Essential-Function and Reasonable-Accommodation Questions Under § 504 Are Generally for the Factfinder; RA Disparate-Impact Requires Comparative Proof

Case: Carolyn Gardner v. Kutztown University (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2026) (not precedential)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Key statutes/doctrines: § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; ADA concepts incorporated by regulation; summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

1. Introduction

Carolyn Gardner, an Associate Professor at Kutztown University (“KU”), has an incurable autoimmune condition requiring immunosuppressive medication. During the COVID-19 emergency KU permitted remote instruction, but it planned to return to pre-COVID in-person teaching for Fall 2021 and beyond. Gardner requested to teach her scheduled in-person courses remotely for four semesters (Fall 2021, Spring 2022, Fall 2022, Spring 2023). KU denied or did not respond to those requests, relying on an approach that treated converting in-person classes to remote as a “fundamental alteration.”

Gardner sued under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act asserting multiple disability-discrimination theories, including failure to accommodate, intentional discrimination (direct and pretext), disparate impact, and interference. The District Court largely granted summary judgment to Gardner. KU appealed.

The Third Circuit’s central concern was procedural and evidentiary: the District Court had resolved contested “essential function” and “reasonable accommodation” issues as matters of law, rather than leaving those fact-intensive questions for a jury.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Intentional discrimination (Counts III & IV): Vacated. Whether in-person teaching/office hours are “essential functions,” and whether full-time remote work is a “reasonable accommodation,” presented material fact disputes inappropriate for summary judgment.
• Blanket policy discrimination (Count II): Vacated. The same disputed essential-function and reasonableness issues undermined summary judgment.
• Failure to accommodate (Count I):
  • Fall 2021, Spring 2022, Fall 2022: Vacated. Material disputes existed regarding the interactive process and the reasonableness of remote teaching.
  • Spring 2023: Affirmed for KU. KU’s proposed classroom modifications and protective measures were reasonable as a matter of law; an employer need not provide the employee’s preferred accommodation.
• Disparate impact (Count V): Reversed. A disparate-impact theory required comparative evidence; Gardner produced none capable of establishing disproportionate impact on disabled employees.
• Interference (Count VI): Reversed. Even assuming (without deciding) interference claims exist under the RA, KU’s denial of remote teaching requests did not constitute “meddling” under the adopted framework.
• Remedy: The case was remanded for further proceedings (trial) on the remaining disputed issues.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

1) Summary judgment guardrails

• Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo — supplied the Third Circuit’s articulation of plenary review and the rule that, where cross-motions reveal no genuine issue, judgment goes to the party entitled under law; conversely, if genuine disputes exist, neither side is entitled.
• Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) — anchored the “no genuine dispute of material fact” standard the panel found the District Court violated by effectively weighing contested evidence about job functions and accommodation feasibility.

2) RA “qualified individual,” “essential functions,” and factfinder allocation

• Shiring v. Runyon — provided the prima facie structure for RA intentional discrimination: disabled; qualified; nonetheless prevented from performing the job.
• Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist. (quoting Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc.) — supplied the “qualified” definition: meeting prerequisites plus ability to perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.
• Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., a Div. of Time Warner Ent. Co., L.P. — was pivotal procedurally: even with a record that “almost unequivocally” resolved the essential-function question, the court remanded for a jury. The panel relied on this to conclude that the District Court improperly decided as a matter of law whether in-person instruction and office hours were essential here.
• Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S. — reinforced that essential-function determinations are factual issues “that must be decided by a jury,” underscoring why the panel vacated summary judgment on Counts II–IV and part of Count I.

3) Failure-to-accommodate and the interactive process

• Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC (quoting Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Mem'l Hosp.) — supplied the four-element test for failure to accommodate, including the employer’s duty to make a good-faith effort in the interactive process.
• 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)-(iii) — the regulatory definition of “reasonable accommodation,” used to frame the inquiry as enabling essential functions or equal employment benefits/privileges.
• United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia (citing Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook) and Hankins v. The Gap, Inc. — supported the Spring 2023 affirmance: an employer must provide an accommodation that is reasonable, not the employee’s preferred or “most reasonable” option.

4) Disparate impact: comparative evidence requirement

• Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Harrison, N.J. — invoked by KU by analogy to Title VII disparate-impact methodology, emphasizing statistical or comparable empirical proof of disproportionate impact on a protected class.
• NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc. — directly supported reversal: the Third Circuit previously rejected an RA disparate-impact claim where the plaintiff produced no credible evidence of disproportionate adverse effect. The panel treated Gardner’s proof as similarly deficient.

5) “Interference” framework and judicial caution on novel questions

• Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp. — used to acknowledge the District Court’s “conundrum” when forced to choose a framework on an unsettled legal question.
• Revock v. Cowpet Bay W. Condo. Ass'n. — supplied the adopted framework (from Fair Housing Act practice): “interference” means “meddling in or hampering an activity or process.” Applying that definition, the panel found no evidence KU “meddled” with Gardner’s ability to seek an accommodation merely by maintaining a general approach against remote conversions.

