Exhibit-Listed Retirement Accounts Remain Subject to a Postnuptial Retirement Division Formula

Introduction

In Andrea K. Smerski f/k/a Andrea K. Lemon v. Darren M. Lemon, 2026 WY 61 (June 4, 2026), the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed a recurring drafting-and-interpretation problem in marital agreements: how to treat retirement accounts that are (1) disclosed on “separate property” exhibits, yet (2) governed by a separate retirement-specific division clause.

The parties married in 2017 and executed a postnuptial agreement in 2018. Wife filed for divorce in Wyoming in 2024. The central dispute on appeal concerned four “Subject Retirement Accounts” listed on the agreement’s attached exhibits: three accounts on Wife’s exhibit and Husband’s Thrift Savings Plan on his exhibit. The district court awarded each account in full to the named account holder, reasoning that the exhibits “clearly identify accounts that the parties expected would remain their separate property.”

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement’s retirement-division formula applied to those exhibit-listed retirement accounts as well, making post–June 1, 2017 contributions and associated growth “joint property” subject to equitable distribution.

Summary of the Opinion

• The postnuptial agreement excluded retirement benefits and entitlements—present or future—from the definition of “separate property” and stated the parties “decline to characterize retirement benefits and entitlements as separate or joint property.”
• A separate clause (Paragraph 5(g)) established a division formula: (1) balances (including contributions and interest) prior to June 1, 2017 are separate and not divisible; (2) contributions and related earnings/interest on or after June 1, 2017 are “joint property” subject to division under applicable standards.
• The district court applied Paragraph 5(g) to retirement accounts not listed on the exhibits but did not apply it to the exhibit-listed Subject Retirement Accounts, awarding those accounts entirely to their holders.
• The Supreme Court held this was error: Paragraph 5(g) “necessarily includes” the Subject Retirement Accounts. The case was reversed and remanded for the district court to distribute the post–June 1, 2017 portions under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Choice-of-law enforcement and procedural/scope principles

• Boyce v. Jarvis, 2021 WY 80, ¶ 17, 490 P.3d 320, 324 (Wyo. 2021), citing Denbury Onshore, LLC v. APMTG Helium LLC, 2020 WY 146 ¶ 24, 476 P.3d. 1098, 1105 (Wyo. 2020): These cases supplied the framework that even when another state’s substantive law applies (here, Oregon by contract), Wyoming law still governs procedural matters, including the standard of review. That allowed the Court to apply Wyoming’s de novo review for contract interpretation while respecting the agreement’s Oregon choice-of-law clause.
• Finley Resources, Inc. v. EP Energy E&P Co. L.P., 2019 WY 65, ¶ 9, 443 P.3d 838, 842 (Wyo. 2019): The Court used this case for the rule that Wyoming courts enforce choice-of-law provisions unless doing so is contrary to Wyoming law, public policy, or citizens’ general interests. This supported applying Oregon law to the agreement’s distribution terms (unchallenged by the parties).

2) Marital agreements as contracts; de novo interpretation; “four corners”

• Jones v. Young, 2025 WY 130, ¶ 44, 580 P.3d 1026, 1038 (Wyo. 2025), citing Morrison v. Hinson-Morrison, 2024 WY 96, ¶ 15, 555 P.3d 944, 952 (Wyo. 2024), and Long v. Long, 2018 WY 26, ¶ 11, 413 P.3d 117, 122 (Wyo. 2018): These cases grounded the Court’s approach that postnuptial agreements are interpreted under ordinary contract principles and that the interpretive goal is the parties’ intent as reflected in the agreement’s language.
• Morrison v. Hinson-Morrison, 2024 WY 96, ¶ 15–16, 555 P.3d 944, 952 (Wyo. 2024), quoting Hensel v. DAPCPA RPO, LLC, 2023 WY 84, ¶ 12, 534 P.3d 460, 464 (Wyo. 2023), and citing Van Vlack v. Van Vlack, 2023 WY 104 ¶ 20, 537 P.3d 751, 757 (Wyo. 2023): Together, these authorities provided the operative interpretive tools: de novo review; plain meaning; and where unambiguous, confining interpretation to the “four corners” of the document. The Court emphasized no party claimed ambiguity, which made the contract text controlling.

3) Harmonizing clauses; reading the contract as a whole (Wyoming and Oregon)

• Brown v. Miles, 193 Or. 466, 480, 238 P.2d 761, 768 (Or. 1951): The Court invoked this Oregon authority to show Oregon treats postnuptial agreements like any written contract and requires construing the agreement as a whole to render clauses harmonious. This supported giving effect to both the exhibits and (critically) the retirement-specific formula rather than letting the exhibit labels override it.
• Bradley v. Bradley, 2007 WY 117, ¶ 15, 164 P.3d 537, 542 (Wyo. 2007): The Court relied on this case to justify consulting analogous decisions from both jurisdictions because Wyoming and Oregon contract-interpretation rules are similar.
• Western Bank v. Youngs, 545 P.2d 886, 888 (Or. 1976): Cited for the proposition that a contract “cannot be read in isolation,” reinforcing the need to interpret Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 5(g) together.
• Sheridan Fire Fighters Loc. No. 276, IAFF, AFL-CIO, CLC v. City of Sheridan, 2013 WY 36, ¶ 16, 303 P.3d 1110, 1115 (Wyo. 2013): Used to reiterate Wyoming’s rule that a contract must be interpreted as a whole—an approach that undercut the district court’s exhibit-focused reading.

