Equitable Distribution in Montana Dissolution: No Mandatory Net-Worth Finding; Dissipation Considered Without Required Offsets

Introduction

Marriage of Long & Batista (Mont. Sup. Ct. Feb. 17, 2026) is a memorandum opinion affirming a Missoula County dissolution decree that divided a marital estate dominated by (1) a New York investment condominium purchased during the marriage with heavily unequal cash inputs, (2) post-separation purchases and account drawdowns funded with marital earnings, and (3) joint tax debt.

The parties were Alexandra Long (“Allie”), a professional soccer player whose peak earnings occurred around 2016–2019, and José Batista, who ended his soccer career earlier, assisted with training, and operated an untracked cash-basis gambling enterprise. After separation, José lived in the New York condominium; Allie bought a Missoula home and, later, a BMW; and the condominium sale was delayed until July 2024.

The appeal presented three issues: whether the District Court (1) abused its discretion valuing and distributing the estate (including whether it had to find a single net-worth number), (2) failed to consider alleged dissipation by Allie, and (3) applied an improper legal standard by focusing on relative financial contributions and outcomes.

Summary of the Opinion

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. It held that:

• The District Court did not abuse its discretion in valuing and distributing property under § 40-4-202, MCA, even though it did not make a single explicit finding of total net worth.
• The District Court did consider dissipation and made supported factual findings; it was not required to award José dollar-for-dollar “offsets” for each unilateral expenditure in order to account for dissipation.
• The District Court applied the correct legal standard and did not commit the error condemned in the Ash decision (i.e., restoring premarital “economic stations” by strict accounting while undervaluing nonmonetary contributions).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review: deference to trial courts

• In re Marriage of Ash & Elliot, 2024 MT 273, ¶ 12: Provided the central review framework—affirm unless findings are clearly erroneous and distribution reflects no abuse of discretion.
• In re Marriage of Tummarello, 2012 MT 18, ¶ 21: Supplied the definitions of “abuse of discretion” (arbitrary, without conscientious judgment, or beyond bounds of reason causing substantial injustice) and “clearly erroneous” findings.
• In re Marriage of Funk, 2012 MT 14, ¶ 6: Confirmed correctness review for legal conclusions and reiterated the breadth of discretion under § 40-4-202, MCA.

2) Equitable distribution is not equal distribution

• In re Marriage of Elder & Mahlum, 2020 MT 91, ¶ 9 (citing In re Marriage of McNellis, 267 Mont. 492, 501, 885 P.2d 412, 418 (1994)): Supported the Court’s rejection of José’s “equalize each asset” approach; equity may require unequal allocation of specific assets and liabilities.

3) Findings required to permit appellate review (but no mandatory net-worth number)

• In re Marriage of Crowley, 2014 MT 42, ¶ 26 (quoting In re Marriage of Funk, ¶ 24): Required the trial court to determine and consider assets and liabilities of each party, ensuring reviewability.
• In re Marriage of Richards, 2014 MT 213, ¶ 15: Was pivotal to resolving José’s “net worth” argument; it states a specific net-worth finding is not mandatory so long as findings allow the Supreme Court to determine net worth and review equity without speculation.

4) Dissipation: factual determination; offsets are permissible, not mandatory

• In re Marriage of Peterson, 211 Mont. 118, 122, 683 P.2d 1304, 1306 (1984): Anchored dissipation as a fact question for the trial court—important because José’s challenge largely sought reweighing of evidence.
• In re Marriage of Lewis, 2020 MT 44, ¶ 10; In re Marriage of Skinner, 240 Mont. 299, 305, 783 P.2d 1350, 1354 (1989); In re Marriage of Cooper, 243 Mont. 175, 178-79, 793 P.2d 810, 812 (1990); In re Marriage of Merry, 213 Mont. 141, 152-53, 689 P.2d 1250, 1255-56 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Marriage of Funk, ¶ 34: These authorities show that courts may account for dissipation through offsets or specific awards. The Court used them here to make a limiting point: they do not require a mechanical offset for each expenditure if the overall distribution remains equitable.

5) Credibility and weighing evidence

• In re Marriage of Crilly, 2005 MT 311, ¶ 25: Reinforced deference to the trial judge on conflicting testimony—critical to affirming findings that José’s nonmonetary contributions were “de minimis and often even negative.”

