Enforcing Appeal Waivers After Hunter I: Ordinary Guidelines Disputes (Including Career-Offender Classification) Are Not “Miscarriages of Justice”

I. Introduction

United States v. Chaney (5th Cir. Sept. 18, 2026) is a post-remand decision testing the Supreme Court’s newly announced “miscarriage of justice” limitation on the enforceability of appellate-waiver clauses in plea agreements. Devin Chaney pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act Robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) and Armed Bank Robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d)). His plea agreement contained a broad waiver of appeal rights (with limited carve-outs not relevant to his Guidelines challenge), and the government dismissed nine other counts in exchange.

Despite the waiver, Chaney appealed, arguing the district court wrongly designated him a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The Fifth Circuit originally dismissed the appeal, enforcing the waiver and noting the circuit had “not adopted a miscarriage-of-justice exception.” The Supreme Court then vacated and remanded in light of Hunter v. United States (Hunter I), which held that appeal waivers are unenforceable when enforcement would produce a “miscarriage of justice.”

On remand, the key issues were: (1) what qualifies as a “miscarriage of justice” under Hunter I, and (2) whether an alleged career-offender misclassification (and the district court’s handling of the objection) meets that threshold.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit again enforced Chaney’s appeal waiver and dismissed the appeal. Applying Hunter I, the court held that Chaney identified no “extreme,” “obvious,” or “egregious” error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. Even assuming arguendo that the Guidelines were misapplied, the asserted mistake was the kind of “standard-fare” sentencing issue that Hunter I specifically said cannot defeat an appeal waiver.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The governing Supreme Court rule: Hunter v. United States (Hunter I)

Hunter v. United States (Hunter I), 146 S. Ct. 1702 (2026), supplied the controlling standard and the remand directive. The Supreme Court announced that an appeal waiver is unenforceable when enforcement would cause a “miscarriage of justice,” defined as leaving in place an “egregious error” that would “bring the judicial system into disrepute.” It also emphasized the exception is a “high bar” and a “safety valve for extreme cases.”

Hunter I provided examples at the outer boundary: sentences beyond statutory maximums; sentences infected with blatant constitutional error (e.g., race-based sentencing or a constitutionally infirm condition such as “barring a defendant from becoming pregnant”); and sentences imposed without “some minimum of civilized procedure” (including the “twelve orangutans” trial example). Conversely, it drew a sharp line against “uncertain or ordinary” sentencing mistakes, including inevitable errors in detailed Guidelines calculations.

2. The Fifth Circuit’s waiver doctrine pre-remand: United States v. Chaney (2024), United States v. Keele, United States v. Bond

The panel’s earlier decision, United States v. Chaney, 120 F.4th 1300 (5th Cir. 2024), enforced the waiver as “knowing and voluntary” and applicable to the issue. It relied on the Fifth Circuit’s established waiver framework, quoting United States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2005)). What changed post-remand was not the general enforceability rule, but the addition of Hunter I’s constitutional backstop.

3. Fifth Circuit post-Hunter I elaboration: United States v. Hunter (Hunter II), United States v. Nyandoro, United States v. London

The panel leaned heavily on its own post-Hunter I cases implementing the new exception:

  • United States v. Hunter (Hunter II), 183 F.4th 416 (5th Cir. 2026), supplied two critical clarifications: (a) “clear or obvious” error is assessed against “controlling law” and generally does not include extending precedent; and (b) scarcity of supporting authority cuts against calling an alleged error “blatant.”
  • United States v. Nyandoro, No. 23-10579, 2026 WL 2619961 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2026), reinforced that plain-error cases can be “a helpful starting point” but do not define the distinct Hunter I waiver standard.
  • United States v. London, No. 25-20102, 2026 WL 2452236 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2026), was cited (along with Nyandoro and Hunter II) to underscore the Fifth Circuit’s consistent refusal to treat routine sentencing disputes as waiver-defeating miscarriages of justice.

4. Chaney’s reliance on nonprecedential sentencing cases: United States v. Kimmons, United States v. Hill

Chaney’s primary support came from two unpublished Fifth Circuit decisions: United States v. Kimmons, No. 25-30371, 2026 WL 1587522 (5th Cir. June 3, 2026) (unpublished), and United States v. Hill, No. 24-30669, 2025 WL 2222989 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025) (unpublished), which involved concessions or findings of clear error in applying the career-offender enhancement to the same Louisiana offense.

The panel distinguished them on three grounds central to waiver jurisprudence after Hunter I: (1) they post-dated Chaney’s sentencing (undermining any claim the error was “obvious” at the time); (2) they were unpublished and thus nonbinding; and (3) plain-error “clear or obvious” analysis is not the same as Hunter I’s “extreme/egregious” miscarriage-of-justice standard.

5. Underlying substantive debate: what counts as a “controlled substance” predicate (circuit split)

The panel emphasized that even the existence of a significant circuit split makes it difficult to characterize the district court’s approach as “obvious” or “egregious.” It cited decisions reflecting that split, including: United States v. Lewis, 58 F.4th 764 (3d Cir. 2023); United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024), vacated on other grounds, 145 S. Ct. 1041, reinstated, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025); United States v. Jones, 81 F.4th 591 (6th Cir. 2023); United States v. Jones, 15 F.4th 1288 (10th Cir. 2021); United States v. Henderson, 11 F.4th 713 (8th Cir. 2021); United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020); contrasted with United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Fulcar, 181 F.4th 63 (1st Cir. 2026); and United States v. Bautista, 989 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 2021).

