Employment Alone Does Not Create a Special-Relationship Duty to Protect; Verbal Mediation Does Not Assume a Duty Against Third-Party Criminal Violence
(Spears v. Antelope Mountain Resort, LLC)

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1. Introduction

Spears v. Antelope Mountain Resort, LLC arises from a horrific homicide on a rural Clark Fork, Idaho property owned in part by Mary Katherine Russell and in part by her limited liability company, Antelope Mountain Resort, LLC (“AMR”). Mary Russell allowed her adult grandson, James D. Russell—alleged to have serious mental illness and a documented history of violence—to live on the property in a garage loft apartment. David Flaget, a groundskeeper/caretaker periodically hired by Mary Russell, was killed by James Russell in September 2021 while working on the property.

Flaget’s heirs sued multiple Russell family members and AMR, seeking to impose civil liability on Mary Russell for James Russell’s criminal act. On appeal, the heirs challenged summary judgment on: (1) wrongful death negligence (duty to protect); (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); and (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). The central legal issue was whether Mary Russell owed any affirmative duty to protect Flaget (or the heirs) from James Russell’s violence under either (a) a “special relationship” theory or (b) an “assumed duty” (voluntary undertaking) theory.

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2. Summary of the Opinion

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Mary Russell and AMR. It held:

• Waiver: The heirs waived challenges to evidentiary rulings striking parts of declarations because their opening brief did not meaningfully argue abuse of discretion under Lunneborg v. My Fun Life.
• No duty to protect Flaget: Mary Russell had no affirmative duty under a “special relationship” because the employment arrangement lacked the “custody and control” hallmark. Nor did she assume a duty to protect against criminal violence through limited verbal mediation of minor disputes.
• IIED fails: Mary Russell’s alleged nonfeasance (failure to warn/protect) was not “extreme and outrageous,” and there was no intentional conduct directed at the heirs.
• NIED fails: The heirs did not identify a duty owed personally to them; the claim depended on duties allegedly owed to Flaget.
• Attorney fees: Partial attorney fees were awarded under Idaho Code section 12-121 because the IIED and NIED components of the appeal were pursued frivolously, though the duty theories were deemed more “plausible.”

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3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Result)

A. Summary judgment standards and appellate review

• Fragnella v. Petrovich: Reinforced that a nonmovant must present evidence on which a jury could reasonably rely; a “scintilla” is insufficient—supporting affirmance where plaintiffs’ duty theories failed as a matter of law.
• Stonebrook Constr., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC and Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue: Established de novo review of summary judgment and free review over pure legal questions like duty.

B. Waiver for inadequate briefing; abuse-of-discretion framework

• Anson v. Les Bois Race Track, Inc. (quoting State v. Zichko): Failure to provide argument/authority waives the issue—driving the Court’s refusal to reach evidentiary objections.
• Cummings v. Stephens and Lunneborg v. My Fun Life: Required meaningful application of the abuse-of-discretion factors; merely reciting the test was not enough.
• Herr v. Herr (quoting United States v. Sineneng-Smith): Emphasized party-driven adversarial litigation; courts do not develop arguments for litigants.

C. Wrongful death negligence requires an underlying duty

• Castorena v. Gen. Elec.: Confirmed wrongful death liability depends on standard negligence elements, including duty.

D. No affirmative duty to protect absent “unusual circumstances”

• Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity: Reaffirmed the baseline rule—no affirmative duty to assist/protect absent unusual circumstances, commonly reflected in Restatement (Second) of Torts concepts.

E. “Special relationship” is anchored in “custody and control”

• Turpen v. Granieri and Henrie v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints: Defined two categories of special relationships (actor/third person; actor/other) but tied both to the practical ability/obligation to control—supporting the Court’s insistence on “custody and control” rather than mere workplace supervision.
• GSN Cap., LLC v. Shoshone City & Rural Fire Dist.: Supplied the Court’s contemporary articulation that “custody and control” are the “quintessential aspects” of special relationships—central to rejecting a duty premised on ordinary employment.
• Litchfield v. Nelson: Reinforced that the actor must have the ability and obligation to control the third person’s conduct for the special relationship to exist (used to underscore the control requirement).
• Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc.: Used as persuasive authority to explain why some employments create reliance-based protection duties (employees “entrust” themselves with “loss of control”); it helped the Court distinguish jobs like miners/divers/flight attendants from a groundskeeper who retains autonomy.
• Harper v. Herman: Supported the principle that knowledge of danger alone does not create an affirmative duty to protect.

