Date: Mar 24, 2026

Enforcing Appellate Waivers After Competency Is Confirmed: “Hard Look” Review of the Ultimate Competency Finding

I. Introduction

In United States v. Barraza (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), Alex Barraza appealed life-and-related sentences imposed after a guilty plea to four counts arising out of a large-scale drug-trafficking enterprise that also involved firearms, money laundering, and an aiding-and-abetting murder charge.

The appeal centered on mental competency and its downstream effects: whether Barraza was competent when he pleaded guilty in April 2022; whether he should have been allowed to withdraw that plea; and whether his other challenges were foreclosed by an appellate-waiver clause in his plea agreement. The case’s unusual procedural history—multiple expert evaluations, competency-related hospitalization, and allegations of malingering—required the Fifth Circuit to apply its “hard look” approach to the district court’s “ultimate competency finding,” while also deciding what issues remain reviewable notwithstanding an appeal waiver.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit:

Affirmed the district court’s finding that Barraza was competent at the April 2022 plea hearing.
Affirmed the denial of Barraza’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Affirmed the district court’s August 2024 “ultimate” finding that Barraza was competent to proceed to sentencing.
Enforced the plea agreement’s appellate waiver and therefore dismissed Barraza’s remaining challenges as barred.

In doing so, the panel emphasized that a competency-based attack on the plea can be reviewed even in the face of an appellate waiver, but once competency and voluntariness are confirmed on the record, a properly explained waiver will be enforced according to its plain language.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Competency standard: the Dusky/Godinez framework

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960): supplies the baseline definition of competency— “sufficient present ability” to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993): confirms that the competency requirement has a “modest aim”— capacity to understand proceedings and assist counsel—and that the same functional standard governs competency to plead guilty (as applied here).

These authorities anchor the panel’s dual inquiry: competency at the time of the plea and competency later at the “ultimate” adjudication before sentencing.

2. Reviewing competency findings: “hard look,” deference to the trial judge, and expert conflicts

United States v. McKnight, 570 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2009): supplies the governing Fifth Circuit template. It frames competency as a mixed question, applies clear-error review to factual determinations of mental disorder, and instructs the appellate court to take a “hard look” at the “ultimate competency finding.” It also illustrates that district courts may credit one expert over others when supported by the record.
United States v. Simpson, 645 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 2011): emphasizes that appellate review is not to “relitigate the battle of the experts” and that reversal occurs only if the competency finding is “clearly arbitrary or unwarranted.”
United States v. Davis, 638 F. App'x 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpublished): cited for two propositions: (i) competency challenges may be reached despite a waiver when they go to the plea’s validity; and (ii) district courts may choose among experts so long as they do not arbitrarily fail to consider rejected testimony.
Albany Ins. Co. v. Anh Thi Kieu, 927 F.2d 882, 894 (5th Cir. 1991): supports the principle that a factfinder may credit one expert over another if the rejected views are not arbitrarily ignored (imported here into the competency context).
United States v. Porter, 907 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2018): reinforces that the reviewing court takes a “hard look” at the trial judge’s “ultimate conclusion” on competency and highlights the relevance of the trial judge’s personal observations and the broader record.
Moody v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1998): quoted via McKnight to ground the “hard look” language.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975): cited for the duty of trial courts to remain alert to changes in competency; the opinion uses Drope to justify reviewing “ultimate” competency even when initial competency was found at the plea hearing.

In Barraza, these precedents collectively validate the district court’s approach: weigh competing expert reports, consider lay testimony and the defendant’s conduct, and rely on repeated in-court observations—without converting appellate review into a de novo expert re-weighing exercise.

3. Plea-colloquy verity and the weight of contemporaneous admissions

United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2002): supports giving “substantial weight” to a defendant’s contemporaneous sworn statements during the plea colloquy when assessing whether a plea was knowing and voluntary.
United States v. Teijeiro, 79 F.4th 387, 392 (5th Cir. 2023): reinforces that later-emerging signs of incompetency do not necessarily undermine competency at the plea hearing; it also emphasizes a “strong presumption of verity” for plea-hearing testimony.

The panel used these cases to treat the April 2022 plea record as the most reliable snapshot of contemporaneous understanding—particularly where no one raised competency concerns at the time and the defendant’s answers showed responsiveness and comprehension.

