Enforcing Appeal Waivers and Rule 11’s “Low Bar” Factual-Basis Standard After a Plea-Withdrawal Breach

I. Introduction

In United States v. Justin Deshun Stiger (6th Cir. June 2, 2026), the Sixth Circuit reviewed a federal drug-conspiracy case arising from a multi-jurisdictional fentanyl/cocaine distribution investigation centered on Memphis, Tennessee, with alleged sourcing activity tied to Arizona. After a first trial ended with acquittals on aiding-and-abetting counts but a hung jury on conspiracy counts, Justin Deshun Stiger entered a guilty plea to a conspiracy count pursuant to a plea agreement that included (1) a joint recommendation of a 60-month sentence and (2) an appellate waiver limited to sentences exceeding the statutory maximum or the Guidelines range established by the district court.

The case presented three core appellate disputes:

  • whether the district court complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 when accepting the plea (knowing/voluntary plea and factual basis);
  • whether Stiger could appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw the plea despite the appellate waiver;
  • whether Stiger could appeal a within-Guidelines 120-month sentence imposed after the government asserted Stiger breached the plea agreement by attempting to withdraw his plea.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in full. It held:

  1. The plea was valid under Rule 11. The record showed Stiger understood the charge and its essential elements, and the court had an adequate factual basis.
  2. Stiger’s appellate challenge to the denial of his motion to withdraw the plea was waived by the plea agreement’s appeal waiver.
  3. Stiger’s sentencing challenge was also waived because his 120-month sentence was within the Guidelines range and did not exceed the statutory maximum; once Stiger breached, the government was free to argue for any lawful sentence, and the waiver remained enforceable.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is an application-heavy decision: it relies on a line of Sixth Circuit cases that set (1) the standards for Rule 11 review and (2) the strong enforceability of appellate waivers in plea agreements.

1. Standards of review and the court’s willingness to resolve without choosing (plain error vs. de novo)

  • United States v. Short, 128 F.4th 823 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited for the proposition that the court may resolve the Rule 11 claim without deciding between plain-error and de novo review where the defendant loses under any standard. Short also supplies the “low bar” articulation for the factual-basis requirement.
  • United States v. Catchings, 708 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2013): Reinforces the approach that preservation disputes need not be dispositive when the outcome is the same under either standard.

2. Rule 11 framework: voluntariness, understanding of charges, and factual basis

  • United States v. Windham, 53 F.4th 1006 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Pitts, 997 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2021)): Provides the overarching description of Rule 11’s function—ensuring voluntariness, understanding of rights and charges, consequences of the plea, and a factual basis. The Stiger panel uses Windham/Pitts as the organizing statement of Rule 11’s purpose.
  • United States v. Williams, 941 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Valdez, 362 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 2004)): Supplies the Rule 11(b)(1)(G) requirement that the defendant understand the “critical or essential elements” of the offense. Stiger uses this to evaluate whether the plea colloquy and surrounding record sufficiently established understanding.
  • Ocasio v. United States, 578 U.S. 282 (2016): Cited to identify an essential conspiracy concept: joining with intent that the underlying crime be committed by some member of the conspiracy. Ocasio anchors the “what must be understood” inquiry for a conspiracy plea.

3. Evaluating later claims that contradict the plea colloquy

  • United States v. Mitchell, 135 F.4th 507 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357 (2017)): Supports skepticism toward “post hoc assertions” that contradict the defendant’s sworn, contemporaneous plea statements. The Stiger panel uses this to discount later arguments that he did not truly understand the elements.
  • United States v. Ellis, 115 F.4th 497 (6th Cir. 2024): Used for two points: (1) plea-hearing representations are strong evidence the plea was knowing and voluntary, and (2) appellate waivers commonly bar appeals from denials of motions to withdraw guilty pleas.

4. The factual-basis requirement is intentionally modest

  • United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam): Quoted (via Short) for the “subjectively satisfy itself” formulation—Rule 11 does not demand a trial-like showing, only enough to satisfy the judge.
  • United States v. Mobley, 618 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2010): Quoted (via Short) for the “some evidence, not necessarily strong evidence” standard. In Stiger, Mobley helps validate reliance on the government’s proffer and broader record, including the PSR.
  • United States v. Short, 128 F.4th 823 (6th Cir. 2025): Reiterated as calling the factual-basis requirement a “low bar” and allowing consideration of the “entire record.”

5. Waiver/forfeiture concepts and enforcement of appeal waivers

  • Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 49 F.4th 1000 (6th Cir. 2022): Cited to define “forfeiture” (failure to timely assert a claim). Stiger uses it to dispose of a newly raised venue argument.
  • United States v. Martin, 526 F.3d 926 (6th Cir. 2008): Establishes de novo review of whether an appellate waiver bars an appeal and reiterates that valid plea agreements waive appeals of non-jurisdictional issues except as preserved.
  • United States v. Milliron, 984 F.3d 1188 (6th Cir. 2021): Applied to enforce the waiver and “foreclose appellate review” where the sentence falls within the parameters the defendant agreed to.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 11(b)(1)(G): Understanding the charge and essential elements

The court treated the Rule 11 “understanding” requirement as a record-based inquiry, not a hindsight credibility contest. The decisive record facts were:

  • Stiger confirmed he received and reviewed the indictment and discussed it with counsel.
  • He stated counsel advised him on “every element of the offense,” and counsel affirmed his understanding.
  • He acknowledged reading and understanding the plea agreement, which identified the offense as “conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.”
  • Although he briefly expressed disagreement with the government’s account, he conferred with counsel and then unequivocally agreed and stipulated.