F. “Assumed duty” is limited to the actual undertaking (plus reliance and foreseeability)

• Featherston ex rel. Featherston v. Allstate Ins. Co.: A voluntary undertaking can create a duty to perform that undertaking non-negligently.
• Baccus v. AmeriPride Servs., Inc.: The duty is “coterminous” with the undertaking; no obligation beyond what was actually assumed—critical to rejecting the attempt to transform “verbal dispute mediation” into “ongoing protection from criminal violence.”
• Udy v. Custer County (citing City of Santee v. County of San Diego and Fort Bend Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch): Past voluntary acts do not create an entitlement to future assistance absent an express promise—supporting rejection of reliance based on two prior interventions.
• Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Fam. Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc. and Beers v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints: Helped anchor the three-element Idaho assumed-duty test ultimately applied via GSN Cap., LLC v. Shoshone City & Rural Fire Dist. (undertaking; reliance; foreseeable harm).

G. IIED requires extreme/outrageous conduct and intent directed at the plaintiff

• Hopper v. Swinnerton: Provided the four IIED elements and supported affirmance where no intentional conduct was directed at the plaintiffs.
• Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods.: Defined the high threshold for “extreme and outrageous” conduct; also framed when the issue is for the court versus the factfinder.
• Gray v. Schenectady City Sch. Dist., Roberts v. Circuit-Wise, Inc., and Burrow ex rel. Burrow v. Postville Cmty. Sch. Dist.: Persuasive authority supporting that “mere inaction” or “passive negligence” typically does not meet the IIED outrage standard.
• Christensen v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty.: Supported the “directed at the plaintiff” requirement (collecting cases), used to deny IIED where conduct was not aimed at the heirs.
• Alderson v. Bonner: Idaho authority reinforcing directedness; IIED fails where the defendant’s intentional act is not directed at the claimant.

H. NIED requires duty owed to the claimant (not merely to an injured third party)

• Schriver v. Raptosh (quoting Frogley v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2): Restated NIED as a negligence claim requiring a recognized legal duty.
• Nation v. State, Dep't of Corr. and Vulk v. Haley: Supported dismissal where plaintiffs could not premise their recovery on duties owed to someone else (and could not “step into” the decedent’s position for their own emotional-distress damages).

I. Attorney fees for frivolous appellate components; apportionment

• Telford Lands LLC v. Cain: The Court considers the “entire course of the litigation” in assessing section 12-121 fees.
• Idaho Mil. Hist. Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen: Approved apportionment where only parts of a case are frivolous.
• C & G, Inc. v. Rule: Used to frame “fairly debatable” as the threshold; the Court found IIED/NIED were not fairly debatable.

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3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Wrongful death negligence: the decisive question was duty

The Court treated duty as a threshold legal question. The heirs sought to impose an affirmative duty on Mary Russell to protect Flaget from James Russell’s criminal violence. Idaho’s baseline rule, reaffirmed through Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, is that there is no affirmative duty to protect others from harm absent unusual circumstances—typically a special relationship or an assumed duty.

B. Special relationship: employment is not enough without “custody and control” over the employee’s person

The heirs argued that Mary Russell’s relationship with Flaget (groundskeeper) created a special relationship imposing a duty to protect him from James Russell. The Court rejected this by narrowing the relevant “control” inquiry: not agency-style control over work, but “custody and control” over the person such that the employee has surrendered autonomy and relies on the employer for safety (as described through GSN Cap., LLC v. Shoshone City & Rural Fire Dist. and illustrated by Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc.).

Key facts cutting against custody/control:

• Flaget set his own hours and worked with minimal supervision.
• He could freely enter and leave the property.
• The job did not inherently deprive him of the ability to protect himself.

The heirs’ emphasis on isolation, onsite equipment, and Mary Russell’s knowledge of James’s history did not establish the required “custody and control” element; knowledge of danger alone does not create an affirmative duty.

C. Assumed duty: two instances of verbal mediation did not become an “undertaking” to prevent criminal violence

The heirs argued Mary Russell assumed a protective duty by intervening in two prior disputes: (1) telling James to stop moving between buildings; and (2) telling James to stop “bossing” the caretaker.

