Experience-Based Grooming Testimony May Explain Inducement Without Predicting Abuse

Commentary on United States v. Bindues
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · November 5, 2026 · No. 24-2117
Panel: Judges Hartz, McHugh, and Eid. Opinion by Judge Eid.

1. Introduction

The Tenth Circuit affirmed Johnathon Bindues’s conviction for producing child sexual abuse material and upheld the admission of expert testimony explaining grooming. The decision addresses two related questions: whether the evidence sufficiently connected Bindues’s requests to a minor’s production of sexually explicit videos, and whether an experienced law-enforcement expert could explain grooming without presenting a scientifically predictive or diagnostic model.

Bindues, a thirty-year-old high-school basketball and track coach, developed a sexual relationship with Jane Doe, a student he had first coached when she was thirteen. Their extensive communications began when she was fourteen and continued after her fifteenth birthday. A jury convicted him of coercion and enticement under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and production of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251. The district court imposed 276 months’ imprisonment and ten years of supervised release.

The opinion’s central evidentiary distinction is between using grooming testimony to explain patterns of conduct and using it to diagnose abuse or determine guilt. The court accepted the former use on this record. Separately, it held that repeated requests for explicit images and videos supplied ample evidence of inducement, notwithstanding the defense’s characterization of the minor’s recordings as unsolicited.

2. Background and Procedural History

The communications and recordings

Between September 2020 and June 2021, Bindues and Doe exchanged more than 17,000 text messages. Doe trusted Bindues and confided in him about difficulties at home. Their communications developed into romantic and sexual exchanges, including discussions of marriage and children. Bindues repeatedly encouraged secrecy, asked Doe to delete messages, and sometimes proposed communicating through an application with disappearing messages.

The record also showed that Bindues used coaching activities to create opportunities for sexual contact. The court described encounters associated with sports travel, purported individual training, and meetings away from school.

For the production charge, the important evidence concerned Bindues’s repeated requests for explicit photographs and recordings. Those requests escalated from rejecting clothed photographs to expressly requesting nude images and a video. On June 11, 2021, he clarified that he wanted to watch Doe touching herself. The following day, after further sexual communications and requests, Doe sent explicit videos. Bindues responded enthusiastically and requested more.

Doe’s mother discovered the communications after confiscating Doe’s phone and locating messages preserved on a paired school laptop. She contacted police, who recovered the communications and arrested Bindues.

The competing experts

The government called FBI Supervisory Special Agent Daniel O’Donnell, chief of Behavioral Analysis Unit III, to explain grooming. He testified as a “blind” expert: he had not reviewed the case evidence and did not express an opinion that Bindues had groomed Doe.

O’Donnell described grooming as a collection of behaviors intended to obtain a child’s cooperation in sexual activity, prevent discovery, and delay disclosure. He identified five commonly observed stages: identifying a target, establishing a connection, gathering information, fulfilling needs while exploiting vulnerabilities, and lowering inhibitions. He emphasized that these stages were not necessarily sequential.

The defense presented forensic psychologist Dr. Simone Viljoen. Based on her literature review, she disputed the existence of a settled definition of grooming and challenged the ability to measure or predict it reliably.

The appellate issues

Bindues challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the § 2251 conviction and the admission of O’Donnell’s testimony under Rules 702 and 403. The opinion did not separately undertake a sufficiency analysis of the § 2422(b) conviction or identify an independent sentencing challenge.

3. Summary of the Opinion

  • Sufficient evidence of production: Viewed favorably to the government, the messages, testimony, and recordings permitted a rational jury to find that Bindues induced Doe to produce sexually explicit material.
  • Reliable specialized knowledge: O’Donnell’s training, investigative experience, and the FBI’s accumulated experience supported the limited explanatory testimony. The absence of a scientific predictive model did not automatically make that testimony inadmissible.
  • Assistance to the jury: Grooming testimony could explain offenders’ methods and a minor’s participation in exploitation without deciding whether grooming occurred in this particular case.
  • No controlling analogy to attempt instructions: Decisions addressing grooming as evidence of a substantial step toward attempted enticement did not foreclose explanatory testimony in a prosecution for completed offenses.
  • No abuse of discretion under Rule 403: The district court reasonably assessed the testimony’s limited probative and prejudicial effects and allowed a competing defense expert.

The court affirmed the challenged conviction and evidentiary ruling, leaving the judgment undisturbed.

4. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Sufficiency of the evidence

CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchins, 874 F.3d 1201, 1209 (10th Cir. 2020)

The court cited this decision for de novo review of sufficiency challenges. That standard requires an independent assessment of legal sufficiency, but does not authorize the appellate court to retry the facts.

