English-Only Plea Agreements and Appeal-Waiver Enforceability After a Rule 11 Colloquy

1. Introduction

In United States v. Marin (10th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026) (Order and Judgment), the Tenth Circuit enforced an appellate-rights waiver contained in Noel Carias Marin’s plea agreement and dismissed his appeal. Marin had pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of methamphetamine and received a within-Guidelines sentence of 210 months (Guidelines range: 188–235 months).

The key dispute was not the sentence’s merits but the enforceability of the plea agreement’s appeal waiver. Marin argued the waiver was not knowing and voluntary because he could not read English and the only copy of the plea agreement was in English. He also argued that enforcing the waiver would cause a miscarriage of justice. The government moved to enforce the waiver under United States v. Hahn.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Applying the three-part framework from United States v. Hahn, the court held:

• Scope: Marin conceded his appeal fell within the waiver’s scope, so the court did not address this factor.
• Knowing and voluntary: The waiver was knowing and voluntary because (a) the plea agreement expressly stated Marin “knowingly and voluntarily” waived appeal and collateral-attack rights, and (b) the district court conducted an adequate Rule 11 colloquy, including a direct, in-court review of the waiver with Marin, who repeatedly confirmed his understanding. Although Marin did not receive a Spanish-written version of the plea agreement, defense counsel represented that it had been read to Marin in English and Marin understood it; Marin confirmed that representation.
• Miscarriage of justice: Marin failed to show any of the four Hahn miscarriage-of-justice categories applied. His claim that the waiver was “otherwise unlawful” merely repeated his knowing/voluntary argument and did not identify an independent defect making the waiver unlawful under Tenth Circuit standards.

The Tenth Circuit therefore granted the government’s motion and dismissed the appeal.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) United States v. Hahn

United States v. Hahn supplies the governing test for enforcing appellate waivers in plea agreements: (1) scope, (2) knowing and voluntary, and (3) miscarriage of justice. Hahn also defines the miscarriage-of-justice inquiry as limited to four specific situations (impermissible factor such as race; ineffective assistance in negotiating the waiver; sentence exceeding the statutory maximum; or waiver “otherwise unlawful”).

In Marin, Hahn is not merely cited—it is the analytical structure that controls the entire outcome. Once scope was conceded, the decision turned on the second and third Hahn prongs.

2) United States v. Porter

The court relied on United States v. Porter to justify bypassing the scope analysis once Marin conceded the appeal fell within the waiver’s scope. Porter reinforces a practical point: when a defendant does not dispute a Hahn factor, the court may resolve the motion without extended discussion of that prong.

3) United States v. Tanner

United States v. Tanner is cited for the burden allocation: the defendant bears the burden of showing the waiver was not knowing and voluntary. This matters in Marin because the record contained multiple confirmations of understanding during the plea hearing, making it difficult for Marin to meet that burden absent concrete evidence of misunderstanding or deficient procedures.

4) United States v. Sandoval

United States v. Sandoval clarifies what “otherwise unlawful” means in the Hahn miscarriage-of-justice inquiry: the focus is on whether the waiver itself is unlawful due to procedural error or because “no waiver is possible,” and the unlawfulness must seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Marin is a textbook application of Sandoval’s constraint: a defendant cannot satisfy “otherwise unlawful” by re-labeling the same knowing/voluntary argument already rejected under Hahn’s second prong. The court treated Marin’s “otherwise unlawful” claim as circular because it depended entirely on the premise that the waiver was not knowing/voluntary—a premise the court had already rejected.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning rests on two reinforcing pillars used routinely in appeal-waiver enforcement: (1) the plea agreement’s express waiver language and (2) the district court’s Rule 11 colloquy.

1) Text of the waiver and express acknowledgment

The plea agreement stated Marin “knowingly and voluntarily” waived appeal and collateral-attack rights covering “any matter” connected to the prosecution, conviction, sentence components, and supervised release. This contractual clarity supports enforceability under Hahn’s knowing-and-voluntary prong.

