Expungement Does Not Automatically End a Lawyer’s Serious-Crime Interim Suspension

1. Introduction

The Vermont Supreme Court’s decision addresses the relationship between criminal-record expungement and the regulation of lawyers. It holds that expungement following successful completion of a deferred sentence does not constitute reversal or vacatur of a conviction for purposes of automatic reinstatement under Administrative Order 9, Rule 21(F). The Court also declined to terminate the suspension on extraordinary-circumstances grounds, concluding that staffing difficulties in a prosecutor’s office did not justify reinstatement where alternative governmental assistance remained available.

The respondent, Eva Vekos, was the elected Addison County State’s Attorney. Following her conviction for first-offense driving under the influence, the Court placed her on interim suspension in April 2026. Although the offense was a misdemeanor, the Court had classified it as a “serious crime” under the attorney-disciplinary rules because of the surrounding circumstances, including her prosecutorial role, her performance of official duties when the offense occurred, and her conduct during arrest and processing.

This was Vekos’s third request to lift the suspension. She relied on two developments: the criminal court’s expungement of her case records and worsening staffing shortages in her office. Disciplinary Counsel opposed reinstatement. Formal disciplinary charges were pending, but no hearing panel had yet been assigned.

The decision distinguishes three matters that do not necessarily move together: relief from the consequences of a criminal case, eligibility to resume legal practice during disciplinary proceedings, and the ultimate resolution of professional-misconduct charges.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Automatic reinstatement was unavailable

Rule 21(F) requires automatic reinstatement when a lawyer suspended solely under the relevant serious-crime provisions demonstrates that the underlying conviction “has been reversed or vacated.” Vekos argued that expungement under 13 V.S.A. § 7041(e), following successful completion of her deferred sentence, satisfied that requirement.

The majority rejected that argument. Neither the rule nor the deferred-sentence statute equates expungement with reversal or vacatur. The statutory directions to strike the adjudication of guilt and expunge the records did not establish the legal or factual deficiency in the conviction that the Court’s earlier decision had identified as the basis for automatic reinstatement.

Extraordinary circumstances were not established

Rule 21(D)(2) separately permits the Court, “[i]n the interest of justice,” to terminate an interim suspension upon a showing of “extraordinary circumstances.” Vekos maintained that her office’s staffing crisis, resulting backlogs, and effects on the criminal justice system met that standard.

The majority disagreed. The Attorney General’s Office had assumed oversight of Addison County prosecutions and arranged assistance from a prosecutor assigned from another county. Considering those arrangements, the conduct underlying the suspension, and the purposes of Rule 21, the Court was not persuaded that reinstatement was “absolutely necessary” or warranted in the interests of justice.

The dissent concerned discretionary relief, not automatic reinstatement

Justice Nolan agreed that expungement did not satisfy Rule 21(F). She nevertheless would have granted relief under Rule 21(D)(2), emphasizing rehabilitation, the absence of further offending, operational harm to the prosecutor’s office, and the prolonged absence of a disciplinary merits hearing.

3. Legal Framework

Serious-crime interim suspension

Administrative Order 9, Rule 21(C) defines a “serious crime” as “any felony or lesser crime that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Consequently, a misdemeanor can qualify. The inquiry is not confined to the offense’s criminal classification; the circumstances and their implications for professional fitness also matter.

An interim suspension operates before the final disciplinary disposition. As the Court explained in the earlier suspension decision, it protects the profession and the administration of justice from the appearance created when a person convicted of a serious crime continues to serve as an officer of the court in good standing.

Two distinct routes to reinstatement

• Rule 21(F): A mandatory route when the underlying conviction has been reversed or vacated and the lawyer was suspended solely under the specified provisions.
• Rule 21(D)(2): A discretionary route requiring extraordinary circumstances and a determination that termination serves the interests of justice, after notice and an opportunity for Disciplinary Counsel to be heard.

The distinction is central. Failure to satisfy Rule 21(F) does not eliminate the Court’s discretionary authority under Rule 21(D)(2), but a lawyer must independently establish the conditions for that relief.

4. Precedents and Other Authorities

In re Vekos, 2026 VT 11

The original suspension decision supplied the controlling assessment of the underlying conduct. The Court had concluded that Vekos’s DUI conviction qualified as a serious crime because of the combined circumstances: she was an elected prosecutor, committed the offense while performing official duties, and attempted to avoid the consequences of her conduct during arrest and processing.

The present majority relied on that assessment rather than treating expungement as requiring a fresh classification of the offense. It also repeated the earlier conclusion that the conduct indicated deficiencies relevant to legal practice and an indifference to legal obligations.

This reliance limits the reach of the decision. The Court did not hold that every first-offense DUI necessarily warrants serious-crime suspension. Its reasoning remained tied to the particular circumstances previously established.