United States v. Sapp, 53 F.3d 1100, 1103 (10th Cir. 1995)

This decision supplied the requirement to examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the government. Its practical importance was substantial: the messages had to be considered together, with reasonable supporting inferences, rather than isolated from the surrounding course of conduct.

United States v. Emmons, 24 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 1994)

The court relied on the familiar question whether any rational factfinder could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. This directed attention to the statutory elements and the evidence supporting them, not whether Bindues could propose an alternative account.

United States v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737, 742 (10th Cir. 1997)

This authority prohibits appellate reassessment of witness credibility and evidentiary weight. Accordingly, the court could not replace the jury’s assessment of Doe’s explanations of the messages with Bindues’s competing interpretation.

United States v. Streett, 83 F.4th 842, 854 (10th Cir. 2023)

This was the principal limiting authority on the production issue. It suggested that merely requesting a naked photograph may, in some circumstances, fall short of § 2251(a). The panel preserved that distinction but found Bindues’s repeated, expressly sexual requests far beyond a bare request for nudity. The decision therefore does not establish that every request for a nude image satisfies the statute.

Expert gatekeeping and appellate review

United States v. Pehrson, 65 F.4th 526, 540–41 (10th Cir. 2023)

This decision identified Rule 702 as the governing admissibility framework. It also supported the distinction between reviewing whether the trial court performed its gatekeeping function and reviewing the court’s particular admissibility determination.

Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003)

The court used this authority both for the obligation to screen expert evidence for relevance and reliability and for the deferential standard governing admissibility rulings. Deference follows the performance of gatekeeping; it does not replace that obligation.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 591 (1993)

Daubert supplied the foundational reliability-and-relevance requirement and the connection between relevance and assistance to the factfinder. The panel’s application emphasized the purpose for which the testimony was offered: explaining criminal behavior, not scientifically predicting or diagnosing it.

United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1122 (10th Cir. 2006)

This decision reinforced that the district court must satisfy itself of reliability and relevance before allowing the jury to hear expert testimony. The existence of a competing defense expert did not eliminate that preliminary judicial responsibility.

United States v. Holt, 161 F.4th 1253, 1263 (10th Cir. 2025)

The panel cited this decision for de novo review of whether the correct Rule 702 standard was applied and whether gatekeeping actually occurred. Because Bindues did not challenge either point, the appeal proceeded under the more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.

Etherton v. Owners Ins. Co., 829 F.3d 1209, 1216 (10th Cir. 2016)

This case supported substantial deference to the district court’s application of Rule 702. Reversal required more than disagreement: the ruling had to fall outside the permissible range of judicial choice.

Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002)

Quoted through Etherton v. Owners Ins. Co., this decision reinforced the same deferential approach. It helped explain why the panel did not independently choose between the prosecution’s and defense’s competing accounts of grooming expertise.

Experience-based expertise and explanatory testimony

United States v. Garza, 566 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009)

This authority recognized that law-enforcement experience can qualify an officer to explain common criminal practices. It supplied a direct basis for treating investigative knowledge as potentially admissible expertise rather than requiring laboratory science.

Conroy v. Vilsack, 707 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 2013)

The court cited this decision for the relevance of specialized training and substantial experience to expert qualifications. O’Donnell’s psychology training, leadership role, and investigative background were material to that assessment.

United States v. Kamahele, 748 F.3d 984, 999 (10th Cir. 2014)

This decision established that testimony is not unreliable merely because it lacks a scientific methodology. It directly answered Bindues’s contention that the absence of empirical studies or predictive application necessarily defeated admissibility.

United States v. Batton, 602 F.3d 1191, 1202 (10th Cir. 2010)

This was the closest substantive authority for helpfulness. It approved testimony about sex offenders’ modus operandi because such practices are not necessarily common knowledge. The panel treated grooming testimony as comparable explanatory evidence.

Grooming in attempted-entitlement prosecutions

United States v. Flechs, 98 F.4th 1250 (10th Cir. 2024)

Bindues argued that this decision’s treatment of grooming left nothing useful for an expert to explain. The panel distinguished the case: United States v. Flechs concerned jury instructions and grooming as a substantial step toward attempted enticement. Here, grooming testimony explained conduct underlying completed offenses. A legal definition governing an attempt instruction did not resolve the separate evidentiary question.

United States v. Faust, 795 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 2015)

This decision recognized that § 2422 reaches sexual grooming without requiring an intention to consummate the contemplated sexual activity. The panel used it to explain the statutory context of United States v. Flechs, not to impose grooming as an additional element of Bindues’s production charge.

