Enforcing Rule 11(c)(1)(C) Appeal Waivers Absent Plea-Agreement Breach, While Preserving Review of Plea Validity and Counsel-Substitution Claims

Case: United States v. Charles Scott (No. 25-4181) (4th Cir. Feb. 27, 2026) (unpublished)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Disposition: Affirmed in part; dismissed in part

1. Introduction

Charles Edward Scott pleaded guilty to distributing eutylone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), pursuant to a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) agreement that set a binding sentencing range. The district court imposed a 156-month term of imprisonment (within the binding range) and three years of supervised release.

On appeal, counsel filed an Anders brief (asserting no nonfrivolous issues) but questioned the plea’s validity and the sentence’s procedural/substantive reasonableness. Scott filed a pro se brief raising additional arguments, including alleged breach of the plea agreement, denial of his motions to withdraw/substitute counsel, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Government sought dismissal based on Scott’s appeal waiver.

The central issues were: (1) whether any claims survived the appeal waiver (especially an alleged plea-agreement breach); (2) whether Scott’s guilty plea and appeal waiver were valid; (3) whether the sentence could be reviewed notwithstanding the waiver; (4) whether the denial of substitution/withdrawal of counsel was reviewable and erroneous; and (5) whether ineffective-assistance claims were cognizable on direct appeal.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit enforced the appeal waiver after concluding (i) the Government did not breach the plea agreement, and (ii) Scott knowingly and voluntarily entered the plea and waiver following a compliant Rule 11 colloquy. As a result, the court dismissed sentencing-reasonableness challenges as within the waiver’s scope.

The court nevertheless addressed certain non-waived issues: it rejected Scott’s claim that the Government promised sentencing credit or concurrency with a state sentence because such promises were not in the plea agreement and Scott disavowed extra-agreement promises at the plea hearing. It also reviewed and rejected Scott’s challenge to the denial of his motions to withdraw and substitute counsel. Finally, it declined to consider ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because the record did not conclusively establish ineffectiveness.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Anders v.  California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Governs counsel’s obligation to identify any arguably meritorious appellate issues and the court’s independent review of the record. The panel applied Anders to confirm there were no meritorious, non-waived issues.
  • United States v. Wilson, 149 F.4th 448 (4th Cir. 2025): The opinion’s backbone for two propositions: (1) a claim that the Government breached the plea agreement survives an appeal waiver; and (2) plea agreements are interpreted using contract principles, limiting the Government’s obligations to promises actually made in the agreement’s plain language. The panel also borrowed Wilson for the plain-error standard of review on breach claims when not preserved.
  • United States v. Tate, 845 F.3d 571 (4th Cir. 2017): Reinforces that a breach occurs if the Government fails to fulfill a plea-inducing promise. Here, Tate framed the breach inquiry, even though the court found no promise to enforce.
  • Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977): Supplies the “strong presumption of verity” attached to sworn plea-hearing statements. The panel used Blackledge to discount Scott’s assertions of unwritten promises (sentencing credit and concurrency) in light of his in-court confirmation that no extra promises induced the plea.
  • United States v. Taylor-Sanders, 88 F.4th 516 (4th Cir. 2023): Cited for two key points: (1) an appeal waiver does not bar review of the validity of the guilty plea or the waiver itself; and (2) a properly conducted Rule 11 colloquy creates a strong presumption the plea is final and binding. This authority enabled merits review of plea validity despite the waiver.
  • United States v.  Garrett, 141 F.4th 96 (4th Cir. 2025): Establishes plain-error review for unpreserved Rule 11 challenges. Because Scott did not move to withdraw his plea or object to the plea hearing, the panel applied this deferential standard.
  • United States v.  Jackson, 952 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992): Together stand for the proposition that the Bureau of Prisons (acting for the Attorney General) calculates sentencing credit after a defendant begins serving the sentence, not the sentencing court. The panel invoked these cases to explain why Scott’s “credit” complaints were misdirected to the sentencing court.
  • United  States v. Smith, 134 F.4th 248 (4th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217 (4th Cir. 2023): Provide the framework for enforcing appeal waivers—validity (knowing and intelligent under the totality of circumstances) and scope (whether the issue falls within the waiver). The panel used these to conclude Scott’s waiver was valid and enforceable.
  • United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2013): Cited for the common-sense point that sentencing challenges generally fall within the scope of a valid appeal waiver. This supported dismissal of Scott’s sentence-reasonableness attack.
  • United States v. Cohen, 888 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2018) and United States v.  Porter, 405 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005): Support the rule that certain counsel-related claims—like denial of a motion to substitute counsel—are not barred by an appeal waiver. These cases provided the jurisdictional pathway to reach Scott’s substitution claim.
  • United States v. Lamborn, 159 F.4th 230 (4th Cir. 2025): Supplies the governing test for denial of substitution counsel—timeliness, adequacy of inquiry, and degree of attorney-client conflict—and clarifies standards of review (abuse of discretion; clear error for certain factual findings). The panel applied this rubric to uphold the district court’s ruling.
  • United States v. Smith, 749 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2014): Cited to support the propriety of denying substitution/withdrawal without an evidentiary hearing where the record and court’s inquiry are adequate.
  • United States v. Perry, 92 F.4th 500 (4th Cir.), Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and United States v. Freeman, 24 F.4th 320 (4th Cir. 2022) (en banc): Provide the modern Fourth Circuit approach to ineffective-assistance claims: generally inappropriate on direct appeal unless the record conclusively establishes deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland; otherwise, the proper vehicle is a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. The panel followed this rule and declined to reach Scott’s IAC allegations.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Breach claims survive appeal waivers, but only for promises actually made

