Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms § 922(g)(1)’s Constitutionality Post-Bruen/Rahimi and Upholds an Above-Guidelines Sentence Based on Deterrence and Public Protection

I. Introduction

In United States v. Jesse Jay Perez (11th Cir. Sept. 10, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed both the conviction and a 36-month sentence imposed on Jesse Jay Perez for possessing ammunition as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8).

The appeal raised two core issues: (1) whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, and whether it exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority (facially and as applied); and (2) whether the district court’s above-guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Factually, the case involved a traffic-style stop (bicycle equipment violation) leading to arrest on an outstanding felony warrant, after which officers found ammunition, magazines, and other weapons/components described as sufficient to build a “ghost gun” assault rifle.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on all grounds. It held that Perez’s constitutional attacks on § 922(g)(1) were foreclosed by binding circuit precedent, and thus he could not demonstrate reversible error—particularly under plain-error review because he raised the constitutional challenges for the first time on appeal.

On sentencing, the court held the 36-month term was substantively reasonable despite exceeding the advisory guidelines range (15–21 months), emphasizing the district court’s focus on deterrence and public safety given Perez’s repeated firearm-related history and the circumstances of the offense. The panel also noted the sentence was well below the fifteen-year statutory maximum.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standard of review and sentencing framework

  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025): The court relied on Alfonso for the rule that constitutional challenges raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed only for plain error. This choice of standard materially constrained Perez’s ability to obtain relief.
  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): The panel used Gall’s abuse-of-discretion standard and “totality of the circumstances” approach to assess substantive reasonableness, including review of variances above the guidelines range.
  • Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007): The court cited Kimbrough for the “sufficient but not greater than necessary” parsimony principle that governs § 3553(a).

2. Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1)

  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024): Perez invoked these Supreme Court decisions to argue his conduct fell within the Second Amendment’s coverage and that history did not support disarming nonviolent felons. The panel did not re-adjudicate the historical inquiry on the merits because it treated the question as already settled in this circuit by prior precedent.
  • United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010): This was the decisive precedent for the Second Amendment issue. Rozier held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment. The panel treated Rozier as binding and controlling.
  • United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6281 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026): The panel relied on Dubois for the specific proposition that neither Rahimi nor Bruen abrogated Rozier. In effect, Dubois functioned as the “post-Bruen/Rahimi reaffirmation” that closed the door on Perez’s Second Amendment argument at the panel level.

3. Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(1)

  • United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995): Perez relied on Lopez to argue § 922(g)(1) exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, including a facial attack on the statutory text and an as-applied challenge based on lack of substantial effect on interstate commerce. The panel did not accept that Lopez undermined existing Eleventh Circuit interpretations of § 922(g).
  • United States v. Stancil, 4 F.4th 1193 (11th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2001): These cases supplied binding circuit authority that § 922(g) is within Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, foreclosing Perez’s facial argument.
  • United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010), and United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387 (11th Cir. 1996): These cases governed the as-applied analysis through the “minimal nexus” test: the government satisfies the interstate-commerce element by showing the firearm/ammunition was manufactured outside the forum state and therefore necessarily traveled in interstate commerce. The panel emphasized Perez’s guilty-plea admission that the ammunition was manufactured outside Florida.

4. Prior-panel-precedent rule and plain error

  • United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016): The panel invoked White for the Eleventh Circuit’s strict prior-panel-precedent rule: a panel must follow prior binding precedent unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.
  • United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019): Cited to underscore there is no exception to the prior-panel-precedent rule even if a later panel believes an earlier decision was wrongly decided or insufficiently reasoned.
  • United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003): Used to reinforce that, absent Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent directly resolving the issue in the defendant’s favor, there generally can be no “plain error.”

