Eleventh Circuit Recognizes Claim-by-Claim Supplemental Jurisdiction After Federal Claims Are Dismissed

I. Introduction

In T. Mueller v. Walmart Corporation (11th Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), plaintiff Todd Mueller sued Walmart Corporation and employee Brandon Zachary Burston in federal court, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 alongside multiple Georgia tort claims (including false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault, and battery). After Mueller abandoned his federal civil-rights claims, the district court dismissed them and then took a “split” approach to the remaining state claims: it retained supplemental jurisdiction to grant summary judgment on several tort claims, but declined supplemental jurisdiction over assault and battery.

The appeal raised two central issues:

  1. Whether a district court, after dismissing all claims supplying original federal jurisdiction, may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over some state-law claims while declining jurisdiction over others.
  2. Whether summary judgment was properly granted on Mueller’s Georgia malicious-prosecution claim, specifically on the element of “favorable termination.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held:

  • Supplemental jurisdiction may be exercised on a claim-by-claim basis under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). There is no per se rule requiring an “all or none” approach to remaining state-law claims once federal claims are dismissed.
  • The district court did not abuse its discretion by retaining jurisdiction over false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims while declining jurisdiction over assault and battery.
  • The district court did err in granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution because a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether the shoplifting charge was dropped as part of a compromise or was unilaterally abandoned by the prosecution (relevant to “favorable termination”).

Disposition: affirmed in part (jurisdictional ruling), reversed in part (malicious-prosecution summary judgment), and remanded.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The discretionary character of supplemental jurisdiction

  • United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966): The court invoked Gibbs for the foundational proposition that “pendent” (now “supplemental”) jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion requiring pragmatic balancing rather than mechanical rules. This undergirded the panel’s resistance to Mueller’s proposed per se “no-split” rule.
  • Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988): Cohill supplied the modern balancing factors—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—and the observation that, typically, once federal claims drop out, those factors “usually” favor dismissal of state claims. The panel emphasized that Cohill describes a tendency, not a mandate.
  • City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997): Cited for reaffirming the controlling factors (economy, convenience, fairness, comity) as the proper guideposts in § 1367 decisions.
  • Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Lab'ys, Inc., 803 F.3d 518 (11th Cir. 2015) and Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 55 F.4th 863 (11th Cir. 2022): These anchored the standard of review (abuse of discretion) and reiterated that supplemental jurisdiction is a “doctrine of flexibility.” The court used them to frame the district judge’s wide “range of choices.”
  • Estate of Amergi ex. rel. Amergi v. Palestinian Auth., 611 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2010): Quoted for the definition of abuse of discretion—no “clear error of judgment”—reinforcing deference to case-management decisions, including § 1367 decisions.
  • United States v. McCutcheon, 86 F.3d 187 (11th Cir. 1996) and Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40 (2016): Used to analogize § 1367 discretion to docket-management discretion and to justify pragmatic decision-making aimed at efficient resolution.

2. The claim-by-claim question and sister-circuit consensus

  • Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 1999); Southerland v. Hardaway Mgmt. Co., 41 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 1994); Nielander v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 582 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2009): These were cited as a uniform body of authority allowing district courts to act claim-by-claim when deciding whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit aligned itself with this consensus.
  • Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244 (7th Cir. 1994): Mueller relied on Wright to argue for an all-or-nothing approach with narrow exceptions. The panel rejected that framing, reading Wright as still fundamentally grounded in balancing rather than categorical appellate carveouts.
  • Browning v. Bay Radiology Associates, No. 23-13842, 2024 WL 3200472 (11th Cir. June 27, 2024) (unpublished): Not binding, but noted as consistent with the permissibility of retaining jurisdiction over some claims while sending others away.

3. Royal Canin and the “federal hook” clarification

  • Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22 (2025): Mueller argued that once federal claims are eliminated, federal jurisdiction disappears. The panel distinguished Royal Canin by emphasizing the procedural mechanism: when a plaintiff amends the complaint to drop federal claims, § 1367(a)’s predicate “original jurisdiction” is removed; but when federal claims are dismissed mid-case, § 1367(c)(3) applies and jurisdiction over state claims becomes discretionary, not automatic termination.

4. Georgia tort principles applied in the retained claims

  • Smith v. Walmart Stores E., LP, 765 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014): Provided the “line of demarcation” between (i) urging/instigating prosecution and (ii) merely relaying information to police who then independently decide to act—central to rejecting false arrest/false imprisonment on the district court’s view of the facts.
  • Sheffield v. Futch, 839 S.E.2d 294 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) and McKissick v. S.O.A., Inc., 684 S.E.2d 24 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009): Provided the elements of Georgia malicious prosecution and, in particular, the favorable-termination requirement.
  • Laster v. Star Rental, Inc., 353 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987): Cited for the proposition that favorable termination can be satisfied where the government “voluntarily abandon[s]” the charge.
  • Garner v. Heilig-Meyers Furniture Co., 525 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999): Cited for the counter-rule: termination is not “favorable” when it results from a compromise or agreement.

