Ex parte Young Cannot Be Used to Obtain Injunctive “Specific Performance” of a State Contract

I. Introduction

This appeal asked whether the Florida Prepaid College Board (concededly “an arm of the State of Florida”) is protected by state sovereign immunity from a federal suit seeking to stop the Board from applying amendments to Florida prepaid tuition plan contracts. Plaintiffs Andrea Darlow and Erica Lavina, on behalf of a putative class, purchased prepaid tuition savings plans (2004 and 2006) promising to cover tuition at Florida public institutions or to transfer an equivalent amount if the beneficiary attended a private or out-of-state school.

The dispute arose after Florida authorized a “tuition differential” fee in 2007, treated statutorily as separate from “tuition,” and exempted certain preexisting plan holders from paying it at Florida public schools. When Darlow’s and Lavina’s daughters later attended out-of-state colleges, the Board transferred only what it would have paid for Florida “tuition,” refusing to include an amount equivalent to the exempted “tuition differential” fee. Plaintiffs alleged this violated the Contracts Clause and Takings Clause and sought declaratory and injunctive relief ordering the Board to stop applying the statutory exemption/definition and the Board’s contract amendments to beneficiaries attending non-Florida schools.

The key issue on appeal was not merely whether the relief was “prospective,” but whether the requested injunction would, in substance, compel specific performance of a state contract—a form of relief the Eleventh Circuit held is barred by sovereign immunity even when styled as an Ex parte Young action.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the core jurisdictional ruling: the suit is barred by sovereign immunity because the requested injunction, although framed as prospective equitable relief, would effectively require the State to perform its obligations under the prepaid tuition contracts—i.e., specific performance of a contract to which the State was a party.

However, the court held the district court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. A dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice. The judgment was therefore vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Holding)

• Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post-secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)
  Used to establish the Board’s status as an “arm of the State of Florida,” anchoring the threshold applicability of the Eleventh Amendment. Once that status is fixed, the plaintiffs must fit within a recognized exception (principally Ex parte Young) or identify valid abrogation/waiver.
• Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) and Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)
  These cases supply the conceptual foundation: sovereign immunity reflects a structural “presupposition” of state sovereignty and nonconsent to suit by individuals. The panel deploys them to frame immunity as the default rule and to justify a narrow construction of exceptions.
• Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) and Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
  The opinion recites the classic logic of Ex parte Young: federal courts may enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional acts because unconstitutional conduct strips the official of his representative capacity. Pennhurst is cited for the “supreme authority of the United States” rationale and as a reminder that Young is an exception aimed at vindicating federal rights while respecting state sovereignty.
• Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002)
  Cited for the common modern test: a suit may proceed under Ex parte Young if it alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective. The panel acknowledges that the parties and district court primarily argued within this “prospective vs. retrospective” frame.
• Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 750 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2014)
  Used for two related propositions: (1) even where relief is styled as equitable, courts must look to whether it is “in essence” a recovery of money from the state; and (2) litigants cannot “wiggle into [Ex parte Young] through creative pleading.” This supports the panel’s insistence on functional analysis—what the injunction would do, not how it is labeled.
• Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886), and In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)
  These are the opinion’s decisive authorities. The panel reads them to establish a distinct limitation on Ex parte Young: federal courts may not entertain actions against state officers that seek specific performance of a contract to which the State was a party. Hagood and In re Ayers are particularly significant because they involve Contracts Clause theories yet still reject officer suits that effectively enforce the State’s contractual obligations—closing a potential argument that Contracts Clause violations uniquely justify such suits.
• Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 177 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 1999)
  This is the Eleventh Circuit’s controlling articulation of the “specific performance” bar: Ex parte Young does not permit suing officers when the requested relief would, in effect, require the sovereign’s specific performance of a contract. The panel uses Tamiami Partners to convert the Supreme Court’s broader statements into a directly applicable circuit rule.
• Maron v. Chief Financial Officer of Florida, 136 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2025)
  Plaintiffs’ principal in-circuit comparator. The panel distinguishes Maron because the property interest there (earnings on unclaimed private property) did not arise from a contract with Florida; it was statutory/constitutional in nature. Thus, prospective relief to ensure future just compensation did not equate to compelling performance of a state contract. The distinction clarifies the boundary: Young may support prospective relief for ongoing constitutional injuries not rooted in enforcing state contractual promises.
• Lipscomb v. Columbus Municipal Separate School District, 269 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2001)
  The panel rejects Lipscomb as inconsistent with Edelman, Hagood, and In re Ayers, and in conflict with Tamiami Partners. This signals that, within the Eleventh Circuit, any out-of-circuit authority permitting contract-specific-performance relief under Young will be treated as unpersuasive against the Supreme Court’s older line of cases.
• Koletas v. United States, 159 F.4th 813 (11th Cir. 2025)
  Cited for the standard of review: sovereign immunity dismissals are reviewed de novo. It reinforces that immunity is jurisdictional and addressed as a threshold matter.
• Stalley ex rel. United States v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2008) and FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b)
  These authorities drive the remedial disposition: when subject-matter jurisdiction is absent, dismissal must be without prejudice, because it is not a merits adjudication. This is the basis for vacatur and remand.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

