Enduring, Judicially Sanctioned Relief as the Touchstone for § 1988 Fees After Partial Preliminary-Injunction Success

1. Introduction

Disability Rights New York (“DRNY”), New York’s designated Protection and Advocacy (“P&A”) agency, brought suit against the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) to enforce federal access-to-records rights relating to two individuals formerly or presently in DOCCS custody:

• Individual A: records sought under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (“DD Act”), after DOCCS delayed production, withheld pages, and made redactions invoking state privacy laws.
• Individual B: records sought under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986 (“PAIMI Act”), where DOCCS declined access pending a state-commission investigation following Individual B’s death in custody.

The district court granted DRNY a preliminary injunction for Individual B (ordering access to requested records in DOCCS’s possession), but denied preliminary relief for Individual A (finding likely success yet no irreparable harm because DRNY could physically inspect/copy). Later, DOCCS produced remaining records and, after intervening New York legislation, the case ended with summary judgment for DOCCS. DRNY then sought attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The district court awarded fees only for work tied to the successful preliminary injunction for Individual B, at reduced rates and with temporal limits. DRNY appealed the fee ruling.

Key issues on appeal:

• Whether DRNY was a “prevailing party” as to Individual A despite losing merits relief and receiving no order regarding A’s records.
• Whether post-preliminary-injunction work (after DRNY obtained access for Individual B) was compensable.
• Whether the district court properly used historic (at-the-time) rates rather than current rates to account for delay.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed. It held that DRNY was a prevailing party only to the extent it obtained enduring, judicially sanctioned relief—namely, the preliminary injunction securing access to Individual B’s records. DRNY did not prevail as to Individual A because it received no court-ordered relief on that claim and ultimately lost on the merits. The court further upheld limiting fees to work performed up to and including the preliminary-injunction success for Individual B, and upheld using Northern District of New York market rates contemporaneous with the preliminary-injunction litigation, finding the roughly 2.5-year delay insufficient to compel current-rate enhancement.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Lilly v. City of New York, 934 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2019)
  Role in the opinion: Framed the deferential standard of review for attorney-fee decisions. The panel emphasized that fee awards are reviewed “deferentially,” reinforcing the uphill nature of DRNY’s challenge to discretionary fee-calculation choices.
• Perez v. Westchester County Department of Corrections, 587 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2009)
  Role: Distinguished the standard of review for the “prevailing party” question, which is reviewed “without deference.” This allowed the court to independently assess whether DRNY prevailed as to Individual A.
• Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192 (2025)
  Role: Supplied the governing, modern articulation of prevailing-party status: fees require “enduring judicial relief” that “material[ly] alter[s]” the parties’ legal relationship, and both the change and its enduring character must be “judicially sanctioned.” The panel used Lackey as the primary lens to reject attempts to convert litigation events (favorable dicta, voluntary compliance) into fee entitlement.
• Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987)
  Role: Foreclosed DRNY’s argument that favorable legal commentary in the preliminary-injunction denial regarding Individual A could confer prevailing status. Under Hewitt, “a favorable judicial statement of law” that culminates in judgment against the plaintiff does not suffice.
• Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)
  Role: Rejected the “catalyst theory” of fees. The panel relied on Buckhannon to hold that DOCCS’s eventual production/abandonment of a position—absent judicial imprimatur—cannot make DRNY a prevailing party for Individual A.
• Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)
  Role: Anchored two points. First, where claims can be separated, hours may be divided “on a claim-by-claim basis.” Second, even interrelated claims may justify reductions for limited “degree of success.” The court invoked Hensley to uphold restricting fees to the successful preliminary-injunction slice (Individual B) and to uphold reductions reflecting partial success.
• Preservation Coalition of Erie County v. Federal Transit Administration, 356 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2004)
  Role: Provided a close analogue: fees limited to the portion of litigation producing the relevant court-ordered relief, and no recovery for work after the operative order. The panel used it to justify (i) limiting fees to the preliminary injunction for Individual B and (ii) denying fees for later work once the injunction delivered the sought access.
• Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274 (1989)
  Role: Established that “enhancement for delay in payment” may be part of a reasonable fee. The panel cited it to acknowledge DRNY’s delay argument, but treated the issue as discretionary and context dependent.
• Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858 (2d Cir. 1998)
  Role: Illustrated when current rates are appropriate—particularly where many years pass before the award. The panel distinguished that eight-year, multi-trial scenario from the more modest delay here, supporting use of historical rates.
• Disability Rights New York v. N.Y. State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, No. 21-2040, 2022 WL 10218514 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2022) (summary order)
  Role: Provided procedural context: the earlier appeal was dismissed as moot because DOCCS produced all records and intervening New York law effectively ensured compliance going forward.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) “Prevailing party” requires durable, court-ordered change—claim by claim

The court treated “prevailing party” status as tethered to relief, not to litigation momentum or persuasive commentary. Applying Lackey v. Stinnie, it asked whether DRNY obtained:

• (1) A material alteration in legal relationship,
• (2) that is judicially sanctioned, and
• (3) enduring in nature (also judicially sanctioned).

