Eminent Domain in New Jersey: Condemned Land Cannot Serve as “Currency” for a Public-Benefit Land Swap

I. Introduction

Case: Township of Jackson v. Getzel Bee, LLC; Township of Jackson v. Bellevue Jackson, LLC
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Date: July 20, 2026
Opinion by: Chief Justice Rabner (unanimous)

The Township of Jackson adopted a series of ordinances to condemn two privately owned lots (Lots 84 and 90) owned by Bellevue Jackson, LLC and Getzel Bee, LLC (collectively, the owners). The Township then transferred those condemned lots to a private developer, Bellevue Estates, LLC, without restricting the developer’s future use. In exchange, the developer conveyed different land (Lots 58 and 58Q) to the Township for open space.

The central legal issue was whether New Jersey’s condemnation statutes and “public use/public purpose” doctrine permit a municipality to condemn private property not to use it for a public purpose, but to trade it to a developer to obtain other property that will be used for a public purpose elsewhere. A second core issue was whether the Township acted with the required level of fairness and transparency—i.e., whether it “turned square corners”—in how it described the taking’s purpose to the owners and the public.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the Appellate Division and held that neither the Local Lands and Buildings Law (LLBL) nor the Eminent Domain Act (EDA), nor governing federal/state precedent, authorizes a municipality to condemn private land solely to exchange it for other land that will be put to public use. The condemned parcels here were effectively “currency” for a transaction; the public use (open space) attached to the developer’s land, not to the condemned land. That structure fails the public-purpose requirement as applied to the property actually taken.

The Court also agreed the Township did not act forthrightly with the owners: the ordinances’ evolving and sometimes misleading descriptions of the purpose of acquisition fell short of the government’s obligation to “turn square corners.”

Because the land exchange may already have occurred, the Court remanded for the trial court to determine appropriate equitable relief.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. New Jersey’s constitutional and statutory framing of eminent domain

The Court grounded its analysis in the constitutional limits described in Township of West Orange v. 769 Assocs., L.L.C. (quoting State v. Lanza): eminent domain is permitted only within strict boundaries—most importantly, the taking must be for a “public use,” with just compensation and due process. The Court also cited Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro for the same baseline constitutional constraints.

Procedurally, the Court referenced City of Atlantic City v. Cynwyd Invs. to situate the court rules (Rules 4:73-1 to -11) as implementing the EDA’s requirements.

On judicial review of condemnation decisions, the Court reiterated the deference framework stated in Tex. E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Pres., Inc. (and also cited Burnett v. Abbott): courts generally do not interfere absent fraud, bad faith, or arbitrary/capricious action. But the Court emphasized that constitutional and statutory interpretation questions are reviewed de novo, citing Krug v. State Parole Bd..

2. “Public use” doctrine: from narrow use to broad “public purpose,” with limits

To explain the elasticity—and the limits—of “public use,” the Court cited New Jersey decisions like County of Essex v. Hindenlang and State Highway Comm'r v. Totowa Lumber & Supply Co., and reiterated that New Jersey adopts the broader “public purpose” understanding, consistent with Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Intermodal Prop..

The Court then reviewed key U.S. Supreme Court decisions that broadened “public use” beyond literal public occupation:

• Berman v. Parker: upheld takings within a comprehensive redevelopment plan targeting blight; public welfare is “broad and inclusive.” The Court used Berman to illustrate that integrated plans can include downstream private participation (lease/sale to private parties) without negating public purpose.
• Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff: upheld a condemnation-and-transfer scheme designed to dismantle a land oligopoly. Crucially, the transfer itself furthered the articulated public purpose; private receipt of title did not, by itself, negate constitutionality.
• Kelo v. City of New London: upheld takings for economic development within an “integrated development plan,” while drawing an important boundary: “the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B.” The Court in the present case relied on Kelo both for the integrated-plan principle (no piecemeal review) and for the anti-pretext/anti-A-to-B warning that one-to-one transfers can signal a private purpose “was afoot.”
• Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.: referenced (via Kelo) as another example where the Supreme Court accepted a broad conception of public purpose in takings-related contexts.

