Enforcing Appellate Waivers in Anders Appeals: De Novo Validity Review, Miscarriage-of-Justice Limitation, and Affirmance (Not Dismissal)

Introduction

United States v. Dayakar Mallu (3d Cir. Mar. 9, 2026) is a nonprecedential Third Circuit decision addressing how appellate courts handle a criminal appeal when (1) the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement containing a broad appellate waiver and (2) appointed counsel moves to withdraw under Anders v. California.

The United States prosecuted Dayakar Mallu for (a) conspiracy to commit securities fraud and (b) aiding and abetting the preparation of a false tax return. Mallu pleaded guilty. His plea agreement included an appellate waiver allowing an appeal only if the Government appealed or if the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or unreasonably exceeded the Guidelines range. The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 46–57 months, varied downward, and imposed 24 months’ imprisonment, along with restitution and forfeiture. Mallu appealed; his counsel filed an Anders brief and moved to withdraw. Mallu also filed a pro se brief.

The central issues on appeal were procedural: whether counsel satisfied Anders, and whether any nonfrivolous issues existed in light of the appellate waiver, the Rule 11 plea colloquy, and the below-Guidelines sentence.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed. It held that counsel’s Anders submission satisfied Third Circuit requirements and that independent review revealed no nonfrivolous issues. The court enforced Mallu’s appellate waiver because:

  1. the issues fell within the waiver’s scope;
  2. Mallu knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver; and
  3. enforcement would not work a miscarriage of justice.

The court also briefly addressed (and rejected as nonfrivolous) points raised in Mallu’s pro se brief, including an ineffective-assistance claim (deferred to § 2255), a selective-prosecution claim, a consideration challenge to the plea agreement, and an argument premised on dismissal of charges against an alleged co-conspirator.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) The Anders framework and appellate review duties

  • Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)
    Establishes the procedure permitting appointed counsel to withdraw when an appeal is wholly frivolous, while requiring a record-based submission and independent judicial review to protect the defendant’s right to counsel on appeal. The Mallu panel implemented this structure by assessing counsel’s brief and then conducting its own review for nonfrivolous issues.
  • United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2001)
    Supplies the Third Circuit’s two-step inquiry: (1) whether counsel’s Anders brief is adequate and (2) whether independent review reveals any nonfrivolous issue. Mallu uses Youla as the organizing authority for its Anders analysis.
  • United States v. Brookins, 132 F.4th 659 (3d Cir. 2025)
    Reinforces what adequacy requires in the Third Circuit: counsel must identify potential issues and explain why they are frivolous; and clarifies the definition of frivolousness by emphasizing that any “arguable” issue defeats an Anders motion. Mallu cites Brookins both for the appellate standard of review in the Anders posture and for the content requirements of an Anders brief.
  • Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000)
    Recognizes that jurisdictions may implement their own Anders-type procedures, but counsel must still search the record and identify issues that might arguably support the appeal. Mallu cites it to justify the adequacy inquiry focused on whether counsel “thoroughly examined the record.”
  • McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429 (1988)
    Defines “frivolous” as lacking any basis in law or fact. Mallu uses McCoy (and Brookins) to frame the threshold question: is there any legally arguable issue despite the waiver and the plea colloquy?

2) What remains appealable after a guilty plea

  • Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam)
    Often cited for the principle that a guilty plea narrows, but does not eliminate, appealable issues (e.g., jurisdictional or certain constitutional claims). Mallu uses it to explain that, even before considering an appellate waiver, a guilty plea typically confines the appellate field to jurisdiction, voluntariness, and sentencing.

3) Enforcing appellate waivers (scope, voluntariness, miscarriage of justice)

  • United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564 (3d Cir. 2022)
    Provides the Third Circuit’s modern three-part test for enforcement of appellate waivers: scope, knowing/voluntary assent, and absence of miscarriage of justice. Mallu applies this test directly and finds each element satisfied.
  • United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921 (3d Cir. 2008)
    Establishes strict construction of waiver language. Mallu relies on Corso when concluding the waiver’s exceptions do not apply because the Government did not appeal and the sentence was below the statutory maximum and below the Guidelines range.
  • United States v. Grimes, 739 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2014)
    Supplies both (a) the de novo standard for reviewing waiver validity/scope (as also stated in Mallu’s footnote) and (b) the “miscarriage of justice” rubric, including the idea that nonenforcement is reserved for “unusual circumstances” to prevent “manifest injustice.” Mallu uses Grimes to emphasize that routine Rule 11 compliance and a substantively reasonable sentence do not approach that high bar.
  • United States v. James, 928 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2019)
    Clarifies an important procedural point: a valid waiver does not strip appellate subject-matter jurisdiction; rather, the court typically affirms rather than dismisses once it elects not to exercise jurisdiction to reach the merits. Mallu cites James to explain its chosen disposition (affirmance).