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning tracks § 40-4-202(1), MCA, which requires an equitable (not necessarily equal) apportionment after considering enumerated factors, including each spouse’s contributions and any dissipation.

1) No “net worth” finding required if findings permit review

José argued the decree was defective because it did not compute a single “net worth” number and because the New York condominium proceeds division (giving him $50,000 out of $272,543.35 and requiring Allie to pay joint tax debt from the proceeds) was arbitrary. Relying on In re Marriage of Richards and In re Marriage of Crowley, the Court held the District Court’s itemized findings and allocation were sufficiently detailed to determine net value and understand the court’s rationale without speculation. The Supreme Court itself could derive the distribution’s effect from the findings.

2) Condominium proceeds: equity justified by unequal investment and exclusive use

The District Court explained it would be inequitable to split the condominium proceeds equally because it would ignore Allie’s “lopsided cash investment” and José’s “exclusive possession of the property as a living space.” The Supreme Court approved this as a conscientious, reasoned exercise of discretion—especially where the court found Allie bore the loss on the investment while José realized a net gain relative to his contributions.

3) Dissipation: accounted for in the overall scheme, not necessarily by offsets

José’s dissipation theory sought specific reimbursement for: (a) forfeited earnest money, (b) the Missoula home purchase, (c) the BMW purchase, and (d) depletion of accounts. The Supreme Court emphasized two points:

• The District Court expressly found dissipation (the $48,000 forfeited earnest money) and assigned it solely to Allie.
• Even where spending occurred, the statute requires the court to consider dissipation, not to apply a mandatory, transaction-by-transaction reimbursement formula. The overall distribution—together with the court’s findings about José’s minimal financial and nonfinancial contributions—supported the equity of the result.

4) Rebutting the “premarital stations” argument under Ash

José invoked In re Marriage of Ash & Elliot to argue the District Court improperly focused on premarital economic status and relative contributions. The Supreme Court distinguished Ash: here, the trial court’s discussion of who funded the lifestyle and who absorbed the condominium loss was used to apply § 40-4-202(1), MCA’s required factors (contributions, dissipation, circumstances), not to restore premarital positions by strict accounting while disregarding meaningful nonmonetary contributions. The District Court did evaluate nonmonetary contributions—and found José’s overstated and minimal.

Impact

Although noncitable, the decision is practically informative for Montana dissolution litigation in three ways:

• Findings drafting and appellate safety: Trial courts need not recite a single net-worth total if the findings and allocation allow the total to be derived and the reasoning to be understood (reinforcing In re Marriage of Richards).
• Dissipation remedies are flexible: Parties should not assume that proving unilateral spending compels a matching offset; courts may account for dissipation through the overall balance of the distribution.
• Exclusive use of an asset matters: A spouse’s post-separation exclusive occupancy of an investment property can support an unequal division of sale proceeds where the other spouse carried the financial burden.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Equitable vs. equal distribution: “Equitable” means fair under the circumstances; it can be 50/50, but it does not have to be.
• Dissipation of marital assets: Wasteful or unilateral depletion of marital property (e.g., forfeiting a deposit, draining accounts) that the court may factor into a fair division.
• Offsets: A court-ordered adjustment that reimburses one spouse for the other spouse’s spending; allowed in appropriate cases but not required if the overall division is fair.
• Clearly erroneous vs. abuse of discretion: “Clearly erroneous” targets factual mistakes unsupported by substantial evidence; “abuse of discretion” asks whether the court’s decision was unreasonable or arbitrary.
• M. R. Civ. P. 60(b): A procedural rule allowing a party to seek relief from an order under limited grounds; here it arose in José’s unsuccessful attempt to set aside an order to vacate the condominium.

Conclusion

The Court affirmed the decree because the District Court (1) made reviewable findings sufficient to assess the marital estate without a mandatory net-worth total, (2) considered dissipation as § 40-4-202(1), MCA requires without being compelled to award itemized offsets, and (3) applied—rather than departed from—Montana’s equitable-distribution framework, distinguishing the improper premarital “station restoration” approach rejected in In re Marriage of Ash & Elliot.