Expert Testimony Required to Establish Real Estate Professionals’ Standard of Care for Tenant Screening (No “Common Knowledge” Internet-Search Duty)

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a landlord’s claim that his real estate brokerage and its agent failed to adequately screen a proposed tenant for a waterfront condominium in Newport. The tenant allegedly stopped paying rent, refused to vacate at lease end, and remained in possession during the COVID-19 eviction moratorium, leading to substantial claimed damages.

The central legal issue was narrow and dispositive: whether the plaintiff needed expert testimony to establish that Rhode Island real estate professionals owed (and breached) a duty of care to perform a “basic internet search” of a prospective tenant—beyond the credit and criminal background checks the defendants did perform. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for defendants after the plaintiff was precluded from offering expert testimony due to discovery-related failures.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Negligence framework reaffirmed: Duty, breach, proximate causation, and damages are required; without duty, negligence fails as a matter of law.
• Question of law vs. proof at trial: Whether duty exists is a question of law for the court, but establishing the professional standard of care generally requires expert testimony unless the “common knowledge” exception applies.
• No common-knowledge exception here: What constitutes a “reasonable” tenant background check by a licensed real estate professional is not within ordinary juror experience.
• Separation-of-powers caution: Imposing a specific, judicially created “internet search” requirement would raise policy and implementation questions better suited to the General Assembly.
• Disposition: Affirmed summary judgment for defendants.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Summary judgment review and methodology

• Wilson v. City of Providence by and through Lombardi, 338 A.3d 282 (R.I. 2025) (quoting Bronhard v. Thayer Street District Management Authority, 326 A.3d 178 (R.I. 2024)): cited for the de novo standard of appellate review of summary judgment.
• Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Providence Business Loan Fund, Inc., 200 A.3d 153 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Cancel v. City of Providence, 187 A.3d 347 (R.I. 2018)): cited for the governing test—view evidence in the nonmovant’s favor and affirm only if no genuine issue of material fact exists and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

B. Duty in negligence as a gatekeeping legal question

• Wells v. Smith, 102 A.3d 650 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Brown v. Stanley, 84 A.3d 1157 (R.I. 2014)): cited for the elements of negligence and the “axiomatic” proposition that without a duty, there is no negligence liability.
• Roman v. City of Providence, 333 A.3d 74 (R.I. 2025) (quoting Wells v. Smith): cited for the rule that duty is a question of law; if no duty exists, summary judgment is appropriate because the factfinder has nothing to decide.

C. Expert testimony, professional standards of care, and the “common knowledge” exception

• Donnelly Real Estate, LLC v. John Crane Inc., 291 A.3d 987 (R.I. 2023) (quoting Jessup & Conroy, P.C. v. Seguin, 46 A.3d 835 (R.I. 2012)): cited for the general rule that expert testimony is required to establish matters beyond lay understanding. The court treated this as the controlling articulation of the “beyond common knowledge” principle.
• Rhode Island Resource Recovery Corporation v. Restivo Monacelli LLP, 189 A.3d 539 (R.I. 2018): cited to illustrate that, in cases involving professional obligations (there, legal/technical contexts), standard of care, breach, and causation often require expert testimony because they are outside jurors’ common knowledge. The court analogized real estate professionals to other licensed professions.
• Laplante v. Rhode Island Hospital, 110 A.3d 261 (R.I. 2015): used to exemplify the “common knowledge” exception (e.g., leaving a surgical instrument inside a patient), contrasting that kind of obvious error with the non-obvious question of what tenant screening requires.

D. Defining professional negligence standards (comparative citations)

• 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 175 (2022): quoted for the proposition that expert testimony is required to establish professionals’ specific standard of care where the subject is beyond the average layperson’s ken—and for the parallel statement recognizing the “common knowledge” carve-out.
• 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 173 (2022) and Malinou v. Miriam Hospital, 24 A.3d 497 (R.I. 2011): cited for the general formulation of professional negligence—reasonable prudence under similar circumstances—and for medical-malpractice analogs about measuring conduct against customary professional practice.
• Boccasile v. Cajun Music Limited, 694 A.2d 686 (R.I. 1997): quoted within Malinou v. Miriam Hospital to articulate the “degree of care and skill ordinarily employed” benchmark (medical context), reinforcing the court’s view that such benchmarks typically require expert proof.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in a structured chain:

1. The plaintiff’s negligence theory required proof of a cognizable duty and its breach. The plaintiff alleged defendants were negligent because they did not do enough screening—specifically, they did not perform an internet search that allegedly would have revealed adverse public information about the tenant.
2. The relevant inquiry was the applicable professional standard of care, not whether the tenant’s history was “bad.” The court corrected what it viewed as the plaintiff’s misframing: the question was not whether an internet search would have uncovered damaging facts, but whether the law (via the professional standard of care) required real estate professionals to do such a search as part of their tenant-screening services.
3. Real estate professionals are licensed, trained, and regulated, implying specialized practices. The court relied on statutory licensing and education requirements—G.L. 1956 chapter 20.5 of title 5, including § 5-20.5-4(a) and § 5-20.5-4(b)—to support its characterization of the profession as one involving specialized knowledge beyond lay experience.
4. Because the screening practices of “reasonably prudent” real estate professionals are not within everyday juror knowledge, expert testimony is required. The plaintiff conceded defendants obtained credit and criminal checks; the dispute was whether an additional layer (internet searching) is required. The court found that neither judges nor jurors routinely conduct professional tenant background checks, so expert testimony was needed to establish what the standard practice is and whether defendants departed from it.
5. The “common knowledge” exception did not apply. Unlike an obviously negligent act (e.g., leaving a surgical instrument inside a patient, per Laplante v. Rhode Island Hospital), the adequacy and scope of tenant screening by a real estate professional is not self-evident to nonprofessionals.
6. Institutional competence and separation of powers counseled restraint. The court emphasized that declaring an enforceable “internet search duty” would instantly raise policy/administrability questions (e.g., which search engines, how extensive, how to verify results, when is the search complete). In the court’s view, such requirements resemble regulatory policy choices better suited for the General Assembly rather than judicial creation in tort litigation.

3.3 Impact

• Professional-negligence framing for real estate brokers/salespersons: The decision solidifies that claims attacking the adequacy of real estate professionals’ tenant-screening practices will typically be treated like other professional-negligence cases—requiring expert testimony on standard of care (and often breach and causation).
• Narrowing the “common knowledge” exception in this context: Plaintiffs cannot avoid experts merely by arguing that an additional step (like “just Google them”) seems sensible. The court signaled that “sensible” is not synonymous with “legally required,” and that the content of professional duties is usually established by professional evidence.
• Litigation strategy consequence: The case illustrates a practical, case-dispositive dynamic: when expert testimony is precluded (here, due to failure to produce the expert for deposition), negligence claims hinging on professional standards may be vulnerable to summary judgment.
• Legislative/regulatory pressure point: By highlighting unanswered operational questions, the opinion implicitly invites the General Assembly (or relevant regulators) to specify tenant-screening obligations if Rhode Island policy favors them—rather than having courts craft such obligations case by case.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Duty” (in negligence): A legal obligation recognized by the court that requires a defendant to act (or refrain from acting) in a certain way toward the plaintiff. If there is no duty, the negligence claim ends.
• “Standard of care” (professional negligence): The benchmark conduct expected of a reasonably prudent professional in similar circumstances—often established by evidence of professional norms and practices.
• “Expert testimony” requirement: When the jury cannot evaluate conduct intelligently without specialized knowledge (e.g., industry customs, technical practices), an expert must explain the standard practice and whether it was followed.
• “Common knowledge” exception: If the error is so obvious that ordinary people can recognize it without specialized training (classic example: leaving a surgical instrument inside a patient), expert testimony may be unnecessary.
• “Separation of powers” in this setting: Courts decide cases; legislatures make broad policy choices and regulations. When a proposed tort duty would effectively create detailed rules for an industry (like how to conduct internet searches), courts may defer to legislative action.

5. Conclusion

The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s opinion establishes a clear, profession-focused rule: where a plaintiff challenges the adequacy of a real estate professional’s tenant-screening process—specifically whether an internet search is required—those questions are not within lay “common knowledge” and must be proven through expert testimony. The decision reinforces duty as a legal gatekeeping concept, treats real estate practice as specialized and regulated, and warns against courts effectively regulating the profession through ad hoc tort duties better suited for legislative resolution.