Justice Nolan’s earlier dissent supplied the foundation for her present disagreement. She regarded suspension as disproportionate to a low-level, nonrecidivist offense and questioned the relationship between the asserted need for immediate protection and Disciplinary Counsel’s delay in seeking relief.

In re Vekos, 2026 VT 35

The July 2026 decision was the immediate doctrinal predecessor. Vekos had then sought reinstatement after completing her deferred sentence and obtaining an order striking the adjudication of guilt. The Court distinguished “strike” from “vacate,” drawing on statutory language, case law, and dictionary definitions. It held that automatic reinstatement is appropriate when there is a legal or factual deficiency in the underlying conviction.

That decision did not resolve the effect of an actual expungement order, because expungement was not then before the Court. The present opinion answers that reserved question: adding expungement to the striking of an adjudication does not satisfy Rule 21(F).

Vekos also relied on Justice Nolan’s concurrence in the July decision, which referred to her lack of recidivism, acceptance of responsibility, and compliance with court orders. Those considerations informed the argument for discretionary relief but did not alter the majority’s interpretation of automatic reinstatement.

In re Vekos, No. 26-AP-081 (Vt. May 13, 2026) (unpub. mem.)

The May order rejected an earlier extraordinary-circumstances application based on delay and the adverse effects of suspension on the administration of justice in Addison County. The Court emphasized the existence of a process for providing support and resources to the State’s Attorney’s Office.

The present majority treated that reasoning as continuing to apply despite the subsequent departure of the office’s remaining licensed prosecutor. The Attorney General’s intervention demonstrated that institutional assistance remained available. The Court therefore rejected the renewed application on its merits rather than simply refusing to reconsider the earlier request.

United States v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 2004)

This federal decision appeared through the parties’ discussion of the July ruling. Vekos distinguished the federal expungement statute discussed there from Vermont’s deferred-sentence scheme, arguing that Vermont provided broader relief through both striking the adjudication and expunging records.

The present Court did not undertake an extended analysis of United States v. Crowell. Its decision rested on the language of Vermont’s disciplinary rule and statute. The case therefore served principally as background to Vekos’s attempt to distinguish the earlier reasoning, not as an independent source of the present holding.

In re Guardianship of A.S., 2012 VT 70

Vekos invoked Justice Dooley’s concurrence, which described expungements as operating to “change court history for beneficial purposes.” That language supported her argument that Vermont expungement should have substantial rehabilitative consequences.

The majority declined to translate that policy proposition into an additional ground for automatic reinstatement. The quoted language came from a concurrence, and the Court found that Vekos’s policy arguments were not reflected in Rule 21(F)’s text. The opinion thus illustrates the limits of relying on broad rehabilitative purposes to expand a specifically worded disciplinary rule.

In re Discipline of Treffinger, 393 P.3d 1084, 1089 (Nev. 2017)

Justice Nolan cited this Nevada decision in support of her concern that interim suspension could exact a greater practical penalty than the sanction ultimately imposed after disciplinary adjudication. The cited decision favored staying an interim suspension to avoid that possibility.

This was persuasive authority used by the dissent, not a rule adopted by the majority. Its significance lies in identifying a structural risk: a provisional protective measure can become functionally punitive when merits proceedings do not advance promptly.

ABA commentary and Vermont’s regulatory purpose

Disciplinary Counsel cited the official commentary to the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 19 for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, which states that extraordinary-circumstances relief should be limited to what is “absolutely necessary.” The majority expressly used that formulation when rejecting reinstatement.

Justice Nolan, by contrast, invoked the Reporter’s Notes to Administrative Order 9, emphasizing that Vermont’s attorney-regulation system has long focused on prevention and education as well as prosecution. These authorities illuminate the disagreement over how to balance professional protection, rehabilitation, and the practical consequences of continued suspension.

5. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

Text controls the automatic-reinstatement inquiry

The majority’s analysis begins with the specified legal events in Rule 21(F): reversal or vacatur. Section 7041(e), by contrast, directs the striking of an adjudication and expungement of records after the statutory conditions are met. The Court declined to treat those different terms as interchangeable.

The distinction reflects the function of each form of relief in this case. Successful completion of a deferred sentence establishes compliance with the sentence’s requirements. It does not, without more, establish that the conviction was legally erroneous or factually unsound. Accordingly, it does not undermine the original serious-crime determination in the manner contemplated by Rule 21(F).

This is a holding about the disciplinary consequences of expungement under a particular rule. It should not be read as declaring that expungement lacks legal effect generally, or as resolving every question concerning access to or use of expunged records.

Immediate danger is not an additional Rule 21 requirement

Vekos argued that the completed criminal matter no longer presented an immediate danger to clients or the public. The majority answered that Rule 21 does not require that additional showing. The relevant threshold was conviction of a serious crime as defined by the rule.

The protective interests recognized by the Court therefore extend beyond preventing imminent injury to a particular client. They include confidence in the profession and the administration of justice. This explains why rehabilitation and the absence of further offenses, although significant to the dissent, did not compel reinstatement.

