Date: Feb 15, 2026

Empty Alcohol Container + Driver Drowsiness Can Supply Reasonable Suspicion to Extend a Stop for a Dog Sniff (Qualified Immunity Applies)

1. Introduction

Wogan v. Rose is a Fifth Circuit interlocutory appeal from the Southern District of Mississippi addressing whether three Ridgeland police officers were entitled to qualified immunity after an overnight parking-lot encounter escalated into a prolonged detention, a K-9 sniff, a vehicle search, and an arrest.

Parties: Plaintiffs–Appellees Terrence Lee Wogan, II and Heather Lee Wilkes (pro se) sued Officer April Rose, Sergeant Hunter Bridges, and K-9 Officer Ben Johnson (in official and individual capacities).
Core Fourth Amendment issues: (1) whether the officers unlawfully prolonged the detention to conduct a dog sniff without reasonable suspicion, and (2) whether the subsequent search was unreasonable—particularly given plaintiffs’ allegation that the K-9 alert was “manufactured.”

The district court allowed two Fourth Amendment claims to proceed, holding (as pleaded) that the stop may have been extended too long without reasonable suspicion and that the K-9 officer was “obviously” not entitled to qualified immunity on the search claim. The officers appealed the qualified-immunity denial.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the remaining Fourth Amendment claims on qualified-immunity grounds.

The court held that Officer Rose had reasonable suspicion to investigate a potential violation of Ridgeland’s open-container ordinance based on (i) an empty Fireball whiskey bottle in the car and (ii) Wogan’s statement that they parked because he was getting sleepy.
Because reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity arose, the officers could extend the stop long enough to pursue that investigation, including a dog sniff.
The reasonable suspicion held by Officer Rose extended to the other officers under the collective knowledge doctrine.
The plaintiffs failed both to show a constitutional violation and to identify clearly established law prohibiting the officers’ conduct; therefore, qualified immunity applied.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Appellate jurisdiction over qualified-immunity denials (collateral-order doctrine)

Harris v. Clay Cnty., 47 F.4th 271 (5th Cir. 2022): Cited for the proposition that the court may review qualified-immunity denials on interlocutory appeal and may decide whether factual disputes are material to qualified immunity.
Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2015): Reinforces jurisdiction to review qualified-immunity denials under the collateral-order doctrine.
Samples v. Vadzemnieks, 900 F.3d 655 (5th Cir. 2018): Quoted (via Harris) for focusing appellate review on whether disputed facts are “material to the application of qualified immunity.”
Walton v. City of Verona, 82 F.4th 314 (5th Cir. 2023): Used to reject plaintiffs’ jurisdictional argument: even with factual disputes, the Fifth Circuit can review whether qualified immunity applies.

How these cases influenced the outcome: They cleared the path for merits review at the pleading stage by framing the appeal as a legal question—whether the alleged facts, even if disputed in part, establish a constitutional violation and/or violate clearly established law.

2) Standard of review and the qualified-immunity framework

Edmiston v. Borrego, 75 F.4th 551 (5th Cir. 2023): Supplies the de novo standard of review for qualified-immunity denials on a motion to dismiss.
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012): States the governing qualified-immunity rule: officials are shielded unless they violated a statutory/constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.
Bakutis v. Dean, 129 F.4th 299 (5th Cir. 2025): Restates the two-prong burden for plaintiffs: (1) a constitutional violation and (2) clearly established law.

How these cases influenced the outcome: They structured the decision. The panel found plaintiffs could not satisfy prong one (no Fourth Amendment violation given reasonable suspicion) and, independently, could not satisfy prong two (no clearly established authority cited).

3) Prolonged stops, reasonable suspicion, and dog sniffs

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015): Provides the central Fourth Amendment principle: a stop is unlawful if prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission that justified the stop—unless additional justification arises.
United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828 (5th Cir. 2013): Explains that if reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity develops, officers may further detain occupants for a reasonable time to attempt to dispel that suspicion.
United States v. Zuniga, 860 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2017): Supplies the definition of reasonable suspicion (specific, articulable facts and rational inferences) and is later used for collective knowledge.
United States v. Spears, 636 F. App'x 893 (5th Cir. 2016): Cited (as consistent with Rodriguez) for the idea that waiting to conduct a dog sniff can be permissible when supported by reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity.
United States v. Agena, 138 F.4th 1063 (8th Cir. 2025): Persuasive authority: an open-container violation can supply reasonable suspicion and justify extending a stop to investigate.
United States v. Patterson, 852 F. App'x 1004 (6th Cir. 2021): Persuasive authority: seeing an open alcohol container can “certainly” justify further detention.

