Introduction
Darshon Crudup, a 48-year-old African American former employee of the City of Atlanta, alleged race and age discrimination under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), as well as a Fourteenth Amendment violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He claimed that discriminatory treatment beginning in 2019 included missed evaluations, denied raises and promotions, lack of recognition, and a hostile work environment that forced his resignation in September 2022.
The appeal concerned timeliness rather than the merits of those allegations. Crudup received an EEOC right-to-sue notice on June 5, 2024, but did not file suit until October 3, 2024—more than 90 days later. His § 1983 claim was also filed outside Georgia’s applicable two-year limitations period.
The principal issue was whether Crudup’s asserted anxiety, major depressive disorder, PTSD, and allegations of institutional misconduct justified equitable tolling of the federal employment-discrimination deadline.
Analysis
Precedents Cited
Pleading and Standard of Review
- Lane v. Philbin
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Established that appellate review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is plenary. The Eleventh Circuit therefore independently reviewed the legal sufficiency and timeliness of Crudup’s claims.
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
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Supplied the governing pleading standard: factual allegations must raise the right to relief above a speculative level, and a formulaic recitation of legal elements is insufficient. Crudup’s conclusory reference to mental-health conditions did not adequately demonstrate entitlement to tolling.
- Bingham v. Thomas
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Required liberal construction of Crudup’s filings because he proceeded without counsel.
- Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.
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Limited the principle of liberal construction. A court may not act as a pro se litigant’s lawyer or rewrite a deficient pleading to preserve the case.
Administrative Prerequisites and Equitable Tolling
- Gregory v. Ga. Dep't of Hum. Res.
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Confirmed that a Title VII plaintiff must first file a discrimination charge with the EEOC.
- Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co.
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Established the corresponding EEOC-charge requirement for ADEA claims.
- Stamper v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd.
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Supported application of the “causal connection” standard: the asserted incapacity must be connected to the claimant’s failure to meet the filing deadline.
- Lawrence v. Florida
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Was central to the decision. It holds that merely identifying a mental condition is insufficient; the claimant must explain how that condition actually prevented timely action. Crudup did not supply that functional connection.
- Arce v. Garcia
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Characterized equitable tolling as an extraordinary remedy that should be applied sparingly and placed the burden of establishing entitlement to tolling on the claimant.
- Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc.
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Demonstrated that a plaintiff need not affirmatively plead equitable tolling in the complaint. These authorities led the appellate court to reject the district court’s alternative conclusion that Crudup had waived tolling by omitting it from his amended complaint.
Preservation of Appellate Arguments
- Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Preston
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Distinguished a preserved claim or issue from the individual arguments used to support it. Once Crudup properly raised equitable tolling below, he was not confined on appeal to precisely the same supporting arguments.
- ECB USA, Inc. v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J.
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Reinforced that litigants may waive or forfeit positions or issues, but generally do not waive particular arguments or authorities supporting a preserved position.
Section 1983 Limitations Period
- Wallace v. Kato
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Established that § 1983 actions borrow the personal-injury statute of limitations of the state where the federal action is brought.
- Mullinax v. McElhenney
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Identified Georgia’s two-year period under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 as the limitations period applicable to § 1983 actions filed in Georgia.
Legal Reasoning
1. The Title VII and ADEA deadline expired
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and 29 U.S.C. § 626(e), Crudup had 90 days after receiving the EEOC right-to-sue notice to commence a civil action. He received the notice on June 5, 2024, but filed on October 3, 2024. He did not dispute that the filing occurred outside the statutory period.
2. Mental incapacity required a functional, causal showing
Crudup cited severe anxiety, major depressive disorder, and PTSD. The court held that diagnoses or generalized assertions of illness do not establish equitable tolling without facts showing that the conditions caused the late filing.
The court did not require medically impossible “day-specific” proof. Instead, it required an explanation of how the impairment affected Crudup’s capacity during the relevant 90-day period. Because he offered only a conclusory assertion, he did not meet his burden.
3. Crudup’s account of his own activities undermined tolling
Crudup contended both that the City’s conduct left him neurologically and cognitively unable to file and that he diligently pursued counsel, medical records, unemployment proceedings, and a complex administrative dispute. The court viewed those positions as incompatible. His demonstrated ability to undertake substantial advocacy weakened the claimed causal link between his mental condition and the missed deadline.
The holding is best understood as record-specific. Mental illness can vary over time, but Crudup did not provide a timeline or functional evidence reconciling his extensive administrative activity with his asserted inability to file suit.
4. The misconduct arguments were preserved but insufficient
The City argued that Crudup had waived his allegations of obstruction and institutional misconduct by not making the same arguments below. The court rejected that position because Crudup had raised equitable tolling and had identified alleged notice defects, EEOC irregularities, and non-cooperation by the City in the district court.
Preservation did not establish entitlement to relief, however. Even considering the expanded arguments, Crudup failed to prove that the alleged misconduct caused his untimely filing.
5. Equitable tolling did not have to appear in the complaint
The panel expressly corrected the district court’s statement that Crudup waived equitable tolling by failing to allege it in his amended complaint. A plaintiff need not anticipate a limitations defense and plead tolling in the complaint. The judgment was nevertheless affirmed because Crudup’s later submissions did not factually establish tolling.
6. The § 1983 claim exceeded Georgia’s two-year period
Crudup’s § 1983 claim accrued no later than September 2022, when he resigned. Because he did not file until October 3, 2024, the claim fell outside Georgia’s two-year limitations period. The court therefore affirmed its dismissal without reaching the merits of the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation.