Date: Mar 16, 2026

Eligibility for a Second § 7-13-301 Deferral When the First Ended in Revocation: Only a Prior Felony Conviction or Prior “Discharge and Dismissal” Bars Relief

Introduction

In Aaron R. Maki v. The State of Wyoming, 2026 WY 32 (March 9, 2026), the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant is legally ineligible for a deferred sentence under Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301 simply because he previously received a § 7-13-301 deferral on a misdemeanor decades earlier—where that prior deferral ended with revocation and the defendant never obtained a statutory “discharge and dismissal”.

Mr. Maki entered a global plea agreement in Campbell County. The parties contemplated a felony deferral under § 7-13-301 on a conspiracy-to-commit-theft charge, along with jail/probationary terms on related misdemeanors. After the PSI revealed a 1996 misdemeanor DUI deferral that was revoked in 1997 (resulting in entry of the conviction), the district court concluded Mr. Maki could not get “another shot” at § 7-13-301 and imposed a suspended prison sentence instead of the contemplated deferral. The dispositive appellate issue was purely legal: Did § 7-13-301 make Mr. Maki ineligible?

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, holding that the district court misinterpreted § 7-13-301. On the statute’s plain language:

Eligibility under § 7-13-301(a) turns on whether the person has previously been convicted of any felony (subject to listed offense exclusions not applicable here).
The statute’s “one-time” limitation in § 7-13-301(e) restricts only the ability to receive a “discharge and dismissal” under § 7-13-301 (or a similar provision in another jurisdiction)—not the ability to be placed on a deferral that later fails.
Because Mr. Maki had no prior felony conviction and had never received a discharge and dismissal, he remained legally eligible for § 7-13-301 treatment, even though he previously had an unsuccessful deferral.

The Court emphasized an important procedural point: even though Mr. Maki is legally eligible, the district court retains discretion whether to grant a deferral. The case was remanded because the district court denied the deferral on a mistaken belief of legal ineligibility—not as a discretionary sentencing choice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Lynch v. State

The Court cited Lynch v. State, 2026 WY 8 for the governing standard: statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. That framing is consequential here because it prevented any deference to the district court’s “common sense” view that an unsuccessful prior deferral should bar a later one. The Supreme Court treated the question as one of statutory text and legislative choice, not equitable instinct.

In re Birkholz

In re Birkholz, 2019 WY 19 was cited through Lynch to reinforce the same de novo review principle. Its functional role in this opinion is methodological: the eligibility inquiry is a legal question about what the statute says, not a factual assessment or discretionary sentencing judgment.

Alvarado v. State

Alvarado v. State, 2024 WY 9 supplied the Court’s interpretive rules: ascertain legislative intent from the statute’s plain and ordinary meaning; give effect to every word; where language is unambiguous there is no room for construction; and courts will not read omitted words into a statute.

This was the engine of the Court’s holding. The district court effectively added an extra eligibility restriction: “no prior failed deferrals.” Alvarado forecloses that move absent textual support.

Minter v. State

The Court quoted Minter v. State, 2023 WY 35 (via Alvarado) for the principle that omission of words is presumed intentional. That canon becomes decisive when the Court later compares § 7-13-301 to the controlled substances deferral statute (§ 35-7-1037), where the legislature used broader “any offense” language. The contrast supports the inference that § 7-13-301’s narrower “any felony” phrase was deliberate.

Rawson v. State

The State relied heavily on Rawson v. State, 900 P.2d 1136 (Wyo. 1995), particularly its description of § 7-13-301 as “legislative grace” not intended “to be invoked repetitively.” The Supreme Court distinguished Rawson on its facts and its actual holding.

What Rawson decided: whether a defendant could obtain the benefit of Wyoming’s discharge-and-dismissal mechanism when she had already received a similar benefit under a Colorado statute (or failed to prove she qualified as a first offender).
How it influenced Maki: it clarified that § 7-13-301’s “first offender” concept is policed through the statutory criteria—especially the “discharge and dismissal” limitation and felony-conviction status—not through a free-floating anti-repetition principle.

Importantly, the Court also cited Rawson for a separate proposition: even with party consent, the district court retains full discretion whether to grant a deferral. That supported the remand remedy—eligibility does not equal entitlement.

Rosen v. State

Rosen v. State, 2022 WY 16 was cited for reading statutes on the same subject in harmony. The Court used that principle to compare § 7-13-301 with § 35-7-1037, drawing meaning from the legislature’s different word choices in two parallel deferred adjudication schemes.

Frederick v. State

Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27 played two roles:

It clarified that a plea recommendation under W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B) is not binding and does not give the defendant an automatic right to withdraw the plea if the court declines the recommendation.
It confirmed that a sentencing court may reject a deferred-sentence disposition after considering a wide array of factors, i.e., the decision is discretionary even when legally available.

This matters because the Supreme Court did not order that Mr. Maki receive a deferral—only that the district court conduct a new sentencing hearing under the correct legal premise that he is eligible.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning is a textbook application of plain-language statutory interpretation and structural comparison.