3. Open space as a recognized public use in New Jersey

The Court reaffirmed that New Jersey recognizes preservation of open space as a public use, citing Mount Laurel Township v. MiPro Homes, L.L.C. and the Appellate Division opinion Mount Laurel Township v. MiPro Homes, L.L.C., 379 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 2005). That precedent mattered because it removed any doubt that “open space” can qualify—while still leaving the key question: whether the condemned particular parcels must themselves be condemned for that public purpose.

4. The “land swap” problem addressed directly elsewhere

The Court found persuasive the Utah Supreme Court’s reasoning in Salt Lake City Corp. v. Evans Dev. Grp., LLC, which rejected a taking used to facilitate a property exchange: “It is not enough to accomplish a public use on some property; the condemnor must satisfy the public use requirement on the property subject to the condemnation.” That concept functioned as a doctrinal “fit” for New Jersey’s statutory definitions and for the Court’s concern about abusive leverage.

5. Government’s duty to “turn square corners”

The Court relied on F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains (quoting Gruber v. Mayor & Twp. Comm. of Raritan) for the principle that government must “turn square corners” when dealing with the public. It also cited Citizens for Equity v. Dep't of Env't Prot. as consistent authority requiring fairness in agency/public interactions.

6. Remedy and equitable powers

On relief, the Court cited Kaye v. Rosefielde for courts’ equitable power to tailor just remedies—important here because the Township represented that the exchange had occurred and the Township no longer controlled the lots.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory incompatibility: the EDA and LLBL require a public purpose tied to the property condemned

The Court’s holding is anchored in the EDA’s internal definitions. Under N.J.S.A. 20:3-2(a), to “condemn” is “to take private property for a public purpose,” and a “condemnor” under N.J.S.A. 20:3-2(b) condemns private property for a public purpose. The Court treated these definitions as substantive limits—not merely procedural labels. Because Lots 84 and 90 were not intended to be used for open space (or otherwise restricted to a public function) and instead were transferred to a developer for unrestricted private use, the Township did not condemn those lots “for a public purpose” within the meaning of the statute.

The LLBL similarly did not authorize what occurred. The Court focused on N.J.S.A. 40A:12-16, which permits municipalities to exchange lands “owned by the county or municipality” for other lands “desired for public use.” The Township attempted to structure an “exchange” that included land it did not own (including the defendants’ lots) and then used condemnation to acquire that “exchange” inventory. The Court read the statute as not authorizing municipalities to (1) condemn third-party land solely to (2) trade it away as consideration, where (3) the condemned land itself is not destined for a public use.

2. Constitutional caution: “A to B” transfers and pretext risk

While the Court accepted New Jersey’s broad “public purpose” approach, it emphasized that breadth is not boundlessness. The structure here approximated the scenario Kelo v. City of New London flagged as constitutionally suspect: a compelled transfer from A to B outside an integrated plan can indicate a private purpose. The Court underscored the practical danger: if condemnation can be used as “currency” to obtain public benefits elsewhere, municipalities could take private land with weakly articulated or shifting reasons and use it as bargaining leverage—an erosion of the “basic constitutional principle” that property may be taken only for public use.

The Court also distinguished Berman v. Parker, Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, and Kelo v. City of New London on a common axis: even where property ended up in private hands, the takings were embedded in comprehensive public programs where the condemned property itself was taken as part of a public-purpose initiative (blight remediation/redevelopment; dismantling oligopoly; integrated economic development plan). By contrast, here the condemned parcels were not taken as part of a public-use area or plan; they were a trade chip.

