestive when an adverse action occurs during FMLA leave.
  • Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri: Invoked to distinguish discrimination claims (which require harm to an identifiable term/condition of employment) from retaliation claims (which are broader under Burlington).

C. Lower bonuses/raises and older “discretionary vs. automatic” bonus reasoning

  • Rabinovitz v. Pena, Griffin v. Potter, and Turner v. Gonzales: The panel discussed these pre-Burlington cases to illustrate how older doctrine sometimes drew lines between discretionary bonuses and automatically expected pay increases to determine whether there was a cognizable adverse action. The Third Circuit reasoned that those distinctions were driven by the older “terms and conditions” requirement and are less persuasive under Burlington’s deterrence-focused standard.

D. Causation: temporal proximity, pattern of antagonism, and holistic proof

  • Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis and LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n: These cases anchor the temporal proximity doctrine. When timing is “unusually suggestive,” it alone can create an inference of causation. When it is not, the court looks to the record “as a whole.”
  • Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, and Andreoli v. Gates: Used to calibrate timing—days can suffice; multi-month gaps usually do not without additional evidence.
  • Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., and Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., Red Arrow Div.: Provide the “pattern of antagonism” concept as an alternative route to causation when temporal proximity is not unusually suggestive.
  • Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co.: Cited for the holistic, inferential approach to causation when timing alone is insufficient.

E. Statutory cross-pollination and interstatutory consistency

  • E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co. and Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc.: These cases supported the textual similarity between Title VII and the ADA retaliation provisions.
  • Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC: Reinforced that, in some circumstances, a request for FMLA leave can also qualify as an ADA accommodation request, allowing the court to treat the 2020 leave as protected activity under both statutes for the prima facie analysis.

F. Appellate restraint and waiver

  • Singleton v. Wulff: The panel declined to decide pretext because the district court had not addressed it.
  • Nagle v. Alspach: Used to find waiver of Steidle’s disparate treatment discrimination claim on appeal (issues not pursued are abandoned).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The new precedential rule: Burlington’s “materially adverse” test governs ADA and FMLA retaliation

The decision’s principal doctrinal move is explicit and broad: retaliation claims under the ADA and FMLA use the same adverse-action standard as Title VII retaliation. The panel grounded this on:

  • Textual similarity (ADA retaliation language is “nearly identical” to Title VII’s).
  • Legislative borrowing (the FMLA antiretaliation provision was “derived from [Title VII] and [was] intended to be construed in the same manner”).
  • Structural harmony (the statutes share the same prima facie retaliation elements and use the same McDonell Douglas framework in circumstantial-evidence cases).
  • Persuasive consensus (the opinion canvassed other circuits adopting the same approach for ADA/FMLA retaliation).

Doctrinally, the court framed the district court’s error as importing a discrimination-centric notion of adversity into retaliation—precisely what Burlington cautioned against because the two provisions serve different purposes (substantive equality vs. safeguarding enforcement mechanisms).

B. Bonuses and raises can be materially adverse, even if discretionary

The panel rejected the idea that retaliation adversity turns on whether a bonus was “automatically entitled” or discretionary. Under Burlington, the question is practical deterrence: would the reduction likely dissuade a reasonable worker from protected activity? Here, the court emphasized context:

  • Steidle’s historical compensation pattern included materially higher bonuses and salary increases before protected activity.
  • After protected activity, both bonus amounts and percentage increases dropped sharply (including a more than 40% reduction relative to prior levels as described by the court).

The court also corrected a category error: the district court asked at the prima facie stage whether performance deserved a higher bonus. That inquiry typically belongs to later steps (legitimate reason and pretext), not to whether the challenged act could be materially adverse.

C. Causation: unusually suggestive timing is enough at the prima facie stage (2020), but not for a six-month gap (2021)

For the 2020 bonus/increase, approval occurred mid-leave. The panel treated this as “unusually suggestive” temporal proximity and held that the district court improperly relied on USLI’s end-of-year compensation practice and performance concerns to negate causation at the prima facie step. Those considerations may matter later, but they do not erase the inference created by unusually suggestive timing.

For the 2021 bonus/increase, the six-month span between the May 2021 accommodation request and the late-2021 compensation decision was not unusually suggestive under Third Circuit precedent. The panel then evaluated “timing plus other evidence” and found it lacking:

  • The increased claim assignments began before the accommodation request, undermining the notion they were retaliatory.
  • A single combative meeting with a supervisor (without discipline or additional retaliatory acts) did not establish a “pattern of antagonism.”

Consequently, the 2021 retaliation theory failed at causation—even though the compensation reduction could qualify as materially adverse in the abstract.

3.3 Impact

A. Immediate doctrinal significance in the Third Circuit

  • Clear, precedential alignment: Litigants and district courts now have a definitive rule—ADA and FMLA retaliation claims use Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White’s “materially adverse” standard.
  • Compensation decisions are squarely in play: Reduced bonuses and smaller raises may constitute materially adverse actions even when discretionary, if they could deter protected activity.
  • Sharper stage discipline under McDonnell Douglas: The opinion polices the boundary between prima facie causation and later-step performance/justification disputes—likely affecting summary judgment practice.

B. Practical consequences for employers and employees

  • Bonus/raise documentation becomes more consequential: Employers should anticipate that discretionary pay decisions can be scrutinized as retaliation and should maintain consistent, contemporaneous, and comparably applied criteria.
  • Timing risks: Adverse compensation decisions approved during an employee’s leave or immediately after a protected request may more readily create a prima facie inference of causation.
  • But causation remains a meaningful gatekeeper: The 2021 holding demonstrates that a plaintiff still needs unusually suggestive timing or additional evidence (antagonism, inconsistencies, retaliatory animus) to connect protected activity to the challenged decision.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Materially adverse” (retaliation) vs. “adverse employment action” (discrimination):
    Discrimination claims typically require a change in the terms/conditions of employment (pay, status, duties). Retaliation claims are broader: the question is whether the employer’s action might deter a reasonable worker from exercising rights.
  • McDonell Douglas burden shifting:
    (1) Employee shows basic elements (protected activity, materially adverse action, causation).
    (2) Employer offers a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason.
    (3) Employee shows that reason is pretext (not the real reason).
  • “Temporal proximity”:
    If the adverse action happens very soon after (or during) protected activity, timing alone can support an inference of causation at the prima facie stage.
  • “Pattern of antagonism”:
    If timing is not close, a plaintiff can show causation through a sustained course of hostility or retaliatory conduct between the protected act and the adverse action.
  • Summary judgment:
    A case ends before trial only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Here, the court found genuine issues remained for the 2020 bonus causation and adverse-action elements under the correct legal standard.

5. Conclusion

Jeffrey Steidle v. United States Liability Insurance Co., Inc. establishes a clear Third Circuit rule: the Burlington Northern “materially adverse” retaliation standard governs not only Title VII, but also ADA and FMLA retaliation claims. This is the opinion’s central precedential contribution and it carries practical weight—particularly for compensation decisions such as bonuses and salary increases, which can be materially adverse even if discretionary.

At the same time, the decision illustrates that broadening the adverse-action definition does not eliminate causation requirements: unusually suggestive timing supported Steidle’s 2020 theory, while a six-month gap and limited intervening evidence doomed the 2021 theory. The remand ensures the district court will now address the next analytical stage—whether USLI’s explanations for the 2020 compensation decision were pretext for retaliation.