Express Plea-Waiver Language Bars Appeals from Revocation Sentences as “New Sentences”

1. Introduction

In United States v. Louis, the Tenth Circuit enforced a plea-agreement appeal waiver to dismiss a defendant’s attempt to appeal the prison term imposed after revocation of supervised release. Alexander Kanehoalan Louis, III had pleaded guilty to firearm and drug offenses and received concurrent 87-month sentences followed by supervised release. After release, he admitted violating two special conditions of supervised release. The district court revoked supervision and imposed nine months’ imprisonment plus a new three-year supervised-release term.

The central issue on appeal was not the merits of the revocation sentence, but whether Louis’s original plea agreement validly waived any right to appeal “any sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release,” and thus required dismissal under the Tenth Circuit’s waiver-enforcement framework.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court granted the government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver under United States v. Hahn, concluding:

• Scope: The waiver’s text expressly included “any sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release,” so the appeal fell within the waiver.
• Knowing and voluntary: The plea agreement’s clear language and an adequate Rule 11 colloquy established a knowing and voluntary waiver; Louis did not carry his burden to show otherwise.
• Miscarriage of justice: None of the four Hahn exceptions applied; the waiver was not “otherwise unlawful” merely because Louis could not predict future revocation circumstances.

The court dismissed the appeal and denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, explaining that an Anders v. California withdrawal was not appropriate because the case was resolved through waiver enforcement rather than merits review.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)

Hahn supplies the controlling three-part test for enforcing appellate waivers: (1) scope, (2) knowing and voluntary waiver, and (3) whether enforcement would result in a miscarriage of justice. It also defines the four exclusive “miscarriage of justice” categories: impermissible factor (e.g., race), ineffective assistance in negotiating the waiver, sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, or a waiver that is “otherwise unlawful.”

Louis is a straightforward application of Hahn: the panel methodically tracks each prong and places the defendant’s arguments into the correct doctrinal bucket (knowledge/voluntariness and “otherwise unlawful”), rejecting them under existing standards.

2) United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2005)

The court relied on Taylor for the contract-law approach to construing waivers—examining the “plain language” of the agreement. That principle did the heavy lifting on scope: because the waiver explicitly mentioned revocation sentences, the court treated the text as dispositive.

3) United States v. Tanner, 721 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013)

Tanner emphasizes the “synergistic effect” of (a) clear waiver text plus (b) a proper Rule 11 colloquy, and places the burden on the defendant to show the waiver was not knowing and voluntary. In Louis, the panel used Tanner to reject claims of “confusion” where both the written waiver and the in-court advisement were direct and specific.

4) United States v. Porter, 905 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2018)

Porter is the opinion’s key conceptual anchor on revocation appeals. It explains that revocation proceedings produce a “separate right to appeal from the revocation sentence,” and thus a waiver in the original plea agreement does not reach revocation appeals “absent specific language to that effect.”

Louis uses Porter in two important ways:

• Clarifying the nature of revocation punishment: a revocation sentence is a “new sentence,” not an alteration of the original judgment.
• Validating drafting technique: parties may “include sentences upon revocations within the scope of the [appeal] waiver” if the plea agreement says so expressly.

5) United States v. Sandoval, 477 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2007)

The court invoked Sandoval to reject the argument that a waiver is invalid unless the defendant can foresee the exact consequences later being waived. In waiver doctrine, “knowing and voluntary” does not require “specificity [as to] the result he forfeits.” That principle directly undercut Louis’s claim that he could not intelligently waive appeal rights for unknown future revocation events.

6) United States v. Lonjose, 663 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2011)

Lonjose supports the idea that “more precise language” can extend waivers beyond direct appeals into post-conviction contexts. Louis uses this to frame revocation-appeal waivers as a legitimate, enforceable extension when the agreement clearly describes what is being waived.

7) United States v. Gordon, 740 F. App'x 647 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Phillips, 831 F. App'x 921 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Draper, 836 F. App'x 711 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Ivory, No. 21-3028, 2022 WL 2301640 (10th Cir. June 27, 2022)

These nonprecedential decisions function as a consistency check: the court noted it has enforced “the same type of waiver” multiple times. While not binding, they demonstrate a settled Tenth Circuit practice of enforcing expressly drafted revocation-appeal waivers under Hahn.

8) Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)

The brief Anders discussion is procedural: because the appeal was dismissed via waiver enforcement (not after a merits review of arguable issues), the panel denied counsel’s motion to withdraw premised on Anders.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is a textbook Hahn analysis, but with an important revocation-specific clarification drawn from Porter: a revocation sentence is a new sentence with its own appeal right, so a waiver must explicitly reference revocation to cover it—here, it did.

On knowledge/voluntariness, the court relied on two reinforcing pillars:

• Text: the waiver was explicit about revocation sentences.
• Rule 11 colloquy: the district judge specifically advised Louis that he was waiving appeals regarding “any later violation” and confirmed his understanding and agreement, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N).

Louis’s “confusion” theory failed largely because it assumed revocation sentencing modifies the original sentence and might trigger an “outside-guidelines” appeal exception. The panel rejected that premise: revocation sentencing is separate, and the waiver covered it categorically.

On miscarriage of justice, Louis invoked the “otherwise unlawful” category. The court treated this as an attempt to relitigate knowledge/voluntariness and, in any event, held that uncertainty about future revocation facts does not make a waiver unlawful under Sandoval/Hahn.

C. Impact

Although labeled “not binding precedent,” United States v. Louis reinforces several practical consequences in Tenth Circuit plea bargaining and supervision practice:

• Drafting matters: Porter’s requirement of “specific language” is satisfied by clear, direct references to “any sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release.”
• Rule 11 best practices: district courts strengthen enforceability by explicitly discussing waiver consequences for supervised release and later violations, mirroring the colloquy here.
• Limits on post-revocation appellate review: defendants who sign such waivers will face dismissal even when challenging the length or conditions of the revocation sentence, unless they can fit a Hahn miscarriage-of-justice exception.
• Procedural clarity for counsel: where a waiver likely controls, the key litigation becomes waiver enforceability; an Anders-style merits presentation may be beside the point if the court resolves the case on the waiver.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised release: a post-prison monitoring period with conditions. Violations can lead to revocation and additional punishment.
• Revocation sentence as a “new sentence”: punishment imposed after revocation is not a retroactive change to the original prison term; it is a separate sentencing event with its own appeal right (per United States v. Porter).
• Appeal waiver: a contractual term in a plea agreement where the defendant gives up some or all rights to appeal. Courts enforce these if they are within scope, knowingly/voluntarily made, and not causing a Hahn miscarriage of justice.
• Rule 11 colloquy (Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N)): the judge must personally ensure the defendant understands any waiver of appeal/collateral-attack rights before accepting the plea.
• “Miscarriage of justice” (in this context): not a general fairness inquiry; it is limited to the four specific Hahn categories.
• Anders brief: a procedure allowing appointed counsel to seek withdrawal when the appeal is frivolous, typically after identifying anything that might arguably support the appeal; here, waiver enforcement made an Anders withdrawal inappropriate.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Louis confirms that, in the Tenth Circuit, an appeal waiver will be enforced to bar an appeal from a supervised-release revocation sentence when the plea agreement uses explicit revocation-appeal language and the Rule 11 colloquy confirms the defendant’s understanding. The decision reiterates the doctrinal point that revocation punishment is a “new sentence” with its own appeal right—one that can be waived in advance by clear drafting— and it underscores the narrowness of the Hahn miscarriage-of-justice safety valve.