3. “Square corners” as a condemnation constraint: transparency and accuracy in stated purpose

The Court treated the Township’s conduct as independently problematic. The early ordinances did not specify the public purpose tied to Lots 84 and 90. Later ordinances asserted the Township would have “access onto, over and through” the parcels for open space—language the Court found inconsistent with the already-executed exchange contract showing the lots were intended to be conveyed to the developer. The Court concluded the asserted public purpose was “vague, inaccurate, and pretextual” at times, and that the public and owners were deprived of the forthright disclosure necessary to evaluate and respond to the condemnation.

C. Impact

1. A clear New Jersey rule against condemnation-as-consideration

The decision establishes a concrete boundary: municipalities may not condemn private property solely to facilitate a land swap in which the public use is realized on different property (e.g., the counterparty’s land), while the condemned property is transferred for unrestricted private use. In practical terms, a municipality must be able to articulate—and support—how the condemned parcel itself is being taken “for a public purpose,” not merely how the overall transaction benefits the public.

2. Greater scrutiny of “swap” structures and transactional creativity in redevelopment/open-space deals

Public entities and redevelopment agencies (as reflected by CRDA’s position) often seek flexible tools to reduce cost and assemble land efficiently. This ruling signals that cost-saving and transactional convenience cannot substitute for statutory authorization and parcel-specific public purpose. Future efforts will likely need to be structured as: (a) direct condemnation of the land to be used for the public project; (b) exchanges involving only land already owned by the municipality as contemplated by N.J.S.A. 40A:12-16; or (c) voluntary acquisitions rather than compelled takings.

3. “Square corners” will matter at the ordinance-and-record stage

The opinion reinforces that condemnation risk increases when public bodies use evolving, opaque, or misleading statements of purpose. Municipal counsel and governing bodies should expect heightened judicial skepticism if ordinances do not plainly disclose (1) the intended end use of the condemned parcel, (2) whether the parcel will be transferred to private hands, and (3) what restrictions, if any, will preserve the public purpose.

4. Remedial implications: equitable relief even after title transfer

By remanding for equitable relief after an apparent consummated exchange, the Court signaled that “it’s already been transferred” is not a safe harbor. Trial courts may be asked to unwind transactions, impose constructive remedies, or craft compensation/other relief depending on post-taking developments. That prospect changes litigation incentives: condemning authorities and private counterparties bear ongoing risk if they proceed while appeals are pending.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Eminent domain: the government’s power to force a sale of private property, but only for a public use/purpose and with just compensation.
• Public use vs. public purpose: “Public use” does not always require that the public literally occupies the property; New Jersey accepts broader “public purpose” (e.g., redevelopment, open space). This case adds a constraint: the condemned parcel cannot be taken merely to obtain public benefits elsewhere.
• “A to B” transfer: shorthand from Kelo v. City of New London for a forced transfer from one private owner to another, which can be constitutionally suspect if it looks like pretext to benefit a private party.
• “Currency” condemnation: using condemned land as bargaining consideration in a trade, rather than condemning it because it will itself serve the public. The Court held this is not authorized under the EDA/LLBL as applied here.
• “Turn square corners”: a heightened fairness principle applied to government conduct; in condemnation, it requires forthright, accurate, non-misleading dealings with owners and the public about what is being taken and why.
• Equitable relief on remand: flexible remedies a court may craft to do justice (potentially including transaction unwinding or other tailored orders) when legal wrongs cannot be fixed by a simple ruling alone.

V. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of New Jersey drew a firm line: although open space is a valid public purpose, a municipality cannot condemn private property as a mere instrument of exchange where the condemned property itself is not intended to be used (or restricted) for public purposes. The EDA and LLBL require that the public-purpose justification attach to the property being condemned, not merely to a broader transaction that produces a public benefit elsewhere.

Equally significant, the Court reaffirmed condemnation’s procedural-ethical dimension: municipalities must “turn square corners,” describing takings candidly and consistently so owners and the public can evaluate the true purpose and consequences. The remand underscores that courts may still provide meaningful relief even after property changes hands, increasing the practical importance of lawful structure and transparency from the outset.