4. Mental illness and intellectual disability are not automatically incompetence

United States v. Sterling, 99 F.4th 783, 803 (5th Cir. 2024): cited for the principle that the existence of mental illness is not determinative of incompetency.
United States v. McKnight, 570 F.3d at 643-44: cited again to show competency can exist despite serious diagnoses (e.g., schizophrenia, delusions, major depression).
United States v. Davis, 638 F. App'x at 298-99 n.1: used to illustrate that disability-benefit findings or unusual behavior do not control the criminal competency determination.

This cluster of authority allowed the court to accept that Barraza may have anxiety, depression, illiteracy claims, or mild intellectual disability while still concluding he met the functional Dusky threshold.

5. Withdrawing a guilty plea: Carr factors and standard of review

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B): requires a “fair and just reason” for plea withdrawal before sentencing.
United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1984): provides the seven-factor framework used to review plea-withdrawal rulings.
United States v. McKnight, 570 F.3d at 645-46: reiterates the Carr factors and confirms abuse-of- discretion review.

The panel’s affirmance leaned heavily on the district court’s method: it identified the correct standards, reviewed available medical reports (generated months after the plea), used the plea transcript as contemporaneous evidence, and analyzed each Carr factor—finding all seven against withdrawal.

6. Appeal waivers: enforceability, interpretation, and what survives

United States v. Jacobs, 635 F.3d 778, 780-81 (5th Cir. 2011): supplies the two-part test—(1) knowing and voluntary and (2) applies to the circumstances based on plain language; also states that an accurately explained waiver followed by the defendant’s acknowledgment generally forecloses later claims of misunderstanding.
United States v. Strother, 977 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 2020): directs use of ordinary contract principles and narrow construction of waivers against the Government.
Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 882 (5th Cir. 1980), modified on other grounds, 646 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1981): supports upholding a guilty plea and “any concomitant agreement” where the defendant understands charges and consequences and pleads voluntarily without coercion.
United States v. Gibson, 204 F. App'x 388, 389 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished): used to reject waiver invalidation absent “sufficient facts” raising reason to doubt competence or voluntariness.
Todd v. United States, 418 F.2d 134, 135 (5th Cir. 1969): invoked for the general rule that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives prior non-jurisdictional defects.

Importantly, the court also cited waiver-adjacent cases to clarify reviewability boundaries: United States v. McKnight, United States v. Davis, and United States v. Freeze, No. C.A. C-06-54, 2006 WL 1897238, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2006) (unpublished) for the idea that competency-based attacks on the plea can be heard despite a waiver because they potentially invalidate the plea itself. And in a footnote context, it noted that denials of plea-withdrawal motions are often reviewed notwithstanding a waiver when the defendant claims the plea was not knowing or voluntary, citing United States v. Conway, 558 F. App'x 402, 403 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished), United States v. Robinson, 187 F.3d 516, 517 (5th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Arbuckle, 390 F. App'x 412, 414-19 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).

7. Deciding merits without resolving waiver scope

United States v. Smith, 528 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 2008): permits pretermitting waiver questions when a claim is easier to resolve on the merits.
United States v. Graves, 908 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 2018), as revised (Nov. 27, 2018): reiterates the same pragmatic approach.
United States v. Castillo-Lopez, No. 23-11099, 2025 WL 3043384, at *1-2 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 2025) (unpublished): another example of resolving on the merits without deciding waiver enforcement.

The panel applied this principle to avoid entangling itself in a potentially difficult waiver-scope question about post-plea competency proceedings, while still conducting the “hard look” review required by Fifth Circuit competency law.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Competency at the April 2022 plea

The court treated the plea hearing as the critical contemporaneous record. It emphasized that Barraza answered preliminary questions, neither side flagged competency concerns when asked, and the district judge expressly found him competent. The extended colloquy covered charges, factual basis, punishment ranges, and rights waived; Barraza repeatedly affirmed understanding under oath. The panel also stressed behavioral indicators of comprehension (asking for clarification; conferring with counsel before answering), consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on plea- colloquy verity under Cothran and Teijeiro.

The panel acknowledged PSR evidence of anxiety, depression, alleged illiteracy, special education, and disability benefits, but treated those facts as insufficient—without more—to establish incompetence, citing Sterling, Davis, and McKnight.