5. Summary judgment standards and evidentiary treatment

  • Bowen v. Manheim Remarketing, Inc., 882 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2018); Edmondson v. Velvet Lifestyles, LLC, 43 F.4th 1153 (11th Cir. 2022); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): These framed de novo review and the “genuine dispute of material fact” standard that constrained the court from weighing competing inferences about the plea deal and the nolle prosequi.
  • United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc): Used to confirm that even a self-serving affidavit may create a genuine dispute if non-conclusory and Rule 56-compliant—key to Mueller’s declaration asserting the shoplifting dismissal was unilateral rather than bargained-for.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The new rule: § 1367(c) permits claim-by-claim retention or declination

The opinion’s core doctrinal move is textual and structural. The court contrasted:

  • § 1367(a), which speaks in plurals (“all other claims … they form part of the same case or controversy”), and
  • § 1367(c), which authorizes declining jurisdiction over “a claim” under specified circumstances.

From this, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Congress contemplated a situation where multiple state claims fall within supplemental jurisdiction, yet the court may decline jurisdiction over individual claims depending on the circumstances. The panel also reinforced that an all-or-nothing rule would conflict with the “flexibility” repeatedly emphasized in Eleventh Circuit supplemental-jurisdiction decisions.

2. No abuse of discretion in this case’s “split” approach

Applying the economy/convenience/fairness/comity factors, the panel deferred to the district court’s practical assessment: it resolved claims it viewed as legally straightforward on the developed summary-judgment record, while declining those it viewed as credibility- and fact-intensive (assault and battery). The Eleventh Circuit treated this as a quintessential docket management judgment within the permissible “range of choices.”

Notably, the panel rejected the argument that the district court had to provide a more explicit factor-by-factor explanation. It found the rationale sufficiently apparent from the order’s structure and reasoning: some claims were disposed of quickly; others were left to state court due to heavily disputed facts.

3. Malicious prosecution: favorable termination is a jury question on this record

The panel’s reversal on malicious prosecution turned on a narrow but consequential Georgia-law hinge: whether the nolle prosequi on shoplifting was voluntary abandonment (potentially favorable) or part of a compromise bound up with the obstruction plea (not favorable).

The court identified evidence supporting Mueller (his deposition understanding, his sworn declaration that the state was unprepared for trial, and the lack of explicit linkage in plea-hearing documentation) as sufficient to create a genuine dispute, even though Walmart pointed to contrary signals (defense counsel’s plea-hearing remarks treating the charges together and the contemporaneous resolution paperwork). At summary judgment, the court emphasized, it could not weigh which inference was more credible.

C. Impact

1. Federal practice in the Eleventh Circuit: partial retention is expressly validated

The most significant forward-looking effect is institutional: district courts in the Eleventh Circuit now have clear published authority to retain supplemental jurisdiction over some state-law claims while declining others after federal claims drop out. This enables tailored case management—for example:

  • resolving legally clean claims on a mature record while remanding/dismissing fact-heavy claims,
  • avoiding unnecessary state-court duplication where a federal judge can efficiently conclude parts of the dispute, while
  • preserving comity by leaving contested, credibility-driven state tort claims to state courts.

2. Clarification of Royal Canin’s reach

The opinion limits litigants’ ability to invoke Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger as a broad jurisdiction-stripping weapon. The critical distinction is procedural: amendment deleting federal claims versus dismissal/abandonment mid-case. This will influence strategic choices about pleading amendments and removal/remand maneuvering.

3. Georgia malicious-prosecution litigation: plea contexts remain fact-sensitive

The reversal underscores that when multiple charges are disposed of around the same time as a plea, whether a particular charge was dropped as part of a bargain may present a triable factual issue. Defendants will likely respond by developing clearer record evidence of linkage (explicit plea terms, prosecutor statements, written agreements), while plaintiffs will emphasize ambiguity, unilateral prosecutorial reasons, or lack of documentation tying charges together.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367): A federal court’s power to hear state-law claims that are part of the same “case or controversy” as a federal claim.
  • § 1367(c)(3): When “all claims” giving original federal jurisdiction are dismissed, the court may (but need not) decline state claims.
  • Claim-by-claim discretion: The court can keep some state claims and dismiss others, depending on efficiency and comity concerns.
  • Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard—reversal requires more than disagreement; it requires a clear error of judgment outside the permitted range of choices.
  • Nolle prosequi (“nolle pros”): A prosecutor’s formal decision to stop pursuing a charge.
  • “Favorable termination” in malicious prosecution: For a plaintiff to sue for malicious prosecution, the underlying criminal case must end in a way that is favorable to the plaintiff. Under Georgia law, a unilateral abandonment can qualify, but dismissal as part of a compromise generally does not.
  • Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling where the judge decides there is no genuine dispute of material fact for a jury. If reasonable jurors could disagree based on the evidence, summary judgment is improper.

V. Conclusion

T. Mueller v. Walmart Corporation establishes an important Eleventh Circuit clarification of § 1367: after federal claims are dismissed, district courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction selectively—keeping some state-law claims and dismissing others—based on the familiar economy, convenience, fairness, and comity considerations.

At the same time, the opinion demonstrates that even where a court properly retains jurisdiction, it must still respect the boundary between legal sufficiency and factfinding. On the malicious-prosecution claim, the Eleventh Circuit held that ambiguity about whether a charge was dropped as part of a plea bargain or unilaterally abandoned is the kind of dispute that belongs to a jury, not resolution on summary judgment.