Eleventh Circuit: The Bureau of Prisons ARP Forecloses New Bivens Medical-Care Claims Even When an Estate Cannot Use the Process After Death

1. Introduction

In Carrin v. Smiledge (11th Cir. July 23, 2026), the estate of Raymond Marshall Carrin sued federal prison medical personnel under Bivens seeking damages for alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Carrin, a federal detainee and later sentenced inmate at Federal Detention Center Tallahassee (“FDC Tallahassee”), died from complications of Hepatitis C after never receiving direct-acting antivirals (“DAAs”)—an 8–12 week oral treatment.

The defendants were Shauna Marie Smiledge (Health Services Administrator) and Joseph Jimenez (staff physician), sued in their individual capacities. The estate alleged violations of:

  • Eighth Amendment (as an inmate): deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (Counts I–II).
  • Fifth Amendment (as a pretrial detainee): denial of due process through deliberate indifference to medical needs (Counts III–IV).

The key legal issue was not whether the pleadings described constitutionally deficient care, but whether a Bivens damages remedy is available at all after the Supreme Court’s restrictive framework and the Eleventh Circuit’s intervening decision in Johnson v. Terry, 119 F.4th 840 (11th Cir. 2024).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings dismissing all claims. Applying the modern two-step Bivens framework, the court held:

  1. Both the Fifth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims arose in a new context compared to the three recognized Bivens settings (Bivens, Davis, Carlson).
  2. A “special factor” barred extending Bivens: the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program (“ARP”), an alternative remedial structure. Critically, the ARP’s existence foreclosed a damages remedy even though the estate could not use the ARP after Carrin’s death.

The panel also emphasized that Carrin was in custody for over a year as his condition deteriorated and never filed an ARP grievance, distinguishing the immediacy of the death in Carlson.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

  • Johnson v. Terry, 119 F.4th 840 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 101 (2025)
    This was the decisive circuit precedent. The court treated Johnson as establishing that the ARP is, by itself, a special factor that forecloses recognizing new Bivens claims in the prison medical-care setting. The Carrin panel repeatedly relied on Johnson for two propositions:
    1. Courts look for any relevant difference from prior Bivens contexts; “mostly the same” is insufficient.
    2. An alternative remedial structure need only exist; courts may not weigh its adequacy for the plaintiff.
  • Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
    The foundational case recognizing an implied damages action for a Fourth Amendment violation by federal officers. Here, it supplied only the historical baseline; the court stressed that expansion beyond the three recognized settings is now disfavored.
  • Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)
    Recognized a Fifth Amendment damages remedy in a sex-discrimination employment claim against a Congressman. The court cited Davis as one of the three recognized contexts and used it to frame why Carrin’s Fifth Amendment detainee medical-care theory is not the same context.
  • Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)
    The closest analogue: an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim arising from an inmate’s fatal asthma attack and acute failures in care. The court used Carlson as the comparator but concluded Carrin’s claims were meaningfully different—factually (long-term disease progression; different nature of treatment) and doctrinally (modern alternative-remedies inquiry).
  • Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017)
    Provided the modern posture: expanding Bivens is a “disfavored judicial activity.” Ziglar supplied the “new context” inquiry (meaningful differences) and the separation-of-powers rationale emphasizing Congress’s primacy in creating causes of action.
  • Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022)
    Tightened the special-factors analysis: if there is even a single reason to defer to Congress, courts must not imply a damages remedy; and an alternative remedial structure alone can end the case. The court invoked Egbert to reject arguments based on the ARP’s adequacy or availability to this particular estate.
  • Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942 (2025)
    Quoted for the principle that the alternative remedy need not be equally effective; its existence counsels against Bivens. The panel used Goldey to reinforce that the ARP can foreclose a damages action even if it offers no damages.
  • Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001)
    Cited for the function of the ARP: to bring unconstitutional actions and policies to BOP attention to prevent recurrence—supporting the view that the ARP qualifies as an alternative remedial structure.
  • Perez v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 774 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2014) and Del Castillo v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Health, 26 F.4th 1214 (11th Cir. 2022)
    These governed standards of review and stare decisis constraints (the panel’s obligation to follow Johnson).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Step One: “New Context”

The court applied the Egbert/Ziglar step-one question: are Carrin’s claims “meaningfully different” from Bivens, Davis, or Carlson?