6) Individual liability and § 1983 end-run

• A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schools — explained why the panel did not engage Gardner’s cross-appeal: no individual liability under § 504, and no § 1983 cause of action for RA violations when the § 1983 claim rests on the same facts as the RA claim.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The core holding: essential-function and reasonableness disputes typically bar summary judgment

The panel treated two questions as dispositive across multiple counts: (i) whether in-person teaching and office hours are “essential functions” of an Associate Professor’s job at KU, and (ii) whether full-time remote teaching is a “reasonable accommodation” in this context. Because the parties offered competing evidence (e.g., KU’s post-COVID modality expectations and historical course-offering percentages versus the CBA’s performance criteria and the absence of a written “in-person essential” job description), the panel held the District Court impermissibly weighed evidence and drew conclusions that belong to the factfinder.

This reasoning drove the vacatur of summary judgment on Counts II–IV and much of Count I: if the “qualified/essential functions” and “reasonable accommodation” predicates are genuinely disputed, then liability theories premised on them cannot be resolved as a matter of law.

2) A narrow affirmance: Spring 2023 accommodation was reasonable as a matter of law

For Spring 2023, KU offered a package of risk-reducing measures (classroom reconstruction with limited capacity, separate entrance, specialized air filters, and plexiglass options). Applying the principle from United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia (citing Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook) that an employer need not provide the employee’s preferred accommodation, the panel held no reasonable juror could deem KU’s offer unreasonable. This is the opinion’s most concrete merits ruling: even when an employee seeks remote work due to heightened health risk, robust on-site mitigation may satisfy § 504’s accommodation duty.

3) Disparate impact failed for lack of comparative proof

Without definitively fixing the elements of RA disparate impact in employment, the panel still resolved this case on evidentiary necessity: a court cannot declare a policy disparately impactful without some “legitimate or measurable” comparative showing that disabled employees (as a group) are disproportionately burdened. Gardner’s reliance on her individual exclusion theory was insufficient at summary judgment, so the panel reversed and directed judgment for KU on Count V.

4) Interference: denial of an accommodation request is not automatically “meddling”

The panel assumed (without deciding) that RA interference claims are cognizable and accepted the District Court’s choice to borrow the FHA’s “meddling/hampering” definition from Revock v. Cowpet Bay W. Condo. Ass'n. Even under that standard, the panel held the record did not show that KU “clearly meddled” with Gardner’s statutory rights in Fall 2021. The key analytical move is separating (a) the right to request accommodations and have them considered from (b) an entitlement to a specific accommodation—especially where the accommodation’s reasonableness is disputed.

C. Impact

• Remote-work accommodation litigation will turn on fact development. Post-pandemic disputes about whether physical presence is essential—especially in teaching roles—are unlikely to be resolved cleanly at summary judgment when the record is mixed (institutional practice, modality data, CBA language, job descriptions, and past remote teaching experience).
• Employers may defend by offering strong on-site mitigation packages. The Spring 2023 holding underscores that well-supported, concrete health-safety modifications can be “reasonable” even if the employee prefers remote work.
• RA disparate-impact claims in employment will require comparative evidence. The reversal on Count V signals that plaintiffs should expect to marshal statistics or other empirical comparators showing a disproportionate burden on disabled employees, not merely individualized proof of hardship.
• Interference theories are not a substitute for proving denial of a reasonable accommodation. Even where courts borrow an “interference” framework, a plaintiff likely must show coercion/intimidation/obstruction beyond a disputed denial—something more akin to “hampering” the process itself.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Essential functions”: The fundamental duties of the job (not marginal tasks). Whether a duty is “essential” often depends on evidence such as written job descriptions, actual practice, operational needs, and performance criteria—commonly a jury question when contested.
• “Qualified individual” under the RA: Someone who meets baseline prerequisites (education/experience) and can perform essential functions with or without a reasonable accommodation.
• “Reasonable accommodation”: A workplace change enabling the employee to perform essential functions or enjoy equal job benefits. The employer must provide a reasonable option, not necessarily the employee’s first choice.
• “Interactive process”: A back-and-forth between employer and employee to identify workable accommodations. A failure-to-accommodate claim can succeed if the employer does not engage in good faith and a reasonable accommodation was possible.
• “Disparate impact”: A neutral policy that disproportionately harms a protected group. Typically proven with comparative data (e.g., statistics) showing the burden falls more heavily on disabled employees than non-disabled employees.
• “Interference”: Conduct that obstructs or “meddles” with the exercise of statutory rights (borrowed here from FHA analysis). The panel treated a mere denial of a requested accommodation—where reasonableness is disputed—as insufficient by itself.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit largely rejected the District Court’s merits determinations at summary judgment, emphasizing that contested “essential function” and “reasonable accommodation” questions under § 504 commonly require a jury. The court nevertheless affirmed a narrow point: for Spring 2023, KU’s concrete on-campus mitigation measures were reasonable as a matter of law, and KU was not required to provide Gardner’s preferred remote-teaching arrangement. The opinion also clarifies, at least as applied here, that RA disparate-impact claims in employment demand comparative proof of disproportionate effect, and that “interference” is not established merely because an employer denies a requested accommodation in a context where the underlying accommodation duty remains genuinely disputed.