How these cases influenced the outcome: Rodriguez supplied the plaintiffs’ general theory (no prolongation for a dog sniff absent justification). Andres/Zuniga/Spears supplied the officers’ pathway: once reasonable suspicion arises, extending the stop for investigatory steps (including a dog sniff) can be lawful. Agena and Patterson provided persuasive support that open-container indicators commonly constitute reasonable suspicion sufficient to extend detention.

4) Collective knowledge

United States v. Zuniga, 860 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2017): Cited for the “collective knowledge” doctrine: an assisting officer need not personally know all facts establishing reasonable suspicion/probable cause if acting at the request of an officer who does.

How this case influenced the outcome: It allowed Officer Rose’s reasonable suspicion to justify the actions of Officer Bridges (participation in search) and Officer Johnson (dog sniff), defeating individualized Fourth Amendment theories aimed at the assisting officers.

B. Legal Reasoning

Identification of the “prolongation” question under Rodriguez: The district court treated the dog sniff as an unjustified extension. The Fifth Circuit accepted Rodriguez’s baseline rule but emphasized the recognized exception: a stop may be extended if reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity develops.
Reasonable suspicion based on an open-container investigation: The panel found it “reasonable for Officer Rose” to suspect an open-container violation after hearing Wogan’s drowsiness explanation and seeing an alcohol bottle in the vehicle. The court rejected the argument that the bottle’s emptiness defeated suspicion, reasoning that (a) the ordinance text did not compel the “liquid must be present” interpretation and (b) it was still reasonable to infer recent consumption or additional alcohol in the car, or to investigate whether the bottle contained alcohol.
Dog sniff as a permissible investigative step once suspicion existed: With reasonable suspicion established, extending the detention to conduct a dog sniff was not treated as an unconstitutional delay in this case.
Collective knowledge spreads the suspicion across officers: Even if only Rose personally observed/learned the key facts, Bridges and Johnson could rely on her knowledge while assisting.
Qualified immunity disposes of the case: The panel held plaintiffs failed prong one (no constitutional violation on these facts) and, in any event, failed prong two by not identifying clearly established law that would have made the officers’ conduct unlawful.

C. Impact

Prolonged-detention litigation: The opinion underscores that even in encounters not initiated as traffic stops (here, a late-night welfare/suspicious-vehicle contact), officers may extend a detention if they can articulate a specific basis for additional investigation—here, potential open-container activity.
“Empty container” as a suspicion trigger: The decision signals that an empty alcohol bottle can still contribute to reasonable suspicion, particularly when paired with contextual cues (time of night, drowsiness explanation) that make recent consumption plausible.
K-9 challenges reframed by predicate suspicion: Plaintiffs’ “manufactured alert” theory was not reached as an independent factual dispute requiring trial because the court resolved the constitutional analysis through reasonable suspicion and qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Collective knowledge in multi-officer scenes: The reasoning provides defendants a strong doctrinal bridge when different officers perform different tasks (questioning, sniff, search) during an investigation.
Practical effect: In the Fifth Circuit, plaintiffs challenging extended detentions involving dog sniffs must be prepared to confront (and distinguish) “additional-crime” reasonable suspicion and must also identify clearly established precedent closely matching the scenario.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: A rule that protects government officials from money damages unless the plaintiff shows both (1) the official violated the Constitution (or a statute) and (2) existing case law made it clear—at the time—that the conduct was unlawful.
Collateral-order doctrine: An exception to the final-judgment rule allowing immediate appeal of certain orders (including many qualified-immunity denials) because the immunity is meant to protect officials from the burdens of litigation itself.
Reasonable suspicion: A lower standard than probable cause. It requires specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences suggesting criminal activity may be occurring—more than a hunch, less than evidence sufficient to arrest.
Prolonged stop under Rodriguez: Officers generally cannot extend a stop beyond the time needed to handle the original reason for the stop. But if new reasonable suspicion arises, they may extend it long enough to investigate the new issue.
Collective knowledge doctrine: When officers are working together, one officer’s knowledge supporting reasonable suspicion or probable cause can justify another officer’s actions, even if the second officer lacks all the details.

5. Conclusion

Wogan v. Rose applies established Fourth Amendment and qualified-immunity principles to a common policing scenario: a late-night vehicle contact that evolves into a K-9 sniff and search. The Fifth Circuit held that the combination of an empty alcohol bottle and a driver’s drowsiness explanation gave rise to reasonable suspicion of an open-container violation, permitting an extended detention and dog sniff. It further held that this suspicion could be imputed to assisting officers via collective knowledge. Because plaintiffs could not show a constitutional violation or clearly established law to the contrary, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, and the Fourth Amendment claims were dismissed.