  • Fifth Amendment claims: Concededly new context because Carlson is an Eighth Amendment case and Davis involved an employment discrimination due process claim, not detainee medical care.
  • Eighth Amendment claims: The estate argued they matched Carlson because both alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs leading to death. The panel rejected that level of generality and found meaningful differences:
    • Nature and timeline of harm: Carlson involved acute treatment failures over hours during an asthma attack; Carrin’s case involved a chronic illness progression over more than a year with multiple hospitalizations.
    • Type of treatment decision: Carrin alleged a prolonged failure to administer an approved but logistically complex 12-week DAA regimen requiring uninterrupted completion and monitoring.
    • Remedial-context differences: Post-Egbert, the existence of an alternative remedial structure (the ARP) itself is a “relevant difference,” and because Carlson predated that approach, the court treated modern alternative-remedy analysis as a contextual distinction.

B. Step Two: “Special Factors”

Because the claims arose in a new context, the court asked whether special factors counsel hesitation. The ARP was dispositive.

  • ARP as an alternative remedial structure: Under 28 C.F.R. § 542.10, the ARP provides formal review of issues relating to confinement, including alleged constitutional violations. The court treated this as the type of congressionally authorized executive remedial scheme that ends the Bivens inquiry.
  • Adequacy and plaintiff-specific accessibility deemed irrelevant: The estate argued that because Carrin died, the estate could not use the ARP and thus the ARP should not count. The panel held controlling precedent forbids that inquiry; the only question is whether a remedial process exists “intended to redress the kind of harm.”
  • Time-to-grieve distinction from Carlson: The court added a factual point: unlike the same-day death in Carlson, Carrin’s deterioration spanned over a year, providing time to initiate ARP review (which he did not).

3.3. Impact

  • Further contraction of federal prisoner damages remedies: In the Eleventh Circuit, federal detainees/inmates (and their estates) face an exceptionally steep barrier to obtaining Bivens damages for alleged unconstitutional medical care when the ARP exists.
  • Estate and post-injury posture will rarely matter: The holding signals that inability to use ARP due to death (or other plaintiff-specific circumstances) will not revive Bivens. That is likely to preclude many wrongful-death constitutional damages claims against federal prison medical staff.
  • Incentive to litigate through other vehicles: Plaintiffs will likely redirect toward FTCA claims where available, injunctive relief while incarceration continues (if any), and aggressive ARP utilization to build records—though the opinion underscores those paths are not judicially evaluated for “adequacy” as substitutes for damages.
  • Institutional accountability concerns highlighted by concurrence: Judge Rosenbaum’s concurrence flags a structural risk: if expensive care can be delayed and the ARP cannot award damages, officials could perceive insufficient deterrence. While not altering the holding, it frames future en banc or Supreme Court review and invites legislative attention.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Bivens remedy: A judge-made (implied) right to sue federal officials for money damages for certain constitutional violations. Today it is largely limited to the three Supreme Court contexts: Bivens (Fourth Amendment search/seizure), Davis (Fifth Amendment sex discrimination in employment), and Carlson (Eighth Amendment prison medical care under older doctrine).
  • New context: Even if a claim sounds similar to a prior Bivens case, any “relevant difference” (facts, defendants, mechanisms, risks, remedies) can make it “new,” triggering a presumption against extending damages remedies.
  • Special factors counseling hesitation: Reasons a court should leave the decision to create a damages remedy to Congress (separation of powers). After Egbert, the presence of an alternative remedial structure is often enough by itself.
  • Administrative Remedy Program (ARP): The Bureau of Prisons’ internal grievance process. It may allow review and corrective action but does not function like a damages lawsuit. Under current doctrine, courts focus on its existence, not whether it can compensate the plaintiff.
  • Deliberate indifference: A constitutional standard in prison medical cases requiring more than negligence—roughly, knowing of and disregarding a serious medical risk. Notably, the court did not reach whether the allegations met this standard because the case was resolved on the threshold availability of a Bivens cause of action.

5. Conclusion

Carrin v. Smiledge cements, in the Eleventh Circuit, a stringent rule after Johnson v. Terry: federal prisoner and detainee medical-care claims seeking damages will almost always be treated as impermissible Bivens expansions when the Bureau of Prisons’ ARP exists. The court held that the ARP’s existence is a dispositive special factor even where the plaintiff is an estate unable to access that process after the inmate’s death. The concurrence underscores the practical and moral tension this framework creates—potentially leaving grave constitutional harms without a meaningful damages remedy—while acknowledging that current Supreme Court doctrine compels the result.