Applying the three-element assumed-duty test (undertaking; reliance; foreseeability) as stated in GSN Cap., LLC v. Shoshone City & Rural Fire Dist.:

• No qualifying undertaking: Her actions were limited to verbal mediation aimed at work harmony, not a commitment to provide physical protection against violence. Under Baccus v. AmeriPride Servs., Inc., any duty is limited to the undertaking actually assumed.
• No reliance: The record did not show Flaget relied on Mary Russell for “ongoing physical protection,” and Udy v. Custer County cautions that past helpful acts do not create an expectation of future assistance absent an express promise.
• No foreseeable legally recognized harm from stopping mediation: Even if further arguments were foreseeable, murder was not a foreseeable consequence of failing to continue to mediate “relatively minor disagreements,” as the undertaking was properly defined.

D. IIED: nonfeasance was not “extreme and outrageous,” and there was no intent directed at the heirs

The Court agreed that failing to warn/protect (nonfeasance) did not meet the “extraordinarily high threshold” for “extreme and outrageous” conduct under Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods.. It also found IIED lacking because there was no evidence Mary Russell acted with intent (or substantial certainty) to cause emotional distress to the heirs specifically—consistent with Hopper v. Swinnerton, Alderson v. Bonner, and the “directed at the plaintiff” principle discussed through Christensen v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty..

E. NIED: the heirs could not base their claim on duties allegedly owed to the decedent

NIED is negligence-based and requires a legal duty owed to the claimant. The Court held the heirs’ theory improperly depended on supposed duties owed to Flaget. Even if a duty to Flaget existed (the Court held it did not), the heirs could not “step into his shoes” for their own emotional distress damages, consistent with Vulk v. Haley and Nation v. State, Dep't of Corr..

F. Attorney fees: partial apportionment for frivolous IIED/NIED appeal

The Court distinguished between the heirs’ duty theories (not frivolous) and the IIED/NIED claims (frivolous). Using Idaho Mil. Hist. Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, it apportioned fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 to the frivolous elements only.

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3.3. Impact

• Constrains “special relationship” arguments in workplace violence cases: The decision tightens the analytical focus to whether an employer exercises “custody and control” over the employee’s person (loss of autonomy/reliance for safety), not merely supervision of work. Plaintiffs will face a higher burden when the job is ordinary, mobile, and independently performed.
• Limits “assumed duty” expansions: The Court’s insistence that the undertaking be defined precisely—and that duty is coterminous with it—makes it harder to convert informal conflict mediation or partial interventions into broad duties to prevent third-party criminal acts.
• Clarifies pleading/briefing discipline: The waiver holding reinforces that evidentiary and discretionary issues require developed arguments applying the relevant factors, not just citation to the standard.
• Signals fee exposure for weak emotional-distress theories: The partial fee award indicates that pursuing IIED/NIED without meeting Idaho’s demanding elements may trigger section 12-121 consequences, even where other aspects of the appeal are colorable.

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4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Duty to protect” (affirmative duty): Tort law usually does not require someone to rescue or protect another. A duty can arise only in special situations (e.g., custodial relationships) or when someone undertakes protective services and others rely on them.
• “Special relationship”: A relationship that can create an affirmative duty to protect because one party has practical control over the other’s safety (or over the dangerous person). The Court emphasized “custody and control” over the person—meaning the protected person has lost ordinary ability to protect themselves and must rely on the other.
• Agency “control” vs. tort “custody and control”: A boss often controls tasks and schedules (agency). That does not automatically mean the boss has custodial control over the worker’s physical safety in a way that creates a duty to protect from third-party crimes.
• “Assumed duty” / “voluntary undertaking”: If you choose to do something protective, you must do that specific thing with reasonable care—but only that thing. Two past interventions do not automatically obligate future interventions unless there is reliance and foreseeable harm from stopping.
• IIED vs. NIED:
  • IIED requires extreme/outrageous conduct plus intent (or recklessness) directed at the plaintiff, and severe distress.
  • NIED is ordinary negligence applied to emotional harm and requires a duty owed to the claimant, not just to someone else.
• Apportioned attorney fees: When only parts of a case are frivolous, the court may award fees only for those parts, rather than for the entire appeal.

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5. Conclusion

Spears v. Antelope Mountain Resort, LLC reaffirms Idaho’s reluctance to impose affirmative duties to protect against third-party criminal acts and clarifies two key limiting principles: (1) an employment relationship does not create a special-relationship duty to protect absent custodial “custody and control” over the employee’s person; and (2) an assumed duty is confined to the actual undertaking and requires reliance and foreseeability tied to that undertaking. The Opinion also underscores the stringent requirements for IIED and NIED—especially directed intent (IIED) and a duty owed to the claimant (NIED)—and demonstrates that pursuing legally untenable emotional-distress claims can justify apportioned attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121.