2) Rule 11(b)(1)(N) compliance and language-access concern

Rule 11 requires the district court to ensure the defendant understands any plea provision waiving the right to appeal or collaterally attack the sentence. Here, the district judge:

• Used an interpreter at the hearing;
• Investigated whether Marin had a Spanish copy of the plea agreement (he did not);
• Clarified counsel’s representation that the agreement was read to Marin in English and Marin’s spoken English was “very” capable though his reading was not;
• Questioned Marin directly multiple times to confirm understanding of the English read-through;
• Reviewed the waiver in open court, explained what appeal rights Marin would otherwise have, and confirmed Marin understood he was waiving “almost all” appeal rights.

Marin’s argument was essentially that lack of a translated written plea agreement negated a knowing waiver. The panel rejected that as inconsistent with the plea-hearing record: the district court did not accept the waiver on assumption; it created a record of direct, repeated confirmations that Marin understood the agreement and the waiver. The absence of a Spanish-written plea agreement did not, on this record, defeat the conclusion that the waiver was knowing and voluntary.

3) Miscarriage-of-justice: rejecting “otherwise unlawful” by repetition

Under Hahn and Sandoval, the “otherwise unlawful” category is not a free-floating equity review of the sentence or case; it is a narrow inquiry into whether the waiver itself is legally defective in a way that undermines the integrity of judicial proceedings. Marin did not claim (for example) that the court relied on an impermissible factor, that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, or that counsel was ineffective in negotiating the waiver. He relied solely on “otherwise unlawful,” but the alleged unlawfulness was simply the already-rejected claim that the waiver was not knowing/voluntary. The panel treated this as insufficient to satisfy Hahn’s third prong.

C. Impact

Although designated “not binding precedent” (except under law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), the decision has persuasive significance for plea-waiver litigation in the Tenth Circuit in at least three ways:

1. Language-access challenges will be record-driven. Marin indicates that an English-only written plea agreement does not automatically invalidate a waiver where the defendant has the agreement read aloud, the court probes comprehension, and the defendant repeatedly confirms understanding in open court.
2. Rule 11 colloquy remains the central safeguard. The decision underscores that a careful, explicit waiver discussion—especially one that addresses potential comprehension problems—will usually be dispositive in enforcing waivers.
3. Limits on “otherwise unlawful” arguments. By labeling Marin’s miscarriage-of-justice theory “circular,” the panel reinforces that defendants must identify an independent defect in the waiver’s legality under United States v. Sandoval, not simply restate voluntariness objections.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Appeal waiver: A plea-agreement term where the defendant agrees not to appeal (and often not to collaterally attack) the conviction or sentence, subject to limited exceptions.
• Rule 11 colloquy: The judge’s in-court questioning before accepting a guilty plea, designed to ensure the plea is voluntary and informed. Rule 11(b)(1)(N) specifically requires the judge to ensure the defendant understands any appeal-waiver provision.
• Knowing and voluntary: The defendant must understand the waiver and agree to it without coercion. Courts often look to the waiver’s text and the plea-hearing transcript to decide this.
• Miscarriage of justice (Hahn): A narrow safety valve. Even a valid waiver will not be enforced if one of four specific conditions exists, such as reliance on race, ineffective assistance in negotiating the waiver, a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, or a waiver that is itself unlawful.
• “Otherwise unlawful” (Sandoval): Not a general fairness review. It asks whether the waiver itself is illegal because of a procedural defect or because a waiver cannot legally be made in that context—and only if the defect seriously undermines the integrity of proceedings.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Marin reinforces that, under United States v. Hahn, an appellate waiver will be enforced when the plea agreement expressly states the waiver is knowing and voluntary and the district court conducts an adequate Rule 11 colloquy confirming the defendant’s understanding—even where the written plea agreement is not provided in the defendant’s preferred language. The decision also illustrates the constrained nature of the miscarriage-of-justice inquiry: under United States v. Sandoval, a defendant must show a distinct illegality in the waiver itself, not simply repackage a rejected voluntariness argument.