The court first addressed Scott’s pro se allegation that the Government breached the plea agreement—an argument that, under United States v. Wilson, 149 F.4th 448 (4th Cir. 2025), is not extinguished by an appeal waiver. Applying contract-law principles, the panel focused on the plea agreement’s text and the Rule 11 record.

Scott claimed a verbal promise of sentencing credit dating from March 15, 2022, and a promise to recommend concurrency with an undischarged state sentence. The panel rejected both, reasoning that neither promise appeared in the agreement’s “plain language,” and Scott affirmed during the plea colloquy that no outside promises induced his plea. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) supplied the presumption that these sworn statements are reliable.

2. Credit for prior custody is an administrative computation by BOP

To the extent Scott reframed the argument as sentencing error by the district court, the panel explained—citing United States v.  Jackson, 952 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992)—that sentencing credit is computed by the Bureau of Prisons after the sentence begins. This foreclosed the notion that the sentencing court’s failure to “apply credit” itself demonstrated breach or procedural error in this appeal.

3. Validity of the plea and waiver: Rule 11 compliance and totality-of-circumstances review

The court then evaluated the guilty plea’s validity (not barred by the waiver) under Rule 11, reviewing for plain error because Scott did not seek to withdraw his plea. It concluded the magistrate judge “fully complied” with Rule 11 and that Scott’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis, triggering the strong presumption of finality described in United States v. Taylor-Sanders, 88 F.4th 516 (4th Cir. 2023).

Next, under United  States v. Smith, 134 F.4th 248 (4th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217 (4th Cir. 2023), the panel held the appeal waiver was knowingly and intelligently made and thus enforceable.

4. Scope: sentencing challenges are waived in this posture

With a valid waiver and no breach, the court enforced the waiver and dismissed Scott’s procedural/substantive reasonableness challenges to the 156-month sentence. Citing United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2013), it treated the sentencing issues as squarely within the waiver’s scope—especially where the sentence fell within the binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) range.