Applying Williams/Valdez and the conspiracy-intent concept referenced in Ocasio v. United States, the Sixth Circuit held the colloquy and signed agreement demonstrated sufficient understanding. It invoked United States v. Mitchell (quoting Lee v. United States) to justify skepticism toward later claims inconsistent with the plea-hearing admissions.

2. Rule 11(b)(3): Factual basis—“some evidence” and “low bar”

The panel emphasized that the factual-basis inquiry is not an adjudication of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Short, Mobley, and the “subjectively satisfy itself” language drawn from United States v. Adams, the court held it was enough that the record included:

  • a co-conspirator’s arrest with large quantities of fentanyl and cocaine in Memphis;
  • phone messages connecting Stiger to the Memphis trip and the hotel address;
  • information that Stiger traveled from Arizona to Memphis to help distribute drugs;
  • PSR information (including informant reporting) that Stiger received a percentage of drug proceeds.

Taken together, the court held this was “ample” for Rule 11(b)(3), satisfying the modest evidentiary threshold.

3. Venue argument disposed as forfeited

Stiger attempted to pivot from “no factual basis” to “no venue” on appeal. The court rejected this because it was raised for the first time on appeal, invoking Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ. to characterize the issue as forfeited.

4. Appeal waiver: denial of motion to withdraw and sentencing challenge are barred

The heart of the back-end appellate analysis is contractual: once the plea is valid, the appellate waiver is enforced according to its terms.

  • Denial of motion to withdraw: Under United States v. Martin, non-jurisdictional issues are waived except as preserved. The plea agreement did not preserve an appeal right for denial of plea withdrawal. The panel relied on United States v. Ellis for the specific rule that appellate waivers routinely bar appeals from denials of motions to withdraw guilty pleas.
  • Sentencing challenge: The waiver preserved sentencing appeals only if the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or the Guidelines range established by the district court. The sentence was within-Guidelines. The court also noted that once Stiger attempted to withdraw his plea, the government treated that as a breach, freeing it to recommend any lawful sentence. Even so, the defendant remained bound by the plea and waiver, and United States v. Milliron was applied to enforce the waiver and foreclose review.

C. Impact

Although “not recommended for publication,” the decision is significant as an illustration of how the Sixth Circuit will likely handle common plea-related appellate issues:

  • Rule 11 challenges face a record-first approach: Where the colloquy and written agreement show understanding and voluntariness, later contradictions are disfavored, especially under the skepticism endorsed in United States v. Mitchell and Lee v. United States.
  • Factual basis remains a “low bar”: The court reaffirmed that “some evidence” suffices, and that courts may consider the entire record (including PSRs), reinforcing the practical strength of Short/Mobley in sustaining pleas.
  • Appeal waivers remain highly enforceable: The case underscores that defendants often cannot appeal denial of a motion to withdraw a plea where the waiver is broad, tracking the logic of Ellis, Martin, and Milliron.
  • Breach provisions can shift sentencing exposure dramatically: A clause making an “attempt[] to withdraw” a breach can eliminate negotiated sentencing positions (here, a joint 60-month recommendation), while leaving the defendant bound to the plea and waiver—creating a substantial strategic risk for defendants considering withdrawal motions.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11 plea colloquy
The in-court questioning a judge conducts before accepting a guilty plea, designed to ensure the defendant understands the charge, rights being waived, consequences, and that there is a factual basis.
Knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea
A plea is valid only if the defendant understands what he is pleading to and does so without improper coercion. Courts rely heavily on what the defendant says under oath during the plea hearing.
Factual basis (“low bar”)
The judge need not find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the judge must be satisfied there is some evidence supporting each element of the offense.
Conspiracy (federal)
An agreement to commit a crime plus the defendant’s knowing, intentional participation—i.e., joining with the intent that the underlying offense be carried out by a conspirator.
Waiver vs. forfeiture
Waiver is an intentional relinquishment (e.g., signing an appeal waiver). Forfeiture is a failure to raise an issue in time (e.g., raising venue for the first time on appeal).
Appeal waiver
A plea-agreement term limiting what issues the defendant may appeal. If the plea is valid, courts generally enforce the waiver as written.
Breach of plea agreement
When a defendant violates a negotiated term (here, attempting to withdraw the plea), the government may be released from promises (such as recommending a lower sentence), while the defendant may still be bound to the guilty plea and its waiver terms, depending on the agreement.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Justin Deshun Stiger reinforces three practical rules in Sixth Circuit plea practice: (1) Rule 11 is satisfied when the plea record—colloquy plus written agreement—shows understanding of essential elements and voluntariness; (2) the factual-basis requirement is modest and may be supported by the broader record, including PSR information; and (3) appellate waivers are enforced to bar appeals of plea-withdrawal denials and within-Guidelines sentences when the waiver’s exceptions do not apply—even where the defendant’s post-plea conduct (attempting withdrawal) triggers breach provisions that expand sentencing exposure.