4) Treatment of claims raised in Mallu’s pro se brief

  • United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2002) and United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2003)
    These cases support the standard Third Circuit practice: ineffective-assistance claims are generally better raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding (not on direct appeal) because the record on direct appeal rarely reveals counsel’s advice, strategy, and surrounding circumstances. Mallu uses them to characterize the pro se ineffective-assistance argument as not suitable for direct review.
  • United States v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2012)
    Sets out a demanding standard for selective prosecution: the defendant must show prosecution based on an impermissible ground (such as race or religion). Mallu cites Taylor to deem the selective-prosecution claim meritless on the existing record.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Step one: confirm counsel’s Anders compliance.
    The panel assessed whether counsel (a) reviewed the whole record, (b) identified potential issues, and (c) explained why each was frivolous. A key part of counsel’s reasoning—and the court’s agreement—was that the appellate waiver substantially foreclosed review, making any merits challenges to conviction or sentence legally unavailable absent an applicable exception or miscarriage of justice.
  2. Step two: independently evaluate whether any nonfrivolous issue exists.
    The court’s independent review focused on waiver enforceability under Langley:
    • Scope: The waiver applied unless the Government appealed or the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or unreasonably exceeded the Guidelines. None applied because the Government did not appeal, and the court imposed 24 months—below both the statutory maxima (for securities fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1348 and false return under 26 U.S.C. § 7206) and the 46–57 month Guidelines range.
    • Knowing and voluntary: The Rule 11 colloquy established that Mallu understood the waiver, reviewed it with counsel, and signed the agreement reflecting that understanding. This made a waiver challenge untenable on direct review.
    • No miscarriage of justice: Applying Grimes, the court found no clear or grave error: the district court had jurisdiction; the plea was constitutionally sound and Rule 11-compliant; and sentencing reflected consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and resulted in a below-Guidelines term.
  3. Disposition choice: affirmance rather than dismissal.
    Following United States v. James, the court explained that a waiver does not eliminate jurisdiction; it typically leads the court to affirm the judgment rather than dismiss the appeal.
  4. Pro se issues do not create an “arguable” appellate issue.
    The panel treated the pro se claims as nonfrivolous: ineffective assistance was routed to § 2255 given the record limits; selective prosecution lacked the required showing; the plea agreement had adequate consideration (including the Government’s recommendation of acceptance of responsibility); and dismissal of a co-conspirator’s indictment did not undermine the plea’s validity or the sentence’s lawfulness.

Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the decision is practically instructive in three recurring settings in federal criminal practice:

  • Anders + appellate waiver cases: Mallu illustrates that when the plea colloquy is clean and the sentence falls within (or below) waiver thresholds, appellate waivers will usually render an appeal frivolous for Anders purposes—shifting the appellate court’s focus from merits review to waiver enforceability.
  • Clarification of remedy after enforcing a waiver: By invoking United States v. James, the panel reinforces a procedural point that can matter for litigants’ future posture (including collateral review): the typical result is affirmance of the judgment, not dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
  • Channeling record-dependent claims to § 2255: The opinion reiterates the Third Circuit’s reluctance to adjudicate ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal absent a developed record, preserving habeas as the primary vehicle for those allegations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Anders brief: A filing by appointed appellate counsel stating that, after a careful review, there are no nonfrivolous issues to raise. Counsel must still point to anything that might arguably support the appeal, and the court must independently review the record.
  • Appellate waiver: A contractual term in a plea agreement where the defendant gives up (waives) most rights to appeal. Courts enforce these waivers if the waiver covers the issues raised, was entered knowingly and voluntarily, and enforcing it would not produce a “miscarriage of justice.”
  • “Miscarriage of justice” exception: A narrow safety valve allowing courts to ignore an otherwise valid waiver in extraordinary situations—typically where an obvious, serious error would cause manifest injustice.
  • Rule 11 colloquy: The plea-hearing procedure required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, designed to ensure that a guilty plea (and associated waivers) are knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis.
  • Restitution vs. forfeiture: Restitution compensates victims (here, tax loss) while forfeiture strips the defendant of illicit gains (here, proceeds of securities fraud). They serve different legal purposes and can both be imposed.
  • § 2255 motion: A post-conviction procedure allowing federal prisoners to challenge convictions/sentences on certain grounds (often including ineffective assistance) with the possibility of developing evidence beyond the trial record.

Conclusion

United States v. Dayakar Mallu applies well-established Third Circuit doctrine to a common appellate posture: a guilty plea with a broad appellate waiver followed by an Anders motion. The court enforced the waiver because it plainly covered the appeal, was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and presented no miscarriage-of-justice concerns—especially given a below-Guidelines, below-statutory-maximum sentence and a Rule 11-compliant plea. The decision also reinforces two practical points: a valid waiver typically leads to affirmance (not dismissal), and ineffective-assistance claims ordinarily belong in § 2255 proceedings where a factual record can be developed.