Explicit Sentencing Findings Required for § 2D1.1(b)(1) Firearm Enhancements—Especially When Based on Co‑Conspirator Conduct

1. Introduction

In United States v. Victor Uriel Diego Estrada, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a recurring sentencing problem: when a district court applies a firearm enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) but does not clearly state the factual basis for the enhancement—particularly whether it rests on the defendant’s own possession or a co-conspirator’s possession—appellate review can become impossible.

The case arose from a DEA investigation connecting Estrada to methamphetamine trafficking. After a controlled purchase, agents searched Estrada’s residence (Hightower Trail), then executed a second search warrant at an associated property (Murray Lake), where they found very large quantities of drugs and a loaded 9mm handgun. The key sentencing disputes were:

• Firearm enhancement: whether a loaded handgun found at Murray Lake supported a two-level increase under § 2D1.1(b)(1).
• Zero-point offender adjustment: whether Estrada qualified for the two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, which (among other criteria) requires that the defendant did not possess a firearm in connection with the offense.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit vacated Estrada’s sentence and remanded for resentencing because the district court did not make explicit factual findings sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. The district court’s brief explanation—referencing co-conspirator possession and the “clearly improbable” commentary language—left unclear:

• whether the enhancement was based on Estrada’s own possession or co-conspirator possession,
• what evidence the court credited,
• and, if co-conspirator liability was the basis, what the scope of Estrada’s jointly undertaken criminal activity was.

Because that ambiguity also affected eligibility for § 4C1.1, the panel held that clarification was required before it could evaluate the legal challenges raised on appeal.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

• United States v. Tejas, 868 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2017)
  The panel used Tejas to state the governing standards of review: de novo review for Guidelines interpretation/application and clear-error review for underlying factual findings. This framing matters because Estrada’s appeal raised both legal arguments (e.g., deference to commentary) and factual ones (who possessed the firearm, and how).
• United States v. Geffrard, 87 F.3d 448 (11th Cir. 1996)
  Cited for the proposition that “possession of a firearm for sentencing purposes is a factual finding.” That classification was central to the disposition: when the underlying factual finding is unclear or unstated, the appellate court cannot simply “reinterpret” the record as a legal issue.
• United States v. Mock, 523 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2008)
  Mock supplied the remedial rule: where a sentencing court’s failure to make specific fact findings prevents meaningful appellate review, the sentence must be vacated and remanded for explicit findings. The panel applied this directly, concluding that the district court’s minimal explanation created exactly the kind of appellate-review gap Mock addresses.
• United States v. Barry, 163 F.4th 1346 (11th Cir. 2026)
  This was the most consequential substantive citation. Barry requires “individualized findings concerning the scope of criminal activity undertaken by a particular defendant” before holding the defendant accountable for a co-conspirator’s conduct under relevant-conduct principles. The panel used Barry to show why mere invocation of “co-conspirator possession” is not enough—scope findings are a prerequisite when proceeding through the co-conspirator route.
• United States v. Kluge, 147 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2025)
  The panel referenced Kluge to flag (without deciding) a separate legal issue Estrada raised: whether the district court improperly deferred to the Guidelines commentary (here, the “clearly improbable” language in the commentary to § 2D1.1(b)(1)). The citation indicates that, in the Eleventh Circuit, deference to commentary may be contested depending on whether the commentary aligns with the guideline text.
• United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1991)
  Cited for a best-practices principle: sentencing courts “should make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law” to facilitate review and avoid unnecessary remands. The panel used Gutierrez to underscore that explicitness is not a mere formality—it is essential to appellate function.
• United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2011)
  Bradley provided the limiting principle: even without explicit findings, appellate review may proceed if it is clear from the record what evidence the district court credited. The panel then distinguished Estrada’s case, holding that the record was not clear enough to apply Bradley as a “no-remand needed” escape hatch.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The legal framework the district court had to navigate

Estrada’s drug offenses were sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. The firearm enhancement states: “If a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed, increase by 2 levels.” The commentary adds that the enhancement “should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.”

Separately, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (relevant conduct for jointly undertaken criminal activity) allows a defendant to be held responsible for certain acts of others if they were:

• within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,
• in furtherance of that activity, and
• reasonably foreseeable in connection with that activity.