5. Substantive reasonableness and above-guidelines sentences

  • United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): The court relied on Rosales-Bruno to stress that the weight assigned to § 3553(a) factors is committed to the district court’s discretion, including a court’s choice to emphasize deterrence and public protection.
  • United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2013): Cited for approving reliance on deterrence and protection of the public as sufficient justification for variance where supported by the record.
  • United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007): Used to explain that a court’s failure to discuss every piece of mitigating evidence does not mean it ignored it.
  • United States v. Sotelo, 130 F.4th 1229 (11th Cir. 2025): Cited for the common reasonableness indicator that a sentence well below the statutory maximum tends to support substantive reasonableness.
  • United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): The panel used Irey’s formulation of substantive unreasonableness: reversal is appropriate only when left with a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court made a clear error of judgment in weighing § 3553(a).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Constitutional claims: foreclosed at the panel level

The court’s constitutional analysis turned less on first-principles constitutional adjudication and more on institutional constraints: plain-error review plus the prior-panel-precedent rule. On the Second Amendment question, the panel treated United States v. Rozier as dispositive, and treated United States v. Dubois as resolving the “post-Bruen/Rahimi” abrogation argument. On the Commerce Clause question, the panel treated United States v. Stancil and United States v. Scott as foreclosing the facial challenge, and United States v. Wright and United States v. McAllister as foreclosing the as-applied challenge via the “minimal nexus” rule.

Because Perez’s arguments required the panel to depart from binding precedent—and because he also confronted plain-error limitations—the court concluded the challenges necessarily failed.

2. Sentence: deference to the district court’s § 3553(a) weighing

The panel upheld the upward variance as a conventional exercise of § 3553(a) discretion. It credited the district court’s emphasis on specific deterrence (Perez’s repeated gun-related conduct despite prior convictions), general deterrence, and protection of the public (the volume of ammunition and associated weapons/equipment, plus prior possession of body armor and rifles). The court also accepted that, even if the guidelines already accounted for criminal history, the district court could find the advisory range understated the seriousness suggested by the nature and timing of Perez’s repeated conduct.

Finally, the panel treated the gap between the 36-month sentence and the 15-year statutory maximum as an additional marker of reasonableness.

C. Impact

  • Second Amendment litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: Although unpublished, the decision reflects the continuing operative rule that § 922(g)(1) challenges premised on Bruen and Rahimi remain foreclosed by United States v. Rozier as reaffirmed by United States v. Dubois, unless and until an en banc court or the Supreme Court changes the governing law.
  • Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g): The opinion reinforces the circuit’s longstanding “minimal nexus” approach and signals that guilty-plea admissions regarding out-of-state manufacture are typically case-dispositive on the interstate-commerce element.
  • Sentencing practice: The decision underscores that upward variances in felon-in-possession cases (including ammunition-only cases) may be upheld when the district court ties the variance to deterrence and public safety and grounds its rationale in the defendant’s history and the offense circumstances—especially when the sentence remains far below the statutory maximum.
  • Practical appellate consequence: By emphasizing plain-error review and binding precedent, the decision illustrates how raising major constitutional claims only on appeal substantially reduces the likelihood of relief.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Plain error: A demanding appellate standard applied when an argument was not properly raised in the district court. The defendant must show a clear legal mistake that affected substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. If the law is unsettled or binding precedent goes the other way, “plain error” is typically unavailable.
  • Prior panel precedent rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, a three-judge panel must follow earlier binding panel decisions. Only the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc or the Supreme Court can overrule them.
  • Facial vs. as-applied constitutional challenge: A facial challenge claims a law is invalid in all its applications; an as-applied challenge claims the law is unconstitutional in the particular circumstances of the defendant’s case.
  • “Minimal nexus” (Commerce Clause in § 922(g) cases): The government need not prove the defendant’s possession substantially affected interstate commerce in a broad economic sense. It is enough to show the firearm or ammunition previously traveled in interstate commerce—often proven by out-of-state manufacture.
  • Substantive reasonableness: A deferential review of whether the sentence is within the range of reasonable outcomes given the § 3553(a) factors. Disagreement with the district court’s weighting is usually insufficient to reverse absent a clear error of judgment.
  • Guidelines range vs. statutory maximum: The guidelines provide an advisory recommended range; the statutory maximum is the legal ceiling set by Congress. A sentence far below the statutory maximum is often viewed as less suspect on appeal, though it is not automatically reasonable.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Jesse Jay Perez is principally a decision about doctrinal constraint: the Eleventh Circuit applied plain-error review and the prior-panel-precedent rule to reject renewed post-Bruen/Rahimi Second Amendment attacks and to reiterate that § 922(g) remains a valid Commerce Clause exercise under binding circuit law, including the “minimal nexus” approach.

On sentencing, the decision affirms that an above-guidelines term may be sustained where the district court provides a record-based explanation anchored in deterrence and public safety concerns—particularly when the defendant’s history reflects repeated weapons-related conduct and the sentence remains well below the statutory maximum.