Unfair prejudice and directly comparable testimony

United States v. Watson, 766 F.3d 1219, 1241 (10th Cir. 2014)

This authority characterized exclusion under Rule 403 as an extraordinary remedy and an appellate challenge to balancing as onerous. It supported the panel’s refusal to disturb the district court’s assessment without a convincing showing of unfair prejudice.

United States v. Cerno, 529 F.3d 926, 936 (10th Cir. 2008)

This case confirmed the considerable discretion trial courts possess in Rule 403 balancing. The panel relied on that discretion when assessing the district court’s conclusion that both probative value and prejudicial risk were relatively modest.

United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001)

Quoted through United States v. Cerno, this decision reinforced the same discretionary framework. It supplied no separate grooming rule, but supported the governing standard of review.

United States v. Rivera, No. 24-2013, 2025 WL 1684447, at *7–8 (10th Cir. June 16, 2025) (unpublished)

The panel noted that another panel had recently upheld O’Donnell’s testimony on similar facts. This offered persuasive consistency, not an independently binding rule requiring admission in every case.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The complete communications defeated the “unsolicited videos” theory

Section 2251(a), as described in the opinion, prohibits causing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of creating a visual depiction, with the required interstate-commerce connection. Section 2256 includes masturbation and lascivious exhibition of specified intimate areas within “sexually explicit conduct.” The opinion also identifies cellphones as computers within the statutory framework.

The contested point was inducement. Bindues maintained that Doe independently produced the recordings and offered additional material voluntarily. The panel rejected that account because the record showed persistent requests for increasingly explicit material, including a request to watch Doe touching herself shortly before the recordings were sent.

The sequence mattered. A response that he wanted to be “surprised,” considered alone, might appear less directive. Read alongside earlier requests and his encouragement after receiving the first recording, it supported the opposite inference: the videos fulfilled an already communicated demand.

The court did not need to decide that every request for nudity constitutes a production offense. The actual recordings involved expressly sexual conduct, and the surrounding communications permitted the jury to connect their production to Bindues’s encouragement. Nor did the court announce a categorical rule that a minor’s apparent initiative is legally irrelevant. It found that the asserted absence of prompting was contradicted by this record.

2. Independent review did not permit a second trial

The sufficiency analysis combined de novo legal review with substantial respect for the jury’s factual role. The appellate court independently assessed whether the evidence could establish the offense, while accepting reasonable government-favorable inferences and declining to revisit credibility.

This distinction explains the force of the panel’s rejection. Bindues’s argument was not merely that the prosecution had insufficiently demonstrated causation; it depended on factual assertions that the messages directly undermined. The court also stated that the jury had been properly instructed on the statutory elements, although it did not develop a separate instructional analysis.

3. Non-scientific expertise remained subject to Rule 702

Rule 702 permits expertise grounded in knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Its coverage extends beyond scientific testimony to technical and other specialized knowledge. The proponent must nevertheless establish the rule’s admissibility requirements as more likely than not satisfied.

The panel credited O’Donnell’s formal psychology training, specialized investigative work, leadership of the relevant FBI unit, and experience with numerous child-abuse investigations. It also relied on his explanation that the grooming framework reflected information accumulated through the FBI’s behavioral analysis work.

The reasoning was therefore purpose-specific: the witness offered a framework for describing recurring criminal practices, not a validated instrument for predicting abuse. Absence of scientific predictive capacity did not automatically defeat that limited use.

The holding should not be overstated. It does not mean that credentials alone establish reliability, that law-enforcement opinions are presumptively admissible, or that every methodological objection concerns only evidentiary weight. Reliability and helpfulness remain judicial prerequisites. The panel upheld this district court’s assessment of this witness and this explanatory purpose.

4. A descriptive model can assist without determining the answer

The district court acknowledged that the grooming framework lacked predictive power, testability, and verifiability. The appellate court nevertheless accepted its usefulness as modus operandi evidence: it supplied vocabulary and context for conduct that jurors might otherwise misunderstand.

In particular, the testimony explained how emotional attachment, fulfilled needs, secrecy, and lowered inhibitions can contribute to a child’s participation in exploitation. That explanation addressed a potential misconception central to the defense theory—that participation necessarily demonstrates absence of adult inducement.

O’Donnell’s blind-witness role was an important boundary. He did not examine the evidence and then certify that Bindues was an offender. The jury retained responsibility for deciding whether the actual evidence established the charged crimes. The five-stage framework likewise remained descriptive, not a mandatory checklist or diagnostic test.