Combining these provisions, the Eleventh Circuit explained there were two distinct “paths” to apply the firearm enhancement:

• Path 1 (personal possession): the district court finds that Estrada himself possessed the firearm (including constructive possession, if supported).
• Path 2 (co-conspirator possession): the district court finds a co-conspirator possessed the firearm and, under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), that possession is attributable to Estrada—requiring individualized scope findings under United States v. Barry.

(b) Why the district court’s explanation was legally insufficient

At sentencing, the district court overruled the objection with a short statement referencing co-conspirator liability and the “clearly improbable” concept, but it did not specify:

• who possessed the firearm,
• whether it found Estrada had personal possession (actual or constructive),
• or, if it relied on a co-conspirator theory, what the scope of Estrada’s jointly undertaken criminal activity was (as required by Barry).

That ambiguity created a decisive appellate problem: the court of appeals could not determine which legal standards to apply to review the enhancement (and, by extension, could not resolve Estrada’s commentary-deference argument or sufficiency-of-evidence argument in a grounded way). Under Mock and Gutierrez, the appropriate remedy was vacatur and remand for explicit findings.

(c) The downstream effect on § 4C1.1

The panel also emphasized that the lack of firearm findings prevented it from reviewing the denial (or effective non-consideration) of the two-level “Adjustment for Certain Zero-Point Offenders” under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1. One requirement is that the defendant “did not possess . . . a firearm . . . in connection with the offense.” Without a clear firearm-possession finding (and theory), the appellate court could not decide eligibility.

3.3. Impact

• Procedural discipline in firearm-enhancement rulings: The decision reinforces that district courts must do more than recite general legal propositions (e.g., “co-conspirator possession counts”). They must identify the factual basis and, when relevant conduct is invoked, make scope findings tied to the particular defendant.
• Greater salience after § 4C1.1: Because § 4C1.1 can materially lower offense levels for qualifying defendants, firearm findings now carry additional leverage. A poorly explained firearm enhancement does not merely affect two levels; it may also foreclose a separate two-level reduction—making clarity even more critical.
• Appellate outcomes (vacatur) where findings are opaque: The opinion signals that when the record does not clearly reveal what evidence was credited (Bradley) and findings are missing (Mock), the Eleventh Circuit will not attempt to “guess” the theory. The likely consequence is resentencing.
• Commentary deference remains a live issue: By citing United States v. Kluge, the panel highlights that litigants may continue to challenge reliance on commentary (here, the “clearly improbable” language) depending on its fit with the guideline text, though the court did not reach that issue due to the factual-findings defect.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Firearm enhancement” (§ 2D1.1(b)(1)): A guideline rule that increases the sentencing calculation by two levels if a firearm was possessed in relation to a drug offense.
• Guideline “commentary” and “deference”: Commentary is explanatory text accompanying guidelines. Courts sometimes treat it as authoritative, but defendants may argue (as Estrada did) that commentary should not control when it expands or conflicts with the guideline’s plain text—an issue flagged by the panel’s citation to United States v. Kluge.
• “Relevant conduct” and co-conspirator liability (§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)): Sentencing can account for certain acts of others in jointly undertaken activity, but only if the court finds (1) the conduct was within the defendant’s agreed scope, (2) in furtherance of that scope, and (3) reasonably foreseeable. The “scope” piece requires individualized findings (United States v. Barry).
• “Constructive possession”: A person may be treated as possessing an item even without physically holding it if the facts show sufficient control or dominion over the place or the item. Whether constructive possession exists is a fact question, requiring clear findings.
• “Meaningful appellate review”: The court of appeals must be able to tell what the district court found and why. If the basis for an enhancement is unclear, the appellate court cannot properly apply the correct standard of review or evaluate alleged errors, prompting remand (United States v. Mock).
• “Zero-point offender” adjustment (§ 4C1.1): A reduction for certain low-criminal-history defendants who satisfy listed criteria, including not possessing a firearm in connection with the offense. Firearm findings therefore affect both enhancements and eligibility for reductions.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Victor Uriel Diego Estrada establishes (and forcefully applies) a practical rule of sentencing administration in the Eleventh Circuit: when imposing a firearm enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1)—especially via co-conspirator attribution—the district court must make explicit factual findings that identify the possession theory and, if relying on relevant conduct, include individualized scope findings as required by United States v. Barry. Absent such findings, and absent a record that clearly reveals what evidence was credited (United States v. Bradley), the sentence is vulnerable to vacatur and remand under United States v. Mock.