Enforcing Rule 35(b) Waivers in Binding Plea Agreements: Courts May Not Reduce/Modify a Sentence Despite Post‑Sentencing Hardship

Case: The State of Wyoming v. Cameron Michael Boni, 2026 WY 57 (Wyo. May 27, 2026)
Posture: Original Proceeding—Petition for Writ of Review (State sought review of an order granting a W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) sentence reduction/modification)

1. Introduction

This decision addresses whether a district court may grant relief under W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) when a defendant has expressly waived the right to seek sentence modification or adjustment as part of a plea agreement the court accepted as binding under W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(C). The parties were the State of Wyoming (Petitioner) and Cameron Michael Boni (Respondent).

After Mr. Boni pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and battery pursuant to a negotiated resolution (including dismissal of a habitual criminal enhancement under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(a)), the district court imposed the bargained-for concurrent sentence of nine to ten years. Months later, the court nonetheless reduced the remaining prison term to time served and imposed supervised probation—relying, in part, on a perceived distinction between “modification” and “reduction” and on a “miscarriage of justice” concept drawn from federal appellate-waiver caselaw.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, reinforcing that a court that accepts a binding plea agreement must enforce an unambiguous W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) waiver, and that post-sentencing hardship and rehabilitative considerations do not fit the limited “miscarriage of justice” categories described in the cited federal framework.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held the district court erred by granting Mr. Boni’s W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motion because the plea agreement—accepted as binding—expressly required Mr. Boni to waive any request for sentence modification/adjustment, and the district court had expressly advised him that any Rule 35 motion would be “void on its face.” The district court’s later reduction/modification was inconsistent with: (i) the plea agreement’s waiver, (ii) the court’s own sentencing order stating it would grant no further Rule 35(b) reduction except to correct an illegal sentence, and (iii) the court’s plea colloquy warnings.

The Court rejected reliance on United States v. Hahn to avoid the waiver, concluding that—even assuming without deciding that Hahn’s “miscarriage of justice” exception could apply to Rule 35(b) waivers—none of Hahn’s limited miscarriage-of-justice circumstances were present. It reversed the order granting relief.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Opinion is anchored in three clusters of authority: (1) plea agreements as contracts and waiver interpretation; (2) standards governing sentence-modification rulings; and (3) waiver-enforcement and “miscarriage of justice” principles.

  • Plea agreements as contracts; waiver interpretation (Wyoming).
    • Wells v. State — Cited for the core proposition that “A plea agreement is a contract between the State and the defendant” governed by general contract principles. This frames the waiver as an enforceable term, not a discretionary suggestion.
    • Montano v. State — Cited through Wells v. State to support application of contract principles to plea agreements.
    • Henry v. State — Cited for the rule that interpretation of a plea agreement and the scope/enforceability of a waiver is reviewed de novo; also relevant because Wyoming previously “relied on the Hahn test to assess an appellate waiver” in Henry v. State, making Hahn a familiar but carefully bounded tool.
    • Schade v. State and Noel v. State — Cited within the de novo review framework for plea agreement interpretation and waivers.
  • Review of Rule 35(b) rulings; abuse of discretion.
    • Herrera v. State — Cited for the standard: a district court’s decision on a motion for sentence modification/reduction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
    • McNair v. Beck (citing Grove v. Pfister) — Cited for the principle that a court abuses discretion when it rests on an erroneous legal conclusion. Here, the legal error was granting Rule 35(b) relief despite an enforceable waiver and despite inconsistent characterizations (“reduction” vs. “modification”).
  • Federal waiver enforcement; “miscarriage of justice” limitation.
    • United States v. Hahn — Provided the three-part waiver enforceability test (scope; knowing/voluntary; miscarriage of justice) and, critically, Hahn’s four exclusive miscarriage-of-justice categories.
    • United States v. Elliot — Quoted by Hahn for the four miscarriage-of-justice circumstances (impermissible factor such as race; ineffective assistance in negotiating the waiver; sentence exceeding statutory maximum; waiver otherwise unlawful).
    • Hicks v. State (quoting Woods v. State) — Cited to reject expansion of Hahn where the party did not raise and support the argument with cogent reasoning and authority. This citation reinforces a procedural discipline: appellate courts will not create and justify new doctrinal extensions for litigants.
  • Related context authorities.
    • North Carolina v. Alford — The plea was entered under Alford, meaning the court accepted a guilty plea although the defendant maintained innocence. The case is referenced to describe the plea posture, not to decide waiver enforceability.
    • Fuentes v. State (quoting Kruger v. State) — Cited in a footnote to define an Alford plea.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a contract-and-enforcement sequence:

  1. The plea agreement, once accepted as binding, constrains later sentencing discretion.

    The district court acknowledged at the change-of-plea hearing it would be bound by the agreement under W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(C) if it accepted the terms. The plea colloquy explicitly addressed the Rule 35 consequence: Mr. Boni would “waive [his] right to file a motion” under W.R.Cr.P. 35, and any such motion “would be deemed void on its face based on this agreement.” Mr. Boni confirmed understanding.

  2. The district court’s later distinction between “modification” and “reduction” could not avoid the waiver’s substance.

    The district court attempted to justify relief by construing the plea colloquy as barring “modification” but not “reduction.” The Supreme Court treated this as untenable because the agreement’s described waiver covered “sentence modification or adjustment,” and the court’s own prior statements and sentencing order contemplated no further W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) relief except correction of an illegal sentence.