For Individual A, DRNY did not obtain any order compelling production; the district court denied preliminary relief and later granted DOCCS summary judgment. The Second Circuit emphasized that a court’s observation that DRNY was “likely to succeed” did not itself change the parties’ legal relationship. Under Hewitt v. Helms, favorable statements of law that do not translate into a judgment (or order) for the plaintiff are not enough.

(b) Voluntary compliance is not “judicial imprimatur”

DRNY argued that it effectively prevailed as to Individual A because DOCCS later produced the remaining records and backed off certain state-law withholding positions. The panel rejected this as a textbook Buckhannon problem: even if a lawsuit prompts a defendant to change conduct, that change—without a court order—does not support fee shifting. The “judicial imprimatur” requirement prevents fees from attaching to merely strategic, voluntary, or legislatively induced compliance.

(c) Separability of claims justified narrowing fees to the successful portion

Although both records requests involved DRNY and DOCCS, the panel stressed meaningful differences: different individuals, different facilities, different federal statutes (DD Act vs. PAIMI Act), and different asserted reasons for nonproduction. That made this unlike cases where work is so intertwined that division is “too difficult.” Citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, the court approved dividing hours by claim and awarding only those connected to the court-ordered relief for Individual B.

(d) No fees for work after the preliminary injunction delivered the relief

Once the district court issued the preliminary injunction for Individual B and DOCCS produced the requested records, the panel saw the fee-justifying relief as achieved. Relying on Preservation Coalition of Erie County v. Federal Transit Administration, the court upheld denying fees for later work that post-dated the order providing the relevant relief.

(e) Reduced award for limited success; historical rates permissible given modest delay

The court endorsed a reduction for limited success under Hensley v. Eckerhart. It also upheld use of prevailing Northern District rates at the time of the preliminary-injunction work (rather than current rates at fee-petition time). While Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei allows compensation for delay and Gierlinger v. Gleason favors current rates in long-delay cases, the panel deemed the ~2.5-year gap insufficient—on this record—to require a current-rate approach.

3.3 Impact

• Reinforced boundary between “winning the point” and “winning relief”: The order underscores that preliminary-injunction skirmishes, favorable judicial commentary, and litigation-induced voluntary compliance do not themselves create prevailing-party status unless they result in judicially enforceable, enduring relief.
• Encourages careful fee recordkeeping by claim and phase: Where plaintiffs press multiple, even related, access disputes, courts may segregate compensable time to the specific claim that produced a qualifying order—particularly when different statutes, facilities, and factual predicates are involved.
• Signals limits on “delay” enhancements in mid-length cases: Parties seeking current rates (or other delay compensation) should be prepared to show why the time gap is substantial in context, and why historical rates would undercompensate.
• Practical effect in P&A access litigation: Even mission-driven, public-interest litigation does not relax § 1988’s prevailing-party requirements; fee recovery remains tightly linked to court-ordered outcomes rather than eventual disclosure—especially where disclosure is influenced by intervening legislation or agency practice changes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Prevailing party” (under § 1988): Not simply the side that achieved its broader objective, but the side that obtained a court-ordered result that meaningfully and durably changed the parties’ legal relationship.
• “Judicial imprimatur”: A court’s official stamp—typically an order, judgment, or consent decree—making the change enforceable by the court. A defendant’s voluntary change is not enough.
• “Enduring judicial relief”: Relief that lasts in a legally meaningful way (not fleeting or purely interim) and is rooted in the court’s authority. A preliminary injunction can sometimes qualify, but only as to what it actually orders and accomplishes.
• Claim-by-claim fee segregation: Courts may award fees only for time spent on claims that produced prevailing-party relief, especially where claims are factually and legally separable.
• Lodestar and “rates” (historic vs. current): Fee awards typically equal reasonable hours × reasonable rate. Courts may use current rates to compensate for long delays, but are not required to do so for shorter delays.

5. Conclusion

This summary order applies the Supreme Court’s prevailing-party framework—particularly Lackey v. Stinnie and Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources—to hold that § 1988 fees track only judicially sanctioned, enduring relief. DRNY’s fee entitlement arose solely from the preliminary injunction compelling access to Individual B’s records; favorable legal observations and post-suit voluntary disclosure concerning Individual A were insufficient. The decision also validates limiting fees to the successful phase and using historical market rates where delay is not substantial, offering practical guidance for litigants structuring multi-claim civil-rights fee applications.