Operational need did not establish necessity

The staffing argument presented a different question: whether the consequences of continuing the suspension justified exceptional relief despite the continuing basis for it. Vekos submitted caseload information and described backlogs affecting victims, defendants, law enforcement, and the courts.

Disciplinary Counsel challenged the specificity of the claimed prejudice and argued that reinstatement was not the only viable response. The majority focused on the availability of assistance, particularly the Attorney General’s oversight of all county prosecutions. Against that background, it found reinstatement neither absolutely necessary nor justified in the interests of justice.

The decision gives substantial weight to alternatives to reinstatement. It does not, however, hold that staffing disruption can never amount to extraordinary circumstances. Its conclusion depends on the available support arrangements and the conduct underlying this suspension.

Delay remains a concern without becoming a ground for relief

The majority expressly directed that adjudication of the disciplinary merits proceed without undue delay. That acknowledgment matters because interim suspension is not a substitute for resolving the charges.

Nevertheless, the Court did not establish a maximum permissible suspension period or hold that the delay already experienced required reinstatement. Justice Nolan would have given the delay substantially greater weight, particularly because no hearing panel had yet been assigned.

6. The Dissent’s Competing Approach

Justice Nolan’s disagreement concerned the present justification for continued suspension, not the text of Rule 21(F). She accepted that expungement was neither reversal nor vacatur but considered the combined circumstances sufficient for discretionary relief.

Her analysis emphasized four considerations:

1. Rehabilitation: Vekos had accepted responsibility, complied with court requirements, completed the deferred sentence, and not reoffended.
2. Current protective need: In the dissent’s view, the record did not demonstrate a present danger sufficient to justify continued exclusion from practice.
3. Public-service consequences: The office’s shortages allegedly affected functions beyond courtroom prosecution, including victim notification, child-protection emergencies, urgent decisions, and advice to law enforcement.
4. Proportionality and delay: Continued interim suspension risked becoming more severe than the eventual disciplinary sanction.

The dissent also identified an evidentiary concern. According to Justice Nolan, the Court had denied Vekos’s request for a hearing on her affidavit, yet discounted the claimed operational harms without factfinding. She would have taken the submissions more cautiously in favor of allowing Vekos to resume work.

The division thus concerned how best to protect the public and the justice system. The majority prioritized the existing serious-crime determination and available replacement resources; the dissent prioritized demonstrated rehabilitation, operational consequences, and timely adjudication.

7. Potential Impact and Limits

• Criminal relief and professional reinstatement remain distinct. Lawyers cannot assume that expungement after a deferred sentence will automatically restore active status.
• The legal character of relief matters. Applicants invoking Rule 21(F) must establish reversal or vacatur, not merely completion of a sentence, striking of an adjudication, or expungement.
• Extraordinary-circumstances applications face a demanding practical inquiry. Evidence of hardship may be insufficient where workable alternatives to reinstatement exist.
• Public employment does not displace disciplinary standards. An elected lawyer’s importance to an office is relevant context, but not an automatic entitlement to resume practice.
• Merits proceedings remain essential. The majority’s instruction against undue delay and the dissent’s proportionality concerns highlight the importance of prompt disciplinary adjudication.

The ruling does not resolve the underlying misconduct charges, determine a final sanction, or establish that expunged material is admissible in every disciplinary setting. Rule 21(F) itself also makes clear that even qualifying reinstatement would not automatically terminate a pending disciplinary proceeding; that proceeding may continue on available evidence other than the conviction.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

Deferred sentence

A sentencing arrangement under which successful compliance can lead to statutory relief. Here, that relief included striking the adjudication of guilt and expunging records.

Striking an adjudication

Removing the adjudication as the statute directs. The Court held that this is not equivalent to vacating the conviction under Rule 21(F).

Expungement

Statutory relief affecting criminal records. The order required the covered authorities to respond to inquiries as though no record existed, but did not trigger automatic professional reinstatement.

Reversal or vacatur

Legal action overturning or setting aside a conviction. These are the specified triggers for automatic reinstatement under Rule 21(F).

Interim suspension

A restriction on legal practice before final resolution of disciplinary charges, rather than the final disciplinary disposition.

Extraordinary circumstances

Exceptional conditions that can justify discretionary termination of a suspension in the interests of justice. On these facts, hardship and staffing shortages did not satisfy that standard.

9. Conclusion

The decision establishes that expungement under Vermont’s deferred-sentence statute does not, by itself, require automatic reinstatement from a serious-crime interim suspension. It also demonstrates the demanding showing needed for discretionary relief when alternative institutional support remains available.

Its broader significance lies in the separation between criminal rehabilitation and professional regulation. Expungement does not automatically answer whether a lawyer should resume practice, while continued interim suspension must still be understood against the need for prompt merits adjudication. The majority and dissent agreed on the first proposition but sharply differed over how the second should affect Vekos’s immediate right to return to work.