5. Counsel-substitution claims remain reviewable and failed on the merits

The panel recognized (via United States v. Cohen, 888 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2018) and United States v.  Porter, 405 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005)) that denial of substitution/withdrawal of counsel is not barred by the waiver. Applying United States v. Lamborn, 159 F.4th 230 (4th Cir. 2025), the panel weighed timeliness (concededly untimely), the adequacy of the district court’s inquiry, and whether any conflict caused a total breakdown in communication. Finding no clear error in factual determinations and no abuse of discretion (and citing United States v. Smith, 749 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2014) to support denial without an evidentiary hearing), the court affirmed on this non-waived claim.

6. Ineffective assistance: preserved for collateral review unless conclusively shown

Although the panel noted that ineffective-assistance claims fell outside the waiver’s scope, it declined to reach them because the record did not “conclusively” establish ineffectiveness—following United States v. Perry, 92 F.4th 500 (4th Cir.), the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) standard, and the en banc guidance of United States v. Freeman, 24 F.4th 320 (4th Cir. 2022) (en banc).

C. Impact

  • Reinforced enforceability of appeal waivers in Rule 11(c)(1)(C) cases: Where a defendant receives a sentence within the binding range and the Rule 11 record is clean, appellate review of sentencing reasonableness will typically be dismissed as waived.
  • Sharper boundary between alleged side promises and the written agreement: The decision underscores that asserted verbal assurances (credit, concurrency) face steep hurdles when contradicted by the written agreement and the defendant’s sworn plea-hearing statements.
  • Clarified “survivor” claims: Even broad waivers do not necessarily foreclose (i) plea-breach allegations, (ii) challenges to plea/waiver validity, and (iii) substitution-of-counsel rulings—though each is subject to demanding standards of review and record-based analysis.
  • Procedural channeling of sentencing-credit disputes: By pointing to BOP computation authority, the opinion signals that “credit” disputes should be pursued through administrative remedies and (typically) habeas under § 2241, not as sentencing-court error on direct appeal.
  • Continued preference for collateral review of IAC: The ruling continues the Fourth Circuit’s strong tendency to reserve ineffective-assistance litigation for § 2255 unless the trial record alone resolves the claim.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement: A plea deal where the parties agree to a specific sentence or sentencing range that becomes binding once the court accepts the agreement. If accepted, the court must sentence within that agreed term/range.
  • Appeal waiver: A contractual term in a plea agreement where the defendant gives up the right to appeal certain issues. Courts enforce it if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed and the Government did not breach the deal.
  • Plea-agreement breach: Occurs when the Government fails to honor a promise that formed part of the plea’s inducement. Critically, courts enforce only promises actually made in the written agreement (as interpreted by ordinary meaning).
  • Plain-error review: A highly deferential appellate standard used when an issue was not preserved in the trial court. The appellant must show a clear error affecting substantial rights and the fairness/integrity of proceedings.
  • Sentencing credit (prior custody credit): Credit for time already spent in custody is calculated by the Bureau of Prisons after sentencing, not usually “awarded” by the judge at sentencing.
  • Substitution of counsel: A defendant can ask to replace appointed counsel, but courts weigh timing, the judge’s inquiry into the complaint, and whether the attorney-client relationship has so broken down that an adequate defense is impossible.
  • Ineffective assistance of counsel: Under Strickland, a defendant must show (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice. Appellate courts generally require these claims to be raised in a § 2255 motion unless the trial record alone conclusively proves them.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Charles Scott is a waiver-enforcement decision that methodically separates waived from non-waived issues. The Fourth Circuit (i) rejected an alleged plea-agreement breach where the claimed promises were not in the written agreement and were contradicted by the Rule 11 record, (ii) upheld the guilty plea and appeal waiver as knowing and voluntary, (iii) dismissed sentencing challenges as within the waiver’s scope, and (iv) affirmed the denial of substitution/withdrawal of counsel while steering ineffective-assistance claims to collateral review.

Although unpublished and nonbinding, the opinion is a practical roadmap for how the Fourth Circuit will analyze: alleged off-the-record plea promises, Rule 11 colloquy adequacy, waiver validity/scope, and the limited set of claims that remain reviewable despite a broad appellate waiver.