Legal Reasoning

The decision turned on harmonizing two key provisions:

1. Paragraph 2 (“Separate Property”) broadly defines separate property by reference to Exhibits A and B, but expressly carves out an exception: “With the exception of retirement benefits and entitlements owned by either party, either now or in the future….” It then adds: “The parties decline to characterize retirement benefits and entitlements as separate or joint property.”
   
   Interpretive consequence: Even if a retirement account appears on an exhibit labeled “Separate Property,” Paragraph 2 prevents retirement benefits/entitlements from being swept into the agreement’s general “separate property” definition.
2. Paragraph 5(g) (retirement division formula) supplies the special treatment the parties chose in lieu of labeling retirement accounts “separate” or “joint.” It divides retirement interests by date: pre–June 1, 2017 is separate and not divisible; post–June 1, 2017 contributions and their earnings/interest are “joint property” and “subject to division.”
   
   Interpretive consequence: The formula applies to “all retirement benefits, accounts, or entitlements” and therefore reaches the Subject Retirement Accounts as well as later-created retirement accounts.

The district court’s approach—treating the exhibit-listed retirement accounts as entirely separate—effectively nullified the retirement carve-out in Paragraph 2 and the operative division rule in Paragraph 5(g), at least for the largest and most significant listed accounts. The Supreme Court rejected that reading because it failed the “agreement as a whole” requirement and contradicted the agreement’s explicit retirement-specific structure.

Importantly, the Supreme Court did not dictate a particular percentage split on remand. It held only that the post–June 1, 2017 portions must be treated as divisible joint property and then equitably distributed by the district court under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (2025).

Impact

• Exhibit labels are not dispositive when the operative text says otherwise. This decision cautions trial courts against treating disclosures or exhibit headings (“Separate Property of [Wife/Husband]”) as controlling where the agreement’s substantive clauses carve out a category (here, retirement benefits) for special rules.
• Retirement carve-outs and formulas will be enforced according to their breadth. Where a postnuptial agreement states that retirement accounts are treated differently and then provides a comprehensive retirement formula, courts should apply that formula to all retirement accounts—whether preexisting, later-acquired, disclosed on exhibits, or not—unless the agreement clearly limits its scope.
• Drafting lesson: clarity about exhibits and carve-outs. Parties who intend an exhibit-listed retirement account to remain entirely separate must say so explicitly and reconcile that intent with any general retirement-division clause (e.g., by expressly excluding named accounts from the formula). Conversely, parties who intend a formula to govern all retirement accounts should ensure exhibits do not create contrary signals.
• Remedial guidance: classification first, equitable division second. The case reinforces a two-step practice point: identify what the agreement makes divisible (here, post–June 1, 2017 portions), then apply the jurisdiction’s equitable distribution statute to divide that divisible property.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Postnuptial agreement

A contract entered after marriage that sets rules for property and financial rights during marriage and upon divorce or death.

Choice-of-law provision

A clause selecting which state’s substantive law will govern interpretation/enforcement of the agreement’s terms. Here, Oregon law applied to distribution terms, but Wyoming still supplied procedural rules (including appellate review standards).

“Four corners” rule

If a contract is unambiguous, courts determine intent from the document itself—without using outside evidence—by reading it as a whole.

De novo review

An appellate standard under which the reviewing court gives no deference to the trial court’s legal interpretation of a contract.

Separate vs. joint (marital) property in this agreement

The agreement generally protected each party’s separate property, but it carved out retirement benefits from that framework and created a date-based formula: pre–June 1, 2017 retirement value is separate; post–June 1, 2017 contributions and associated growth are joint and divisible.

Equitable distribution (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114)

“Equitable” means fair, not necessarily equal. After identifying divisible property, the district court must divide it in a just and equitable manner based on statutory factors.

Conclusion

Smerski v. Lemon establishes a clear interpretive rule for postnuptial agreements that treat retirement assets specially: when an agreement (1) expressly excludes retirement benefits from the general “separate property” definition and (2) provides a retirement-specific division formula, that formula governs all retirement accounts—including those disclosed on exhibits labeled “separate property.” On remand, the district court must identify the post–June 1, 2017 portions of the exhibit-listed retirement accounts and distribute those portions under Wyoming’s equitable distribution statute.