5. A legal definition does not exhaust an evidentiary subject

The distinction from United States v. Flechs prevented two different uses of “grooming” from being conflated. In an attempt prosecution, grooming conduct may establish the legally necessary substantial step toward the offense. That raises questions about instructions and the boundary between preparation and criminal attempt.

Here, the prosecution concerned completed offenses. The grooming testimony explained how Bindues could have persuaded Doe to create explicit recordings; it did not establish a separate substantial-step requirement. Grooming was not an additional statutory element or an independently charged count.

The broader lesson is that defining a term for a legal instruction does not necessarily eliminate the value of specialized evidence about the behavior that term describes.

6. Rule 403 addressed unfair prejudice, not merely damaging evidence

Rule 403 permits exclusion when probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers including unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury. Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it assists the prosecution.

The district court found that O’Donnell’s testimony had relatively low probative value but also relatively low prejudicial effect. His general, non-case-specific testimony limited the danger that expert authority would substitute for proof. Allowing Dr. Viljoen to explain the framework’s limitations further reduced that risk.

The defense expert’s participation was a supporting circumstance, not a substitute for Rule 702 compliance. The opinion neither requires defendants to retain an expert to preserve an objection nor establishes that competing testimony cures an otherwise inadmissible prosecution opinion.

C. Potential Impact and Limits

Production cases involving apparently willing participation

The decision provides persuasive support for assessing inducement through the complete course of communications. Repeated encouragement, requests shortly before production, and requests for further recordings can undermine a claim that material was wholly unsolicited. Expressions of affection or participation by the minor do not, by themselves, resolve whether an adult induced production.

At the same time, the opinion preserves the distinction between nudity and statutory sexually explicit conduct. It should not be read to eliminate the limitations acknowledged in United States v. Streett.

Experience-based testimony about criminal practices

Prosecutors may rely on the decision when offering qualified experts to explain grooming without asking them to identify the defendant as an offender. Its reasoning favors a clearly defined explanatory purpose, a demonstrated experiential foundation, and restraint concerning case-specific conclusions.

Defense counsel retain meaningful grounds for challenge: whether the expert connects experience to the proposed opinions, whether the subject genuinely requires specialized assistance, whether the framework fits the issues, and whether general patterns risk being treated as proof of guilt.

Gatekeeping remains individualized

The decision’s deference depends partly on the appellate issues presented. Bindues did not argue that the district court used the wrong Rule 702 standard or failed to perform gatekeeping. Future cases presenting those objections could require a different analysis.

A continuing concern is that ordinary relationship-building conduct can acquire incriminating significance when placed within a broad behavioral framework. The opinion permits contextual explanation; it does not authorize conviction because a defendant resembles a generalized offender profile. Independent proof of every statutory element remains necessary.

Finally, because this order and judgment is nonprecedential, its influence outside the case is persuasive. It illustrates an admissible use of grooming testimony rather than compelling the same result whenever such testimony is offered.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

De novo review
The appellate court independently decides a legal question. In a sufficiency appeal, it still respects the jury’s role in resolving credibility and factual conflicts.
Abuse of discretion
A trial court’s ruling is not reversed merely because another judge might decide differently. The ruling must exceed the range of reasonable choices.
Gatekeeping
The judge must screen proposed expert testimony for reliability and usefulness before the jury hears it.
Modus operandi
A characteristic method of operating. Here, the testimony described recurring ways offenders obtain cooperation and maintain secrecy.
Blind expert
An expert who explains a subject without reviewing the particular case or expressing a conclusion about the defendant.
Heuristic
A framework that helps organize information. It is not necessarily a scientifically validated test or a conclusive answer.
Substantial step and inchoate offense
An attempt is an incomplete offense requiring criminal intent and conduct sufficiently advancing its commission. A substantial step distinguishes punishable attempt from mere preparation.
Unfair prejudice
A risk that evidence will produce a decision on an improper basis, rather than through legitimate assessment of the charged conduct.
Persuasive authority
A decision that another court may find useful but is not generally required to follow. This order retains binding effects within the specified law-of-the-case and preclusion doctrines.

6. Conclusion

United States v. Bindues illustrates two complementary principles: inducement may be established through the full context of an adult’s communications, and experience-based grooming testimony may help explain that context without predicting abuse or diagnosing the defendant.

Its significance is bounded. The court upheld a particular evidentiary ruling and a conviction supported by extensive direct evidence. It did not replace statutory proof with a grooming model, equate every nude-image request with a production offense, or create binding circuit precedent.