Experience-Based Reliability Under Rule 702 (Including Photoshop-Adjusted Fingerprint Images) and Enforceable Circuit Rule 30 Certifications

I. Introduction

United States v. Omari Andrews, Jr. (7th Cir. Apr. 15, 2026) arises from a joint federal/local investigation into alleged drug trafficking to a gang in the Skokie/Evanston, Illinois area. After five controlled buys, law enforcement arrested Omari Andrews, Jr. and searched a jointly occupied apartment in Mount Prospect (the “Palm Drive apartment”), recovering drugs, trafficking/production paraphernalia, and four firearms (three Glock pistols and an AR-style pistol).

Andrews pleaded guilty to five drug-distribution counts and went to trial on (1) possession with intent to distribute (based on drugs in his pockets) and (2) 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime) based on the firearms found in the apartment. The jury convicted on both and found Andrews possessed all four firearms.

On appeal, Andrews pressed two principal issues:

  • Sufficiency: whether the evidence proved he possessed the apartment firearms (constructively) in furtherance of drug trafficking.
  • Expert evidence: whether the district court erred under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert by admitting fingerprint testimony where the analyst used Adobe Photoshop to adjust an image angle for comparison (latent print 3A).

The Seventh Circuit affirmed and added a pointed enforcement discussion of Circuit Rule 30 compliance and the consequences of inaccurate appellate certifications.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  1. Sufficiency of the evidence (affirmed). Viewing the record in the government’s favor, the court held a rational jury could find Andrews constructively possessed the firearms found in a jointly occupied residence. Key evidence included (a) a recorded jail call in which Andrews discussed facing a “922(c)” charge and confirmed there were “four” guns “in different rooms,” and (b) fingerprint evidence tying Andrews to at least two firearms (latent prints 3A and 4A), with latent print 4A unchallenged by a Rule 702 motion.
  2. Rule 702/Daubert (affirmed). The district court adequately applied Rule 702/Daubert and did not abuse its discretion by admitting the analyst’s latent print 3A opinion. The panel emphasized that (i) a Daubert hearing is not required sua sponte, especially absent a request and where the challenge is untimely, and (ii) an expert’s experience can establish reliability, making criticisms about Photoshop use issues of weight for the jury rather than admissibility.
  3. Circuit Rule 30 (admonition with consequence). The court criticized counsel’s false certification of appendix completeness (failure to include the district court’s oral ruling central to the appeal) and—while declining monetary/disciplinary sanctions in this case—removed counsel from the CJA appointment list (with the possibility of reapplication after a year upon sufficient explanation and corrective measures).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Result)

1. Sufficiency review and jury deference

  • United States v. Anderson, 988 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2021): supplied the governing sufficiency lens—evidence viewed in the government’s favor—and the “nearly insurmountable” standard for overturning a jury verdict.
  • United States v. Jones, 79 F.4th 844 (7th Cir 2023) and United States v. Moshiri, 858 F.3d 1077 (7th Cir. 2017): reinforced deference to the jury and the appellate court’s refusal to reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility; a “reasonable basis” in the record sustains the verdict.
  • United States v. Taylor, 637 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2011) and United Sates v. Brewer, 143 F.4th 903 (7th Cir. 2025): used to reject Andrews’s attempt to relitigate factual disputes (including competing expert interpretations) under the guise of sufficiency.

2. Constructive possession in jointly occupied residences

  • United States v. White, 95 F.4th 1073 (7th Cir. 2024): framed the actual/constructive possession distinction and supported the idea that a defendant’s demonstrated awareness of a firearm can evidence a nexus to it.
  • United States v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2009): defined constructive possession—possession may be deemed even absent immediate physical control.
  • United States v. Katz, 582 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2009): explained one route to constructive possession—exclusive control of the location.
  • United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2012): critical here because Andrews jointly occupied the apartment; Griffin requires a “substantial connection” between defendant and firearm, not merely presence in the home.
  • United States v. Davis, 896 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2018): sharpened Griffin into a functional test: “proximity coupled with some other factor” (e.g., motive, statements indicating involvement, gestures implying control, evasive conduct).
  • United States v. Richardson, 60 F.4th 397 (7th Cir. 2023): validated reliance on jail calls acknowledging a firearm’s location as evidence supporting constructive possession.

These cases collectively supplied the doctrinal path the panel used: because Andrews jointly occupied the residence, the government needed a firearm-specific nexus (not just proof that guns were in the home). The recorded jail call—especially the father’s question “how many you had in [the] house?” and Andrews’s answer “There was four” in “different rooms”—was treated as nexus evidence rather than mere reportage.

3. Forensic linkage evidence (fingerprints/DNA) as possession support

  • United States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2006): recognized that a fingerprint on a component (there, a magazine) can tie a defendant “quite closely” to a gun.
  • United States v. Maxwell, 143 F.4th 844 (7th Cir. 2025): cited by analogy for biological evidence (DNA) supporting possession.

