Evidence Is Not “Outside the Adjudication” When It Bears on the Adjudicated Neglect Condition (and Improvement Periods May Be Denied for Non-Acknowledgment)

1. Introduction

In In re C.B.-1, R.B., B.B., W.B., and C.B.-2 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. June 24, 2026), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the Circuit Court of Calhoun County’s order terminating Petitioner Mother E.R.’s parental rights to five children. The case arose from abuse-and-neglect allegations that the parents failed to supervise and protect the children, including the oldest child’s exposure to drug use and unsafe adults, and the parents’ continued exposure of the children to individuals with known, extensive substance abuse issues.

The appeal presented two central questions: (1) whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying the mother a post-adjudicatory improvement period; and (2) whether the circuit court improperly terminated parental rights based on matters allegedly outside the scope of the mother’s adjudication—specifically, evidence of prior abuse-and-neglect proceedings and evidence concerning supervision of the oldest child.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed. It held that the circuit court acted within its discretion in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period because the record supported findings that the mother refused or declined services, failed to acknowledge the underlying neglect problem, and continued to expose the children to inappropriate individuals despite warnings.

The Court also rejected the argument that termination rested on “extraneous” grounds. It concluded that the termination was premised on the very condition of neglect to which the mother stipulated— exposing the children to inappropriate individuals with extensive and known substance abuse issues. Evidence about prior proceedings and supervision of the oldest child was deemed directly relevant to whether the mother had the capacity to correct that adjudicated condition.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, -- S.E.2d --, 2026 WL 1362143 (W. Va. May 15, 2026)
    The Court applied the familiar appellate framework: abuse of discretion for dispositional rulings, clear error for factual findings, and de novo review for legal questions. This standard mattered because the mother’s core challenges sought re-weighing of evidence (e.g., whether she was told certain individuals were barred and whether she meaningfully accepted responsibility), which the Court treated as fact-bound.
  • In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 217, 599 S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004))
    These cases supplied the controlling improvement-period principle: a parent’s failure to acknowledge the problem can render the problem “untreatable” and make an improvement period an exercise in futility. The Court used this line of authority to validate the circuit court’s focus on the mother’s lack of full acknowledgment—despite her stated willingness to participate.
  • State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995)
    Cited for the limitation on appellate review: appellate courts do not weigh evidence; that is the trier of fact’s role. This supported affirmance where the mother’s arguments depended on a different interpretation of testimony (e.g., whether she was warned, whether services were offered/declined).
  • In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002)
    Reinforced that circuit courts may refuse an improvement period when “no improvement is likely.” The Court treated the mother’s history of services without lasting change and her non-acknowledgment as a sufficient basis to find an improvement period unlikely to succeed.
  • In re Lilith H., 231 W. Va. 170, 744 S.E.2d 280 (2013)
    The mother relied on this case for the proposition that termination cannot rest on allegations never made the subject of adjudication. The Court distinguished it: unlike Lilith H., the termination here was anchored to the adjudicated neglect condition (exposure to inappropriate substance-abusing individuals), and the challenged evidence bore on that condition.
  • In re K.L., 247 W. Va. 657, 666, 885 S.E.2d 595, 604 (2022)
    Cited for the related concept that a parent cannot be required to acknowledge/correct a condition never legally determined to be a “condition[] of neglect or abuse.” The Court again distinguished: the mother was adjudicated for exposure to inappropriate individuals; the evidence at disposition was used to assess capacity to correct that same adjudicated condition.
  • Maples v. W. Va. Dep't of Com., Div. of Parks & Recreation, 197 W. Va. 318, 319, 475 S.E.2d 410, 411 (1996)
    Used to reject the mother’s continuance-delay claim: a litigant may not acquiesce in alleged error and then seek reversal on that basis.
  • Shaffer v. Acme Limestone Co., Inc., 206 W.Va. 333, 349 n.20, 524 S.E.2d 688, 704 n.20 (1999) and Noble v. W. Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 223 W. Va. 818, 821, 679 S.E.2d 650, 653 (2009)
    Cited to support the rule that nonjurisdictional issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered—reinforcing procedural preservation requirements for appellate relief.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Denial of the Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

The Court applied W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), which requires the parent to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they are likely to fully participate in the improvement period. The circuit court found that the mother’s asserted willingness was undermined by the record: she declined services, minimized the need for services, and continued the same risky exposure pattern despite warnings and prior CPS history.

Critically, the Court framed “participation” not as mere attendance, but as requiring meaningful acknowledgment of the problem to be treated—consistent with In re Timber M. and In re Charity H.. Because the circuit court found a lack of acknowledgment and little prospect of change, In re Tonjia M. supported the discretionary denial.

B. Termination and the “Scope of Adjudication” Argument

The Court confronted a recurrent abuse-and-neglect appellate claim: that the disposition relied on “new” issues not adjudicated. It held that the mother’s adjudicated neglect condition was exposure of the children to inappropriate individuals with known substance abuse issues, and that the supposedly “outside” evidence (prior proceedings and supervision facts involving the oldest child) was probative of:

  • the mother’s ongoing ability (or inability) to identify unsafe adults,
  • her willingness to enforce boundaries after DHS warnings, and
  • her capacity to correct the adjudicated problem “on their own or with help,” as reflected in W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d).

By emphasizing the connection between the evidence and the adjudicated condition, the Court distinguished In re Lilith H. and aligned with the caution in In re K.L.: the law forbids termination for unadjudicated conditions, but it permits using relevant history and related conduct to evaluate whether an adjudicated condition can be corrected and whether termination is warranted.

3.3. Impact

This decision reinforces two practical rules likely to shape future abuse-and-neglect dispositions in West Virginia:

  1. Relevance over labels at disposition: Evidence is not “outside the adjudication” merely because it concerns prior cases or additional factual context; if it materially bears on whether the adjudicated condition can be corrected (capacity, insight, pattern, boundary-setting), it may support a “no reasonable likelihood” finding under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d).
  2. Improvement periods require insight, not just willingness: Courts may deny improvement periods where the parent fails to acknowledge the problem or refused offered services, because participation without acknowledgment can be deemed futile under In re Timber M./In re Charity H..

The opinion also underscores the appellate consequences of preservation failures: continuance complaints are unlikely to succeed where the party agreed to delays or failed to object and cite the record.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication vs. disposition: “Adjudication” is the phase where the court determines whether abuse/neglect occurred and what the conditions are. “Disposition” decides what to do about it (services, improvement periods, custody, termination).
  • Post-adjudicatory improvement period: A structured, court-supervised chance after adjudication for a parent to correct problems (often through services). It is not automatic; the parent must show they are likely to fully participate.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A heightened burden of proof—more than “more likely than not,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • No reasonable likelihood conditions can be corrected: A legal conclusion that the parent lacks adequate capacity to solve the adjudicated problems even with help, authorizing termination if also necessary for the child’s welfare.
  • “Outside the scope of adjudication”: Termination cannot be based on a condition never adjudicated. But courts may consider related evidence (including prior history) when it helps determine whether the adjudicated condition is likely to be corrected.

5. Conclusion

In re C.B.-1, R.B., B.B., W.B., and C.B.-2 affirms that West Virginia courts may deny improvement periods and terminate parental rights where the parent fails to acknowledge the adjudicated neglect problem and the record shows an inadequate capacity to correct it. The decision also clarifies the “scope of adjudication” boundary: prior proceedings and related supervision evidence are permissible considerations at disposition when they directly illuminate whether the adjudicated neglect condition—here, exposing children to unsafe, substance-abusing individuals—can be substantially corrected in the near future.