    The Court also highlighted internal inconsistency in the district court’s order: it “reduce[d]” Count I and “modify[ied]” Count IV, yet both forms of relief functionally produced the same outcome—converting a prison sentence to time served and probation—precisely the kind of post-judgment change Rule 35(b) addresses and the waiver foreclosed.

  3. Hahn could not salvage the motion because the asserted hardships do not match Hahn’s narrow miscarriage-of-justice categories.

    Mr. Boni argued that enforcing the waiver would be a miscarriage of justice under United States v. Hahn. The Supreme Court “assum[ed] without deciding” Hahn might apply to Rule 35(b) waivers, then held that none of Hahn’s four circumstances were present. The hardships offered—good conduct, mental health deterioration, lack of treatment in prison, and strong community support—are post-sentencing developments. Hahn’s enumerated situations largely concern defects at the time of waiver or sentencing (e.g., impermissible factor such as race; ineffective assistance in negotiating the waiver; sentence above statutory maximum) or that the waiver is “otherwise unlawful.”

    The Court emphasized an important limiting principle taken directly from Hahn: a waiver is not a miscarriage of justice unless enforcement produces one of the four specified situations. Mr. Boni did not argue the waiver was “otherwise unlawful,” and he conceded he was effectively seeking an expansion of Hahn—an expansion the Court declined to entertain under Hicks v. State and Woods v. State due to lack of developed argument and authority.

  4. Alternative relief mechanisms exist, but Rule 35(b) was contractually unavailable.

    The Court noted Mr. Boni had considered “medical parole” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-424, but sought Rule 35(b) because he was within the time limit. The Court treated this as understandable but legally irrelevant: the waiver’s express terms controlled.

3.3 Impact

The Opinion’s practical and doctrinal effects are significant for Wyoming plea bargaining and post-sentencing practice:

  • Rule 35(b) waivers are enforceable as written in binding plea agreements.

    The decision signals that, when a district court accepts a plea agreement that contains an express waiver of Rule 35(b) relief, the court lacks discretion to later grant a reduction/modification simply because equities arise. This protects the State’s benefit of the bargain (here, dismissing charges and a habitual criminal enhancement).

  • Labels (“reduction” vs. “modification”) cannot circumvent substance.

    Trial courts should expect close scrutiny if they attempt to recharacterize Rule 35(b) relief to fit around a waiver. The Supreme Court treated the functional result— post-judgment change from imprisonment to probation—as the key.

  • Limits on importing federal “miscarriage of justice” concepts into state Rule 35(b) waivers.

    While the Court did not definitively decide Hahn applies to Rule 35(b) waivers, it strongly indicated that even if it did, Hahn’s categories are narrow and do not include generalized post-sentencing humanitarian concerns. Future litigants seeking to avoid waivers must build arguments within recognized categories (e.g., unlawfulness of the waiver), not broad equitable appeals.

  • Reinforcement of careful plea colloquies and sentencing orders.

    The district court’s own warnings (“void on its face”) and sentencing-order language (“grant no further sentence reduction … except to correct an illegal sentence”) were used against the later Rule 35(b) grant. Courts and counsel should expect such statements to be treated as binding indicators of the agreement’s meaning and the court’s acceptance.

  • Channeling defendants toward statutory/administrative remedies for health-related concerns.

    By pointing to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-424 (medical parole) as an “other option,” the decision implicitly separates equitable medical/mental-health concerns from the contract-limited scope of Rule 35(b) where a waiver exists.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • W.R.Cr.P. 35(b): A procedural rule allowing a defendant (within a set time) to ask the sentencing court to reduce or modify a lawful sentence. It is discretionary relief—unless the defendant has contractually waived it in a plea agreement the court accepts.
  • W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(C) binding plea agreement: A plea bargain where the parties agree to a specific sentencing outcome; if the court accepts the agreement, the court is bound by its terms.
  • Waiver in a plea agreement: The defendant’s intentional relinquishment of a right (here, the right to seek Rule 35(b) relief). Courts treat plea agreements like contracts and generally enforce clear waivers.
  • Alford plea (North Carolina v. Alford): A guilty plea accepted by the court even though the defendant maintains innocence; the defendant admits the State has enough evidence to convict.
  • Writ of review (original proceeding): A procedural vehicle allowing the Supreme Court to review a lower court’s action in limited circumstances, here used by the State to challenge the Rule 35(b) grant.
  • Abuse of discretion based on legal error: Even when a matter is “discretionary,” a court abuses discretion if it relies on an incorrect view of the law—such as ignoring an enforceable waiver.
  • “Miscarriage of justice” (United States v. Hahn): In Hahn, this is a narrow safety valve for enforcing appellate waivers; it applies only to specific categories (impermissible factor like race; ineffective assistance in negotiating the waiver; sentence above statutory maximum; waiver otherwise unlawful). The Court found Mr. Boni’s post-sentencing hardships did not fit these categories.

5. Conclusion

The State of Wyoming v. Boni establishes a clear enforcement message: when a defendant waives W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) relief as part of a binding plea agreement accepted by the court, the district court may not later reduce or modify the sentence under Rule 35(b) based on humanitarian concerns or post-sentencing developments. The Court rejected attempts to evade the waiver through semantic distinctions (“reduction” vs. “modification”) and refused to expand the limited “miscarriage of justice” framework drawn from United States v. Hahn.

Going forward, defendants and counsel must treat Rule 35(b) waivers as real trade-offs in plea negotiations, and trial courts must honor them once accepted—leaving extraordinary health-based or custodial concerns to other legally authorized mechanisms rather than Rule 35(b) relief barred by contract.