2. The August 2024 “ultimate competency finding”

Despite earlier expert opinions of incompetence and non-restorability (Dr. Rivera’s initial telemedicine evaluation; Dr. Miller’s report), later evidence shifted: an evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 produced findings of mild intellectual disability without need for specialized treatment; witness testimony described sophisticated criminal leadership and coherent post-arrest communication; Dr. Rodriguez-Chevres flagged possible exaggeration for “secondary gain”; Dr. Rivera reversed course after an in-person exam and additional materials; and Dr. Pietz opined that Barraza was malingering and “highly intelligent,” corroborated by lay testimony that he coached others to feign incompetence and that he could read and write.

Applying Simpson and Porter, the Fifth Circuit deferred to the district court’s long-view vantage: repeated observations, multiple hearings, and a complete record. It concluded the competency determination was not “clearly arbitrary or unwarranted,” and refused to “relitigate the battle of the experts.”

3. Denial of plea withdrawal

The court upheld the denial under abuse-of-discretion review. The district court used the correct law (Rule 11, Carr, and Dusky), noted that medical reports finding depression and mild intellectual disability were generated months after the plea, relied on the plea transcript for contemporaneous voluntariness, and analyzed all seven Carr factors (all against withdrawal). The Fifth Circuit found that methodical analysis sufficient to defeat the claim that the plea was unknowing or involuntary due to incompetency.

4. Enforcing the appellate waiver

Having affirmed competency and voluntariness, the panel enforced the waiver under Jacobs and Strother. The waiver’s exceptions (ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct) did not cover Barraza’s remaining claims. The district court explained the waiver’s consequences, and Barraza acknowledged understanding and lack of coercion. Under Jacobs, those on-the-record acknowledgments defeated later attempts to unwind the waiver. The panel therefore dismissed the remaining issues as waived, invoking the general guilty-plea waiver rule reflected in Todd v. United States.

C. Impact

Although unpublished and therefore not precedential under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, United States v. Barraza is practically significant in three ways:

Competency challenges remain a gateway despite appeal waivers. The decision reinforces that when a defendant asserts incompetency undermined the plea’s validity, the court will reach competency and voluntariness before enforcing a waiver (consistent with McKnight and Davis).
District courts are rewarded for building a “total record.” The opinion illustrates what makes a competency ruling resilient on appeal: multiple expert evaluations, lay testimony, careful consideration of malingering, and repeated judicial observation, all articulated in findings (as in Porter and McKnight).
Plea colloquies remain central evidence. Where contemporaneous plea-colloquy answers are coherent and specific, later competency claims face a steep uphill climb under the “presumption of verity” approach reflected in Cothran and Teijeiro.

For defense counsel, the case underscores the importance of raising competency concerns early and creating a record tied to the plea date—not just later deterioration or post-PSR distress. For prosecutors, it demonstrates that a properly administered Rule 11 colloquy and a clearly explained appellate waiver remain strong protections once competency is confirmed.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Competency (criminal): A functional test (from Dusky): can the defendant rationally understand what is happening in court and reasonably work with counsel? A diagnosis (depression, intellectual disability, psychosis) may be relevant, but it is not automatically dispositive.
“Hard look” review: Appellate courts give deference to trial judges on competency, but they scrutinize the reasoning and record more closely than in ordinary factual disputes—especially because competency is foundational to due process.
Malingering: Intentional feigning or exaggeration of symptoms for secondary gain (here, to avoid sentencing). Courts evaluate it through expert testing, inconsistencies across settings, and lay observations (e.g., reading/writing despite claims of inability).
Rule 11 plea colloquy: The judge’s in-court questioning designed to ensure the plea is informed and voluntary. Sworn answers given during this process are treated as highly reliable evidence later.
Appeal waiver: A contractual promise in a plea agreement to give up most appellate rights. If the waiver is explained in court and the defendant confirms understanding, it will generally be enforced unless the plea/waiver itself was invalid.
Withdrawing a guilty plea (pre-sentencing): The defendant must show a “fair and just reason” (Rule 11(d)(2)(B)). In the Fifth Circuit, courts apply the seven-factor test from United States v. Carr.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Barraza illustrates a clear operational rule in Fifth Circuit practice: a defendant may litigate competency and plea voluntariness as a threshold matter even when an appellate waiver exists, but once the record supports competency at the plea and at the ultimate competency determination—through a robust mix of judicial observation, expert evaluation, and corroborating lay evidence—the waiver will be enforced according to its terms, and remaining appellate issues will be dismissed.