Thornton and Maxwell helped the court frame fingerprint evidence as more than ambient association: it is a concrete “tie” that can supply the “other factor” needed under Griffin/Davis, particularly where residence occupancy is shared.

4. Rule 702 / Daubert framework and standards of review

  • Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999): set the gatekeeping duty and emphasize flexibility—no definitive checklist; reliability inquiry is case-specific; trial courts have latitude in how to assess reliability.
  • United States v. Godinez, 7 F.4th 628 (7th Cir. 2021) and Kirk v. Clark Equip. Co., 991 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2021): supplied the appellate review architecture: de novo review of whether the district court properly applied Rule 702/Daubert; abuse of discretion if it did.
  • Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2009), Kirstein v. Parks Corp., 159 F.3d 1065 (7th Cir. 1998): reinforced that the inquiry has no required form and that courts have broad discretion over how to evaluate expert reliability.
  • United States v. Johnson, 916 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Tingle, 880 F.3d 850 (7th Cir. 2018)): supported the proposition that a hearing is not required where reliability may be “properly taken for granted.”
  • United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252 (7th Cir. 2018) and United States v. Owens, 162 F.4th 844 (7th Cir. 2025): deployed to rebut any categorical duty for district judges to conduct a sua sponte, step-by-step Rule 702 analysis (or hearing) absent a party request.
  • United States v. Glover, 479 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2007): cited for the general proposition that fingerprint analysis reliability is well-settled.
  • United States v. Acox, 595 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2010): used to justify enforcement of pretrial deadlines for evidentiary objections, especially expert issues, to avoid trial disruption.

5. Experience as a sufficient reliability foundation; disputes go to weight

  • United States v. Parkhurst, 865 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2017): “Training and experience” are proper foundations for expert testimony.
  • Artis v. Santos, 95 F.4th 518 (7th Cir. 2024): emphasized that experts need not rely only on peer-reviewed studies; experience can be an “equally valuable teacher,” and many criticisms are for cross-examination rather than exclusion.
  • United States v. Protho, 41 F.4th 812 (7th Cir. 2022): supported admitting testimony about image enhancements and visual evidence interpretation when grounded in extensive specialized experience—an important analog to Photoshop-assisted fingerprint image adjustment.
  • United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2004): treated challenges to partial fingerprint comparisons as weight/credibility issues for the factfinder, particularly when explored through cross-examination.
  • United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2020): reiterated that expert testimony is not “irrefutable fact”; its persuasive force is for the jury.

These authorities supplied the central move in the Rule 702 analysis: even if the defense expert criticized Photoshop use as unvalidated “digital manipulation,” the court treated the dispute as a classic battle of experts for the jury once the proponent established a minimally reliable basis through training/experience.

6. Appendix compliance and consequences for false certifications

  • United States v. Matthews, 140 F.4th 893 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Hill v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 90 F.3d 220 (7th Cir. 1996)): underscored that failing to supply necessary appellate documents harms the court’s decisionmaking process.
  • United States v. White, 472 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2006): warned against transforming appeals into “scavenger hunt[s]” for judgments/transcript pages.
  • United States v. Boliaux, 915 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2019): provided the admonition that “[f]alse representations to the court of appeals have consequences,” including dismissal/summary affirmance in civil cases and sanctions in criminal cases.

The Andrews panel extended these warnings into an applied consequence: removal from the CJA appointment list for inaccurate Rule 30 certification, while still protecting the defendant by independently locating the missing ruling and confirming no prejudice.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Constructive possession: “substantial connection” proved by statements plus forensic ties

Because Andrews jointly occupied the Palm Drive apartment, the government could not rely on “exclusive control” doctrine. It instead had to show a firearm-specific nexus: “proximity coupled with some other factor.” The panel held the government met that burden with:

  • Recorded admissions/knowledge: Andrews’s jail call was treated as showing not just awareness, but a proprietary relationship—responding to “how many you had in the house” by confirming “four” guns and their distribution across rooms.
  • Fingerprint evidence: latent prints matched to Andrews supplied an additional, concrete tie to particular firearms, supporting the inference that the guns were his tools within a drug-trafficking setting.

The court refused to entertain Andrews’s alternative benign readings of the call (mere repetition of what police found) because sufficiency review does not permit reweighing. The question was whether a rational juror could infer possession, not whether the appellate court might draw a different inference.

