Excessive Default-Judgment Damages May Be Vacated Under Courts’ Inherent Power, With a New Inquest (and Reassignment) Required When the Inquest Record Is Deficient

1. Introduction

Case: Williams v New York City Off. of Chief Med. Examiner, 2026 NY Slip Op 04001 (App Div, 2d Dept June 24, 2026).
Parties: Plaintiffs Tonya Williams, et al. (respondents) sued multiple defendants, including Unity Funeral Chapels, Inc. (appellant).
Claims: Negligence, breach of contract, and fraud.
Procedural posture: Unity defaulted (failed to appear/answer). The Supreme Court (Kings County) permitted entry of a default judgment, conducted an inquest on damages, and entered a $2.5 million judgment ($1.25 million per plaintiff: $750,000 “general damages” + $500,000 punitive damages). Unity moved to vacate the default and judgment; the motion was denied. Unity appealed.

Key issues on appeal:

  • Whether Unity proved lack of personal jurisdiction due to improper service (CPLR 5015[a][4]).
  • Whether Unity showed a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious defense to open its default (CPLR 5015[a][1]).
  • Whether Unity could obtain relief under CPLR 317 (defendant “not personally served”).
  • Even if the default stood, whether the damages award after inquest was excessive or inadequately supported—and what remedy was appropriate.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Department:

  • Dismissed the appeal insofar as Unity sought review of an order denying a motion to vacate a decision, because no appeal lies from such an order.
  • Affirmed the denial of vacatur based on lack of jurisdiction (CPLR 5015[a][4]): Unity did not rebut the presumption of proper service created by the process server’s affidavit.
  • Affirmed the denial of vacatur of the default under CPLR 5015(a)(1): Unity failed to show a reasonable excuse because its only excuse was non-service, which the court rejected.
  • Held CPLR 317 relief was unavailable because Unity was served by personal delivery.
  • Nevertheless exercised discretion and inherent authority to vacate the judgment on damages as “unwarranted and excessive,” faulted the trial court for failing to itemize damages and state essential supporting facts, and remitted for a new inquest on damages before a different Justice due to “injudicious remarks” at the inquest.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Appellate review limits: no appeal from denial of motion to vacate a “decision”

  • Coradin v New York City Tr. Auth., 3 AD3d 547: Used to support the threshold jurisdictional point that an order denying a motion to vacate a decision (as opposed to a judgment or order) is not appealable. The court applied this to dismiss that portion of Unity’s appeal.

2) CPLR 5015(a)(4): vacatur for lack of personal jurisdiction (service defects)

  • U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Lane, 241 AD3d 745: Quoted for the governing rule under CPLR 5015(a)(4): a court may relieve a party from a judgment/order where it lacked jurisdiction.
  • Citimortgage, Inc. v Ramcharran, 240 AD3d 738 and Christiana Trust v Leriche, 219 AD3d 564: Cited for the proposition that improper service defeats personal jurisdiction; the plaintiff’s failure to properly serve means the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
  • Robert M. Spano Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v Summit Farm Realty, Inc., 241 AD3d 584: Cited for the evidentiary presumption: a process server’s affidavit establishes a prima facie case and creates a presumption of proper service.
  • Nurhan v Harley, 237 AD3d 728 and Tuttnauer USA Co., Ltd. v Russo, 216 AD3d 846: Cited for the defendant’s burden: to vacate for lack of jurisdiction, a defendant must overcome the presumption arising from the affidavit of service.
  • CP-SRMOF II 2012-A Trust v Turri, 228 AD3d 727 and Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Fernandez, 208 AD3d 1151: Used as comparators for when submissions fail to rebut service presumption; the court aligned Unity’s showing with these insufficient challenges.
  • Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Yusupova, 172 AD3d 669 and Green Tree Servicing, LLC v Frantzeskakis, 200 AD3d 654: Cited to distinguish “minor” from “significant” discrepancies in the description of the person served. The court found Unity’s asserted discrepancies too minor to warrant a hearing.
  • Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Yurowitz, 181 AD3d 646 and US Bank, N.A. v Cherubin, 141 AD3d 514: Cited to reinforce that Unity’s discrepancies did not raise a factual issue requiring a traverse hearing.

3) CPLR 5015(a)(1): excusable default + potentially meritorious defense

  • Marquez v GSB Supply, Inc, 240 AD3d 877 and 6 Crannell St., LLC v Urban Green Equities, LLC, 207 AD3d 603: Cited for the two-prong standard: reasonable excuse and potentially meritorious defense.
  • Bedessee Imports, Inc. v Najjar, 170 AD3d 640 and Indymac Fed. Bank FSB v Quattrochi, 99 AD3d 763: Cited for the principle that when the only excuse offered is non-service—and service is deemed proper—the defendant fails to establish a reasonable excuse.
  • Aslan Holdings Corp. v Schiff, 240 AD3d 734 and US Bank N.A. v Cooper, 191 AD3d 1035: Cited for the sequencing rule: if no reasonable excuse is shown, the court need not reach the “meritorious defense” prong.

4) CPLR 317: relief for defendants “not personally served”

  • Ross v Sunrise Home Improvement, 186 AD3d 633: Cited to bar CPLR 317 relief where service was by personal delivery—matching the court’s finding here.