1. Eleventh Amendment immunity applies because the defendant entity is the State for immunity purposes.
   The Board is an arm of Florida, so the suit is effectively against the State unless it fits within an exception.
2. Ex parte Young is limited not only by “prospective vs. retrospective,” but also by a “specific performance” prohibition.
   While modern Young litigation often focuses on whether relief is prospective (as the magistrate judge did), the panel emphasizes an older, independent constraint: even prospective injunctions are barred if they amount to forcing the State to perform a contract. The court treats this as settled by Edelman v. Jordan and reinforced by Hagood v. Southern and In re Ayers, and as adopted in-circuit by Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla..
3. The “effect” of plaintiffs’ requested injunction is to enforce contractual obligations—hence specific performance.
   Plaintiffs alleged the Board officials “wrongfully apply and interpret” the contracts and asked the court to enjoin application of statutory definitions and contract changes for beneficiaries at non-Florida schools. Functionally, that would compel the State—“the actual party to the alleged contract”—to provide the disputed benefit (a larger transfer amount) as a matter of contractual entitlement. The panel rejects attempts to re-label this as merely “prospective compliance” because the operative right arises “solely from the plan contracts.”

Notably, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the jurisdictional result on the “specific performance” rationale, even though the district court emphasized the injunction’s resemblance to monetary relief. The panel’s approach makes the source of the right (contract vs. non-contract) and the type of equitable remedy (specific performance) central to immunity analysis.

C. Impact

• Contract-based constitutional challenges against state officials face a sharpened jurisdictional barrier.
  Plaintiffs often attempt to plead Contracts Clause or Takings claims as “ongoing violations” and request forward-looking injunctions. This decision underscores that if the alleged entitlement is contractual and the injunction would deliver the bargain, the claim is jurisdictionally barred in federal court by sovereign immunity notwithstanding Ex parte Young.
• Litigants must separate “constitutional regulation of state conduct” from “enforcement of state contractual promises.”
  The panel’s distinction from Maron v. Chief Financial Officer of Florida suggests that prospective relief remains viable where the asserted property interest is non-contractual (e.g., statutory or common-law property) and the remedy does not amount to enforcing a state contract.
• Strategic consequences: forum and remedy selection.
  While the opinion does not map alternative forums, the holding channels contract-performance disputes away from federal Young suits. Plaintiffs seeking to vindicate contract-derived rights against a state entity will need to consider state-court avenues, waiver/consent theories, or non-contractual constitutional theories that do not reduce to compelling performance of the contract.
• Clarifies dismissal practice.
  The remand instruction—dismissal must be without prejudice—reinforces that sovereign-immunity dismissals are jurisdictional and do not preclude refiling in a court of competent jurisdiction (subject to other defenses).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Sovereign immunity / Eleventh Amendment: States generally cannot be sued by private individuals in federal court without consent. This is treated as a limit on federal courts’ power (jurisdiction), not merely a defense on the merits.
• “Arm of the State”: Some state-created entities are treated as the State itself for immunity purposes. Here, the Board is such an entity under Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post-secondary Educ. Expense Bd..
• Ex parte Young exception: A narrow pathway to sue state officials (not the State) in federal court for an injunction stopping an ongoing violation of federal law. The idea is that unconstitutional acts are not truly “state acts” for immunity purposes.
• Prospective vs. retrospective relief: Prospective relief (stop doing X going forward) is more likely to fit Young; retrospective relief (pay for past harm) usually does not. This case adds that even forward-looking relief can be barred if it is, in substance, contract enforcement.
• Specific performance: An equitable remedy ordering a party to perform a contract (deliver the promised benefit), rather than paying damages. The court holds Young cannot be used to obtain specific performance of a state contract by suing state officials.
• Dismissal “without prejudice”: When a court lacks jurisdiction, it cannot decide the case’s merits. So the case must be dismissed without prejudice, leaving open the possibility of refiling elsewhere (if otherwise permissible).

V. Conclusion

Erica Lavina v. Florida Prepaid College Board tightens and clarifies the Eleventh Circuit’s sovereign-immunity doctrine in a recurring posture: plaintiffs seeking forward-looking equitable relief against state officials. The court holds that Ex parte Young does not authorize federal injunctions that would effectively compel the State’s specific performance of its contracts, even where plaintiffs frame the claim as a Contracts Clause or Takings Clause violation and request “prospective” relief.

The decision’s practical takeaway is twofold: (1) federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit will look past labels to the effect of the remedy and the source of the asserted right, and (2) sovereign-immunity dismissals must be entered without prejudice because they are jurisdictional.