2. Rule 702/Daubert: flexible gatekeeping; no sua sponte hearing requirement; experience can establish reliability

The panel’s Rule 702 reasoning had three steps:

  1. Framework applied → abuse-of-discretion review. The district court’s short explanation (experience supported reliability of Photoshop use) was “concise” but not the sort of conclusory failure condemned in United States v. Godinez. Thus, the appellate court reviewed admission for abuse of discretion.
  2. No required Daubert hearing. Under Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael and Seventh Circuit authority, a hearing is discretionary. Here, Andrews did not request a hearing and raised the objection on the eve of trial, relying on an untimely defense expert. Those procedural facts weakened any claim that the judge was obliged to convene a separate evidentiary proceeding.
  3. Reliability supported by experience; disputes go to weight. Citing United States v. Parkhurst and Artis v. Santos, the court treated Kern’s years of fingerprint-analyst experience, training in Photoshop, and the cross-disciplinary adoption of techniques as enough to satisfy Rule 702(c). Objections that the method was unusual or not validated to the defense expert’s liking were “fodder for cross-examination,” especially since the defense actually presented competing expert testimony for the jury to evaluate.

3. Procedural discipline as part of appellate administration (Circuit Rule 30)

A notable feature of the opinion is its administrative-law-of-appeals component: the court treated appendix compliance and accurate certification as essential to appellate review integrity. While the panel did the work to locate the missing oral ruling (and emphasized the defendant was not prejudiced), it still imposed a professional consequence on counsel—removal from the CJA appointment list—grounded in United States v. Boliaux and reinforced by United States v. Matthews and United States v. White (2006).

C. Impact

1. § 924(c) litigation in shared-residence firearm cases

The opinion strengthens the practical prosecution template for “substantial connection” in jointly occupied spaces: combine (i) defendant statements demonstrating knowledge/control (especially jail calls) with (ii) forensic linkage (fingerprints/DNA) to at least one firearm. For defendants, Andrews highlights that merely offering alternative inferences is unlikely to succeed on sufficiency review given the “nearly insurmountable” standard.

2. Rule 702 challenges to forensic workflow tools (e.g., Photoshop)

The decision signals that the Seventh Circuit will not treat the use of mainstream image-editing software in forensic comparison as categorically suspect; the key is whether the proponent can explain, through training and experience, that the tool was used in a way consistent with reliable forensic practice. Where that foundation is laid, concerns about “digital manipulation” are likely to be characterized as weight issues for jurors, particularly when the defense can cross-examine and offer a competing expert.

3. Appellate practice: Rule 30 compliance is enforceable, and certifications matter

Andrews is also a cautionary precedent on Seventh Circuit appellate procedure. The panel made explicit that inaccurate Rule 30 certifications can trigger concrete professional consequences even when the defendant suffers no prejudice and even when the court can locate the missing material. The sanction substitute here—removal from the CJA appointment list with a conditional path to reinstatement—shows the court’s willingness to protect institutional functioning without reflexively punishing the client.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (“in furtherance”): Requires proof that firearm possession advanced or helped the drug trafficking crime—not merely that a gun existed somewhere nearby. In practice, guns found alongside drug trafficking evidence, coupled with proof the defendant possessed them, often supports the “in furtherance” element.
  • Actual vs. constructive possession: Actual possession means physical control (e.g., holding the gun). Constructive possession means the person had the power and intent to control the gun, even if not holding it at the moment.
  • “Exclusive control” vs. “substantial connection”: If a defendant alone controls the place where a gun is found, a jury can infer possession more readily. If the place is shared (joint occupancy), the government must show extra facts tying the defendant to the gun specifically.
  • Rule 702 and Daubert: The judge must screen expert testimony for reliability and relevance. But the process is flexible; courts often admit expert testimony when there is a reliable foundation and leave competing criticisms to cross-examination and rebuttal experts.
  • Daubert hearing: A pretrial evidentiary hearing to test expert reliability. It is not automatic; courts may decide the issue on papers and trial context, especially if no party requests a hearing.
  • “Weight” vs. “admissibility”: Admissibility asks whether the jury may hear the evidence at all. Weight asks how persuasive the evidence is. Andrews places many forensic-method objections (here, Photoshop adjustment critiques) into the “weight” bucket once a baseline reliability foundation is shown.
  • Circuit Rule 30 appendix: The appellant must provide an appendix with the key orders/rulings addressing the issues on appeal. Missing materials can impair review and trigger consequences, particularly if counsel falsely certifies compliance.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Omari Andrews, Jr. affirms a § 924(c) conviction by applying settled sufficiency and constructive-possession doctrine to a jointly occupied residence, emphasizing that recorded admissions and forensic linkage can readily establish the “substantial connection” required by Seventh Circuit precedent.

On expert evidence, the opinion underscores a pragmatic Rule 702 approach: district courts have wide latitude in method-of-inquiry; a Daubert hearing is not required absent a request; and experience-based explanations can establish reliability even for workflow tools like Photoshop, with most methodological disputes left to juries through cross-examination and competing experts.

Finally, the decision stands out for its institutional message: Seventh Circuit Rule 30 is not aspirational. Counsel’s certification obligations are substantive, and inaccurate representations can produce serious professional consequences independent of the appeal’s merits.