5) Damages after default: liability admitted, damages not; inherent power to correct excess

  • Reilly v Grieco, 242 AD3d 1030 and Rokina Opt. Co. v Camera King, 63 NY2d 728: Cited for a foundational default principle: a default admits “traversable allegations” (liability) but does not admit the plaintiff’s conclusion as to damages—requiring a proper inquest and evidentiary basis.
  • Quigley v Coco's Water Café, Inc., 43 AD3d 1132 and Cervino v Konsker, 91 AD2d 249: Quoted for the doctrine that courts possess inherent power beyond the CPLR to open defaults and to modify/reduce an award perceived as excessive.
  • Ladd v Stevenson, 112 NY 325: Cited as longstanding authority for inherent judicial power in this area.
  • Neuman v Greenblatt, 260 AD2d 616: Cited for the cautionary principle that an unwarranted, excessive inquest award effectively creates an “open season” against defaulting defendants and should not be sustained.
  • Kokolis v Wallace, 202 AD3d 948; Vested Bus. Brokers, Ltd. v Ragone, 131 AD3d 1232; Thompson v Steuben Realty Corp., 31 AD3d 746: Cited as examples supporting appellate intervention where default damages are excessive or inadequately grounded.
  • Nunez v Bardwil, 145 AD3d 909: Cited for the requirement that the trial court should itemize damages and state essential facts supporting the award; the failure to do so warranted remittal for a new inquest.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Service and jurisdiction were upheld. The court applied the presumption of proper service arising from the process server’s affidavit. Unity’s challenge—based on claimed discrepancies in the description of the recipient—was deemed insufficient to create a factual dispute necessitating a hearing. As a result, Unity failed to establish lack of personal jurisdiction under CPLR 5015(a)(4).
  2. No excusable default was shown. Under CPLR 5015(a)(1), Unity’s sole excuse was non-service. Because the court concluded service was proper, the excuse collapsed. Without a reasonable excuse, the court did not address any potentially meritorious defense.
  3. CPLR 317 was unavailable. The court found Unity was served by personal delivery; CPLR 317 relief is generally limited to defendants “not personally served,” so the statute did not apply.
  4. Yet the damages judgment was vacated via inherent power and discretionary supervision of inquests. The pivotal move in the opinion is the separation of (a) the defendant’s inability to reopen liability from (b) the appellate court’s willingness to reopen the amount of damages. Even though default establishes liability, damages must still be proven. The court held the $2.5 million award was “unwarranted and excessive,” criticized the absence of itemization and essential fact findings, and ordered a new inquest.
  5. Reassignment to a different Justice. Beyond evidentiary deficiencies, the court noted “injudicious remarks” by the inquest Justice. Combined with the excessive/unsupported award, this justified reassignment on remittal to preserve fairness and the appearance of impartial adjudication of damages.

C. Impact

  • Practical rule for default cases: Even when a defendant cannot meet CPLR pathways to vacate a default, appellate courts may still vacate or redo the damages inquest when the award appears excessive or unsupported, invoking inherent power and the principle that damages are not admitted by default.
  • Trial-court discipline in inquests: The decision underscores that courts must itemize elements of damages and state essential facts supporting the award. Thin records increase vulnerability to appellate reversal/remittal.
  • Punitive damages scrutiny: While the opinion does not set a punitive-damages doctrinal test, it signals that large punitive components in a default setting—without careful findings—invite appellate intervention.
  • Reassignment as a remedial tool: The court reaffirmed that where the inquest proceeding raises concerns about judicial comments or tone, reassignment may be ordered to safeguard the integrity of the damages determination.
  • Service challenges remain difficult: The opinion reinforces that minor description discrepancies rarely defeat the affidavit-of-service presumption; defendants should marshal concrete proof if contesting personal delivery.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Default judgment: A judgment entered because the defendant did not respond. It generally establishes liability, but not the amount of damages.
  • Inquest: A court hearing (often brief) to determine damages after a default—plaintiffs must present proof of the amount sought.
  • CPLR 5015(a)(4): A mechanism to vacate a judgment if the court lacked jurisdiction (commonly due to improper service).
  • Presumption of proper service: A process server’s sworn affidavit is treated as prima facie proof of service; the defendant must rebut it with specific, credible facts.
  • Traverse hearing: A hearing to resolve a factual dispute about whether service was properly made; held only if the defendant raises a genuine issue of fact.
  • CPLR 5015(a)(1): Relief from default for “excusable default,” requiring both a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious defense.
  • CPLR 317: A separate remedy for certain defendants who were not personally served and did not receive notice in time—unavailable when service was personal delivery.
  • Inherent power: Authority courts possess independent of statutes to manage proceedings and prevent unfair outcomes—here, to correct an excessive damages award after default.
  • General damages vs. punitive damages: General damages compensate for harm (often non-economic). Punitive damages punish and deter egregious misconduct and typically require careful justification.

5. Conclusion

Williams v New York City Off. of Chief Med. Examiner draws a clear line: a defendant who cannot reopen liability after default may still obtain meaningful appellate relief if the damages inquest is excessive or inadequately supported. The Second Department reaffirmed (1) the strength of the affidavit-of-service presumption, (2) the strictness of “reasonable excuse” requirements when non-service is the sole excuse, and (3) the judiciary’s inherent power to prevent disproportionate default awards. Equally important, the decision emphasizes transparent, itemized, fact-grounded damages findings—and authorizes reassignment where the inquest record reflects conduct undermining confidence in the damages determination.