The presence of this split supported the panel’s conclusion that, at most, Chaney raised a debatable Guidelines question—not an “egregious” error that discredits the judiciary.

6. Fifth Circuit “controlling law” and “extension of precedent”: United States v. Gomez-Alvarez, United States v. Evans

Chaney pointed to doctrinal analogies from immigration-related Guidelines comparisons, but the panel emphasized the Fifth Circuit had not adopted, in a controlling opinion, the same approach for § 4B1.2(b). It cited United States v. Gomez-Alvarez, 781 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2015), as an example of comparing state and federal drug offenses in the different context of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, while stressing that § 4B1.2(b) remained unsettled in controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

To reinforce that a district judge’s failure to extend precedent generally cannot be “plain error” (and therefore is even less likely to be “egregious” under Hunter I), the panel quoted United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2009).

7. Procedural “haste” and due process framing: Wright v. Admin. Rev. Bd., U.S. Dep't of Lab., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States

Chaney argued the district court “summarily” overruled his objection. The panel rejected this as nowhere near Hunter I’s “minimum of civilized procedure” concept and cited: Wright v. Admin. Rev. Bd., U.S. Dep't of Lab., 836 F. App'x 248 (5th Cir. 2020), and N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), for the proposition that speed does not necessarily imply unlawful bias or procedural deprivation.

B. Legal Reasoning

The opinion operationalizes Hunter I by drawing three practical boundaries:

  1. Miscarriage of justice is qualitatively different from Guidelines error. Even if the career-offender designation were wrong, the court treated it as the kind of ordinary, technical sentencing dispute that Hunter I anticipated and excluded from the exception (“unfortunate but inevitable mistakes”).
  2. “Obviousness” depends on controlling law at the time—not later, nonbinding signals. The panel refused to deem an error “obvious” based on unpublished decisions that post-dated the sentencing and did not bind the court, echoing United States v. Hunter (Hunter II).
  3. Procedural complaints must reach the “minimum of civilized procedure” threshold. A brisk ruling, after an opportunity to object, is not comparable to the extraordinary procedural breakdowns Hunter I described.

In effect, the panel treated Hunter I as preserving waivers in nearly all Guidelines disputes, reserving nonenforcement for the most institutionally threatening errors (statutory-max violations, blatant constitutional defects, or fundamentally uncivilized process).

C. Impact

United States v. Chaney is significant less for resolving the hemp/marijuana mismatch question than for showing how narrowly the Fifth Circuit will apply Hunter v. United States (Hunter I) in practice:

  • Appeal waivers remain powerful. Defendants challenging Guidelines calculations—especially career-offender classifications—should expect waivers to be enforced unless the error resembles Hunter I’s extreme exemplars.
  • Unpublished opinions will rarely establish “miscarriage of justice.” The court signaled that nonprecedential, post-sentencing decisions are poor vehicles for proving an “obvious” and “egregious” mistake.
  • Ongoing circuit splits undermine “obviousness.” By highlighting the 7-3 split, the panel suggested that where federal courts disagree on the governing interpretive method, a district court’s choice among competing approaches is unlikely to qualify as a waiver-defeating miscarriage of justice.
  • Procedure-based attacks face a steep hill. Unless the sentencing process is fundamentally lawless (no meaningful hearing, blatant constitutional abuse), “summary” rejection of arguments is unlikely to trigger Hunter I.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Appeal waiver
A defendant’s contractual promise in a plea agreement not to appeal (often exchanged for charge dismissals or sentencing concessions). Courts generally enforce waivers if they are knowing and voluntary and cover the issue raised.
“Miscarriage of justice” (under Hunter I)
A narrow exception allowing an appeal despite a waiver when enforcing the waiver would preserve an extreme, egregious error that would discredit the courts— not merely a plausible or even clear Guidelines mistake.
Career offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1)
A Guidelines enhancement that increases the advisory range for defendants with certain prior convictions. Whether a prior state drug conviction qualifies can depend on how “controlled substance” is defined and whether state and federal drug schedules must match.
Plain error vs. Hunter I waiver standard
“Plain error” is an appellate standard used when an issue was not properly preserved; it includes a “clear or obvious” prong. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that Hunter I’s “miscarriage of justice” test is distinct and more demanding than ordinary plain-error concepts.
Unpublished opinions
Decisions designated as nonprecedential. They may be persuasive, but they do not bind future panels in the same way published opinions do.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Chaney concretely illustrates the Fifth Circuit’s narrow implementation of Hunter v. United States (Hunter I): even substantial disputes about career-offender status and the definition of “controlled substance” ordinarily remain within the category of “standard-fare” sentencing errors that do not defeat an appeal waiver. Unless a defendant can point to a statutory-max violation, a blatant constitutional defect, or a fundamentally uncivilized sentencing process, the waiver will be enforced—and the appeal dismissed.