Equal Pay Act/CFEPA: “Substantially Similar Job Content” and Higher-Paid Comparator Required—Hierarchy and Shared Salary Do Not Establish a Prima Facie Case

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a sex-based wage discrimination suit brought by Sha'Ola Terrell against Alabama State University and the Board of Trustees of Alabama State University (collectively, “ASU”). Terrell alleged that ASU violated the federal Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), and Alabama’s Clarke Figures Equal Pay Act (“CFEPA”), Ala. Code § 25-1-30, by paying her less than male colleagues for “equal work.”

The central issue on appeal was whether Terrell produced valid comparators—male employees who were (i) paid more and (ii) performed “substantially similar” work as measured by actual job content. Terrell also challenged ASU’s reliance on a budget-based justification, but that argument mattered only if she first established a prima facie case.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for ASU because Terrell failed to establish a prima facie case under either the EPA or the CFEPA. The court held that none of Terrell’s proposed male comparators both (1) performed substantially similar work and (2) was paid more than she was. For two proposed comparators, the court additionally emphasized that identical pay defeats an EPA-style wage-disparity claim even if the plaintiff believes she should have been paid more.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is largely an application of established Eleventh Circuit (and binding former Fifth Circuit) doctrine, anchored by the following authorities:

• Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010): Cited for the de novo standard of review for summary judgment and the requirement to view evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. This framed the appellate posture: even with all reasonable inferences for Terrell, the record lacked a triable comparator.
• Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): Cited for the proposition that only disputes over material facts preclude summary judgment. This supported affirmance because the comparator differences were not minor factual disputes but legally dispositive differences in primary duties and/or pay.
• Baker v. Upson Reg'l Med. Ctr., 94 F.4th 1312 (11th Cir. 2024): Provided the controlling two-step EPA framework: (1) plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) employer’s affirmative defense. Importantly, the court invoked Baker’s statement that if the employer proves an affirmative defense, “there is no third step,” but here the case ended even earlier—at step one.
• Arrington v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 1998), as amended (May 28, 1998): Supplied the “substantially similar” inquiry focused on “primary duties,” and the principle that “actual job content” controls over titles and personal qualifications.
• Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586 (11th Cir. 1994): Reinforced that EPA comparisons rest on “primary” rather than “incidental” duties, and clarified the employer’s burden on affirmative defense (sex must provide “no basis” for the differential). The opinion also used Mulhall’s executive-level discussion to explain that higher-level administrative roles are not automatically comparable.
• Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970): The key test for when “additional tasks” defeat substantial equality: additional duties must require extra effort, consume significant time, and have economic value commensurate with the pay differential. The panel used this standard both to distinguish certain roles and to reject Terrell’s “I had more duties, therefore I should be paid more” framing where the required evidentiary showing was absent.
• Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): Cited for the rule adopting pre-October 1, 1981 Fifth Circuit decisions as binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit—thereby giving Brookhaven and Behrens Drug continuing force.
• Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973): Cited for the proposition that where two positions are substantially the same, “no EPA violation occurs if they are paid the same.” The court relied on this to dispose of comparators who earned the same salary as Terrell.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds in three clean moves: (i) state the EPA/CFEPA standards; (ii) apply the “substantially similar” comparator test to each proposed comparator; and (iii) end the case at step one without reaching ASU’s affirmative defense.

(a) The governing test (EPA and CFEPA)

The court treated the CFEPA as materially parallel to the EPA and applied the same analytical framework. Under that framework, Terrell had to show that ASU paid higher wages to male employees for “equal work” requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions. “Equal work” is operationalized as “substantially similar” work based on primary job duties, not job titles, perceived seniority, or the employee’s subjective sense of greater contribution.

(b) Comparator-by-comparator application

(c) No need to reach affirmative defenses

Because Terrell did not clear step one, the court expressly declined to consider ASU’s affirmative defense arguments (including the budget-related justification Terrell challenged). This is a recurring structural feature of EPA litigation: absent a valid higher-paid substantially-similar comparator, the employer’s justification never becomes relevant.

3.3 Impact

• Comparator rigor—especially in multi-role athletic departments: The decision underscores that broad administrative titles within athletics are not interchangeable for EPA purposes. Department-wide oversight, contract authority, and program-creation duties can be decisive “primary duties” defeating substantial similarity.
• “Same salary” is a hard stop: The opinion reiterates that an EPA/CFEPA plaintiff cannot proceed on a theory that she should have earned more than an equal-paid comparator unless she can identify a higher-paid opposite-sex comparator for substantially similar work.
• Hierarchy is not a proxy for “equal work”: Supervisory status or being “higher” in an org chart does not establish the statutory elements; job-content proof remains central.
• Litigation strategy and evidence development: Plaintiffs must develop the record on comparators’ day-to-day primary duties (not just job titles or generalized descriptions). Defendants can often win at summary judgment by demonstrating non-overlapping core responsibilities or by showing equal pay.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Prima facie case (EPA/CFEPA): The initial, required showing that a woman was paid less than a man for substantially similar work. Without it, the case ends.
• “Substantially similar” work: Not identical jobs, but jobs whose primary duties require similar skill, effort, and responsibility. Courts look at what people actually do, not what their titles suggest.
• Comparator: The specific opposite-sex employee used for comparison. The comparator must be paid more (for a wage-disparity claim) and must perform substantially similar work.
• Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling that ends a case when there is no genuine dispute of material fact for a jury to decide, even when evidence is viewed in the non-movant’s favor.
• Affirmative defenses (“factor other than sex,” etc.): Justifications an employer can prove after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. Here, the court never reached that stage.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Sha'ola Terrell v. Alabama State University reinforces a disciplined EPA/CFEPA comparator inquiry: a plaintiff must identify a higher-paid opposite-sex employee performing substantially similar work measured by primary duties and actual job content. Differences in department-wide authority, contract oversight, and core mission can defeat similarity; organizational hierarchy alone is not dispositive; and equal pay forecloses a wage-disparity claim. Because Terrell did not establish the threshold prima facie case, the court affirmed summary judgment without addressing ASU’s asserted justifications.