1) The statute’s eligibility trigger is “any felony,” not “any prior deferral,” and not “any prior misdemeanor”

Section 7-13-301(a) applies to “a person who has not previously been convicted of any felony” (subject to enumerated offense exclusions). Mr. Maki met that condition. His prior record was extensive, but it was not a prior felony conviction. The district court’s added notion—failure on a prior § 7-13-301 deferral ends eligibility—does not appear in the text.

2) Revocation is not the same as a “discharge and dismissal”

Section 7-13-301(d) provides that successful completion results in “discharge and dismissal,” which “is not a conviction for any purpose.” Section 7-13-301(c) provides that if probation is violated before discharge, the court may enter conviction and sentence (or set the case for trial).

Mr. Maki’s 1996 misdemeanor deferral ended in revocation and entry of conviction; he therefore never received the “discharge and dismissal” benefit. That fact is crucial because § 7-13-301(e) limits the number of “discharge and dismissal” outcomes, not the number of times a court may attempt deferred treatment that fails before discharge.

3) The “one-time” clause targets the benefit, not the attempt

The Court read § 7-13-301(e) as the legislature’s chosen mechanism to prevent repeat use of the ultimate benefit: “a person shall only receive one (1) discharge and dismissal” under § 7-13-301 or similar statutes elsewhere. Because Mr. Maki had never received a discharge and dismissal, granting him § 7-13-301 treatment in this felony case would not violate § 7-13-301(e).

4) Structural confirmation: contrast with the Controlled Substances Act deferral statute

The Court reinforced its reading by comparing § 7-13-301 with Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1037, which expressly limits eligibility to those who have not previously been convicted of “any offense” under drug laws. That is a broader disqualifier than “any felony.”

Applying Alvarado/Minter, the Court inferred that the legislature knew how to write a broad disqualification and deliberately chose not to do so in § 7-13-301. The judiciary therefore cannot expand § 7-13-301’s disqualification beyond its text.

5) Remedy tailored to the error: remand for discretionary resentencing

The record showed the district court denied deferral because it believed it lacked legal authority, not because it made a discretionary judgment that deferral was inappropriate. The Supreme Court therefore reversed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing where the district court may exercise discretion on a correct understanding of eligibility.

Impact

This decision establishes (and clarifies for sentencing practice) a concrete rule about § 7-13-301 eligibility:

A prior § 7-13-301 deferral that ends in revocation (without a “discharge and dismissal”) does not automatically render a defendant legally ineligible for a later § 7-13-301 deferral.
The statutory “repeat-use” limiter in § 7-13-301(e) is keyed to whether the defendant has previously received the benefit of a discharge and dismissal (in Wyoming or a similar out-of-state statute), not whether the defendant has previously been placed on probation under a deferral.
District courts must separate (a) legal eligibility from (b) discretionary suitability. If the court denies deferral, it should be clear whether the denial is discretionary or based on a legal bar.

Practically, defense counsel can use Maki to resist categorical eligibility objections based solely on a prior failed deferral, while the State and sentencing courts may still argue—and decide—that a defendant’s record makes deferral inappropriate as a matter of discretion. The ruling thereby shifts the dispute from “power to grant” to “whether to grant.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

Deferred sentence / deferred proceedings (§ 7-13-301): A statutory mechanism allowing the court to place a defendant on probation without entering a judgment of guilt. If the defendant succeeds, the case ends with a “discharge and dismissal.”
Discharge and dismissal: The statutory reward for successful completion of probation under a deferral. Under § 7-13-301(d), it “is not a conviction for any purpose.” Section 7-13-301(e) limits a person to one such outcome (including similar outcomes from other jurisdictions).
Revocation under a deferral: If the defendant violates probation before discharge, § 7-13-301(c) permits the court to enter conviction and impose sentence (or set for trial). A revocation means the defendant did not obtain the “discharge and dismissal” benefit.
Plain meaning / no reading words into statutes: Courts enforce what the legislature wrote. If the legislature used “any felony,” courts will not expand it to “any offense” or “any prior deferral” unless the statute actually says so.
W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B) plea recommendation: A type of plea agreement where the parties recommend a sentence, but the judge is not bound by it and the defendant typically cannot withdraw the plea just because the judge imposes a different sentence.

Conclusion

2026 WY 32 clarifies that Wyoming’s general deferred sentencing statute, § 7-13-301, does not impose a blanket “one attempt only” rule. A defendant is not rendered legally ineligible merely because a prior deferral was revoked; the decisive statutory limits are (1) prior felony conviction status under § 7-13-301(a) and (2) whether the defendant has already received a “discharge and dismissal” under § 7-13-301(e) (or a similar statute elsewhere). The opinion’s broader significance lies in its insistence on text-based sentencing eligibility determinations and its clear separation of statutory eligibility from discretionary sentencing judgment—an approach likely to shape future plea negotiations and sentencing hearings involving deferred adjudication in Wyoming.